Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations

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Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations (2002)

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by Tuomas Sandholm

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175 - 23 self

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@INPROCEEDINGS{Sandholm02winnerdetermination,
    author = {Tuomas Sandholm},
    title = {Winner determination in combinatorial auction generalizations},
    booktitle = {},
    year = {2002},
    pages = {69--76}
}

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Abstract

Combinatorial markets where bids can be submitted on bundles of items can be economically desirable coordination mechanisms in multiagent systems where the items exhibit complementarity and substitutability. There has been a surge of recent research on winner determination in combinatorial auctions. In this paper we study a wider range of combinatorial market designs: auctions, reverse auctions, and exchanges, with one or multiple units of each item, with and without free disposal. We first theoretically characterize the complexity. The most interesting results are that reverse auctions with free disposal can be approximated, and in all of the cases without free disposal, even finding a feasible solution is ÆÈ-complete. We then ran experiments on known benchmarks as well as ones which we introduced, to study the complexity of the market variants in practice. Cases with free disposal tended to be easier than ones without. On many distributions, reverse auctions with free disposal were easier than auctions with free disposal— as the approximability would suggest—but interestingly, on one of the most realistic distributions they were harder. Single-unit exchanges were easy, but multi-unit exchanges were extremely hard. 1

Keyphrases

free disposal winner determination combinatorial auction generalization reverse auction multi-unit exchange interesting result combinatorial market design recent research desirable coordination mechanism multiagent system multiple unit wider range combinatorial auction market variant combinatorial market single-unit exchange many distribution realistic distribution feasible solution known benchmark

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