DMCA
C.: On the security of ballot receipts in e2e voting systems (2007)
Cached
Download Links
| Venue: | IAVoSS Workshop On Trustworthy Elections (WOTE |
| Citations: | 8 - 2 self |
BibTeX
@INPROCEEDINGS{Clark07c.:on,
author = {Jeremy Clark and Aleks Essex and Carlisle Adams},
title = {C.: On the security of ballot receipts in e2e voting systems},
booktitle = {IAVoSS Workshop On Trustworthy Elections (WOTE},
year = {2007}
}
Share
 |
 |
 |
 |
||
OpenURL
Abstract
Abstract. This paper examines and compares the security of ballot receipts in three end-to-end auditable (E2E) voting systems: Prêt à Voter, Punchscan, and Three-Ballot. Ballot receipts should have two properties: from a privacy perspective, they should provide no information as to how the ballot was cast, and from an integrity perspective, they should provide no information that would assist an adversary in tampering with the tallying process. We find that Prêt à Voter and Punchscan have similar security properties with respect to ballot receipts, and provide no nonnegligible information on the receipt itself that could compromise privacy or security (assuming the underlying cryptography is secure). However we show that ThreeBallot receipts leak partial information that is useful for compromising voter privacy and the integrity of the tally. 1
