INTRODUCTION
Concern with bureaucracy is of long standing in modern sociological literature. It can be traced on the one hand to Ferguson’s theories of Oriental Despotism, which stressed the special character of officialsdom as an instrument of oppression in Oriental states. On the other hand, this concern can be found in the writings of Marx and Tocqueville, both of whom discerned the trend towards “bureaucratization”, towards growing regimentation of social life in the modern world, and tried to interpret it according to their major analyses of the trends in the development of modern society. It has been rightly stressed by Lipset and Bendix¹ that the works of these authors already feature a strong preoccupation with growing bureaucratization as part and parcel of their general analysis of modern society and of its political structure and development.

In all these writings, however, the discussion of the bureaucracy was embedded in, and constituted only a part of, analyses which were focused mainly on other problems. It was only with Max Weber, R. Michels and G. Mosca that the structure of the bureaucracy and processes of bureaucratization became a focus of independent major analysis. True, both Weber and Michels built on foundations which were laid, to some extent, by others (Stein, Schmoller and other German historians, as well as Ostrogorsky in his analysis of modern parties). But Weber, Michels and Mosca brought the problems of bureaucracy into the limelight, and presented them as one of the major foci of modern sociology and of the analysis of modern society. In their works, analysis of the bureaucracy and of bureaucratization processes became closely interwoven on the one hand with the examination of problems of power, its control and legitimation, in modern society, and on the other, with the analysis of processes of rationalization, in terms of growing efficiency and specialization, in it. It has been rightly said that “roughly, for Max Weber bureaucracy plays the same part that the class struggle played for Marx and competition for Sombart”.²

Mosca was the first to treat the bureaucratic state as a distinct type of political system and organization of the ruling class. He contrasted it with the feudal régime (and to some extent with city-states) and attempted to analyse what may be called its internal dialectics of stability and disorganization.

Bureaucracy and bureaucratization have been taken up in different directions in the works of political scientists like Friedrich and Finer, and, in the last attempt at a major “total” sociological interpretation of modern society, in the work of Karl Mannheim. In their writings, these problems are thrown into sharp relief as major trends in the development of modern society. Here, bureaucracy and bureaucratization are related to and closely interwoven with problems of democracy, totalitarianism and mass-society. Aside from and contemporaneously with these major interpretations there appeared a host of more specialized studies, representing several major trends in scientific enquiry, which touched on and expressed various viewpoints regarding different aspects of the problems of bureaucracy. Although many of these

studies dealt only with special and partial aspects, they contributed much towards
the systematic analysis of the bureaucratic system. The analyses of isolated aspects
of this problem in the course of time converged and the major themes that were
presented in the works of the “classics” were gradually investigated by systematic
researches and their interrelations systematically explored.

Let us first summarize those aspects of the bureaucracy which constituted topics
for analysis in the sociological “classics”, and then turn to a brief survey of the major
trends in specialized research in this field.

THE BASIC DILEMMA OF BUREAUCRACY

Almost all the classical works dealing with bureaucracy are preoccupied with one
basic dilemma—namely, whether the bureaucracy is master or servant, an independent
body or a tool—and if a tool, whose interests it can be made to serve. This dilemma
is posed in different ways. Max Weber considers the bureaucracy to be the epitome
of rationality and efficiency, the most rational means of implementing a given goal.
From his standpoint it follows that the bureaucracy is directed by those who can set
the goals, although he did not systematically examine the problem of the relation
of the bureaucracy’s structure to the nature of the polity’s goals. On the other hand,
however, he frequently alludes to and analyses the bureaucracy as a powerful,
independent body which advances and conquers new areas of life in modern society,
monopolizes power, and tends to rule over and regulate the life of the individual.
It is this second standpoint that underlies Weber’s critique of socialism—and his
partial resignation to its inevitability—in some countries, at least.

Concentration of power in the hands of the bureaucracy, the growing bureaucrati-
zation of different social organizations, and the diminishing voluntary participation
in such organizations constituted, as is well known, the main focus of the work of
Robert Michels. Perhaps his main contribution was to pose the problem of the dis-
placement of goals by the bureaucracy, and to analyse the internal and external con-
ditions responsible for such displacement. Although Michels was concerned chiefly
with problems of internal usurpation of power by bureaucrats or oligarchs (and it is
significant in itself that he rarely distinguishes between the two) yet in the course of
his analysis he also specifies some of the external conditions under which this can
take place—such as the concentration of communication with the outer world, and
of access to various facilities in the hands of the élite. Moreover, he poses, at least
implicitly, the problems of the relation between bureaucratization as a political
process and bureaucratic organization as a technical arrangement for the implement-
tion of certain goals and provision of services. Although he does not state this in
so many words, he proceeds on the important hypothesis that the two are inversely
related and that growing bureaucratization, or usurpation of power by the bureau-
crats, is accompanied by a process of displacement of goals by the bureaucracy and
its growing disregard of its initial purpose and raison d’être—implementation of some
goals of the polity.

An ambivalent attitude towards the bureaucracy characterizes much of the social
thought of the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the
twentieth, and is especially prominent in liberal-socialist polemics. It is significant
that no side—neither the liberals, the conservatives, nor the socialists—took an un-
equivocal and clear stand in relation to the bureaucracy. The liberals and the con-
servatives often strongly objected to the bureaucracy and depicted it as a colossus
which would engulf the various areas of life and cancel the traditional liberties of the
people, and which would engender a mechanized and oppressive civilization choking
the individual and regimenting his every activity. While this view in its extreme form,
as expressed for instance by L. v. Mises, is no longer taken seriously, the problem itself remains and looms large in contemporary social thought. On the other hand, however, many liberals and conservatives stressed the importance of the bureaucracy as a means of implementing social reforms, and upheld the ideal of a neutral civil service. While many of the naive assumptions about the clear, unadulterated benefits that would accrue from social reforms implemented by bureaucracy are long forgotten, the main problem remains, accentuated by the growing awareness of the problem of power. As Kaufman has stressed rightly in a recent review article: “The whole analysis of public administration has shifted, ... from seeing administration as the best way of implementation of social goals, to problems of public control of bureaucratized administration”.

An ambivalent attitude towards bureaucracy is also featured by the socialist and the communist camps. On the one hand there is the realization of its importance as a means of implementing social goals and reforms—on the other, there is the suspicion of it as a tool in the hands of the capitalist ruling classes. From a different vantage point the socialists have often depicted bureaucracy as a mere appendage of capitalist society and oppression which will become obsolete and unnecessary under socialism and its rational “management of things”, not of men. Paradoxically enough, the tables have recently been turned on the socialists, and especially on the communists, by the liberal or social-democratic camp, with the growing realization that bureaucracy may easily become a tool of oppression, especially under conditions of great concentration of power—the very fear expressed by socialists regarding capitalistic bureaucracy. This camp has come to realize that one of the major problems facing modern régimes is the effective political and democratic control of the bureaucracy on the one hand, and the planning for possible de-bureaucratization in different spheres of life on the other.

This ambivalent attitude towards bureaucracy is also manifest in the views regarding what may be called the professional aspect of bureaucratic behaviour and attitudes, an aspect of professional detachment, of conformity with rules and of dealing with various problems and people sine ira et studio, efficiently, preserving secrecy, etc. On the one hand, the bureaucracy’s professional, detached attitude is frequently upheld as one of its main virtues. On the other hand, it has often been shown that such an attitude may have several “unanticipated” negative consequences. Thus it may either give the bureaucrat almost unlimited and uncontrollable power both over his clients and his non-bureaucratic superiors (such as political lay leaders, etc.), or make him into a subservient tool of any master who may arise. These two seemingly contradictory possibilities have, in practice, at times developed side by side in one and the same organization, as shown by the example of German officialdom under the Weimar Republic.

One of the most debated set of questions concerning bureaucracy, and representative of its problematic nature, centred on the political neutrality of the civil service. The main concrete problem was whether the civil service, the highest echelons of which were usually recruited from the upper and upper-middle strata, would be willing to implement radical (socialist-political) reforms, envisaged by a labour or socialist government. Large portions of the polemical literature, which was characterized by a Marxist or semi-Marxist bias, came to be based on the assumption that the civil service would always be class-bound in its orientations, would never be willing to implement social change and would sabotage any large-scale political and social programmes. Immediately after the Second World War, with the rise of

the Labour government to power in Britain, the political orientations of the bureaucracy constituted an acute problem, the Canadian aspect of which was taken up by Lipset. The British case seemed to substantiate Finer’s view (against Kingsley’s) of the political neutrality of the civil service and of its loyalty to democratically-elected political leadership.

Obviously the conditions determining the effects of bureaucracy’s political neutrality vary in different countries, and one of the main problems facing the comparative study of bureaucratic organization is to elucidate these situations. However, the complexity and severity of the problem of the consequences of the civil service’s total political neutrality was emphasized owing to the course of events in Germany. True, it has been shown that some branches of the German Beamtentum attempted to sabotage many of the Weimar reforms and never did become fully loyal to the Weimar Republic. But at the same time their political passivity and non-participation made them an easy tool in the hands of the Nazis and their very neutrality and (official or unofficial) willingness to accept political masters of any kind (even if they did not serve them with good heart) facilitated the rise of the Nazi régime.

The major issue implicit in this discussion was to what extent it would be justifiable for the civil service to use the potential power at its disposal for the support of any régime. The very complexity of this problem indicates the absence of a simple answer to the grave question regarding the desirability of passive instrumentality on the part of the bureaucracy in any political situation.

Whatever the concrete problems investigated within this context and the various attitudes towards the bureaucracy, most of them evince this basic ambivalence. The source of all these ambivalent attitudes towards the bureaucracy is twofold. First, it lies in recognition of a basic paradoxical aspect of the structure and organization of bureaucracy. This paradox is rooted in the fact that a bureaucracy (any bureaucracy—whether governmental, economic, military, or social) in order efficiently to perform its functions as an instrument of implementation of goals or provision of services, must necessarily develop some autonomy. Its members must have some professional orientations and standards and be immune to various inside and outside pressures. It must have and uphold a set of internal rules and there must be some spheres of activity which are left to its discretion. Moreover, by the very nature of its activities, a bureaucracy fulfils some mediating and regulative functions with respect to different groups and, as a result, is put in a certain power position in relation to these groups. Thus the tension between bureaucracy as a tool on the one hand and as an independent body or master on the other, is inherent in its very genesis and nature. Second, this ambivalence is rooted in the fact that whatever its genesis, every bureaucracy, in virtue of the services it performs, the areas it regulates, the interests between which it mediates, and its own structure and organization, develops into a centre of power which may become independent and unregulated. Consequently there arise problems of the relations of this centre of power to other centres of power in society and especially to those in which the legitimate power of a society is vested, problems concerning: (a) the relations between the bureaucracy and its masters (political leaders, owners of industrial enterprises, bodies of trustees, etc.) with regard to the extent to which the former will accept the general direction of the latter or whether it will generate independent power and policy-making; (b) the relation of the bureaucracy to its clientele, the degree to which it accepts their legitimate demands and attempts to provide them with the services due to them or conversely, the extent to which it attempts to dominate and regulate them; and (c) (cutting across the former) the extent of what
may be called legitimate exercise of power by the bureaucracy in terms of mediation between different groups and interests in society.

The relations between any bureaucracy and the other centres of political power in a society pose a basic dilemma of how to establish effective control over the bureaucracy and at the same time not to restrict its autonomy to the point of making it impotent, formalistic, and inefficient.

Thus, in more general terms it may be said that the main problem facing the study of bureaucracy is the relation between the bureaucracy and bureaucratization, between the development of organizations aiming at implementing various goals and providing services and accordingly fulfilling various important functions on the one hand, and the growing acquisition of unregulated power by these organizations, their increasing regimentation and domination of vast areas of social life and their use of such power for their own benefits and goals on the other. In short, between the acquisition of power necessary for fulfilment of what are seen as the society's and the bureaucracy's legitimate functions on the one hand and usurpation of such power, displacement of goals, and growing bureaucratization on the other.

Thus it can be seen that the study of bureaucracy cannot be confined to an analysis of the internal structure of various organizations. Even the earliest attempts at such an analysis referred to the relations between the organization and its wider social setting. It was only through reference to wider problems that the study of bureaucracy came to focus on the major themes discussed above, and to be undertaken by systematic research.

The concrete queries and answers necessarily varied from period to period, according to specific historical circumstances, but the above-listed major themes have been continuously in the foreground of the discussions and analyses of bureaucracy.

APPROACHES TO THE EMPIRICAL STUDY OF BUREAUCRACY

The study of bureaucracy has not been concerned only with these major themes and, in the course of time, due to varying social and historical circumstances, it was undertaken by several trends of research dealing with specific problems which they investigated in their own way. The predominant concern of many of these trends was not necessarily with the above-mentioned central themes and many other foci and avenues of research have developed. However, these independent investigations have a bearing upon, and gradually converge with, the central problems dealt with. Let us, then, analyse the development of these currents, and their contribution to the study of bureaucracy.

A.—Max Weber: ideal Type and Reality

The systematic study of bureaucracy can be traced to the work of Max Weber which focused mainly on: (a) the evolution of what has been called the "ideal type" of bureaucracy; (b) the conditions of the development of bureaucratic organization in historical and modern societies; and (c) problems of the "formation" of different bureaucratic role-types.

According to Weber the ideal type of bureaucracy is characterized by the following attributes:

1. The regular activities requisite for the fulfilment of the organization's functions are distributed in a fixed way as official duties.


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2. The organization of offices follows the principle of hierarchy; that is, each lower office is under the control and supervision of a higher one.

3. Operations are governed "by a consistent system of abstract rules ... [and] consist of the application of these rules to particular cases".

4. The ideal official conducts his office ... in a spirit of formalistic impersonality—sine ira et studio, without hatred or enthusiasm.

5. The bureaucratic organization is based on technical qualifications and the employee is protected against arbitrary dismissal. "It constitutes a career. There is a system of 'promotion' according to seniority or to achievement, or both."

6. "Experience tends universally to show that the purely bureaucratic type of administrative organization ... is, from a purely technical point of view, capable of attaining the highest degree of efficiency."

Thus it can be said that the ideal type represents the bureaucratic organization and rôle as constructed according to criteria of universality, achievement, and specificity. As the main conditions under which the bureaucracy evolves Weber emphasized the development of a money economy, political centralization, and extensive technical knowledge.

Since Weber's time, many studies of different types of bureaucratic organization, both historical and concrete (for example, factories, hospitals, governmental agencies, etc.), have been published. Although not all of these studies were directly derived from Weber's work, most of them were conducted within the framework erected by him. Many of them implicitly or explicitly amplified and modified some of his main conclusions or premises and made important contributions to the study of bureaucracy. The major works worthy of note include those of the political scientists C. Friedrich and Finer; the historians Hintze, Diehl, Bréhier, Kracke; and the sociologists Gouldner, Blau, and Janowitz. (Some of the historical works were also greatly influenced by Mosca.)

In his Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy Gouldner pointed out how bureaucratic rules may evolve from the power-aspirations of the chiefs or supervisors of the bureaucracy, and how, in such cases, these rules tend towards a "punishment orientation". In addition, he emphasized the importance of "succession" as a condition of growing bureaucratization. In general many of these studies recognize the importance of "non-rational" factors (such as power orientations, primary groups and personal relations) in the constitution of a bureaucracy, and the possibility that under certain circumstances these factors may be functional from the point of view of the efficiency and morale of the "ideal type" of bureaucracy.

Weber's work is justly considered as the major starting-point of the sociological approach to bureaucracy. While the other streams of research in this field which will now be considered have made many contributions in their own right and have opened many new vistas, their contributions may at the same time be considered extensions, modifications, and amplifications of Weber's "ideal type".

B.—Investigations of the Conditions of Bureaucratization

The second stream of research, which derived largely from Michels (and to some extent from Mosca), was concerned with the process of oligarchization and bureaucratization. The works of Selznick (on the T.V.A. and other general matters), Bendix (on problems of bureaucracy and power), Lipset and associates (about the political process in trade-unions), Finer (on the Civil Service), and Janowitz (on the military and on relations between the administration and the public), attempted to analyse the conditions under which bureaucracy usurps power and displaces its
goals, or conversely, the conditions under which it can be an efficient means of implementing social policy. These studies provided illustrations of the "iron law of oligarchy" and at the same time showed that there are situations in which oligarchization and bureaucratization do not develop. Some of these studies already hinted at processes of de-bureaucratization; that is, minimization or reduction of the bureaucratic rôle and the organization's impersonality and maximization of member participation, as a result of the impact of non-bureaucratic rôles and groups.

C.—The Study of Public Administration and Bureaucratic Efficiency

An entirely different stream of research, which bears on some central problems of bureaucracy, is concerned with general and public administration. This stream, the development of which differed on the Continent, in England, and the U.S.A., had empirical and pragmatic roots. It grew out of concern with the growth of public and private administrative agencies and aimed at discovering methods of analysing these institutions and organizations, in order to measure their efficiency and find ways of improving their smooth functioning.

The analysis of administrative problems was undertaken in several ways. One comprised manifold descriptive studies of the organization of different departments and firms. Another, often in conjunction with the former, consisted of abstract analyses of the "principles" of administration, the best ways of efficient and rational division of administrative agencies and labour, and performance of administrative tasks.

At this point it would be worth while to refer to Waldo, who recently pointed out that several major models have been used in the analysis of administration. One was the "machine model" employing many mechanical metaphors and emphasizing the efficiency problem; another was the "business model" with emphasis on profit; a third, "the organic model", stressed harmony with and integration into the environment; the last was the "pure system" model emphasizing the nature of any organization as a system with special systemic needs.1

These studies provide a wealth of concrete data, even if not always fully systematized and organized. Moreover, they bring into relief several basic aspects of organization and administration, even though they include some abstract principles divorced from reality and of little help to the understanding of the ways in which the organization functions.

Aside from concrete data, perhaps the major potential contributions of these studies to the sociology of the bureaucracy include:

(a) coming to grips with the problems of the internal structure of bureaucratic organizations;
(b) recognition of the fact that the parts of these organizations constitute parts of an overall system which may contribute to its functioning even when deviating from its formal pattern;
(c) elucidation of the relations of these organizations with their environment; and
(d) recognition of the importance of the non-bureaucratic ("primary" personal, etc.) elements in the constitution of a bureaucracy and their functional contribution to its working.

D.—Bureaucracy and Theory of Organization

From within the study of public administration, but also in relation to other approaches, there developed a more independent and specialized body of research,

1 D. Waldo, Perspectives on Administration (University of Alabama Press, 1956), pp. 26–80.
which may be called the organization theory. The main starting-point of this approach was concern with efficiency and the laws of organizational structure and behaviour. Although it was concerned with general problems of organization and not only with those of bureaucratic structures, yet most of its research was centred on the latter. This approach aimed at discovering and formulating the laws which determine the patterns of behaviour within organizations, the internal structure of the organizations, and the contributions of each type of behaviour and internal structure to the efficient functioning of the organization. It was concerned with conditions which make for maximum rational behaviour, calculation, and performance within a given structural organizational setting or, conversely, the extent to which various structural and organizational factors limit rational calculation and efficiency. This approach, best exemplified by the work of Chester Barnard, on the one hand, and of H. Simon and his associates on the other, derives from the following sources: (a) the classical economic theory, with its emphasis on "rational choice" and those developments in economic theory, such as the theory of oligopoly, of imperfect competition, which have worked out different models for the estimate of limitation of such rational behaviour; (b) the long tradition of small group and primary group research in sociology and social psychology, which has shown that elements of social attachments, of informal group norms, motivate conception of goals and performance no less, if not more, than rational calculations of profit; (c) the modern communication theories; and (d) those sociological approaches which stressed the internal strains within a bureaucratic organization, its possible internal blocks of communication and displacement of goals.

The theory of organization contributed to the study of the bureaucracy by undertaking a systematic analysis of the internal structure of organization, of its internal subdivision, and of the nature and function of different roles within it on the one hand, and by emphasizing the possibility that the organization in its different parts will harbour different goal conceptions which will influence the rationality of its functioning on the other. Among the various works representative of the "organization theory", Barnard's stresses the strategic function of the executive bureaucratic role, Simon's Administrative Behaviour is the first attempt at synthesis of the various sources, and Simon and associates' Public Administration endeavours to fuse this approach with the more "traditional" one of public administration.

E.—Recent Sociological Studies of Bureaucracy

This last approach has gradually become closely connected with several recent major sociological approaches to the analysis of bureaucracy, represented by the work of R. K. Merton and of his students, P. Blau and A. Gouldner, and, more recently, by some papers of T. Parsons. As is well known, Merton was concerned primarily with the nature of the bureaucratic role and with the internal strains and contradictions in the bureaucratic organization engendering developments in the rôle-structure which obstruct the rational pursuit of bureaucratic goals. He showed how the very attributes essential to the bureaucratic rôle may, under certain conditions, give rise to dysfunctional pathological features. His work generated a series of more detailed studies of the factors responsible for the occurrence of pathologies of bureaucracy on the one hand and of patterns of different bureaucratic rôles in different settings and organization on the other. Later, there developed more systematic approaches to the analysis of the internal and external settings and processes of bureaucratization. The Reader in Bureaucracy, edited by Merton and his collaborators, is characteristic of this phase. Under the headings: Theoretical Conceptions, Bases for the Growth of Bureaucracy, Bureaucracy and Power Relations,
Recruitment and Advancement, The Bureaucrat, Social Pathologies of Bureaucracy, Field Methods for the Study of Bureaucracy, they compiled materials from the various disciplines outlined above and emphasized their gradual convergence. However, there remained many areas (for example, the process of social association)—which could not as yet be dealt with systematically. In addition there appeared many concrete studies of different types of bureaucratic organization showing the existence of many significant differences between different structures and organizations according to their goals, position within the community, basic orientations and directions. It has been shown that the type of structure also influences the internal organization and patterns of behaviour of the officials and bureaucrats and moulds the conceptions of the bureaucratic rôles.

Lately, T. Parsons has attempted, in a series of papers [135, 136], to provide a systematic analysis of the organization as a social system and to define the main principles underlying its internal division of labour and the articulation of its relations with its social and economic environment. According to him, a (bureaucratic) organization is defined as a social system oriented to the implementation of a relatively specific type of goal, which contributes to a major function of a more comprehensive system, usually the society. Such an organization is analysed in terms of an institutionalized value system, which defines and legitimizes its goal, and of the mechanisms by which it is connected with the rest of the society in which it operates. The following are the three primary areas wherein the organization is connected with its environment: (1) procurement of the necessary resources, financing, personal services, and "organization" in the economic sense; (2) the major types of tensions and decisions which are classified as policy decisions, allocative decisions, and co-ordinating decisions; and (3) the institutional structure which integrates the organization with others, centring on contract authority, and the institutionalization of universalistic rules.

Parsons also outlines a classification of organizational types, based on the primacy of different organizational goals, and illustrates its utility by analysing variations in the business firm, the military organization, and the university in modern society. Janowitz's work should also be mentioned in this context.

F.—Historical and Comparative Studies of the Bureaucracy

In addition to all these trends, we should also mention the appearance of numerous historical studies dealing with the development of different types of bureaucratic organization and their relations to the social and power systems that prevail in their societies. While many of these studies are purely descriptive or historical in the narrower sense of the word, others, such as those of China by Kracke, and of Prussia by Dorwart and Rosenberg, offer a more problematic or analytical approach which derives largely from Weber and Hintze. Even the more descriptive treatises provide useful materials and data for comparative studies.

Side by side with such historical works there appeared many studies of the evolution of contemporary bureaucracies, in the governmental, public, and private sectors, dealing with the development and internal structure of public services and governmental services and corporations, as well as with the manifold legal problems and problems of control that they engender.

There also exist several analyses of the administration and bureaucracy in various non-Western, especially Asian and African, societies. The ancient administrative systems of these societies and the development and problems of colonial administration aroused the interest of historians and administrators. Perhaps Furnivall's work
is the most outstanding in this field and may constitute a starting-point for many interesting and valuable studies.

The proliferation of various “technical assistance” programmes, of attempts to instigate economic development and progress in many Asian and African societies, has drawn attention to problems of administration and administrative implementation of various political and economic goals. Side by side with the “discovery” that administrative practices and organizations constitute an important factor affecting economic development and technical performance, it was also “discovered” that it is impossible to transplant administrative techniques and organizations from one cultural setting to another. The various reports of the International Bank are very suggestive from this point of view. Experience has shown that administrative performance and administration are closely linked with their broader cultural setting, which therefore must be taken into full account in the planning of administrative progress. This problem of the nature of the relationship between administration and organization and the wider social and political setting has come into the limelight. The establishment of new independent states with new power centres, as well as mounting governmental regulation in recent years, also draw attention to the problem of bureaucratization.

In the comparative and historical studies we once again encounter the problem of the relation between bureaucracy and bureaucratization. Of the attempts at a more general, historical approach to this problem, the most notable, even if not necessarily valid, is Wittfogel’s recent Oriental Despotism.

The various approaches enumerated above constitute autonomous, and to some extent, self-contained fields of research and lines of enquiry. Each deals with many problems which are not of direct concern for the study of bureaucracy. The relation between the various lines of enquiry, even when they deal with problems of bureaucracy, are often haphazard and far-fetched. Not all the approaches oriented themselves to the same basic problems and concepts and they are not easily compared. This diversity, while making for a multiplicity and wealth of viewpoints and materials, at the same time involves mere multiplication of sterile data.

But of late we can discern a growing convergence of the different fields and approaches, at least in so far as they deal with problems of bureaucracy as is manifest, for instance, in the recent appearance of the Administrative Science Quarterly or in such publications as D. Siffin’s (ed.) Toward the Comparative Study of Public Administration. This convergence does not necessarily obliterate the distinctiveness of each field or approach but it does tend to orient them more and more to common problems.

INTRODUCTION

Due to the convergence of the various trends of enquiry, it is now possible to delineate the paramount common problems, evaluate the present state of the study of bureaucracy, and indicate the main potential lines of enquiry.

The focal point of our analysis will be the problem outlined above of the relation between bureaucracy and bureaucratization. Thanks to the literature produced by the different approaches, and to various theoretical insights, we are able to pose this problem in a more systematic way, to relate it to the various concrete researches and case-studies, and to indicate the various possible approaches to it. In other words, we shall propose a systematic method of examining the bureaucracy-bureaucratization
relation and show how it can be related to the study of the internal structure of bureaucratic organization, to the nature of the bureaucratic rôle, and to the efficiency and rationality of bureaucratic performance.

The specific problems upon which our systematic analysis of bureaucracy and processes of bureaucratization will focus are as follows:

(a) The conditions responsible for the development of any given bureaucratic organization; and for the type of relation between the bureaucratic organization and its social environment in terms of: (1) the need for, and mobilization of, manpower and resources; (2) the need to maintain its legitimation; (3) the sources of potential power over parts of its social environment at the disposal of the organization; and (4) the main processes of power and communication generated by it.

(b) The basic components of the bureaucratic organization's internal structure, the way in which they necessitate the establishment and maintenance of different systematic relations with the organization's environment, and the nature of the power processes which are generated by these relations.

(c) The main variables (such as types of goal, relations to centres of power, etc.) which determine the way the internal structure of different bureaucracies and their interrelation with their environment vary.

(d) (Which may be seen as a specification of c) the main types of "public" control over different bureaucracies, and the conditions under which it is effective, or, conversely, usurped by the bureaucracy.

(e) The factors conducive (or detrimental) to the effectiveness of the performance of a given organization's tasks, the influence of different types of bureaucratic performance on the division of labour within the organization and on its external relations.

(f) The types of bureaucratic rôle and their relations both with the bureaucratic organization and with wider social contexts in terms of: (1) the main components of these rôles (for example, specialization, detachment, professional education, universal and achievement orientations, tendency towards domination); (2) the conditions under which one or several of these components become predominant within any given rôle or organization; and (3) the relation of these developments to pressures of bureaucratization or de-bureaucratization.

(g) The conditions which give rise to processes of bureaucratization or de-bureaucratization or maintenance of a service orientation by the bureaucracy, and the relation between these conditions and the problems and variables discussed under the preceding headings.

These are the main systematic problems confronting the contemporary field of the study of bureaucracy. They may be dealt with by referring to the existing materials or they may also serve as starting-points of research. These problems are given to both microscopic and macroscopic analyses. They can be subjected first to analyses proceeding from a given bureaucratic organization (be it a factory, a governmental bureau, a hospital, or a political party) and investigating its relations with its immediate environment; and second, to analyses proceeding from the general structure of the society and the major processes which take place within it, and examining their influence on the development of bureaucratic organizations and the processes of bureaucratization.

Let us now survey each or most of these problem areas, delineate the main concrete problems in each, summarize and illustrate some of the main existing findings, and suggest directions for further research.
CONDITIONS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF BUREAUCracIES AND BUREAUCRATIZATION

Strangely enough, there are relatively few systematic studies of the conditions responsible for the development of bureaucratic organizations and processes of bureaucratization which could serve as a basis for a systematic comparative analysis. Our analysis of these conditions will draw upon the abundant materials provided by the numerous concrete historical analyses of the development and functioning of different bureaucratic organizations. On the basis of these materials and of ongoing research it is possible to propose some general hypotheses which apply to both modern (European) and historical (such as Chinese, Byzantine, and Egyptian) bureaucratic societies, and which attempt to specify the conditions under which bureaucratic organizations tend to develop.

We find that bureaucratic organizations tend to develop in those societies or institutional sectors thereof in which:

(a) There develops a great degree of differentiation between different roles and institutional (economic, political, religious, etc.) spheres.

(b) The crucial roles in the society are allocated not according to criteria of membership in the primary, particularistic (kinship and territorial) groups, but rather according to universal criteria or criteria of membership in more flexible groups.

(c) There evolve many functionally specific (economic, cultural, religious, social-integrative) groups which are not embedded in territorial and kinship groups.

(d) The definition of the total community is not identical with, and consequently is “wider” than any such particularistic group.

(e) There develops growing complexity of different spheres of social life.

(f) The value system of the society evolves wide group orientations and contains some universalistic elements.

(g) The major groups and strata in the society develop, uphold, and attempt to implement numerous political, economic, and/or social service goals which cannot be implemented within the limited framework of given ascriptive, kinship, and territorial groups. The implementation of these goals requires large-scale co-ordination of specialized and expert activities.

(h) There exists a strong competition between different groups about the order of priority of different goals and for resources needed for the implementation of these goals.

These developments result in some extent of “free-floating” resources, that is, manpower and economic resources, as well as commitments for political support which are neither embedded in nor assured to any primary ascriptive-particularistic groups. Consequently, the various groups and institutional spheres in the society have to compete for resources, manpower, and support, and the major social spheres are faced with many regulative and administrative problems.

It is our basic hypothesis that bureaucratic organizations develop in connection with differentiation in the social system and the problems which it creates. Bureaucratic organizations (although not only these) perform important functions in the implementation of different goals, the provision of resources, and the regulation of various intergroup relations and conflicts. It is these conditions that give rise to the development of the main formal characteristics of bureaucracy, and especially of “(1) the rational orientation towards goal orientation; (2) the hierarchical arrange-
ment of rôles; (3) the functional relationship of goals; and (4) a body of explicit rules
directing action associated with rôles".1

Those hypotheses are, in general, based on an analysis of the evolution of historical-
bureaucratic societies from primitive, patrimonial, and feudal systems on the one hand,
and on an examination of the development of bureaucratic organization in different
sectors of modern societies on the other. Their purpose is to explain both the genesis
of bureaucratic organizations in given social settings and the variations in the rate
of their development and in the scope of their activities in different societies.

These hypotheses obviously need to be amplified through application to various
societies and different institutional spheres thereof. But even at this stage of our
analysis, they are of interest from the point of view of our concern with the articula-
tion of the relation between the internal structure and external environment of the
bureaucracy.

These hypotheses indicate that: (a) the development of bureaucratic organizations
is related to certain conditions and to the social environment created by them. The
most important characteristics of the environment conducive to the development
of bureaucracies are first, the availability of various “free-floating” resources, and
second, the development of several centres of power which compete over such
resources; (b) as a result of the very conditions which gave birth to it, any bureau-
cratic organization by definition is obliged to compete for resources, man-power,
general support, and clientele.

The classical theories of bureaucracy rightly recognized that the bureaucracy is
always dependent on the outside world for its resources. Unlike traditional ecological,
family, or kinship groups, it is not and cannot be self-sufficient and, characteristically,
the incumbents of its offices do not get direct remuneration from their clients nor
do they own their “means of production”. But because many of these theories
referred chiefly to governmental bureaucracies, they took the supply of the requisite
resources for granted and only emphasized the fact that dependence on external
resources assures the relative segregation and independence of the bureaucrat’s rôle.
In reality, however, the need to compete for legitimation and resources faces govern-
mental departments as well and can be considered an aspect of every bureaucracy.

Thus from the very beginning, a bureaucratic organization is put in what may be
called a power situation in relation to its environment and has to generate processes of
power on its own behalf.

The tendency towards bureaucratization, towards excessive domination by the
bureaucracy of parts of its environment, is therefore inherent in the very position
from which any bureaucracy develops, although the extent of its realization varies
from case to case and constitutes one of the main foci of comparative research.2

(c) The tendency towards bureaucratization is also closely related to the bureau-
cracy’s mediatory-regulative functions. While at first glance it would appear that
the main functions and raison d’être of the bureaucracy are to assure implementation
of the polity’s goals and to provide services, these functions entail additional ones.
For through goal implementation and provision of services, the bureaucracy comes in
contact with its environment of differentiated social groups competing over available
resources. If, on the one hand, the bureaucracy depends on its environment for external
resources, on the other, various social groups come to depend on the bureaucratic

1 After Slesinger [93], p. 5.
2 In the existing literature there has been but little distinction between conditions which make for
the growth of bureaucracy and those conducive to increasing bureaucratization. Gouldner’s polemics
against those who foresee the inevitability of bureaucratization are to some extent due to the lack
of this distinction. See A. Gouldner, “Metaphysical Pathos and the Theory of Bureaucracy”,
American Political Science Review, 49 (2), June 1955, pp. 496–507.
organization. The rules governing goal implementation and service-provision necessarily affect the distribution of power and allocation of resources to different groups. Thus the bureaucracy's rôle is not only technical but mediatory or regulatory as well.

These added functions enhance its potential power position, increase the competition of other groups for its services, and under certain conditions initiate processes of bureaucratization. Thus, from its very inception the bureaucratic organization is in a state of constant interaction with its environment and works out different ways of maintaining compulsory equilibrium of the relations of mutual impingement between itself and the environmental forces.

The bureaucratic organization is characterized, and distinguished from other social groups, by the need to work out its interrelationship with its environment as an autonomous organization, based on specialization of tasks as well as "rational" division of labour and allocation of rôles. It must therefore develop tasks and rôles specific to its goals and conducted according to autonomous specific criteria. The exact way in which the bureaucracy works out its interrelations with its environment differs from society to society and from period to period, and may involve its orientation to new goals, incorporation of such goals in its structure as well as processes of bureaucratization (or de-bureaucratization). In other words, the same conditions under which the bureaucratic organization develops are often responsible for changes in its goal-orientation and for incorporation by it of new goals.

The foregoing discussion of the conditions responsible for the rise of bureaucracies and the development of bureaucratization is necessarily general and abstract. However, it may be taken as a point of departure for more detailed studies. It does also show us that the possibility of bureaucratization is inherent in the very conditions which give rise to the development of bureaucratic organizations. Whether this possibility will be actualized depends, however, on various conditions. In other words, within the general conditions which give rise to the development of bureaucratic organizations there may develop secondary conditions which will determine the extent to which this organization will develop as a "service" organization or will develop in the direction of bureaucratization. The analysis of these secondary conditions will be postponed until after we discuss other aspects of bureaucratic organization.

THE COMPONENTS OF BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS

Before elaborating our hypotheses concerning the conditions responsible for the development of bureaucratization, let us first examine in greater detail the above listed problems, beginning with that of the major components of the bureaucratic organizations.

A systematic approach to this problem is facilitated by the extensive existing data. The major insights to be gained from existing materials and analyses are:

(i) The fact that any bureaucratic organization constitutes a social system; that therefore its internal division of labour is determined not only by its technical problems of goal-implementation, but also by its other needs and problems; that there exist within it special rôles and activities geared to providing for these needs; that therefore there can be no purely "rational" bureaucratic organization, free from personal, or primary, or power elements; and that, on the contrary, some such elements are functionally important in the organization.

(ii) The fact that each of these rôles is systematically related to the outside world by virtue of: (a) its need to "manipulate" several aspects of the external environment (for example, the directors must deal with boards of members, legislative committees;
the sales-managers with buyers and sellers in different markets; the manager with
trade-unions, labour exchanges, etc.) and (b) the necessary contact between the
incumbents of such rôles and similar (parallel) rôle-incumbents in other organizations,
members with which they have relations. They may easily establish professional,
solidary, or conflict relations and various reference orientations and identifications,
which might cut across their organizational affinity, and at the same time greatly
influence their behaviour in their organizations and consequently affect the perform-
ance of these organizations as well. They also emphasize the relation between the
bureaucratic rôle within the organization and their other social rôles in the family,
community, and especially the type of motivation for performance of their bureau-
cratic rôle that they bring from their social background.

In addition, the clients with whom the incumbent of each type of bureaucratic rôle
within any given organization comes into selective contact might put him under
pressure with respect to his performance of his bureaucratic rôles. Such pressure may
at times be exerted by means of various professional or community rôles and
organizations in which both the bureaucrat and the client participate, or which are
specific to the clients and the public.

(iii) The fact that within each organization there develop various (workmen,
foremen, departmental) sub-groups and sub-systems, and that each organization is
faced with the problem of co-ordinating these sub-groups, of regulating their relations
with each other and with the organization as a whole. Such sub-groups may have
entirely different conceptions of, and attitudes towards, the organization's goals and
needs, and these must be taken into account by those who wish to study the function-
ing of any bureaucratic organization.

(iv) Thus the interaction between the different "sub-groups" in any bureaucratic
organization should be viewed as a continuous process of communication, of alloca-
tion of rewards, of adjustment of mutual perception, a process by which some—
but only some—fusion (the extent of which necessarily varies from case to case and
from period to period) between the motives and goals of different individuals and
sub-groups and the overall organizational goals is effected.¹

(v) The fact that the multiplicity of the organization's external relations and internal
sub-groups may lead to the development, either in it, or on its behalf, of many
different types of activity which transcend the specific bureaucratic rôles and relations
within the organization and between it and its clients. Thus the organization becomes
interested in bettering its internal "human relations", provides facilities for its
members and their families, and integrates its activities with those of other social
groups as in community affairs, all seemingly in order to improve performance of the
bureaucratic rôle.

Such activities, in turn, bring the incumbents of the bureaucratic rôle into various
personal relations which go beyond the basic premises of the bureaucratic rôle, and
which might consequently lead to new goal orientations, to processes of bureaucrati-
(zation (or de-bureaucratization); that is, attempts on the part of the bureaucrats to
impose bureaucratic conceptions and goals on these activities and groups, or, con-
versely, pressure of these activities and groups on the structure and performance of
the bureaucratic rôles directed at changing or supervising them, limiting their
application, or adding new dimensions to them.

Here we are confronted once again with an aspect of the bureaucratic organization
which is of major importance to our analysis; namely, the changeability and flexibility

¹ Conrad M. Arensberg and Geoffrey Tootell, "Plant Sociology: Real Discoveries and New
Problems", pp. 310-337, in Mirra Momarovsky (ed.), Common Frontiers of the Social Sciences (Glencoe,
of its goals. It would appear that any bureaucratic organization is oriented, or evolves, as a means of implementing a specific goal or sets of goals. But the very conditions responsible for its development, and the multiplicity of its internal subgroups and the numerous pressures to which it is subjected, facilitate or perhaps even necessitate continuous change of at least some of its goals. Such flexibility is, as Thompson and McEwen have rightly stressed, almost a condition of the bureaucratic organization’s survival.\(^1\)

It is largely through its continuously incorporating new goals and attempting to assure the requisite resources for their implementation that any bureaucratic organization strikes out its equilibrium with its environment. Through this process of goal definition, of mobilization of resources for the implementation of these goals and of recruitment of manpower, the bureaucratic organization does exert its influence on its environment, establishes various rules which influence the training of people aspiring to be enrolled into it, and may indirectly influence general educational standards and impose its own cultural orientation on parts of its environment. It is through such processes, in addition to those of competition for resources and power that different types of equilibrium between the bureaucratic organization and its social environment develop.

Of the various problems touched upon in the preceding discussion, it would be most worth while to deal in greater detail with the problem of internal division of labour within a bureaucracy. While there are obviously many possible approaches to the classification of the different types of division of labour we can, following the work of Barnard on the one hand and recent formulations of this problem by T. Parsons on the other, distinguish three basic functions within each bureaucratic organization. These functions, each of which represents a specific aspect of bureaucratic organization and performance and is related to specific parts of the organization’s environment, may be classified as:

(a) **technical**, that is, concerned with the “materials” (physical, cultural, or human) which must be processed, and the kinds of co-operation of different people requisite for the organization’s effective performance;

(b) **managerial or administrative**, that is, concerned with mediating the organization’s external relations on the one hand and with “administering” its internal affairs on the other. Both purposes of the managerial rôle involve the “decision-making” processes which have been the centre of so much recent attention. By the external mediation task of this rôle is meant: (i) mediation of relations with the “clients” or “customers”, that is, those utilizing the “products” of the organization’s technical function and (ii) procurement of the financial and physical resources and recruitment of personnel which are necessary in order to carry out this function; and

(c) **general-supervisory**. Just as a technical organization, at a sufficiently high level of the division of labour, is controlled and “serviced” by a managerial organization to which it is in some sense “responsible”, so a managerial organization, in turn, is controlled by the “institutional” structure and agencies of the community of which it is a part. This third level of organization may take the form of the representative community functions of the School Boards in the educational field, of Trustees of various types of private, non-profit organizations, and, indeed, under the fully-developed corporate form, of the Board of Directors of business corporations. These (but not only these) are the mediating structures between the particular managerial organization, and hence the technical organization it controls, on the one

hand, and the higher-order community interests which, on some level, it is supposed to “serve” on the other.

Each type of bureaucratic rôle may, of course, be subdivided into various sub-types which vary from one type of organization to another. The subdivisions of the “technical” rôle are of particular interest as they are based on the distinction between the technical and clerical staff and the workers.

The technical, managerial, and general supervisory rôles have several systematic connections with the outside world, which necessarily influence the attitudes and performance of their incumbents within the organization, and which may add some components to the basic bureaucratic rôle. In addition to the various types of external relation and connection pointed out in the preceding discussion, we should emphasize the professional and community orientations which may develop at each level of bureaucratic rôle and function. Thus, on the technical level there may develop various labour and professional organizations and contacts which may impinge on the performance of the bureaucratic rôle. On the administrative-managerial level there may develop professional and “market” orientations and connections. On the general-supervisory level there may develop community, political, and value-orientations and connections.

The orientations and connections developed at each level impinge on the performance of the bureaucratic rôles and on the functioning of the organization as a whole. They impinge on the bureaucrat by exerting pressure on him and inclining him towards differential application of the bureaucratic rules, partial deviation from them, and setting up of new goals for the organization.

The major co-ordinative-integrative problems created by the existence of different rôles and functions within any bureaucratic organization are as follows: (a) the extent to which the incumbents of the different rôles impinge on one another by attempting to go beyond their legitimate limits and to direct the incumbents of other rôles in those areas in which they should be to some extent autonomous. The endeavours of the “supervisors” to influence the recruitment and technical policies of the managers not according to criteria of professional and technical competence, but rather according to some external (personal, political, etc.) interests, constitute a crucial example of such impingements; (b) the extent to which the differentiation of rôles influences each person’s conception of the organizational goals and of his own performance; and (c) (closely related to the former) the extent of performance efficiency on the one hand and of the flexibility and changeability of the definitions of goals on the other.

While these general types of bureaucratic rôle and their interrelations with the social environment are to be found in all bureaucratic organizations, they vary from case to case in respect to: (a) the extent of differentiation and specialization between and within them; (b) the nature of their interrelation with the “outer world”, that is, the social spheres, groups, and rôles with which they are most closely connected; (c) types and directions of the pressure to which they are subjected; and (d) the extent to which external pressures impinge on the interrelationships between them on the one hand and the performance of the organizational tasks and goals on the other.

**Comparative Analysis of Bureaucratic Organizations: Some Preliminary Indications**

As has been indicated, the existing material offers an abundance of data concerning this problem. However, these data are not as yet fully systematized and comparable and at present there is no systematic knowledge of the most important variables.
which determine the different aspects of the bureaucratic organization. Many studies have emphasized the importance of variables such as size, complexity, centralization, etc. While there is no doubt that these may be of great importance from the point of view of the comparative study of organization, it has recently been recognized that they are not autonomous and entirely independent and that they can be best understood only in relation to some strategic structural characteristics of bureaucratic organizations.

On the basis of the preceding discussion concerning the conditions responsible for the development and basic components of the bureaucratic organization it is possible to indicate (although at this point only generally) some of the variables which seem to be important in influencing the internal structure of bureaucratic organizations.

The preceding discussion emphasized the goals which the bureaucracy has to implement and the services which it has to provide to various groups and strata, as crucial factors in its genesis. It follows that the major goals of the bureaucratic organization, the place of these goals in the social structure of the society, and the type of dependence of the bureaucracy on external forces (whether clients, holders of political power, or other prominent groups) may be of great importance in influencing its internal structure. These factors, while they are to some extent interdependent, at the same time are not identical. Each in its own way brings into relief the interdependence of the bureaucratic organization with its social setting. The bureaucracy's goals are of strategic importance because they naturally define to some extent the nature of its forces and also constitute one of the most important connecting links between the given organization and the total social structure in which it is placed. What from the point of view of the organization is its major goal is, from the point of view of the total society, the function of the organization. Hence the various interrelations between the organization, other groups, and the total society are, to a very large extent, mediated by the nature of its goals. This applies both to the resources needed by the organization and to the products it gives out to the society. In the following discussion we shall analyse the influence of the bureaucracy's goals on its structure mainly by means of examining its relations with its environment.

But the very importance of the goals indicates that this variable alone is not sufficient for the understanding of the varieties of organizational structure and that the others mentioned above, such as the place of the goals in the social structure and the dependency of the bureaucracy on external resources, should also be taken into account.

THE GOALS OF BUREAUCRATIC ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

In order to illustrate the relation between goals and structure of bureaucratic organization let us now examine the influence of several types of goals on the division of labour within a bureaucracy and on its relations with its external environment. We shall deal here mainly with the structural differences between bureaucratic organizations oriented to economic, socio-political and cultural goals, and propose hypotheses regarding the influence of each type of goal on the bureaucracy's relations with the external world (especially the clientele and the general supervisory authorities) and on its internal specialization and division of labour. This list of goals is necessarily preliminary and not exhaustive, but it should be sufficient for the present purposes of illustration.

Economically-oriented bureaucratic organizations have markets other than their major clientele, consisting of other organizations and firms and/or an amorphous
consumer clientele. The availability of resources to such a bureaucracy ultimately depends on the reactions of the markets to its produce although intervening agencies, such as various financial and credit agencies, whether private (banks, etc.) or governmental, may intervene. "Ultimate" societal control over such enterprises is exercised on the one hand by the "impersonal" forces of the market but also, on the other, by various financing and governmental agencies. The degree to which these factors are important naturally differs from one régime to another.

What effects have economic goals on the internal structure of the bureaucratic organizations? First, such bureaucracies feature usually a relatively sharp demarcation between the policy-making, managerial-administrative, and technical roles. Different types of specialization and skill are required on each level and overlapping is meagre.

In older firms, this distinction was most clearly seen in the one between owner and employees. With the growing separation between ownership and management, this distinction applies mostly to the managerial-entrepreneurship functions on the one hand and to the more routine jobs on the other. At the same time, however, the nature of the economically-oriented clientele engenders a new type of specialist on the managerial level, the man dealing with "public relations", "lobbying", etc.

Organizations oriented predominantly to social or political goals, such as political parties, social agencies, and, to a smaller extent, governmental bureaus have different relations with their clientele and, consequently, somewhat different internal structures. The clientele, in most such cases, consists, on the one hand, of the various holders of political power, and, on the other, of various groups with potential influence over the political and social course of events—such as voting and pressure groups, and public opinion leaders. The extent to which such organizations are oriented more to the holders of power than to the wide "electorate", or vice versa, depends greatly on the nature of the political régime, the power of the given organization and its specific aims and locality. The existence of politically or socially oriented organizations usually depends largely on their striking some sort of balance between these two types of clientele. This has several repercussions on the control and authority structure of these organizations. On the whole, the demarcation between "policy-making" and routine (except for their purely technical staff) is not very sharp, while on the other hand the extent of "interference" of external elements, such as various notables and party bosses, is much more marked. This interference influences the activities and recruitment policies of these organizations.

In cultural (scientific, educational, literary, etc.) organizations the situation is again somewhat different. The clientele of such organizations is also the wide public or some select group (for example, students) within it. However, unlike the social-political organizations, the cultural one is not as directly related to or as dependent on the power-holders. True, it may be greatly dependent on them for financial appropriations. However, the type of dependence is different. Or, rather, its responsibility is defined in a different way. As a rule it is expected to produce a certain amount of marketable goods or to provide a certain amount of votes for a given group or party. While cultural organizations may at times be committed in both respects, such commitments are considered by these organizations, and quite often by other groups, as deviations which can perhaps be justified only in terms of exceptional circumstances. The very nature of these exceptional circumstances indicates the usual definition of the responsibilities of such organizations. In general, their function is to educate rather than to propagandize and manipulate.

It can perhaps be said that cultural organizations deal mainly with problems of basic, rather than secondary, orientations. Hence they are controlled by factors other than those controlling economically and politically oriented organizations, as
manifest most clearly in the pure, non-mixed types of such organization, such as academies and institutes for pure research.

Cultural organizations are characterized by relatively little differentiation between the higher, policy-making bodies and most (except the purely technical) of the personnel. This is true at least of most aspects of the organization’s policy which is directly related to its main goals, as borne out by ritual-application and religious education in the Church, and by education and scientific planning in the university. It is chiefly in connection with the more “technical”, at times perhaps crucial, aspects of the policy-problems that many (mostly external) elements of division of labour and specialization enter.

However, in the culturally, unlike the socio-politically oriented, organization the relative absence of differentiation between various echelons of its personnel does not imply a great extent of external interference. On the contrary, most of the personnel is “internal”, recruited according to the autonomous criteria of the organization. External elements may come in at some of the higher, formal levels, such as boards of trustees and religious conventions. At times they may even appoint the head of the cultural organization, as, for example, in the case of the appointment of university presidents. But as a rule even such external control is governed by the organization’s own basic values and takes into account the opinion of its members. Moreover, these external elements do not, as a rule, exert pressure on the organization in order to influence its goal-definition or direction, but rather represent those sections of the general public which are oriented to the organization’s basic values. Consequently, in most cultural organizations, the influence of external factors on the recruitment of personnel is relatively small, although by no means non-existent.

Let us now examine in somewhat greater detail the effect of the different goal-orientations on the internal organization of bureaucracies with respect to the extent of specialization, the division of labour, and the decision-making process.

The extent of specialization and differentiation, of division of labour, is greatest in the economically, less in the culturally, and least in the politically oriented administrative organizations. These differences are intimately related to the nature of the different goals and to the types of activity requisite for their implementation. In economic organizations, great emphasis is laid on “rationality”, on accountability in quantitative terms. This makes, within certain limits, for maximum actualization of the possibilities inherent in a complementary division of labour. While the qualifications demanded of each employee may be relatively minimal, the differences, both quantitative and qualitative, between the main levels of employees, are comparatively great.

In culturally oriented organizations, the extent of specialization required of their employees is far greater than in economic organizations. But in these organizations there is relatively little complementary division of labour between their members—except for the purely technical personnel. The majority of full-status members of most such organizations as a rule perform similar, parallel, rather than complementary, tasks. Thus in a church the priests, and in principle even the cardinal, fulfill at least some similar basic functions, and in a university, all the full members of the faculty perform similar (even if differing in content) tasks. Accordingly, the existence of differences in rank and status within cultural organizations does not necessarily imply a great extent of division of labour. As we shall see, this fact has important repercussions on the authority system of these organizations.

In the organizations with socio-political goals (especially political parties) the extent of specialization and “rational” division of labour is, as stated, least. There are usually but few formal qualifications for specialized training in most organizations of this kind. While in some political (or social) organizations there may officially be a
relatively complicated division of labour, the extent of complementarity in them is usually relatively small. This is related to the basic aim of these organizations, which is to manipulate the contingent loyalties of various groups. Due to the frequent shifts in the issues upon which they may be focused, it is difficult to lay down any specific qualifications for recruitment, except the general ability to manipulate people in various ways. And this aim has to be borne in mind by most of the personnel—there can exist but little complementary specialization and division of labour.

In politically (or socially) and, to some extent, culturally oriented organizations, the tendency is usually towards territorial rather than functional division of labour. As a rule the various territorial units tend to duplicate, rather than functionally complement, one another. Consequently, the control exercised over such territorial divisions by the central organs is of a political rather than a functional nature.

How is the system of authority in bureaucratic organizations related to their goal-orientations? The main criterion of comparison at this stage of our discussion will be the extent to which authorized decision-making is centralized, and the decisions regarding the organization’s problems routinized.

Thus the economic organization features the highest type of centralization, as the nature of its problems and goals demands rather unitary, “quantitative” decisions. In cultural organizations the extent of “collegiate” authority is greatest, although it varies from one such organization to another. The reasons for the predominance of a collegiate type of authority system in cultural organizations are: (a) the parallel (even though differing in content) specialization of their members which prevents their judging one another (this is true especially of universities); and (b) the “basic equality” of all members in relation to the ultimate values of the organization, which was pointed out in the discussion of the “parallelism” of functions in cultural organizations.

In the authority system and decision-making process socio-political organizations are rather unstable. On the one hand they feature what may be called a monolithic tendency (natural in such organizations) towards unification of command in political battles. On the other hand, however, they often develop a tendency towards decentralization of the decision-making pattern, even to the point of lack of co-ordination resulting in contradictory policies. Centralization is brought about largely through the agency of numerous external forces which impinge on the decisions of the political organization and have direct relations with and power over many of its employees, many of whom owe their positions to them.

The preceding discussion showed that it is possible to analyse systematically the relation between the goal orientation of a given bureaucratic organization and its internal structure. It was necessarily discursive and not exhaustive (similar methods can obviously be applied, for example, to public corporations, to military and governmental bureaucracies) and its sole purpose was to bring out the general fact that various aspects of bureaucratic organizations, as well as their “deviations” from the ideal-type of bureaucracy, are systematically related to their goal-orientations.

It has been shown that the effect of its predominant goal-orientation on the internal structure of the bureaucracy’s organization can be explained by the type of internal criteria of rôle allocation which they involve, and by the type of relation the organization establishes with the external world by pursuing and implementing these goals.
upon several other variables, such as the place of these goals in the social structure, the types of dependency of the bureaucracy on its clientele, and other variables. For reasons of space we shall deal here only with the first two.

By the relative place of the specific goals of any given bureaucratic organization within the society, we mean the centrality (or marginality) of these goals with respect to the society's value and power system and the extent of legitimation afforded them by it.

Thus there would obviously be several differences between a small, marginal, economic organization dealing with some marginal products and a big, central factory or corporation; between a political party which is very close to the existing government, one which performs the functions of a "loyal opposition" and a revolutionary group; between established Churches and minority or militant sects; between fully established universities and academies.

Without going into a detailed analysis of the influence of the centrality (or marginality) of its goals on the bureaucracy's internal structure, let us suggest that the main structural aspects affected by the position of the goals are as follows:

(a) the social status of the personnel and of the positions within the given bureaucratic organization;
(b) the criteria of recruitment;
(c) the social strata from which the personnel is recruited;
(d) the authority system;
(e) the availability of different types of resources;
(f) the nature and location of the external control system over the bureaucratic organization.

The next variable which influences the bureaucracy's structural characteristics, and which will be analysed here, consists of the extent and nature of its dependence on external resources, centres of power as well as on its own clientele. This dependence or relation may be defined in terms of:

(a) The chief function of the organization; that is, whether it is a service, market, or membership recruitment agency. (This distinction is closely related to, but not necessarily identical with, the nature of its goals.)
(b) The extent to which its clientele is entirely dependent upon its products, or conversely, the type and extent of competition offered it by other (parallel) agencies.
(c) The nature of the internal (ownership) and extent of the external control and supervision to which it is subjected.
(d) The criteria according to which the success is measured, and especially the extent to which it is measured by changes in the behaviour of its clients.
(e) The spheres of activity of both its personnel and its clientele that the function of the bureaucracy encompasses.

To put it in a very general and preliminary way, the influence of its external dependence on the bureaucracy's structural characteristics seems to be as follows:

(a) The greater its dependence on its clientele in terms of their being able to go to a competing agency, the more will it have to develop many communication techniques, and other additional services in order to monopolize its clientele.
(b) In so far as its great external dependence is due to the fact that criteria of successful organizational performance are based on the number and behaviour pattern of the organization's members, it will have to take an interest in numerous spheres of its clients' activities, and either establish its control over them or be subjected to their influence and direction.
In so far as the extent of the bureaucracy's external dependence is relatively small and its power-basis assured (as is the case in governmental service-agencies), then it tends towards formalization of its organization and activities, and towards growing detachment from its clientele.

Many overlappings may, of course, develop between these possibilities—some of which will be taken into account in the discussion in the last paragraph.

These are necessarily very cursory and partial illustrations. Neither the list of variables nor the series of hypotheses concerning their influence is exhaustive or final. At this point our purpose was only to illustrate the importance of the type and extent of the bureaucratic organization's dependence on other centres of power and on its clientele for the understanding of its activities. This variable is related to changes in the bureaucracy's goal-orientations and to the development of either bureaucratisation or de-bureaucratization, for it is responsible for the generation of the main power processes between the organization and its environment.

Obviously its goal-orientations, their position in the society, and its dependence on external elements, cannot account for all the structural, functional, and relational aspects of the bureaucracy, and the list of variables should be extended and elaborated. However, the foregoing discussion can suggest systematic methods of analysing the given data and undertaking further research.

BUREAUCRATIC RôLES
The major variables enumerated above necessarily influence the structure of the chief bureaucratic rôles, and tend to determine the relative predominance of their components. In other words, it can be postulated that each of these variables, or their different constellations, can influence the relative importance of the internal elements in the definition of the bureaucratic rôle (for example, detachment, professional specialization) as well as of the external elements which constitute part of the bureaucrat's "rôlegroup". Here also there is an abundance of material which has not yet been fully and systematically explored. Let us first briefly illustrate the influence of the bureaucracy's goals on the nature of the bureaucratic rôle.

The economically oriented organization usually develops the most specialized rôle-conception—especially among the non-entrepreneurial staff. To some extent, a specialized approach (though obviously differing in content) can also be found among the managerial echelons. However, the rôle-conception of the highest echelons might feature some diffuse, community-oriented elements.

The rôle-conception of culturally oriented organizations features both professional and some very explicit diffuse elements. These diffuse elements derive from the diffuse nature and orientation of most cultural symbols.

The socio-political organizations are characterized by the least developed professional rôle-image, as the pressures for socio-political activity tend to be very diffuse and weaken professional orientations.

When turning to examine the influence of the bureaucracy's dependence on its clientele on the components of the bureaucratic rôle, we find that this variable is responsible for punishment orientations, formality (or informality), and for the maintenance of strictly universal rôles (or conversely for the development of some particularistic deviations).

Unfortunately, systematic studies of the relation of different bureaucratic rôle-conceptions to the above-listed variables are few. However, numerous additional illustrations are scattered throughout the literature in this field, and they certainly are amenable to further analysis.
CONDITIONS OF BUREAUCRATIZATION AND DE-BUREAUCRATIZATION

Throughout the preceding analysis we have touched often upon the problem of bureaucratization and de-bureaucratization.

Let us close our discussion with an examination of the conditions responsible for processes of bureaucratization or de-bureaucratization, for maintenance of service ideology and partial autonomy by the bureaucracy, or, conversely, for its tendency towards goal-displacement and usurpation of power.

It can be postulated that the variables analysed above, or combinations thereof, might give rise to various types of pressure on different bureaucratic roles and organizations and thus influence the direction of their development; that is, determine whether they will tend towards bureaucratization or de-bureaucratization. All these variables indicate the great interdependence and constant state of dynamic equilibrium existing between the bureaucratic organization and its social environment. Each variable, in its own way, gives rise on the one hand to attempts on the part of the bureaucracy to control different parts of its environment or to adapt its goals to the changing environment, and on the other to attempts on the part of different outside groups to control the bureaucracy and to direct its activities. The outcome of this continuous interaction varies continuously according to the constellation of these different variables.

We have as yet but few full and systematic comparative analyses of these factors and processes. Recently Slesinger [931] has proposed several hypotheses concerning some of the factors which might influence various aspects of the bureaucracy.

On the basis of this material, the foregoing considerations, and ongoing research, we shall propose several general hypotheses concerning the conditions under which bureaucracy tends towards limitation of its power or, conversely, towards bureaucratization.

The development of any given bureaucratic organization as a relatively autonomous service agency is contingent upon the following conditions obtaining in its social setting:

1. a great extent of social and economic differentiation, free-floating resources and social mobility;
2. relative predominance of universalistic elements in the orientations and goals of the groups most closely related to the bureaucracy;
3. relatively wide distribution of power and values in the economic, cultural, and political spheres among many groups and the maintenance of continuous struggle and competition between them or, in other words, non-monopolization of the major power positions in any of these spheres by any one group;
4. the existence of politically strongly articulated groups and goals, and maintenance of control over the implementation of these goals by the holders of political and communal power.

Where the first and fourth factors are highly developed, and the second and third relatively underdeveloped (as in seventh-century Byzantium and eighteenth-century Prussia) the bureaucracy usually constitutes a strong body, controlled by the rulers, distinct (but not alienated) from the major groups recruited from strata most loyal to the rulers, and providing services to these groups (although at times biased in favour of its own interests). Where, on the other hand, the second and third factors are highly developed (as in England and Scandinavia) the bureaucracy will constitute a service group closely related to the other groups and directed by their political representatives.

The obverse of these conditions usually involves the bureaucracy's attainment of
some political autonomy as well as a tendency on its part towards displacement of its service goals, and either usurpation of power or surrender to holders of power.

Thus we find that in societies, or sectors thereof, where any given group establishes a power monopoly over parts of its environment, this group may use the bureaucracy as an instrument of pure power and manipulation, distort its autonomous roles and professional orientation, and subvert some of its echelons through various inducements and personal gratification. The most extreme example of such developments can be found in totalitarian societies or in social movements with totalitarian political or ideological tendencies, but less extreme illustrations can be also found in other societies and sectors thereof.

It is interesting to note that these two seemingly contradictory tendencies, towards bureaucratization and de-bureaucratization, may, in fact, often develop side by side. Thus, for instance, growing use of the bureaucratic machine and extension of the scope of its activities for purposes of political control, might be accompanied by forced deviation from its rules for the sake of political expediency. The concurrence of these tendencies is explained by the fact that an efficient and reliable service bureaucracy is based on the existence of some equilibrium between professional autonomy and societal (or political) control, and once this equilibrium is severely disrupted, the outcome with respect to the bureaucracy’s organization and activity may be the simultaneous development of bureaucratization and de-bureaucratization in different spheres of activities.

These hypotheses are necessarily very general, and have as yet to be applied in detail to different types of society and to different institutional spheres. Nevertheless, they show that it is possible to identify the major variables responsible for the development of bureaucracy and bureaucratization and to relate them systematically to the factors which determine the internal structure of bureaucratic organizations. They bring out the fact that the bureaucratic organization is in a constant state of interaction with its environment, and that it works out different types of equilibrium with the forces which impinge upon it and upon which it impinges in turn.

The type of dynamic equilibrium established at any given moment largely depends on the state of the forces in the immediate “vicinity” of the organization on the one hand and the type of power processes it generates in its environment on the other. The interaction between these forces and processes engenders the continuous development of bureaucracies, bureaucratization, and de-bureaucratization. Whether a bureaucracy will maintain its relative autonomy, and whether at the same time it will be subject to effective “external” control or whether it will develop in the direction of bureaucratization or de-bureaucratization is not predeterminable, and is largely contingent upon the concrete constellation of these various forces.

Thus we return to the first problem examined here, that is, the conditions responsible for the development of bureaucratic organization, and the relation of these conditions to those connected with processes of bureaucratization. Here we close the circle of our discussion, the purpose of which was to offer a preliminary analysis of the main structural characteristics of bureaucratic organizations, and of the systematic relation to factors in the bureaucratic environment, to show how they and the various possibilities of their development are, in a way, inherent in the conditions of their initial growth, and finally, to delineate the conditions responsible for the major processes of bureaucratization and de-bureaucratization.

From the point of view of further research, the preceding discussion has indicated different possible ways of investigating the various structural aspects of bureaucratic organizations and the nature of the processes of bureaucratization and de-bureaucratization. It has shown that with the development, systematization, and conver-
gence of different trends of research it is possible to break down the general problem of bureaucracy and bureaucratization into concrete and detailed variables and hypotheses without losing sight of the major problems; to identify the conditions under which bureaucratic organizations, bureaucratization, and de-bureaucratization develop; and to relate them systematically to the analysis of the structure of bureaucratic organizations.

These conditions need not necessarily obtain to the same degree in all institutional spheres of a society, and in all areas of social life. Thus the trend towards bureaucratization need not necessarily assume "metaphysical inevitability" and may be considered one of many, sometimes parallel, sometimes counteracting, trends in modern society.

THE BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography presented in this trend report was compiled with a view to representing all the main trends of research which have a bearing on the problem of bureaucracy and to covering all the main areas of study. The criteria governing our selection of items from such trends as public administration or the theory of organization, was that of greatest relevance to the study of bureaucracy. It is, of course, quite possible that some pertinent items have been omitted, and we should be most grateful to anybody who would point out such omissions. Here, as in other cases, we were faced with the problem of presenting the items in the proper context, since they bear upon many aspects of the bureaucracy. In classifying them, it is also quite possible that some errors in judgement and emphasis have been committed.

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