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Understanding the NetworkLevel Behavior of Spammers (2006)

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by Anirudh Ramachandran , Nick Feamster
Citations:290 - 22 self
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BibTeX

@MISC{Ramachandran06understandingthe,
    author = {Anirudh Ramachandran and Nick Feamster},
    title = {Understanding the NetworkLevel Behavior of Spammers },
    year = {2006}
}

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Abstract

This paper studies the network-level behavior of spammers, including: IP address ranges that send the most spam, common spamming modes (e.g., BGP route hijacking, bots), how persistent across time each spamming host is, and characteristics of spamming botnets. We try to answer these questions by analyzing a 17-month trace of over 10 million spam messages collected at an Internet “spam sinkhole”, and by correlating this data with the results of IP-based blacklist lookups, passive TCP fingerprinting information, routing information, and botnet “command and control ” traces. We find that most spam is being sent from a few regions of IP address space, and that spammers appear to be using transient “bots ” that send only a few pieces of email over very short periods of time. Finally, a small, yet non-negligible, amount of spam is received from IP addresses that correspond to short-lived BGP routes, typically for hijacked prefixes. These trends suggest that developing algorithms to identify botnet membership, filtering email messages based on network-level properties (which are less variable than email content), and improving the security of the Internet routing infrastructure, may prove to be extremely effective for combating spam.

Keyphrases

networklevel behavior    network-level property    internet spam sinkhole    ip address space    passive tcp fingerprinting information    email message    control trace    spam message    short period    short-lived bgp route    botnet command    internet routing infrastructure    ip address    email content    17-month trace    network-level behavior    botnet membership    paper study    ip-based blacklist lookup    transient bot    bgp route hijacking   

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