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366
Exit option in hierarchical agency
, 2004
"... We explain why organizations that limit the voice of their agents can benefit from granting them an exit option. We study a hierarchy with a principal, a productive supervisor and an agent. Communication is imperfect in that only the supervisor can communicate with the principal, while the agent has ..."
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We explain why organizations that limit the voice of their agents can benefit from granting them an exit option. We study a hierarchy with a principal, a productive supervisor and an agent. Communication is imperfect in that only the supervisor can communicate with the principal, while the agent
Valuing Exit Options
, 2006
"... This paper examines an important aspect of federalism: the effect of a secession threat on the union’s productivity. Productivity requires a compliance maintenance regime with credible punishment. An exit option gives a government the alternative of opting out of the union rather than suffer the dis ..."
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This paper examines an important aspect of federalism: the effect of a secession threat on the union’s productivity. Productivity requires a compliance maintenance regime with credible punishment. An exit option gives a government the alternative of opting out of the union rather than suffer
Exit Options and the Allocation of Authority
, 2013
"... We analyze the optimal allocation of authority in an organization whose members have conflicting preferences. One party has decision–relevant private information, and the party who obtains authority decides in a self–interested way. As a novel element in the literature on decision rights, we conside ..."
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consider exit option contracts: the party without decision rights is entitled to prematurely terminate the relation after the other party’s choice. We show that under such a contract it is always optimal to assign authority to the informed and not to the uninformed party, irrespective of the parties
Principal-Agent Problems with Exit Options
- The B.E. Journal in Theoretical Economics
, 2008
"... Abstract. We consider the problem of when to deliver the contract payoff, in a continuoustime Principal-Agent setting, in the presence of moral hazard and/or adverse selection. The principal can design contracts of a simple form that induce the agent to ask for the payoff at the time of principal’s ..."
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Cited by 5 (0 self)
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choosing. The optimal time of payment depends on the agent’s and the principal’s outside options. Examples when the optimal time is random include the case when the agent can be fired, after having been paid a severance payment, and then replaced by another agent; and the case when the agent
Private Rents, Exit Options, and Legalization
"... Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the IIIS. All works posted here are owned and copyrighted by the author(s). ..."
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Any opinions expressed here are those of the author(s) and not those of the IIIS. All works posted here are owned and copyrighted by the author(s).
Exit Problems for Spectrally Negative Lévy Processes and Applications to Russian, American and Canadized Options
- Ann. Appl. Probab
"... this paper we consider the class of spectrally negative L'evy processes. These are real valued random processes with stationary independent increments which have no positive jumps. Amongst others Emery [11], Suprun [23], Bingham [4] and Bertoin [3] have all considered fluctuation theory for thi ..."
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Cited by 72 (21 self)
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for this class of processes. Such processes are often considered in the context of the theories of dams, queues, insurance risk and continuous branching processes; see for example [6, 4, 5, 19]. Following the exposition on two sided exit problems in Bertoin [3] we study first exit from an interval containing
Cheap Talk with an Exit Option: A Model of Exit and Voice," mimeo
, 2012
"... Abstract The paper presents a formal model of the exit and voice framework proposed by Hirschman ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Abstract The paper presents a formal model of the exit and voice framework proposed by Hirschman
Exit Options and Dividend Policy under Liquidity Constraints
, 2013
"... We introduce a post-entry liquidity constraint to the standard model of a firm with serially correlated profitability and an irreversible exit decision. We assume that firms with no cash holdings and negative cash ow must either exit or raise new cash at a transaction cost. This creates a precaution ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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We introduce a post-entry liquidity constraint to the standard model of a firm with serially correlated profitability and an irreversible exit decision. We assume that firms with no cash holdings and negative cash ow must either exit or raise new cash at a transaction cost. This creates a
Exit Options in Corporate Finance: Liquidity versus
, 2000
"... (Article begins on next page) The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters. ..."
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(Article begins on next page) The Harvard community has made this article openly available. Please share how this access benefits you. Your story matters.
Results 1 - 10
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366
