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Two Formal Approaches for Approximating Noninterference Properties (2004)
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| Venue: | FOUNDATIONS OF SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DESIGN II |
| Citations: | 8 - 4 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Aldini04twoformal,
author = {Allesandro Aldini and Mario Bravetti and Alessandra Di Pierro and Roberto Gorrieri and Chris Hankin and Herbert Wiklicky},
title = {Two Formal Approaches for Approximating Noninterference Properties},
booktitle = {FOUNDATIONS OF SECURITY ANALYSIS AND DESIGN II},
year = {2004},
publisher = {Springer LNCS}
}
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Abstract
The formalisation of security properties for computer systems raises the problem of overcoming also in a formal setting the classical view according to which confidentiality is an absolute property stating the complete absence of any unauthorised disclosure of information. In this paper, we present two formal models in which the notion of noninterference, which is at the basis of a large variety of security properties defined in the recent literature, is approximated. To this aim, the definition of indistinguishability of process behaviour is replaced by a similarity notion, which introduces a quantitative measure ε of the behavioural difference among processes. The first model relies on a programming paradigm called Probabilistic Concurrent Constraint Programming, while the second one is presented in the setting of a probabilistic process algebra. In both models, appropriate notions of distance provide information (the ε) on the security level of the system at hand, in terms of the capability of an external observer of identifying illegal interferences.
Keyphrases
noninterference property formal approach security property probabilistic process algebra distance provide information programming paradigm recent literature similarity notion computer system unauthorised disclosure probabilistic concurrent constraint programming formal model large variety absolute property external observer illegal interference process behaviour complete absence appropriate notion first model relies second one classical view quantitative measure security level behavioural difference
