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We acknowledge financial support in the form of ERC grant 269143. We are grateful to
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@MISC{Richter_weacknowledge,
author = {Michael Richter and Ariel Rubinstein and Jacopo Perego and Kfir Eliaz and Debraj Ray},
title = {We acknowledge financial support in the form of ERC grant 269143. We are grateful to},
year = {}
}
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Abstract
We propose a new abstract definition of equilibrium in the spirit of competitive equilibrium: a profile of alternatives and a public ordering (expressing prestige, price or a social norm), such that each agent prefers his assigned alternative to all lower-ranked ones. The equilibrium operates in an abstract setting built upon a concept of convexity borrowed from Convex Geometry. We apply the concept to a variety of convex economies and relate it to Pareto optimality. The "magic " of linear equilibrium prices is put into perspective by establishing an analogy between linear functions in the standard convexity and "primitive orderings " in the abstract convexity.
