BibTeX
@MISC{Li07strategicpricing,
author = {Mingmei Li},
title = {Strategic Pricing to Stimulate Node Cooperation},
year = {2007}
}
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Abstract
In wireless ad hoc networks, all nodes cooperate to provide network services. Due to the limited radio transmission range, data packets are usually forwarded through multiple relay nodes before they reach the destinations. If a node always serves as a relay to transmit the packets, it may quickly use up its own energy and other resources. Therefore, some nodes use a selfish approach: they try to avoid forwarding the packets. Such selfish behavior would probably cause the network to break down. Selfish nodes are common within ad hoc networks because they are managed by different authorities. In this thesis, the node cooperation problems are analyzed in two steps: 1) a game theoretic analysis is provided to stimulate node to cooperate; 2) a price-demand function based incentive model is proposed to optimize the nodes ’ service demand and service provision, and encourage the relay nodes to be honest. Firstly, a game theoretic analysis is proposed to study node cooperation. In the related chapter, a “payment and compensation ” scheme is used as a less-aggressive
Keyphrases
stimulate node cooperation strategic pricing game theoretic analysis selfish behavior data packet compensation scheme service provision node cooperation wireless ad hoc network node service demand selfish approach different authority network service price-demand function related chapter node cooperation problem ad hoc network selfish node incentive model limited radio transmission range multiple relay node
