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Differences between the iterated prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken game under noisy conditions (2002)
| Venue: | In Proc. of the 2002 ACM symposium on Applied computing |
| Citations: | 1 - 0 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Carlsson02differencesbetween,
author = {Bengt Carlsson},
title = {Differences between the iterated prisoner’s dilemma and the chicken game under noisy conditions},
booktitle = {In Proc. of the 2002 ACM symposium on Applied computing},
year = {2002},
pages = {42--48}
}
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Abstract
The prisoner´s dilemma has evolved into a standard game for analyzing the success of cooperative strategies in repeated games. With the aim of investigating the behavior of strategies in some alternative games we analyzed the outcome of iterated games for both the prisoner´s dilemma and the chicken game. In the chicken game, mutual defection is punished more strongly than in the prisoner´s dilemma, and yields the lowest fitness. We also ran our analyses under different levels of noise. The results reveal a striking difference in the outcome between the games. Iterated chicken game needed more generations to find a winning strategy. It also favored nice, forgiving strategies able to forgive a defection from an opponent. In particular the well-known strategy tit-for-tat has a poor successrate under noisy conditions. The chicken game conditions may be relatively common in other sciences, and therefore we suggest that this game should receive more interest as a cooperative game from researchers within computer science.
Keyphrases
chicken game noisy condition iterated prisoner dilemma prisoner dilemma iterated game well-known strategy tit-for-tat winning strategy mutual defection alternative game cooperative strategy standard game chicken game condition different level cooperative game repeated game poor successrate striking difference computer science
