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Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids (2000)
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BibTeX
@MISC{Yokoo00robustcombinatorial,
author = {Makoto Yokoo and Yuko Sakurai and Shigeo Matsubara},
title = {Robust Combinatorial Auction Protocol against False-name Bids},
year = {2000}
}
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Abstract
This paper presents a new combinatorial auction protocol (LDS protocol) that is robust against false-name bids. Internet auctions have become an integral part of Electronic Commerce (EC) and a promising field for applying agent and Artificial Intelligence technologies. Although the Internet provides an excellent infrastructure for combinatorial auctions, we must consider the possibility of a new type of cheating, i.e., an agent tries to profit from submitting several bids under fictitious names (false-name bids). If there exists no false-name bid, the generalized Vickrey auction (GVA) satisfies individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, and incentive compatibility. On the other hand, when false-name bids are possible, it is theoretically impossible for a combinatorial auction protocol to simultaneously satisfy these three properties. The Leveled Division Set (LDS) protocol, which is a modification of the GVA, utilizes reservation prices of auctioned goods for making decisions on whether to sell goods in a bundle or separately. The LDS protocol satisfies individual rationality and incentive compatibility, although it is not guaranteed to achieve a Pareto efficient social surplus. Simulation results show that the LDS protocol can achieve a better social surplus than that for a protocol that always sells goods in a bundle.
Keyphrases
false-name bid robust combinatorial auction protocol lds protocol incentive compatibility new combinatorial auction protocol electronic commerce individual rationality promising field artificial intelligence technology utilizes reservation price leveled division set combinatorial auction protocol excellent infrastructure integral part pareto efficient social surplus social surplus combinatorial auction internet auction simulation result new type pareto efficiency lds protocol satisfies individual rationality fictitious name auctioned good several bid generalized vickrey auction
