@MISC{Stewart07robustconventions, author = {Colin Stewart}, title = {Robust Conventions and the Structure of Social Networks}, year = {2007} }

Share

OpenURL

Abstract

This paper considers the equilibrium selection problem in coordination games when players interact on an arbitrary social network. We examine the impact of the network structure on the robustness of the usual risk dominance prediction as mutation rates vary. For any given network, a sufficiently large bias in mutation probabilities favoring the non-risk dominant action overturns the risk dominance prediction; bounds are obtained on the size of this bias depending on the network structure. As the size of the population grows large, the risk dominant equilibrium is highly robust in some networks. This is true in particular if the risk dominant action spreads contagiously in the network and there does not exist a sufficiently cohesive finite group of players. Examples demonstrate that robustness does not coincide with fast convergence.