Adaptive Limited-Supply Online Auctions

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Adaptive Limited-Supply Online Auctions (2004)

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by Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi , Robert Kleinberg , David C. Parkes

Venue:	In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce
Citations:	96 - 24 self

BibTeX

@INPROCEEDINGS{Hajiaghayi04adaptivelimited-supply,
    author = {Mohammad T. Hajiaghayi and Robert Kleinberg and David C. Parkes},
    title = {Adaptive Limited-Supply Online Auctions},
    booktitle = {In Proceedings of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce},
    year = {2004},
    pages = {71--80},
    publisher = {ACM Press}
}

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Abstract

We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically. We suppose that agent valuations are drawn independently from some unknown distribution and construct an adaptive auction that is nevertheless value- and time-strategyproof. For the k = 1 problem we have a strategyproof variant on the classic secretary problem. We present a 4-competitive (e-competitive) strategyproof online algorithm with respect to offline Vickrey for revenue (efficiency) . We also show (in a model that slightly generalizes the assumption of independent valuations) that no mechanism can be better than 3/2-competitive (2-competitive) for revenue (efficiency). Our general approach considers a learning phase followed by an accepting phase, and is careful to handle incentive issues for agents that span the two phases. We extend to the k > 1 case, by deriving strategyproof mechanisms which are constant-competitive for revenue and efficiency. Finally, we present some strategyproof competitive algorithms for the case in which adversary uses a distribution known to the mechanism.

Keyphrases

adaptive limited-supply online auction accepting phase strategyproof mechanism agent valuation unknown distribution learning phase independent valuation adaptive auction strategyproof variant incentive issue classic secretary problem limited-supply online auction problem online algorithm general approach nevertheless value strategyproof competitive algorithm

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