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An incentive compatible reputation mechanism (2003)
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| Venue: | In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on E-Commerce |
| Citations: | 72 - 1 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Jurca03anincentive,
author = {Radu Jurca and Boi Faltings},
title = {An incentive compatible reputation mechanism},
booktitle = {In Proceedings of the IEEE Conference on E-Commerce},
year = {2003},
pages = {285--292}
}
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Abstract
Traditional centralised approaches to security are difficult to apply to large, distributed marketplaces in which software agents operate. Developing a notion of trust that is based on the reputation of agents can provide a softer notion of security that is sufficient for many multi-agent applications. In this paper, we address the issue of incentivecompatibility (i.e. how to make it optimal for agents to share reputation information truthfully), by introducing a sidepayment scheme, organised through a set of broker agents, that makes it rational for software agents to truthfully share the reputation information they have acquired in their past experience. We also show how to use a cryptographic mechanism to protect the integrity of reputation information and to achieve a tight bounding between the identity and reputation of an agent. 1.
