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Optical Time-Domain Eavesdropping Risks of CRT Displays (2002)

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by Markus G. Kuhn
Citations:48 - 2 self
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BibTeX

@MISC{Kuhn02opticaltime-domain,
    author = {Markus G. Kuhn},
    title = {Optical Time-Domain Eavesdropping Risks of CRT Displays},
    year = {2002}
}

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Abstract

A new eavesdropping technique can be used to read cathode-ray tube (CRT) displays at a distance. The intensity of the light emitted by a raster-scan screen as a function of time corresponds to the video signal convolved with the impulse response of the phosphors. Experiments with a typical personal computer color monitor show that enough high-frequency content remains in the emitted light to permit the reconstruction of readable text by deconvolving the signal received with a fast photosensor. These optical compromising emanations can be received even after diffuse reflection from a wall. Shot noise from background light is the critical performance factor. In a sufficiently dark environment and with a large enough sensor aperture, practically significant reception distances are possible. This information security risk should be considered in applications with high confidentiality requirements, especially in those that already require "TEMPEST"-shielded equipment designed to minimize radio-frequency emission-security concerns.

Keyphrases

eavesdropping risk    crt display    background light    raster-scan screen    readable text    information security risk    high confidentiality requirement    optical compromising emanation    cathode-ray tube    dark environment    video signal    radio-frequency emission-security concern    critical performance factor    new eavesdropping technique    fast photosensor    sensor aperture    impulse response    diffuse reflection    time corresponds    significant reception distance    shot noise    emitted light    enough high-frequency content   

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