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Cooperation and coordination in the turn-taking dilemma (2003)
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| Venue: | In 14th International Conference on Game Theory at Stony |
| Citations: | 6 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Neill03cooperationand,
author = {Daniel B. Neill},
title = {Cooperation and coordination in the turn-taking dilemma},
booktitle = {In 14th International Conference on Game Theory at Stony},
year = {2003}
}
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Abstract
In many real-world situations, “cooperation ” in the simple sense of the Prisoner’s Dilemma is not sufficient for success: instead, cooperators must precisely coordinate more complex behaviors in a noisy environment. We investigate one such model, the Turn-Taking Dilemma, a variant of the repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the highest total payoff is achieved not by simultaneous mutual cooperation, but by taking turns defecting (alternating temptation and sucker payoffs). The Turn-Taking Dilemma more accurately models interactions where players must take short-term losses for long-term gains: situations marked by the intricate give-and-take of bargaining and compromise. Using “evolutionary dominance ” as a general measure of performance, we investigated which strategies are most successful in Turn-Taking Dilemma interactions. Our experiments demonstrate that turn-taking can be achieved in a noisy environment, even when agents have strict resource constraints (limited memory strategies). Top strategies such as EXALT2 can effectively coordinate turn-taking under noise, while exploiting cooperators and resisting exploitation by defectors; these strategies are likely to achieve success in the variety of real-world interactions modeled by the Turn-Taking Dilemma. 1 Two models of cooperation The Prisoner’s Dilemma, in its various forms, is widely used to model the evolution of cooperation in interactions between individuals with partially conflicting goals. In particular, two variants of the problem have captured the attention of the research community. In the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD), players simultaneously choose between cooperation for mutual benefit and defection for individual benefit, and this decision situation is repeated over a number of rounds (Axelrod and Hamilton, 1981). In the Alternating Prisoner’s Dilemma (APD), players alternate turns, and on each player’s turn he must choose whether to cooperate or defect (Nowak and Sigmund, 1994; Frean, 1994). For both of these models, the potential outcomes are given in the following payoff table:
Keyphrases
turn-taking dilemma noisy environment prisoner dilemma potential outcome real-world interaction turn-taking dilemma interaction complex behavior model interaction various form iterated prisoner simple sense sucker payoff many real-world situation resource constraint repeated prisoner dilemma player turn following payoff table general measure long-term gain top strategy total payoff alternating prisoner simultaneous mutual cooperation individual benefit intricate give-and-take limited memory strategy short-term loss research community decision situation evolutionary dominance mutual benefit
