@MISC{Turri_contingenta, author = {John Turri}, title = {Contingent A Priori Knowledge Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research}, year = {} }
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Abstract
Abstract: I argue that you can have a priori knowledge of propositions that neither are nor appear necessarily true. You can know a priori contingent propositions that you recognize as such. This overturns a standard view in contemporary epistemology and the traditional view of the a priori, which restrict a priori knowledge to necessary truths, or at least to truths that appear necessary. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 motivates the investigation. Section 2 recounts and criticizes a famous argument of Saul Kripke’s for the possibility of contingent a priori knowledge. Section 3 presents the standard view, focusing on Laurence BonJour’s influential version of it. Section 4 presents my argument for the possibility of contingent a priori knowledge. Section 5 responds to objections.