DMCA
Do difference in legal protection explain differences in ownership concentration? (2008)
| Citations: | 5 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Holderness08dodifference,
author = {Clifford G. Holderness},
title = {Do difference in legal protection explain differences in ownership concentration? },
year = {2008}
}
Share
 |
 |
 |
 |
||
OpenURL
Abstract
A key finding of the law and finance literature is that large shareholders are a response to weak legal protections for investors. The empirical support for this rests with analyses of country averages of ownership concentration. The use of averages, however, creates omitted-variable and aggregation biases. When I analyze firm-level observations and control for firm-level determinates, there is no relation between key measures of investors’ legal protections and ownership concentration. A re-examination of the theory of block ownership suggests no reason to expect any relation between investors’ legal protections and ownership concentration.
