BibTeX
@MISC{Necula97proof-carryingcode,
author = {George C. Necula},
title = {Proof-Carrying Code},
year = {1997}
}
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Abstract
This paper describes proof-carrying code (PCC), a mechanism by which a host system can determine with certainty that it is safe to execute a program supplied (possibly in binary form) by an untrusted source. For this to be possible, the untrusted code producer must supply with the code a safety proof that attests to the code's adherence to a previously defined safety policy. The host can then easily and quickly validate the proof without using cryptography and without consulting any external agents. In order to gain preliminary experience with PCC, we have performed several case studies. We show in this paper how proof-carrying code might be used to develop safe assembly-language extensions of ML programs. In the context of this case study, we present and prove the adequacy of concrete representations for the safety policy, the safety proofs, and the proof validation. Finally, we briefly discuss how we use proof-carrying code to develop network packet filters that are faster than similar filters developed using other techniques and are formally guaranteed to be safe with respect to a given operating system safety policy.
Keyphrases
proof-carrying code safety proof safety policy similar filter untrusted code producer preliminary experience operating system safety policy host system case study binary form network packet filter several case study concrete representation untrusted source proof validation external agent ml program safe assembly-language extension
