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2004) Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent
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| Venue: | Behavior, International Economic Review |
| Citations: | 61 - 15 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Calvó-armengol_2004)social,
author = {Antoni Calvó-armengol and Yves Zenou},
title = {2004) Social Networks and Crime Decisions: The Role of Social Structure in Facilitating Delinquent},
journal = {Behavior, International Economic Review},
year = {},
pages = {935--954}
}
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Abstract
We develop a model in which delinquents compete with each other in criminal activities but may benefit from being friends with other criminals by learning and acquiring proper know-how on the crime business. By taking the social network connecting agents as given, we study the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game in which individuals decide first to work or to become a criminal and then the crime effort provided if criminals. We show that this game always has a pure strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium that we characterize. Ex ante identical individuals connected through a network can end up with very different equilibrium outcomes: either employed, or isolated criminal or criminals in networks. We also show that multiple equilibria with different number of active criminals and levels of involvement in crime activities may coexist and are only driven by the geometry of the pattern of links connecting criminals. Using the equilibrium concept of pairwise-stable networks, we then show that the multiplicity of equilibrium outcomes
Keyphrases
social network facilitating delinquent crime decision social structure crime activity different equilibrium outcome proper know-how active criminal equilibrium concept multiple equilibrium equilibrium outcome crime business different number criminal activity pairwise-stable network isolated criminal subgame perfect nash equilibrium crime effort ex ante identical individual
