Abstract

Abstract This article analyzes the extent to which two institutional logics around climate change-the climate change "convinced" and the climate change "skeptical" logics-are truly competing or talking past each other in a way that can be described as a logic schism. Drawing on the concept of framing from social movement theory, it uses qualitative field observations from the largest climate deniers conference in the United States and a data set of almost 800 op-eds from major news outlets over a 2-year period to examine how convinced and skeptical arguments of opposing logics employ frames and issue categories to make arguments about climate change. This article finds that the two logics are engaging in different debates on similar issues with the former focusing on solutions while the latter debates the definition of the problem. It concludes that the debate appears to be reaching a level of polarization where one might begin to question whether meaningful dialogue and problem solving has become unavailable to participants. The implications of such a logic schism is a shift from an integrative debate focused on addressing interests, to a distributive battle over concessionary agreements with each side pursuing its goals by demonizing the other. Avoiding such an outcome requires the activation of, as yet, dormant "broker" categories (technology, religion, and national security), the redefinition of existing ones (science, economics, risk, ideology), and the engagement of effective "climate brokers" to deliver them. Keywords institutional logic, cultural frame, issue category, climate change, climate skepticism, logic schism, challenger logic, climate broker In 1995, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) declared that "the balance of evidence, from changes in global mean surface air temperature and from changes in geographical, seasonal and vertical patterns of atmospheric temperature, suggests a discernible human influence on global climate" (Bolin et al, 1995). That announcement reflected a larger fact that academic scholars in the physical sciences had come to almost universally accept the belief that human 4 Organization & Environment 24(1) activity was a major cause of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and that these emissions were influencing changes in the global climate. 1 In the face of such scientific support, most social scientists also adopted the idea that anthropogenic climate change was real. While attention to climate change in the social and managerial sciences was slower to develop than in the physical sciences In short, all of these communities had overwhelmingly adopted the view that anthropogenic climate change was a problem and treated this view as a dominant institutional logic. As "the belief systems that furnish guidelines for practical action" (Rao, Monin, & Durand. 2003, p. 795), institutional logics are a critical starting point for understanding the underlying beliefs Unfortunately, much of our social science research either takes a relatively dismissive attitude toward those who challenge the scientific view that climate change is real-dubbed "climate skeptics" or "climate deniers"-or subscribes to them sinister motives and neglects their beliefs altogether (see The shift in the debate began in the fall of 2009 with a series of events that galvanized the climate denier movement and created confusion within the general public. First, the integrity of the scientific community was called into question in November 2009 when a long series of e-mails among climate scientists at the University of East Anglia were released. Dubbed "climategate" by the media, climate deniers claimed the e-mails proved that prominent climate scientists had manipulated and withheld data that disproved the severity of climate change. Subsequent investigations cleared the scientists of wrongdoing Prominent climate deniers quickly adopted these events as a basis for challenging the notion that climate change is a legitimate problem. Coincident with this denier attention was a sharp drop in public acceptance of the reality of climate change. In 2009, a nationally representative survey conducted by the Pew Research Center (2009) This article seeks to expand our understanding of the climate debate by examining it through the lens of cultural and institutional theories Surprisingly, we do not yet have a framework to talk about the climate debate in the social realm. Drawing on my own training in organizational theory, I rely on social movement theory on framing In this analysis, I am careful to distinguish between the organized "climate denier" movement and the broader "skeptical" population. Whereas the organized denier movement is a collective social movement run by professional advocacy organizations working to discredit climate change, such as the Heartland Institute, and conservative think tanks, that produce research and white papers, such as the Cato Institute, the "skeptical" label is ascribed to a population who are doubtful about climate change or the motivations behind calls for climate action in the broader population. To explore how competing logics are presented within the debate over climate change, I examine the issue categories and cultural frames employed by both convinced and skeptical authors in U.S. newspaper editorials between 2007 and 2009. A critical question is whether these competing movements are engaged in common debate or whether they are "talking past each other" in what amounts to a "logic schism." I also seek to uncover which categories and frames from the climate denier movement resonate within the skeptical population by drawing on qualitative field research collected at the largest climate denier conference in the United States and recent work on the denier movement by others Literature Review Similar to all environmental issues, the issue of climate change is institutionally and culturally rooted Recent and successful efforts by organizational researchers to move beyond institutional isomorphism and stability to explore the dynamics of such activities Social Movements and Field-Level Debates Recent discussions in institutional theory have examined the extent to which agents form political networks and coalitions collation act as "important motors of institution-building, deinstitutionalization, and reinstitutionalization in organizational fields" (Rao et al., 2003, p. 796). This conception provides a bridge between institutional theory and social movement theory , focusing attention on the ability of social movements to give rise to new organizational fields and change the demography of existing organizational fields In this contest, social movement organizations with similar preferences for change constitute a social movement industry, a unit of analysis not unlike the organizational field. Change agents become part of these collective movements, using shared and accumulated resources and power to "overcome historical inertia, undermine the entrenched power structures in the field or triumph over alternative projects of change" (Guillen, 2006, p. 43). These actions are often conducted in opposition to others in similarly configured collective movements On the issue of climate change, social movement actors have actively mobilized to influence the form and direction of the broader debate. In the climate "denier" movement, there are groups such as the Heartland Institute, Cato Institute, Hoover Institute, Competitive Enterprise Institute, and others. In the climate "believer" movement, there are groups such as the IPCC, the National Academies of Science, the Center for American Progress, the Environmental Defense Fund, and others. The engagement between the opposing movements has had notable influence within specific constituencies that lie between them, within the general public and the social debate over the problems and solutions to climate change. Consider, for example, the demographic dynamics of the recent shift in beliefs about climate change within the American public. The largest shifts in beliefs from 2008 to 2009 occurred at the extremes of the debate. The percentage of respondents claiming climate change to be "very serious" dropped from 44 to 35 percent and those who see it as "not a problem" increased from 11 to 17 percent (Pew Research Center, 2009). These extreme positions are where one might expect members of the most engaged citizens to reside and can provide views of the contested nature of the debate. But while such surveys provide invaluable snapshots regarding where particular parts of public opinion stands on climate, they do not explain why these shifts occur or how they might weaken or strengthen climate resistance away from the extremes and more toward the broader social and policy realms. Studying the logics, categories and frames that are employed within the climate conflict presently occurring is one way to gain traction in this effort (see Institutional Logics, Frames, and Issue Categories Logics can be observed at the level of "organizations, markets, industries, inter-organizational networks, geographic communities and organizational field" (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010, p. 825), and there are frequently competing logics battling for dominance within any given level . Logics "define the norms, values and beliefs that structure the cognition of actors in organizations and provide a collective understanding of how strategic interests and decisions are formulated" (Thornton, 2002, p. 82) and describe the practices and beliefs embedded within institutions and populations within them. As such, they provide the "organizing principles for institutionalized practices in social systems" (Nigam & Ocasio, 2010, p. 823). So, for example, the institutional logic of capitalism is the "accumulation and the commodification of human activity; that of the state is rationalization and the regulation of human activity by legal and bureaucratic hierarchies (Friedland & Alford, 1991, p. 248). These are the "axial principles of organization and action based on cultural discourses and strategic practices prevalent in different institutional or societal sectors" (Thornton, 2004, p. 2). On the issue of climate change, we are in a period of flux in which an understanding of the issue and its possible solutions has not yet been fully resolved, despite perspectives within the 8 Organization & Environment 24(1) academy that it has. As a challenge to the existing scientific and political order has emerged, conflicts and tension between competing logics are brought to the surface through framing debates and discursive contests. The domain in which these challenges are resolved can be described as an institutional "field of struggles" The skeptical logic has been described as relatively hierarchical and individualistic in nature. Consistent with a capitalist market logic, those who employ this logic will be skeptical of environmental risks, as such beliefs would justify restricting commerce and individual freedom. Conversely, the convinced logic has been described as being more egalitarian and communitarian in nature. Those who employ this logic will be inclined to accept environmental risks because they resent unrestrained commerce and self-interested behavior and readily accept that such activities are dangerous and worthy of regulation Tightly linked to logics is the concept of cultural frames and framing processes. Although "both refer to ideas and belief systems and recognize the role they play in providing direction, motivation, meaning and coherence" (McAdam & Scott, 2005, p. 16), logics refer to the power of dominant ideologies and shared worldviews, and frames are used to present and articulate those worldviews. Where institutional ideologies can be thought of as the core beliefs that drive a movement, framing is the strategies of promoting a particular logic. Frames become particularly salient with groups that seek to challenge the dominant logics as they are critical for mobilizing a movement and lend structure and organization to a set of specific practices In this article, I focus on three types of collective action frames that social movement organizations typically employ-diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational The third and final concept in this article is that of the issue category. These are the empirical topics or subjects that underpin logics and form the center around which logics and frames are employed. Hulme (2009) has presented seven such categories, which will form the initial structure for this article. These include science, economics, religion, psychology, media, development, and governance. A Logic Schism By analyzing the frames and categories used by proponents of the convinced and skeptical logics, this article seeks to take a first step in uncovering whether these competing logics represent a schism that cannot be resolved. Such schisms arise due to linguistic and value differences that Hoffman 9 lead to positions that are relatively exclusive, rigid, inelastic, and restricted. Boundaries become established, which define clear in-group and out-group distinctions Pielke In a logic schism, a contest emerges in which opposing sides are debating different issues, seeking only information that supports their position and disconfirms their opponents' arguments Method and Data To analyze the current debate over climate change, data were collected from two separate sources. The first source of data comes from qualitative research using interviews, texts, and observations at the largest annual climate denier conference in the world-the Fourth International Conference on Climate Change-in May 2010. This 2-day conference is hosted by the Heartland Institute, an organization that lists "building social movements" as one of its stated goals. The organization's mission is to "discover, develop, and promote free-market solutions to social and economic problems," and its target audience is the "the nation's 8,300 state and national elected officials and approximately 8,400 local government officials" (http://www.heart land.org/about/mission.html). The author's sociology graduate student research assistant with advanced training in qualitative research methods was invited to the conference by a long-time climate denier insider who agreed to attend all the sessions and facilitate informal interviews with conference attendees. The research assistant attended the conference, recorded quotes from conference presentations (also available online at http://www.heartland.org/events/2010Chicago/proceedings.html), and conducted informal interviews with conference participants. During these interactions, the research assistant was able to inquire about individuals' motivations for attending the conference, their organizational affiliations to government or private sector groups, and their climate beliefs. The research assistant relied on the climate denier informant who was also present during these interactions to test and clarify observations against the informants' understanding of the presentations. Detailed field notes from the conference were recorded after each conference day ended. These source materials-along with work on the organized climate denier movement The second source of data comes from an analysis of all U.S. newspaper editorials in the LexisNexis database from September 2007 to September 2009 that included the keywords "climate change" or "global warming." This search criterion yielded 885 editorials and letters to the editor. 10 Organization & Environment 24(1) After removing duplicates and nonrelevant articles, the final data set includes 795 articles, which were used to capture the institutional logics and frames within the broader climate debate. I chose the time period from 2007 to 2009 because of the major shift in climate opinion among the American public that occurred from April 2008 The newspaper data were coded using a coding key developed based on Hulme's (2009) seven "lenses" to view the climate change debate. Using Hulme's work as a guide, an initial code key of seven issue categories was created in which the convinced and skeptical authors were likely to invoke particular frames and categories in their editorial writings. The initial key was tested using subsamples of articles, and through multiple rounds of coding and revising the key with the author and research assistants, a comprehensive code key was created that includes frames in the following issue categories: science, risk, technology, economics, religion, political ideology, and national security. See the appendix for the full coding key. Within each of the seven issue categories, convinced and skeptical arguments were further coded as diagnostic, prognostic, or motivational frames The newspaper editorials were coded by two Sociology doctoral students with advanced training in qualitative methods. The coders applied global and specific codes to each article using HyperRESEARCH 2.8. First, they coded each article overall as convinced, skeptical, neutral, or unclear. Next, they coded each article sentence by sentence using the code key outlined above. If sentences expressed multiple frames in different issue categories, each frame was coded. Frames were also coded multiple times if they were used more than once in a given article. After coding several subsamples of the data to discuss discrepancies and refine the code key, the coders' interrater reliability in all but two of the issue categories was .60 or higher (Cohen's kappa). In the two categories where reliability was lower, the coders discussed their coding differences until agreement could be reached. The articles were also coded for date, newspaper source, newspaper location, author credentials, article length, and whether the article was a letter to the editor. Hoffman 11 Findings Climate Denier Conference Observations The Heartland Institute conference included presentations by more than 70 climate denier presenters (and 2 climate believer speakers) over a 2-day period with an estimated audience of around 700 conference attendees. The theme of the conference was "Reconsidering the Science and Economics" and was cosponsored by almost 120 nonprofit institutions, including among others: Americans for Tax Reform, Ayn Rand Institute, Cornwall Alliance for the Stewardship of Creation, George C. Marshall Institute, Hayek Institut, John Locke Foundation, New Zealand Climate Science Coalition, Science and Public Policy Institute, and the Tennessee Center for Policy Research. The presentations consisted of small panel discussions as well as full conference plenary speeches. Many of the speakers used loud, forceful tones during their presentations to express their view that climate change is not a problem, and many also expressed optimism at the recent increase in public skepticism around climate change, the climategate scandal, and the IPCC retractions. The self-proclaimed climate denier who sponsored the attendance at the conference emphasized that climate deniers in the movement are not monolithic in their views. He noted, for example, that deniers have diverse opinions regarding nuclear energy and energy security, and some are driven more by libertarian ideologies while others connect climate change to social issues. Despite these differences within the movement, the majority of presenters invoked three primary issue categories during the conference-science, ideology, and economics-and a predominant emphasis on addressing the nature of the problem through a diagnostic frame. Science. Beyond the actual scientific data of climate change, deniers at the Heartland conference focused on what they consider a corrupt and deeply flawed peer-review process in the scientific academic community. In the denier view, peer review is not based on the merit of the res earch being produced but by the political and social biases of scientists in editorial positions at academic journals Ideology. The deniers also asserted that science editors only publish work that conforms to their own political beliefs. For many climate deniers, there is a belief that climate change is inextricably tied to a liberal political ideology that borders on socialism or communism. During conference presentations and in conversations with attendees, individuals who believe in the science of climate change were referred to as all the following: Warmists, Alarmists, AGW (Anthropocentric Global Warming) people, Lefties, Communists, and Obama-ites. One presenter said that climate believers "hate people, they hate the Western economy." Another went further to suggest, "He who controls carbon controls life," and told the audience that Americans might end up with carbon rationing cards for every person if climate believers succeed. This speaker also called a Thomas Friedman New York Times editorial about the ability of China to do more on climate change faster than the United States, a call for totalitarianism in the United States. Many presenters framed climate change as a tool for a stronger role for government in the personal lives of Americans and a severe restriction on their freedom. For example, a prominent climate denier scientist who was running for the U.S. House of Representatives expressed this view in a campaign video shown at the conference. He said, "All of our industries have been hampered by government regulation . . . climate change is just another attempt to diminish our freedom." Another speaker made links to the environmental movement and ideology by saying, "The environmental agenda seeks to use the state to create scarcity as a means to exert their will, and the state's authority, over your lives." 12 Organization & Environment 24 Overall, the field observations at the Heartland Institute Conference show a denier emphasis on three issue categories (science, ideology, and economics) and a diagnostic frame. The presentation of this emphasis aligns closely to the observations of others who have studied the climate denier movement (i.e., Newspaper Coding Descriptive data. The overall position on climate change within the newspaper article data mirrors national public opinion data for 2008 (see 2 Given this disparity in the convinced and skeptical sample sizes, I do not compare the raw numbers of frames and categories used by each side, but rather the percentage of articles under each logic. Convinced articles were found to be more likely presented through op-eds whereas the skeptical articles were presented more commonly through letters to the editor (see Whereas journalists wrote more than 46% of convinced articles, they only authored 32% of skeptical articles as shown in 3 Notably low in the authorship of all of the climate change articles (convinced and skeptical) are scientists, academics, and policy officials. Presumably, these experts write about climate change Hoffman 13 in venues other than newspaper editorials, but the degree to which their messages regularly reach lay audiences is unclear. Issue categories. This analysis of the skeptical and convinced logics began by looking at the issue categories that are employed in the debate over climate change. Shown in For the convinced, the dominant categories (more than 50% of the articles reference it) are risk (chi-square p ≤ .001) and political ideology (chi-square p ≤ .05). The secondary categories of concern (more than 20% of articles mention it) are science (chi-square p ≤ .001) and religion (chi-square p ≤ .001). The latent or dormant category (less than 20% of articles mention it) is national security (chi-square p ≤ .001). For the skeptical, the dominant categories are science (chi-square p ≤ .001) and political ideology (chi-square p ≤ .05), and the secondary issue category is risk (chi-square p ≤ .001). Religion (chi-square p ≤ .001) and national security (chi-square p ≤ .001) are latent or dormant. Results for economics and technology were not significant. Not surprisingly, almost 90% of skeptical articles reference science. It suggests that the skeptical logic centers on the idea that the problem definition of climate change is the crux of the debate. For the skeptical, there is no problem or there is uncertainty about whether there is a problem. This Frames. Looking more deeply at the frames that are presented within each logic, Skeptical authors were fairly singular in their framing of the issue, with almost 95% of articles using diagnostic frames to call into question the problematization of climate change. The majority of this questioning centered on the science behind climate change, as illustrated by this skeptical newspaper quote: Did you know that global temperatures have been falling, not rising, for the past decadedespite the IPCC's predictions of a steady rise? Have you ever heard the maxim, "If the facts contradict the theory, find a new theory"-a maxim now being ignored by our leaders? (Article no. 84) Conversely, the types of frames invoked for convinced arguments, while predominately prognostic, are more evenly distributed. Diagnostic and motivational frames are both used in more than half of the convinced articles. From this observation, there appears to be more frame heterogeneity in the convinced versus frame homogeneity in the skeptical logic. Linkages between frames and issue categories. Although the skeptical logic broadly addresses climate change as an issue of science and political ideology Al Gore wanders the spheroid he is determined to save, spouting increasingly inane observations as his bank account grows and his "carbon footprint" becomes ever more Godzillalike, considering all the jet fuel burned as he hurtles from appearance to appearance. I have read that his speaking fee is now $175,000 a pop, a fee for which his audiences are fed what seems to me to be an amazing concoction of lies, distortions and flights of fancy. (Article no. 62) As a contrast, convinced articles invoke prognostic frames under the political ideology category more often than diagnostic frames (chi-square p ≤ .001), placing emphasis on what type of federal climate legislation should be passed. Even when convinced authors do not like the form that climate legislation or climate action may take politically, they are generally supportive of doing something about it through legislation or regulation. This convinced author, for example, suggests that any vote for cap and trade is better than nothing: There is much in the House cap-and-trade energy bill that just passed that I absolutely hate. It is too weak in key areas and way too complicated in others. A simple, straightforward carbon tax would have made much more sense than this Rube Goldberg contraption. It is pathetic that we couldn't do better. It is appalling that so much had to be given away to polluters. It stinks. It's a mess. I detest it. Now let's get it passed in the Senate and make it law. (Article no. 72) It is also interesting to note that, although skeptical articles focus less on prognostic frames for climate change under political ideology than convinced authors (because of their opposition 16 Organization & Environment 24(1) to climate legislation), more than 20% of skeptical ideology articles include prognostic frames (chi-square p ≤ .001). These articles generally suggest legislation (carbon tax or cap and trade) should not be passed. The vast majority of the skeptical ideology prognostic frames focus on the argument that fast-growing developing countries such as China, India, and Brazil have to commit to GHG reductions before the United States should take any action. Perhaps the most interesting difference between the two logics manifests itself in the riskissue category. Shown in Global warming does not imply that it will be 50 degrees in the winter in Michigan. What it does mean is that the depletion of the ozone layer and subsequent warming of the earth's oceans and crust will lead to continually worsening weather phenomena when typically cold arctic air masses meet the now warmer air masses coming from the oceans. Consequently, thunderstorms, rainfall, snowfall, tornadoes, hurricanes, tsunamis, and temperature fluctuations to the lower or higher will in fact be much more frequent as well as severe. Climate change is a complex combination of factors that results in a myriad of weather aberrations. (Article no. 243) The convinced authors do not stop at defining climate change as a risk, however. They also express actions they believe must be taken to address the issues. The following convinced risk prognostic article expresses this sentiment: The problem, when it comes to motivating politicians, is that the dangers from global warming-drought, famine, rising seas-appear to be decades off. But the only way to prevent them is with sacrifices in the here and now: with smaller cars, bigger investments in new energy sources, higher electricity bills that will inevitably result once we put a price on carbon. (Article no. 11) For the skeptical, the framing of risk is focused much more on motivations than diagnosing the problem or suggesting actions to take (chi-square p ≤ .001). Although risk is a secondary issue category for skeptical authors, over a quarter of all such articles make a risk motivational argument to focus on the positive externalities that will occur due to climate change (e.g., longer growing seasons) or the risks to quality of life if climate change is addressed. For example, this skeptical risk motivational article states that, "Not all the effects of climate change negatively affect agriculture; growing seasons will be longer and increased carbon dioxide levels encourage plant growth." (Article no. 151) Discussion When one thinks about the climate change debate, it is sometimes tempting to first refer to the political discourse on the issue, particularly around the Waxman-Markey Climate Bill (HR 2454 level will be heaven on Earth, but the place that has actually achieved it is a nation swimming in bacterial and protozoal diarrhea, hepatitis A and E, typhoid fever, dengue fever and malaria, with 47 percent illiteracy and a life expectancy of 49 years. It reminds me in some ways of the debate taking place in this country and around the world in the late 1930s. During that period of Nazism and fascism's growth-a real danger to the United States and democratic countries around the world-there were people in this country and in the British parliament who said "don't worry! Hitler's not real! It'll disappear!" Similar to the divisions in the political rhetoric, the denier movement field observations in this article show an antagonistic posture toward the believer movement. And, it appears that some of the themes present in the denier social movement are present in the broader skeptical movement represented by the newspaper article data. A focus on the diagnostic framing of the issue is central within both domains with the issue categories of science, ideology, and economics dominant in the denier movement and the issue categories of science and ideology within the skeptical logic. The coding results of newspaper articles also show a division between the skeptical and convinced logics with the former devoting a great deal of attention to the diagnostic frames around whether climate change is actually happening as a man-made phenomena, and the latter moving to the prognostic frames of accepting the nature of the problem and attending to solutions. This result is suggestive that they are engaging in different debates over climate. This form of division should not be unexpected as debate and control of this initial diagnostic frame is critically important to the identification and definition of the problem. Such diagnostic frames "constrain the range of possible reasonable solutions and strategies advocated" (Benford & Snow, 2000, p. 616). If the skeptical position moves to the prognostic, they accept a bounded set of solutions that have been predetermined by the accepted form of the definition of the problem. The skeptical logic is predominantly built on a diagnostic frame around the issue categories of science and ideology, whereas the convinced logic is predominately built on the prognostic frame around risk and ideology. Within the convinced logic, arguments span the spectrum of all three frames, suggesting continued engagement in a debate with the skeptical logic over the validity of the science. But, looking more deeply at the linkages between frames and issue categories, 18 Organization & Environment 24 Clearly, both logics view climate change as a political issue and engage on the issue by talking about political ideology, politics, and legislation. However, they do not frame the issue of political ideology in the same way. This is likely a reflection of the overall split in dominant frames between the two logics. Skeptical authors almost unanimously question the definition of the problem and who is to blame, using a diagnostic frame for political ideology to suggest that climate change is not a real scientific problem but rather a problem of morally questionable political figures. Convinced authors invoked a prognostic frame for political ideology, placing emphasis on what type of federal climate legislation should be passed to do something about a problem that has already been defined. Where convinced articles emphasize the physical, social, and health risks from climate change, skeptical articles focus on the risks to quality of life if climate change is addressed and the positive externalities that will occur due to climate change (e.g., longer growing seasons). Risk is built on two completely contrasting assessments of the threat at hand, one coming from inaction and the other from action. As one final note, there were two surprising results in the data. First, it was surprising to find that religion was more likely to be invoked as an issue category by the convinced than skeptical authors. Contrary to what many believe is a skeptical movement driven by the Christian right (see Climate change poses a myriad of difficult challenges-scientific, political, economic and technological. But more important than any of that, it poses a moral challenge. It asks whether we are so bound to our own comfort, so resistant to any suggestion of slight sacrifice, that we will risk condemning future generations to a profoundly diminished planet. (Article no. 735) Second, it was surprising to find that national security arguments were not invoked more often by convinced authors. One might have thought that national security would be another possible issue category that the convinced would use to persuade the undecided and skeptical that climate is a problem worth addressing. One possible explanation is that the national security frame is invoked more often by climate believer social movement actors writing white papers for think tanks and policy institutes that do not reach lay citizens as easily. In summary, there appears to be a deepening schism between the skeptical and convinced logics, one that rests on foundational arguments that are based on different worldviews, different issues, and different frames to communicate them. Much like the schism that exists between the denier and believer movements, the opposing skeptical and convinced logics within the broader public appear to be reaching a level of polarization where one might begin to question whether meaningful dialogue and problem solving has become unavailable to participants. Further research can provide a better understanding and better terminology to explain the details of this debate as well as examine how the debate takes form in different cultural and national contexts. The final sections of this article discuss the scholarly and policy implications of this preliminary result.