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Overconfidence and speculative bubbles (2003)

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by José Scheinkman , Wei Xiong
Venue:Journal of Political Economy
Citations:329 - 22 self
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@ARTICLE{Scheinkman03overconfidenceand,
    author = {José Scheinkman and Wei Xiong},
    title = {Overconfidence and speculative bubbles},
    journal = {Journal of Political Economy},
    year = {2003}
}

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Abstract

Motivated by the behavior of asset prices, trading volume and price volatility during historical episodes of asset price bubbles, we present a continuous time equilibrium model where overconfidence generates disagreements among agents regarding asset fundamentals. With short-sale constraints, an asset owner has an option to sell the asset to other overconfident agents when they have more optimistic beliefs. As in Harrison and Kreps (1978), this re-sale option has a recursive structure, that is, a buyer of the asset gets the option to resell it. Agents pay prices that exceed their own valuation of future dividends because they believe that in the future they will find a buyer willing to pay even more. This causes a significant bubble component in asset prices even when small differences of beliefs are sufficient to generate a trade. In equilibrium, large bubbles are accompanied by large trading volume and high price volatility. Our model has an explicit solution, which allows for several comparative statics exercises. Our analysis shows that while Tobin’s tax can substantially reduce speculative trading when transaction costs are small, it has only a limited impact on the size of the bubble or on price volatility. We also give an example where the price of a subsidiary is larger than its parent firm. This paper was previously circulated under the title “Overconfidence, Short-Sale Constraints and Bubbles.”

Keyphrases

speculative bubble    short-sale constraint    asset price    price volatility    overconfident agent    tobin tax    historical episode    large bubble    asset fundamental    several comparative static exercise    re-sale option    small difference    high price volatility    parent firm    significant bubble component    continuous time equilibrium model    title overconfidence    transaction cost    large trading volume    recursive structure    trading volume    explicit solution    speculative trading    asset owner    future dividend    optimistic belief    limited impact    asset price bubble   

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