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Efficient vote elicitation under candidate uncertainty (2013)
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| Venue: | In Proceedings of the Twenty-third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI13 |
| Citations: | 7 - 4 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Oren13efficientvote,
author = {Joel Oren and Yuval Filmus and Craig Boutilier},
title = {Efficient vote elicitation under candidate uncertainty},
booktitle = {In Proceedings of the Twenty-third International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence (IJCAI13},
year = {2013}
}
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Abstract
Top-k voting is an especially natural form of partial vote elicitation in which only length k prefixes of rankings are elicited. We analyze the ability of top-k vote elicitation to correctly determine true winners, with high probability, given probabilistic models of voter preferences and candidate availability. We provide bounds on the minimal value of k required to determine the correct winner under the plurality and Borda voting rules, considering both worst-case preference profiles and profiles drawn from the impartial culture and Mallows probabilistic models. We also derive conditions under which the special case of zero-elicitation (i.e., k = 0) produces the correct winner. We provide empirical results that confirm the value of top-k voting. 1
Keyphrases
efficient vote elicitation candidate uncertainty correct winner top-k voting worst-case preference profile probabilistic model voter preference top-k vote elicitation natural form mallow probabilistic model true winner impartial culture empirical result high probability special case borda voting rule partial vote elicitation candidate availability minimal value
