BibTeX
@MISC{_forthcomingin,
author = {},
title = {Forthcoming in Philosophy Compass},
year = {}
}
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Abstract
[Penultimate draft; any citations should be to the final, published version.] Abstract: A traditional idea has it that moral judgment involves more than calculating the consequences of actions; it also requires an assessment of the agent’s intentions, the act’s nature, and whether the agent uses another person as a means to her ends. I survey experimental developments suggesting that ordinary people often tacitly reason in terms of such deontological rules. It’s now unclear whether we should posit a traditional form of the Doctrine of Double Effect. However, further research suggests that a range of non-consequentialist factors influence moral judgment, including: intentions, commissions, personal harm, and agent-centered commitments. Many, if not all, such factors appear to affect how involved the agent is in bringing about an outcome.
