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Election Verifiability or Ballot Privacy: Do We Need to Choose?
| Citations: | 5 - 4 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Cuvelier_electionverifiability,
author = {Édouard Cuvelier and Olivier Pereira and Thomas Peters and Université Catholique De Louvain},
title = {Election Verifiability or Ballot Privacy: Do We Need to Choose?},
year = {}
}
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Abstract
Abstract. We propose a new encryption primitive, commitment consistent encryption (CCE), and instances of this primitive that enable building the first universally verifiable voting schemes with a perfectly private audit trail (PPAT) and practical complexity. That is: – the audit trail that is published for verifying elections guarantees everlasting privacy, and – the computational load required from the participants is only increased by a small constant factor compared to traditional voting schemes, and is optimal in the sense of Cramer, Gennaro and Schoenmakers [16]. These properties make it possible to introduce election verifiability in large scale elections as a pure benefit, that is, without loss of privacy compared to a non-verifiable scheme and at a similar level of efficiency. We propose different approaches for constructing voting schemes with PPAT from CCE, as well as two efficient CCE constructions: one is tailored for elections with a small number of candidates, while the second is suitable for elections with complex ballots. 1
Keyphrases
election verifiability ballot privacy commitment consistent encryption audit trail non-verifiable scheme pure benefit traditional voting scheme small number different approach complex ballot large scale election computational load private audit trail small constant factor efficient cce construction new encryption primitive practical complexity similar level verifiable voting scheme election guarantee
