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Honey Encryption: Security Beyond the Brute-Force Bound (2014)
| Citations: | 4 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Juels14honeyencryption:,
author = {Ari Juels and Thomas Ristenpart},
title = {Honey Encryption: Security Beyond the Brute-Force Bound},
year = {2014}
}
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Abstract
Version 1.2 We introduce honey encryption (HE), a simple, general approach to encrypting messages using low min-entropy keys such as passwords. HE is designed to produce a ciphertext which, when decrypted with any of a number of incorrect keys, yields plausible-looking but bogus plaintexts called honey messages. A key benefit of HE is that it provides security in cases where too little entropy is available to withstand brute-force attacks that try every key; in this sense, HE provides security beyond conventional brute-force bounds. HE can also provide a hedge against partial disclosure of high min-entropy keys. HE significantly improves security in a number of practical settings. To showcase this improvement, we build concrete HE schemes for password-based encryption of RSA secret keys and credit card numbers. The key chal-lenges are development of appropriate instances of a new type of randomized message encoding scheme called a distribution-transforming encoder (DTE), and analyses of the expected maximum loading of bins in various kinds of balls-and-bins games. 1
Keyphrases
honey encryption brute-force bound security beyond bogus plaintexts incorrect key little entropy randomized message distribution-transforming encoder practical setting conventional brute-force bound balls-and-bins game general approach key benefit expected maximum loading credit card number brute-force attack password-based encryption appropriate instance key chal-lenges high min-entropy key various kind partial disclosure new type honey message low min-entropy key rsa secret key
