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Sink equilibria and convergence (2005)
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| Venue: | IN FOCS |
| Citations: | 83 - 12 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Goemans05sinkequilibria,
author = {Michel Goemans and Vahab Mirrokni and Adrian Vetta},
title = {Sink equilibria and convergence},
booktitle = {IN FOCS},
year = {2005},
publisher = {}
}
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Abstract
We introduce the concept of a sink equilibrium. A sink equilibrium is a strongly connected component with no outgoing arcs in the strategy profile graph associated with a game. The strategy profile graph has a vertex set induced by the set of pure strategy profiles; its arc set corresponds to transitions between strategy profiles that occur with nonzero probability. (Here our focus will just be on the special case in which the strategy profile graph is actually a best response graph; that is, its arc set corresponds exactly to best response moves that result from myopic or greedy behaviour.) We argue that there is a natural convergence process to sink equilibria in games where agents use pure strategies. This leads to an alternative measure of the social cost of a lack of coordination, the price of sinking, which
