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Public key encryption with keyword search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random oracle
| Venue: | Information Sciences |
| Citations: | 6 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Fang_publickey,
author = {Liming Fang and Jiandong Wang and Chunpeng Ge and Yongjun Ren},
title = {Public key encryption with keyword search secure against keyword guessing attacks without random oracle},
journal = {Information Sciences},
year = {},
pages = {2013}
}
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Abstract
doi:10.4156/jdcta.vol4. issue9.17 A public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme does not allow the user to decrypt the encrypted keyword or decrypt the encrypted massage. This "no-decryption " property also limits the applicability of a PEKS scheme. Fuhr and Paillier also left an open problem on how to come up with a decryptable PEKS which security does not rely on random oracles. In this paper, we first enhance the security model of searchable encryption with decryption scheme (PEKSD) by allowing the test query, and present an efficient PEKSD scheme in the enhanced model without random oracle. And then, we extend our scheme to obtain PEKSD with independent decryption key and trapdoor derivation key. Finally, we also modify our scheme to achieve a PKE/PEKS scheme in which it allows to retrieve both
Keyphrases
random oracle public key encryption keyword search secure trapdoor derivation key security model encrypted massage open problem independent decryption key efficient peksd scheme decryptable peks encrypted keyword keyword search test query enhanced model decryption scheme pke peks scheme searchable encryption no-decryption property peks scheme
