BibTeX
@MISC{Kada04incompletepreference,,
author = {Osamu Kada},
title = {Incomplete Preference, Iterated Strict Dominance and Rationalizability },
year = {2004}
}
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Abstract
In his seminal paper, Epstein (1997) generalized to non-subjective utility model that (correlated) rationalizability is a consequence of common knowledge of rationality in finite normal form games, and showed related results of iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies and a posteriori equlibrium. In this paper we extend his result to incomplete preference using incomplete type spaces. We also show that existence of maximal element with respect to dominance relation is sufficient for order independence of iteration of strictly dominance in infinite normal form games. This extends a result of Dufwenberg and Stegeman (2002).
