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Social Identity, Natural Resources, and Peacebuilding

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A central challenge of managing natural resources in post-conflict settings is identifying if and how resources are linked to social identities or relations involved in violent conflict. While much literature has focused on how economically valuable resources can positively or negatively impact peacebuilding, less attention has been placed on how culturally and politically valuable resources are linked to relapses of or rebuilding after violent conflict. When group identities are closely linked to natural resources, economic ‘wars of interest’ may become intractable ‘wars of value’. Natural resources often have strategic economic importance, but they also may play potent symbolic roles in ethnonational discourses, be deeply embedded in local social relations, or serve strategic political interests. Post-conflict resource management strategies that do not consider these cultural and political values may ignore important criteria for successful peacebuilding and resource management. Drawing from case studies of post-conflict property administration in Indonesia (Aceh), Sudan (Abyei), and Mexico (Chiapas), this paper examines (1) the particular challenges that linkages between social identities and natural resources create for post-conflict natural resource management and (2) policy and strategies used to confront these challenges. In summary, I overview the possible contribution of innovative approaches to property administration (i.e. Social Tenure Domain Model) and propose policy guidelines for managing the complexities between social identity, natural resource management, and peacebuilding.

1. INTRODUCTION

Natural resources are often affected by war and implicated in conditions that lengthen or intensify violent conflicts (Le Billon 2007). In fact, one of the central challenges of post-conflict¹ natural resource management (PCNRM) is identifying if and how natural resources are linked to the dynamics of recent or historical conflict. These links impact the ways in which PCNRM programs can define and distribute rights to access, own, or otherwise use and profit from natural resources. Failure to manage these links may lead to both unsustainable resource extraction and renewed or continued violence. For example, successful sanctions on ‘blood diamonds’ show that understanding how the economic rents of natural resources are linked to financing violent conflict is not only important for sustainable resource management but sometimes critical for peacebuilding and disrupting incentives and opportunities to pursue violence (Le Billon 2008). Indeed, many studies have examined how the management of economically valuable natural resources influences the onset and duration of armed conflict and can positively or negatively impact peacebuilding (Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Collier and Hoeffler 2005; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner 2009; Ross 2004; Weinstein 2007; Bruch et al. 2011). These studies indicate the critical role that natural resource rents can play in processes like rebel recruitment and either the destruction or rebuilding of national economies. When undertaking PCNRM it is vital to intervene in commodity chains that fund violent conflicts and to consider how economic values can be equitably distributed or even used to build good governance, fulfill basic needs, or otherwise promote economic development, reconciliation, and reintegration (Bruch et al. 2011).

¹ In this paper, “post-conflict” is understood to refer to a period occurring after armed conflict between political communities, nations, and/or states.

Yet, the role of natural resources in conflict cannot be explained only by resources' economic values. Natural resources may play potent symbolic roles in ethnonational discourses, be deeply embedded in local social relations, and be framed in identity-based claims that serve strategic political interests. In fact, when group identities are closely linked to natural resources, economic 'conflicts of interest' may become intractable 'conflicts of value' (Aubert 1963; Rothman 1997). Despite ample evidence indicating the central role of social identity in conflicts over everything from territory to oil and coca plants, much of the recent work on managing natural resources for peacebuilding has focused on how to manage the economic values of natural resources.² Less attention has been directed towards understanding how cultural and political values of natural resources must be managed in PCNRM. Indeed, there is currently no analytical framework for understanding how the construction and mobilization of social identities (or the cultural and political values linked to natural resources) impact and can be managed in PCNRM. However, PCNRM strategies that do not consider these symbolic values and the complex ways in which natural resources are linked to social identity in conflicts may ignore important criteria for successful peacebuilding and resource management.

There is a need for both a clear framework for understanding social identity links to PCNRM and for future research that modifies and develops the practical application of this research. In this paper I propose a framework for understanding how social identities are linked to natural resources in post-conflict settings and I examine how it might be used to understand three cases studies in involving land resources and identity in Aceh (Indonesia), Chiapas (Mexico), and Abyei (Sudan). While, at the time of the writing of this article, some of these 'post-conflict settings' could be arguably considered to be ongoing conflicts, it is important to examine more than success stories and to consider how the failure to link social identity claims to natural resources has led to the continuation of violent conflict and failure to manage natural resources for peacebuilding. In each of the case studies, I overview some of the policy approaches used and examine what other steps might have been undertaken. In Section Two, I introduce a definition of social identity and explore how social identity is currently linked to resources and violent conflicts. In Section Three, I introduce a conceptual framework for linking social identity and PCNRM and use this framework to explore three case studies of post-conflict land issues in Indonesia (Aceh), Sudan (Abyei), and Mexico (Chiapas). In Section Four, I provide an overview of policy responses to the links between social identity and PCNRM. Finally, in Section Five, I conclude this paper by indicating some future research avenues.

2. UNDERSTANDING SOCIAL IDENTITY

The way that we define social identity impacts the way that we understand the links between social identities, conflict, and natural resources. Below I offer a working definition of social identity based on 'social identity theory', examine how social identity links to peacebuilding, and then examine links between social identity and PCNRM.

2.1. SOCIAL IDENTITY

Approaches to social identity can be located on a continuum between two ontological stances: primordialism and constructivism. Primordialist approaches conceptualize social identity as a fixed collection of traits that are genetically inherited (in the strong sense of primordialism) or determined by cultural narratives and social structures (in the weak sense of primordialism) (Gurr and Harff 1994). Primordialist approaches are both essentialist and determinist in their understanding of identity as a stable aspect of group and individual psychology. Huntington's (1997) well-known work on the

² For example, see the edited collection by Bruch, Jensen, Nakayama, and Unruh (2011).

clash of civilizations is a modern example of how a primordialist perspective frames some conflicts as the inevitable result of irresolvable, ‘ancient’ prejudices and predicts people’s behaviors along lines of historical identity categories. On the other hand, constructivist approaches emphasize that identity is not fixed and recognize the complex ways in which social identity and collective action are simultaneously constructed through social psychological framing, context, and discourse (Bowen 1996; Kaufman, Elliott, and Shmueli 2003). Constructivist approaches look more at contextual factors and agents’ decisions concerning overlapping social roles, framing discourses, and historical experiences. In other words, constructivist approaches accept the idea that social identity is historically constructed, multi-faceted, and contextually dependent (Gardener 2003). Examples of constructivist approaches to identity include everything from Smith’s (1998) perennialism to political opportunity theory (Meyer 2004), social identity theory (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995), and social movement theory (Tilly 2003).

The choice of a constructivist or primordialist viewpoint influences understanding of how social identity relates to natural resources, war, and peacebuilding. For example, a primordialist approach would see the link between identity and homeland territories as a fixed relation. Not only would the relation be fixed, but it would determine the types of possible interactions between identity groups with competing claims for the same homeland and would inevitably lead to conflict. On the other hand, a constructivist would argue that violent conflicts are not inevitable but the result of strategic interests and political discourses linking identity to territorial or resource claims—for example, irredentist claims of Greece over the southern Balkans (Peckham 2000) and the flexible links between identities and livelihoods in Darfur (Young et al. 2009) reveal how territory or resource claims are often manipulated or contextually framed as social identity claims. Where a primordialist approach envisages inevitable conflict, a constructivist approach encourages a search for ways to reorder the primacy of identity frames (for example to deemphasize some identity claims and to emphasize the benefits of shared user rights, to point to common interests in maintaining resources, or to create new identity frames) in conflicts in which identities are linked to natural resources or violence.

In this paper, the definition of ‘social identity’ is based on social identity theory—a constructivist approach that emphasizes ways that both structural factors, group characteristics, and individual actor decisions play a role in framing and choosing identities (Hogg, Terry, and White 1995; Stets and Burke 2000; Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder 2001). Many authors using this approach draw from Tajfel’s (1982) definition of social identity as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership in a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership.” The emphasis in ‘social identity theory’ is on both the person and the dynamics of groups. However, it is less on how intragroup roles interact and more on how categories (or frames) are formed through intergroup interaction. This approach is useful for studying how identities relate to intergroup conflict (Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder 2001). It allows us to move beyond simply finding identities in conflict to finding out how identities are constructed as categories, interact with each other, and are linked to natural resources in conflicts. Brubaker and Cooper (2000) identify some additional key conceptual distinctions that are useful when investigating how types of social identity are constructed. First, does ‘social identity’ refer to relational or categorical modes of identification? Second, does the act of identification come from an external source or through self-identification? Brubaker and Cooper (2000) recognize that the divisions between relational/categorical and external/self-identification are not always clear, but that these can be analytically useful. For example, identification by positioning in a relational web (such as kinship, friendship, or business ties) may sometimes overlap with identification through categorical attributes (such as race, ethnicity, language, or citizenship) but these represent two very different modes of identification. Likewise, an externally-imposed identity (such as legal citizenship in a nation-state) can be incompatible with self-identification (for example, self-identifying as a French person versus being a legally-recognized French citizen).

These distinctions can be important for understanding the different phenomena described as social identity in cases involving resources and violent conflict. For example, in exploring how economic rents from natural resources are used to recruit soldiers for rebel groups, Weinstein (2007) examined how rebels develop identity through relational modes of self-identification. Opportunities for material gain offered by rebel groups who captured resources to new recruits served as an effective recruitment strategy that eventually tied social identity into group dynamics. Such dynamics are also evident in places like Darfur, where identities often considered to be ancient, static categories of ethnic groups or tribes actually have a more “fluid and permeable nature” in which political alliances, ecology, and livelihood strategies cause individuals or groups to adopt new identities based on context-dependent opportunities (Young et al. 2009). On the other hand, categorical modes of identification are also powerful social organizing tools. For example, the designation of recipients of aid and the timing of aid was impacted by ways in which conflict refugees and disaster refugees in post-tsunami Aceh, Indonesia were categorized by external organizations or through self-identification (Burke and Afnan 2005). Another example is the negotiations leading to the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s redrawing of the borders for historical land claims in the Abyei region of Sudan which arguably used an understanding of identity based on externally and internally imposed categories that bore little resemblance to the actual historical character of communities and kinship networks in the region. The ‘social identity’ formed through externally imposed categories (for example, by the colonial state) is analytically different from and plays a different social role than the relational modes of self-identification that are so important in defining incentives in recruitment processes and violent conflict dynamics. Indeed, the ‘social identities’ discussed in peacebuilding processes commonly involve categorical modes of self-identification and external identification relevant to establishing political negotiation positions or to gaining access to resources or post-conflict aid.

2.2. SOCIAL IDENTITY, NATURAL RESOURCES, AND VIOLENT CONFLICT

An overview of current understanding of links between social identity and peacebuilding must begin with the literature on social identity and violent conflict. Due to contemporary political events, much of the recent work on social identity and violent conflict has taken place under the rubric of ‘ethnic conflict’ (Harff and Gurr 2004). In this paper, work on ethnic conflict is considered a part of a broader vision of identity and violent conflicts. In the early 1990s, there were a number of violent conflicts wherein parties mobilized according to ‘ethnic groups’ (for example, the Yugoslav Wars and genocide in Rwanda). According to Gurr (2000a) many of these conflicts were not directly related to the Cold War as “the eruption of ethnic warfare in the early 1990s was the culmination of a long-term general trend that began in the 1950s and peaked shortly after the end of the Cold War.” Whether or not the Cold War was directly related, perhaps the most interesting dynamic was that ‘ethnicity’ was ultimately grasped as an explanatory variable and connected by both popular media and many scholars to these conflicts. Yet, ‘ethnicity’ is ultimately a type of identity. Indeed as Harff and Gurr (2004) write, an ethnic group is a psychological community “whose members share a persisting sense of common interest and identity that is based on some combination of shared historical experience and valued cultural traits... They are often called identity groups.” Interestingly, most of the literature on ethnic conflicts makes very little contact with social psychology understandings of identity and intergroup conflict (see Harff and Gurr 2004). While ethnic conflict scholarship provides several interesting insights into how ethnic groups are formed, mobilized (the process by which individual and groups are recruited into movements), and involved in violent incidents, approaches to these conflicts that engage with broader concepts of social identity encourage less primordial interpretations and more constructivist (and sometimes instrumental) interpretations of the way that interest and identity groups framing occurs before and in conflict (Rothman 1997; Ashmore, Jussim, and Wilder 2001).

The cultural and political values associated with land, sacred forests, fisheries, water, and other natural resources play roles in ethnonational discourses, livelihood struggles, and religious narratives. These cultural and political values link to many identity frames beyond ethnic groups. While there is an extensive literature that examines the ways in which social identities link to natural resources (Wadley and Colfer 2004), below I focus only on how social identity, natural resources, and violent conflict overlap.

Theories of war often under-theorize the complex links between social identities and natural resources (Ballentine and Sherman 2003; Ross 2003; Aspinall 2007). Yet, the overlap between identity and natural resources involves at least four links related to violent conflicts. These links are important in identity formation and mobilization, they do not necessarily lead to violent conflict but they help to understand how violent conflicts occur. These links are not isolated and one or more of these links may be found within any one conflict:

1. How identity claims involving ownership or privileged access (symbolic or material) to resources lead to violent conflict.
2. How identity influences claims of inequitable distribution of resource rents and leads to grievances and violent conflict.
3. How identities are used by elites and ‘ordinary folk’ to mobilize collective action in conflicts over natural resources.
4. How identity framing facilitates conflict over natural resources.

The first link includes identity conflicts over the historic use or symbolic value of resources. For example, narratives that influence the legal alienation of Arab lands in Israel draw from historical claims to the land (Forman and Kedar 2004). The second link is represented in several center-periphery relationships in which rents from high-value natural resources located in peripheral regions are captured by urban elites or states and not equitably distributed to populations in these peripheral regions that often bear the costs of resource extraction. In situations where center or periphery groups can be linked to identity frames (like ethnic groups), identity often becomes one of the primary frames through which claims to equitable distribution are pursued. For example, Suliman’s (1999) study and recent work by the International Crisis Group (ICG 2008) on the dynamics of the Nuba and Baggara conflict over lands in Sudan’s Southern Kordofan state indicate how identity has been shaped by center-periphery relations and conflict dynamics. Assal (2006) and Suliman (1999) have argued that the state escalated the conflict and that the conflict itself has heightened the collective sense of a Nuba identity.

Before the onset of violent conflict in the Nuba Mountains, the diverse Nuba people were fully aware only of their clan affiliations. They neither perceived themselves as a Nuba nation nor actively sought to be one. Their relations with their Arab neighbors, the Hawazma and Misiriya, were tolerable. They exchanged goods and services, and intermarriage was an acceptable practice especially among Arabs and Muslim Nuba. At the beginning of the conflict, many Nuba even sided with the government, because they perceived the conflict to be a political discord, rather than an ethnic or economic strife . . .

Most violent conflicts are over material resources—actual or perceived. However, with the passage of time, ethnic, cultural, and religious affiliations seem to undergo transformation from abstract ideological categories into concrete social forces. In a wider sense, they themselves become contestable material social resources and, hence, possible objects of group strife and violent conflict. (Suliman 1999, 219)

The third link is one often presented in the Collier-Hoeffler (“greed and grievances”) line of research wherein greedy political entrepreneurs create or manipulate existing local identities in order to profit

from new political and social arrangements or continuing war. Case studies of Rwanda have sometimes cited the underlying land conflict as a source of tension and indicated the role of political entrepreneurs in recasting this tension into the genocidal conflict (Percival and Homer-Dixon 1996; André and Platteau 1998). Other authors see perceived grievances against a perceived community as one of the main ways in which identity becomes a primary mobilizing frame for conflict. Robinson's (1998) study of the role of hydrocarbon extraction in mobilizing collective identity and legitimizing violence in Aceh, Indonesia illustrates such a natural resource extraction - political manipulation - identity grievances - war causal chain. Examining whether the construction of ethnicity (as a type of identity) raises the likelihood of violent conflict, Fearon and Laitin (2000) propose three pathways that identity is constructed: (1) through the logic of cultural discourses, (2) through elites' strategic manipulation of identity categories or relational networks, and (3) through strategic action of masses ('ordinary folk') to maintain specific group boundaries and rights.. Using case studies from Sudan, Sri Lanka, Ireland, Rwanda, and the Balkans, they suggested that in many violent conflicts, so-called ethnic or identity-based violence is actually a mask for strategic actions by elites or strategic action by individuals in the masses. This seems to indicate that cultural and political values are best understood as ways to mobilize groups during violent conflicts in order to achieve strategic gains in resources or power, which supports the concept of rational economic agency described in the Collier-Hoeffler model

The fourth link is subtly different from the third in that it argues that a specific type of identity frame must pre-exist political manipulation and mobilization of identity frames in violent conflict. Rather than assuming that political manipulation can mobilize any identity frame for violent conflict, this link indicates that specific types of identity frames must preexist political manipulation. For example, Aspinall (2007), in discussing Aceh, attempted to go beyond the typical political manipulation - identity grievances - war causal narrative by arguing that collective grievances and legitimization of violence cannot occur without a specific type of preexisting identity frame.

Rather than seeing natural resource grievances as a source of conflict, or as a catalyst or accelerant for the crystallization of identity, I emphasize that it was the evolving framework of Acehnese identity that provided a prism through which natural resource exploitation was interpreted in grievance terms. Put more bluntly, one might say that without the identity framework there would have been no grievances, at least no politically salient ones. Instead, natural resource exploitation in Aceh may have been viewed as unfair and irritating, but also as banal and unavoidable, as it arguably was in other provinces. In this view, grievances should not be seen as trigger factors, antecedent to the discourses that motivate violence. Grievances are instead integral to the ideological frameworks through which the social world, including notions like "justice" and "fairness," are constructed and understood. (Aspinall 2007, 957)

Despite arguments between scholars prioritizing different causal mechanisms, identity and natural resource conflicts are not mutually exclusive themes in the study of war. Natural resources are linked in several ways to social identities in violent conflicts. As well, the ways in which social identities are mobilized in resource conflicts affect how links between social identities and natural resources might positively or negatively affect PCNRM.

3. A FRAMEWORK LINKING SOCIAL IDENTITY AND PCNRM

Although the literature on peacebuilding and natural resources often refers to the role of communal groups in PCNRM and peacebuilding (Bush and Opp 1999; Bruch et al. 2011), there is rarely a theoretical or practical link drawn between natural resources, identity, and peacebuilding. As shown in a number of case studies, this lack of consideration of such links undermines PCNRM and peacebuilding programs (Green 2011a, 2011b; Webersik and Crawford 2011; Yezer 2011). Attention

to identity framing and the cultural and political values of natural resources would seem to be an essential part of PCNRM, but there are several straightforward explanations as to why these links are currently under-recognized in theory and practice. For instance, PCNRM projects necessarily have a time-limited, practical focus that emphasizes economic recovery, but these limits and narrow focus may cause important cultural and political dynamics to be overlooked (Bush and Opp 1999; Paris 2004). As well, social identity might be under-theorized in the PCNRM literature because recent theoretical work relies heavily on the Collier-Hoeffler model's understanding of conflict and tends to downplay identity claims based on cultural and political values as simple grievances. Finally, elite manipulation of policy, legislative, and political processes might strategically deny links between identity and resources in post-conflict scenarios as this denial might produce economic benefits (like land claims) for elites.

Social identities interact with natural resources in at least four ways that should be taken into account when establishing PCNRM programs. Like the four links between violent conflict, resources, and social identities listed above, more than one of these links may occur simultaneously within one case study or one type of link may evolve into another over time.

1. Resources can be at the center of conflicts between groups that have mobilized according to historical identity frames (OR) resources can be at the center of conflicts in which group affiliations have become defined in reference to the resource conflict itself.
2. Social identities can be the main way in which people organize resources in the absence of a centralized territorial authority.
3. Resources can have such strong cultural or political meaning to identity groups that they become indivisible and any limits to use or ownership would threaten a group's identity.
4. Winning or losing itself can take on a symbolic significance, even when resource ownership or access is of marginal economic importance.

3.1. LINK ONE

The first of these four links occurs in situations in which interest and identity groups are mobilized to fight over a resource that has little cultural or political symbolic significance. For example, diamonds partially funded violent conflicts over political power in the 1990s in Liberia and Sierra Leone (Le Billon 2008). In this situation, the cultural significance of the diamonds was less important than the fact that the diamonds offered a lucrative revenue stream and that control of that revenue stream could offer strategic advantages to different belligerent groups. If an alternative lucrative, lootable resource became available (for example a sudden price spike for sapphires) there would be little hesitation to abandon diamonds in pursuit of alternative revenue streams. In this type of case, eliminating revenue streams through sanctions or other direct interventions and providing alternative livelihoods are often the most practical ways to initiate peacebuilding by undermining capacities to wage war. This link is also descriptive of livelihood conflicts where resources have only economic value and do not have cultural or political value to the belligerent groups.

3.2. LINK TWO

The second link refers to the ways in which communities manage resources in the absence of or in resistance to the centralized legal order of the state. Unruh (2003), for example, examines how multiple legal and normative orders (normative pluralism) influence land tenure regimes in post-conflict situations where state power is weakened or illegitimate. These competing normative orders are instrumental interest or identity groups that may impact the peace process by undermining the state's territorial control or disrupting legitimate resource management practices. Unruh's work

illustrates situations in East Timor, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Angola, and other regions where inadequate understanding and recognition of identity groups and their claims to property, inadequate recognition of these groups desire and need to use alternative types of evidence (for example, to call upon community witnesses rather than rely on statutory titles or deeds that may have been destroyed), and inadequate recognition of these groups ability to efficiently and legitimately manage resources have plagued post-conflict efforts to enforce and create state administered real property systems and land laws.

Case Study: Chiapas, Mexico

Chiapas, located in the far south of Mexico, shares borders with Guatemala, the Pacific Ocean, and the Mexican states of Veracruz, Oaxaca, and Tabasco. According to the 2005 INEGI (National Statistics and Geography Institute) census the region has nearly 4,300,000 inhabitants of which approximately 960,000 are indigenous Mayan. Of this indigenous population some 81.5% live either in the Highlands, the Jungle, or the Northern Zone regions of Chiapas. The region is primarily composed of subsistence farmers that have suffered from both ethnic and class-based structural violence and have long experienced limited access to property rights. In fact, property rights specifically in reference to land access are one of the central bones of contention in the region. The 1917 agrarian reforms that were meant to destroy the *encomienda* system (which was a system of feudal tenure labor and land grants inherited from the Spanish colonialists) with the *ejido* system (which was a system of holding common property in a community trust recognized by the government) never actually impacted many of the large landholders in this region as they managed to hold on to large estates or to reestablish estates by titling adjacent properties to different family members. Issues surrounding land access and the migration of communities into this region caused many indigenous and migrants to move into the Lacondon jungle area in the 1950s. Deforestation and degradation of resources within the jungle area cause communities to continue to move within and underlie many property disputes and conflicts in the region. Despite the failure of the 1917 laws, Chiapas currently has the largest amount of *ejidos* of any region in Mexico. These *ejido* lands were protected from future sale by the law of 1917, but were reformed by legislation in 1992 that allowed titling and transfer of *ejido* lands. This new law is considered by some as the trigger event in crystallizing resistance in Chiapas (Harvey 1998).

In 1994, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (Ejército Zapatista de Liberación Nacional or EZLN) declared war against the Mexican state. While the EZLN declaration of war coincided with the first day of NAFTA and was couched in an anti-neoliberal rhetoric, Harvey (1998) considers the roots of resistance in Chiapas as “ecological crisis, lack of available productive land, the drying up of nonagricultural sources of income, the political and religious reorganization of indigenous communities since the 1960s, and the rearticulation of ethnic identities with emancipatory political discourses.” While some authors believe that the leadership of EZLN comes from the Marxist left of the 1970s that is now using the indigenous rebellion for its own purposes, other authors argue that the Zapatistas constitute a original indigenous rebellion based on demands for land tenure, demands for democracy, and respect for indigenous rights (Harvey 1998; Collier and Quaratiello 2005). Either way, the demands for ancestral lands and statutory recognition of the previous rights of *ejido* and communal lands to avoid transfer and alienation through private sales are consistent concerns among the Zapatista movement. After the declaration of war there were several instances of violence against communities supportive of the Zapatista goals and continued expropriation of *ejido* lands for use and sale by government or private individuals.

The Zapatista struggle in Chiapas is a protracted social conflict that is buttressed (if not driven by) persistent identity group (indigenous) claims to land and property rights. It is a case of a failed PCNRM in that between the periods of episodic violence efforts could have been made to reform the

national or regional legal framework for property and land to meet the demands of indigenous communities. Reinstatement and respect of the ejido and communal lands following the five principal topics of the San Andrés Accords (1996):

1. Basic respect for the diversity of the indigenous population of Chiapas.
2. The conservation of natural resources within the territories used and occupied by indigenous peoples.
3. Greater participation of indigenous communities in the decisions and control of public expenditures.
4. Participation of indigenous communities in determining their own development plans, as well as having control over their own administrative and judicial affairs.
5. The autonomy of indigenous communities and their right of free determination in the framework of the State.

This conflict reflects both a failed peace agreement and failed PCNRM. Referring back to the social identity – PCNRM framework, both categorical and relationally defined identity and interest groups have formed around the resources in question. The identity-PCNRM links in this case are representative of link type two and link type three. As in link type two, legitimate communal structures that can functionally manage land and property outside of or in resistance to a centralized territorial state government system exist and need to be recognized by the government. Second, in link type three, identity claims to specific spaces and ways of life entail claims of land and property that are violated when the government assumes (as in the 1992 law) the right to expropriate, transfer, and/or otherwise alienate other rights from the indigenous owners. Offers of land elsewhere cannot be met when demands for absolute ownership of ancestral lands are undermined by the state's assertion of alloidal title over the community.

3.3. LINK THREE

As mentioned above, this third link refers to the cultural and political significance of resources. A resource may have conflicting cultural or political values for different identity groups. For example, enduring separatist movements (like the ELA in the Basque region of Europe) show that particular places in the landscape have not only economic and livelihood value but also cultural value that cannot be resolved with state narratives of citizenship and territory (Raento and Watson 2000). Moore (2005) offers an example of these conflicting values in Zimbabwe where the division of land and provision of alternative land is in some cases unacceptable to groups whose identity is bound to certain places and spatial configurations. Demands by refugees and IDP, forced to flee during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to return to their previous settlements reflect both the need for material recovery and the social and psychological value of certain places (Mikelic, Schoen, and Benschop 2005). Indeed, the settler dilemma in Israel reflects different identity groups' conflicting, incommensurable values regarding land claims (Kedar 2003; Forman and Kedar 2004). However, these values are not always static – they are often manipulated and framed by elites or other actors for strategic political reasons. Elite manipulation and internal group dynamics can help bring about a sudden increase in the political or cultural value of natural resources or territories. For example, an area surrounding the 1,100-year-old Hindu temple Preah Vihear on the Thai and Cambodian border has been contested since at least the nineteenth century. Although the region was awarded to Cambodia by decision of the International Court of Justice in 1962, in times of domestic political upheaval in Thailand, this region is sometimes invaded by Thai leaders who wish to display their patriotic leaning and to distract the population from other political issues. The politicians bring the conflict over the region to the forefront of political and cultural consciousness and frame the conflict over the temple as a national identity issue in order to advance domestic political strategies.

Case Study: Aceh, Indonesia

The region of Aceh, also referred to as Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam (NAD), is governed as a special territory by the Government of Indonesia (GoI). In 2005, the population of Aceh began recovery from both a 29-year separatist war and the devastation of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. Property and tenure systems were severely damaged by both the war and tsunami (Wong et al. 2007, WB 2008). The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami inundated the lowlands of Aceh killing some 168,000 people and leaving 500,000 more homeless. While the tsunami struck the lowlands, the tsunami's impacts changed the region's political, economic, social, and ecological landscape. In addition to the human death toll, it is estimated that some 300,000 land parcels, 250,000 homes, 15% of agricultural lands, over 2,000 schools, and 10,000 km of roads were severely-impacted or destroyed (Fan 2006: Benny et al. 2006). Of the 300,000 parcels affected by the tsunami, 25% had titles issued by the state and the other 75% were managed under adat (customary) and informal institutions (Fitzpatrick 2005a; Benny et al. 2006). While much of the land in Aceh is not registered under state law, the destruction of some 90,000 titles, registration offices, and all field markers for plot identification coupled with the deaths of BPN (National Land Agency) officials threw the system of cadastres and deeds into chaos (Benny et al. 2006). Adat systems, common in rural areas, were more resilient than BPN-administered cadastral systems, but these informal systems also suffered from the loss of human knowledge surrounding use rights and informal arrangements. The massive destruction of the tsunami is thought to have played an indirect role in ending Aceh's cyclically violent separatist war that had claimed 15,000 lives and paralyzed development for some 29-years (Gaillard et al. 2008; Billon & Waizenegger 2007). The Acehese separatist conflict was based on a mix of identity, political, and economic themes that drew from a century of violent conflict with colonial powers and the Indonesian state. Yet, eight months after the tsunami, the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was signed between the rebel GAM (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or the Free Aceh Movement) and the GoI. With an estimated \$8 billion in post-tsunami aid pledges, the region then became one of the largest reconciliation, recovery, reconstruction, and development project in the world (Kenny et al. 2006).

While property rights and tenure security were not among the central issues negotiated in the peace process or among issues identified as problematic for demobilization, disarmament, and reintegration (DDR) (WB 2006a), property rights and tenure security were major concerns for many actors involved in post-disaster recovery (Fitzpatrick 2005). Many international donors, international non-governmental organizations (INGOs), and state actors perceived the lack of state-issued land titles in lowland areas devastated by the tsunami as a reflection of tenure insecurity and as a central obstacle to tsunami recovery and future political and economic development (WB 2006b). As a response to this perceived tenure insecurity, donors offered technical resources and a budget of USD 28.5 million for a state-administered land registration program called the Reconstruction of Aceh Land Administration System (RALAS).

While RALAS emphasized community participation in the mapping of boundaries and adjudication of claims, the emphasis on the primacy of statutory law, wide-scale state registration (or 'regularization'), and issuance of land titles caused several problems for the program. First of all, in Aceh, tenure security is a balancing act between three normative orders or legal systems: adat (customary law), Islamic jurisprudence, and statutory law. Of course, these three orders represent a dramatic simplification of actual practices on the ground (people sometimes draw simultaneously from the different orders or search for the most favorable forum for their arguments to be heard), are not monolithic bodies of norms and laws (adat practices can change in different communities and over time and state law changes according to jurisdiction, governmental level, and the department with which one interacts), and there are arguably other normative orders at work in the Aceh context (like rebel controlled areas or international and transnational discourses involving human rights and environmental stewardship). Some of the greatest challenges to designing a program that could

support tenure security were in clearly defining what constituted tenure security and then identifying how a program would navigate the multiple legal and normative systems regarding land and property to support tenure security. Despite the recognized need for respecting and working with non-state normative orders, RALAS transformed the need for tenure security into a blanket call for land regularization. Policy makers in Aceh adopted Hernando de Soto's land regularization logic that equates tenure security with statutory land title. While such a program is often an important part of providing tenure security for periurban and urban residents, households exposed to real estate markets, and to migrants in new regions, in a post-conflict region where the state's legitimacy and capacity were undermined these ideas need critical evaluation.

Which brings us to a second major problem, land is not only an economic asset but also a potent cultural and political symbol. Statutory land title was not only irrelevant to many of the rural communities of Aceh Jaya and Aceh Barat (where I conducted interviews) that were not exposed to land markets, it was also considered a burden (future taxes and fees) and was opposed by some of the people that still felt that Aceh deserved more than recognition of special autonomy. Interestingly, a lowland tsunami does not wipe out all the political emotions of members of a separatist movement based largely in highland and forested areas. Even members of the United Nations staff questioned the logic of extending a large land titling program into a region where corruption was the norm and government legitimacy, capacity, and legal frameworks were not fully developed enough to recognize property rights. As of 2009, one of the main causes of tenure security in the region continued to be state (including military, forestry, and other departments) claims to land, the lack of recognition of community maps made by NGOs and not with BPN officials, and the fact that some of the areas that had been targeted by RALAS were left in a legal purgatory because households had only partially advanced through the land titling process when RALAS (BPN officials) left their communities. As well, the Aceh Legal Aid Foundation's activities of educating communities about their property rights and mounting legal challenges to property grants and transfers enacted during the conflict years led to the arrest of some of their staff for committing acts against the state.

In this case, the lack of sufficient attention to (1) a clear statutory legal framework for recognizing property rights and alternative tenure systems, (2) local incentives and disincentives³ to title land with the state, and (3) lingering identity conflict (i.e. separatist sentiment in areas of Aceh) led the state to pursue a program that in the end issued less than 30% of its targeted 600,000 titles. Referring back to the social identity – PCNRM framework, in this case we see a link typical of type #3 (Resources with such strong cultural or political meaning to identity groups that they become indivisible and any limits

³While first time registration fees were covered, future transaction costs and taxes were unclear. As well, the main targeted benefit of the program was to allow titled holders "liberate their dead capital". Yet, despite anecdotal evidence of businessmen in Banda Aceh and other urban areas mortgaging their land, most of the people in Aceh have alternative means to access temporary financial assistance through social networks or arrangements involving, for example, forward sales of crops harvests, cooperatives, or mortgage on vehicles. These arrangements are typically preferable for most of the poor and rural areas where communities do not want to risk the main source of their livelihoods or well-being (their land or home) and cannot extract land that is embedded in social relations and obligations. Several bank representatives have expressed hesitation at taking land as collateral even if it is formally titled because the social relations and legal framework surrounding the land may limit its use and because it is difficult to value rural lands where there is no developed market. Deutsch (2009:43) reported that "within the study sample, only about 2.5% of respondents reported accessing credit from commercial banks prior to receiving RALAS land titles, while nearly 7% took bank loans after the receipt of titles." Yet, he notes the small sample size and does not account for factors like the possible increase in investment and lowering of collateral standards in the region due to the end of the war or the focus of the study on areas where land markets already exist. While there are plenty of examples of how formal registration has allowed investment in urban areas, there is no clear evidence that livelihoods required formal land title or that the process of registering land has allowed the poor to access more resources or encouraged international investment to the benefit of the peacebuilding process.

to use or ownership would threaten a group's identity) but also expressive of type #2 (Organization in the absence of a centralized territorial authority – interest and identity groups).

3.4 LINK FOUR

The fourth link describes situations wherein the act of winning or losing conflicts over resources takes on symbolic value; victory itself becomes a new source of political value whether or not the resource is economically valuable.

Case Study: Abyei, Sudan

Abyei is located at the center of Sudan in an oil-rich area that has been the heart of a dispute between communities representing the north and south of Sudan for nearly 40 years. The main populations in this region are the Ngok Dinka (who are associated with the south and the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA)) and the Messiria (who are associated with the north and the Khartoum-based government). Although there has never been a clear and unanimously acceptable line dividing this region into north-south zones, in 2005 the Abyei Borders Commission attempted to delineate north and south zones in this region. The results of the Abyei Border Commission were rejected by the Khartoum-based government and from 2005-2009 the region experienced several bouts of violent conflict and mass migrations of thousands of people. In anticipation of a 2011 referendum for the independence of southern Sudan, the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) in The Hague attempted to redefine the borders of the Abyei region on 22 July 2009.

Although, the PCA borders changed control of some 45,000 square kilometers of land from the south to the north and also gave a large part of the region's rich oil fields and the area through which the Great Nile oil pipeline runs to Khartoum-controlled government of the north, the PCA decision was largely celebrated as a win-win decision. Part of the reason that these borders had previously been an intractable point of conflict and was because the interests of the different groups in the conflict had not been clearly defined. While both parties were interested in controlling the oil fields and pipeline, the act of winning (or not losing) in this situation took on a symbolic significance for the Ngok Dinka that went beyond material interests in the allocation of the region's rich oil fields. The PCA ruling resulted in an unequal division of the oil riches but recognized both the territory's significance to the Ngok Dinka (a type three link) and the importance of not losing to both parties (a type four link).

Redrawing the borders of the region, the ruling gives the north uncontested rights to rich oil deposits like the Heglig oil field, which had previously been placed within Abyei. But the decision leaves at least one oil field in Abyei and gives a symbolic victory to the Ngok Dinka, affirming their claims to the heartland of the fertile region . . . "Who controls Abyei has taken on a symbolic importance beyond the traditional tensions over oil," said Colin Thomas-Jensen. (Otterman 2009: online)

In addition to the four links just described, larger conflicts may also spill over into smaller resource disputes or undermine PCNRM projects that do not seem to be related to the central problems of the original conflict. For example, land administration programs in Aceh from 2005–2008 did not adequately recognize separatist identity issues and how these issues impacted the legitimacy of the Indonesian state in a separatist region and thus the state's ability to implement a land administration system or the appropriate timing and location of such a program (Green 2011b). Where existing frames for cooperation and legitimacy do not exist and cannot be created, community participation—especially in land use decisions—may not be forthcoming (Kaufman and Smith 1998). The shadow of identity conflict can be cast over resources not directly involved in war.

4. POLICY RESPONSES

Below, I overview each of the four links in the social identity – PCNRM framework and some possible policy responses to these links. Because the four links described above may occur in any combination in a conflict or post-conflict setting, there can be no single recipe for PCNRM policy. To be effective, policies must first simply recognize that social identity plays a key role in PCNRM and that identity it is not inherited and static but constructed through framing processes that must be understood in order to change the successfully engage in peacebuilding process. Where a conflict of interest over economic values exists between groups, economic incentives can often contribute to peacebuilding; however, where conflicts over cultural and political values are entrenched in protracted social conflicts, more intense reframing away from conflict identities or strategies for partial recognition are required. Post-conflict policy options are described in more detail in Table 1.

Table 1. PCNRM Policy Options

Social identity–natural resource link	Possible policy responses
Resources are at the center of conflicts between groups that have mobilized according to historic identity frames or defined themselves in reference to the resource conflict.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Interrupt high-value resource commodity chains, and provide alternative livelihoods. 2. Interrupt relational or categorical modes of identification with narratives from alternative historical periods or interest frames.
Social identities are the main way in which people organize resources in the absence of a centralized territorial authority.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Seek state recognition of group property rights, which can occur using social tenure domain models⁴ or cadastral systems oriented toward communal and individual titles. 2. Implement community-based NRM with appropriate legal frameworks. 3. Recognize the authority of identity groups or assign authority to them. 4. Seek state-led reorganization of property rights, where it is possible to equitably implement such programs in accordance with existing rights and obligations.
Resources have symbolic cultural or political meaning and may be indivisible.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Disaggregate the demands of groups to see if separate rights, timing, locations, or other variables can be negotiated according to identity group. This approach may reveal that there is no real conflict of value, or at least clarify what the conflict of value is about. 2. Reframe identity beyond categorical modes of identification using references to alternative historical periods or interest frames.

⁴ A cadastre or cadastral system is a comprehensive register of the geography and tenure relations surrounding real property. Cadastral systems reflect the legal definitions of property. A social tenure domain model (STDM) is a type of property administration or cadastral system that recognizes that the property (rights and obligations) in resources in many areas of the world does not correspond to the common law ideas of freehold or leasehold in property or to the civil law idea of *dominium*. A STDM uses alternative representational formats (for example a point instead of a polygon) to represent the flexibility of resource limits and property ownership in situations where strictly-defined, parcel-based property or land administration does not correlate to actual (and often informal) rights and responsibilities on the ground. The STDM represents an effort to develop pro-poor, flexible property administration systems that move beyond the limitations of current concepts of private property (Lemmen 2010).

Social identity–natural resource link	Possible policy responses
Winning or losing takes on a symbolic significance even if the resources themselves are of marginal importance.	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Disaggregate the demands of groups to see if separate rights, timing, locations, or other variables can be negotiated according to identity group. This approach may reveal that there is no real conflict of value, or at least clarify what the conflict of value is about. 2. Seek agreement on procedural justice standards—for example, referral to the International Court of Justice or Permanent Court of Arbitration. 3. Reframe identity beyond categorical modes of identification using references to alternative historical periods or interest frames.

5. CONCLUSION

The links between social identity and natural resources in violent conflicts affect the strategies that can be used for PCNRM. There are four key ways in which identities are constructed in reference to violent conflicts involving resources, and four ways in which social identity and natural resources are linked in PCNRM. The four PCNRM links and the policy responses identified in this article provide some preliminary insights into a field that is, if empirically obvious, dramatically under-theorized. Current policy responses frequently focus on fixed social identities, permanent territorial boundaries, and ways to equitably divide resources between identity and interest groups. Yet, alternative approaches that engage with constructivist understandings of social identity may provide opportunities for creative solutions that involve reframing identity groups or disrupting incentives to violence.

The four main links in this social identity – PCNRM framework are (1) identity or interest groups mobilize over resource control, (2) identity or interest groups mobilize to manage resources in the absence of centralized territorial authority, (3) natural resources that have politically or culturally symbolic value to the point that resource access may be indivisible, and (4) when winning or losing over a natural resource becomes more important than the actual resource itself. In examining these links through three case studies, I argued that these links can occur simultaneously and that political and cultural values are not naturally present – they are continually manipulated by elites and other institutions or actors or transformed through alternating contexts and framing processes.

Future studies should use alternative conceptualizations of the concepts in this paper in order to examine different theoretical and practical foundations for exploring the nexus of social identity, natural resources, and peacebuilding. Surely, different basic concepts may produce alternative interpretations and conclusions. As well, disaggregating the ways that different types of identity and interest groups link to PCNRM and exploring how specific group characteristics (gender, class, or otherwise) and specific resource types interact would illuminate the subject more than the framework that I offer in this paper. Further work in this area might also examine how the intensity and different forms of violent conflict at regional, interstate, intrastate, state/non-state, and interpersonal scales can be linked to the social identities that form around natural resource management in post-conflict scenarios. Finally, next steps also involved applying this or an improved framework to single case studies in order to provide more in-depth understanding of social identity formation, mobilization, and involvement in violent resource conflicts.

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