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SOS: Secure overlay services (2002)

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by Angelos D. Keromytis , Vishal Misra , Dan Rubenstein
Venue:In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM
Citations:251 - 15 self
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BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Keromytis02sos:secure,
    author = {Angelos D. Keromytis and Vishal Misra and Dan Rubenstein},
    title = {SOS: Secure overlay services},
    booktitle = {In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM},
    year = {2002},
    pages = {61--72}
}

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Abstract

angelos,misra,danr„ Denial of service (DoS) attacks continue to threaten the reliability of networking systems. Previous approaches for protecting networks from DoS attacks are reactive in that they wait for an attack to be launched before taking appropriate measures to protect the network. This leaves the door open for other attacks that use more sophisticated methods to mask their traffic. We propose an architecture called Secure Overlay Services (SOS) that proactively prevents DoS attacks, geared toward supporting Emergency Services or similar types of communication. The architecture is constructed using a combination of secure overlay tunneling, routing via consistent hashing, and filtering. We reduce the probability of successful attacks by (i) performing intensive filtering near protected network edges, pushing the attack point perimeter into the core of the network, where high-speed routers can handle the volume of attack traffic, and (ii) introducing randomness and anonymity into the architecture, making it difficult for an attacker to target nodes along the path to a specific SOS-protected destination. Using simple analytical models, we evaluate the likelihood that an attacker can successfully launch a DoS attack against an SOSprotected network. Our analysis demonstrates that such an architecture reduces the likelihood of a successful attack to minuscule levels.

Keyphrases

secure overlay service    do attack    successful attack    attack point perimeter    intensive filtering    network edge    attack traffic    danr denial    specific sos-protected destination    sophisticated method    sosprotected network    minuscule level    appropriate measure    previous approach    similar type    secure overlay tunneling    high-speed router    simple analytical model    consistent hashing    emergency service   

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