

International Governance as New *Raison d'État*? The Case of the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy

MATHIAS KOENIG-ARCHIBUGI
London School of Economics and Political Science

Various scholars have suggested that at times national governments use international cooperation to gain influence in the domestic political arena and to overcome internal opposition to their preferred policies. Klaus Dieter Wolf has argued that this practice represents the latest embodiment of a longstanding *raison d'état* and has provided theoretical foundations for its systematic study. This article assesses the usefulness of this 'new *raison d'état*' thesis as a source of empirical hypotheses about the origins and persistence of international institutions. On the basis of the general logic of the argument, I develop one crucial implication that may be corroborated by cross-national research. In the light of this, the preferences of European governments regarding the institutional depth of the European Union's common foreign and security policy are examined. Overall, the findings presented in this article confirm that 'collusive delegation' can be a significant factor in the creation of international governance arrangements.

KEY WORDS ♦ CFSP ♦ common foreign and security policy ♦ delegation ♦ democratic deficit ♦ European Union ♦ executive autonomy ♦ international institutions ♦ two-level games

1. Introduction

That rulers sometimes foster international tensions in order to strengthen their grip on the ruled is hardly a new insight. In the early 16th century Erasmus (1515/1824: 487) gloomily remarked that often:

... a war against an unbelieving nation is made a mere pretext for picking the pockets of Christian people; that thus oppressed by every means, and quite

European Journal of International Relations Copyright © 2004
SAGE Publications and ECPR-European Consortium for Political Research, Vol. 10(2): 147–188
[DOI: 10.1177/1354066104042933]

broken down, they may, with more servility, submit their necks to the yoke of despotical rulers, both civil and ecclesiastical.

Far less common is the argument that not only international conflict but also international cooperation can be used by political leaders to maintain the upper hand in the relationship with their societies. International cooperation is usually seen as the way governments attempt to solve problems on behalf of their societies when unilateral action is not sufficient. In the pages of this *Journal*, Klaus Dieter Wolf (1999a) has presented a case for an alternative interpretation of international governance. According to this interpretation, governments, far from being faithful agents of societal groups, pursue their own goals and are prepared to collude with other governments against their own societies if this helps them to attain those goals. Governments are interested in increasing their autonomy vis-a-vis the other actors in the domestic political arena and '[s]elf-binding intergovernmental co-operation, which conventional wisdom mainly associates with a loss of state autonomy, may contribute to an overall gain of the autonomy of national governments' (Wolf, 1999a: 336).

Intergovernmental cooperation can thus be seen as a new *raison d'état*, as a device designed to loosen the constraints imposed on governments in the domestic arena. Given that these constraints tend to be particularly tight in democratic political systems, it follows that the device should be especially attractive to the governments of democratically organized states. In sum, where most observers see attempts at problem-solving across borders, Wolf suggests looking also for a strategy of 'de-democratization by internationalization'.

In his view, major political projects such as European integration can at least partly be explained by this logic. When seen in this perspective, the much discussed 'democratic deficit' of European governance no longer appears as an unfortunate by-product of the integration process, but one of its purposes. This is because the design of international institutions is generally decided by national governments, which do it in a way that furthers their specific interests. This generally results in the form of cooperation that Michael Zürn has called 'executive multilateralism'.¹

Wolf stresses that this interpretation of intergovernmental cooperation has profound implications for the way we should think about the relationship between democracy and the governance of international issues. If his interpretation is correct, intergovernmental cooperation as it is currently practised is deeply problematic from a democratic point of view, and people committed to democratic principles should put great effort into exploring alternative ways in which international interdependence can be tackled.² In this article, however, I ignore the implications of the new *raison d'état* thesis

for normative democratic theory. My aim is rather to assess its usefulness as a source of empirical hypotheses about the emergence and permanence of international institutions. In other words, can it contribute to the explanation of significant instances of international cooperation? And what is its relationship with other important theoretical approaches to international cooperation?

In this article I consider the new *raison d'état* idea as an interpretative lens about world affairs, on a par with 'realism' and 'liberalism'. Like these two research traditions, the new *raison d'état* perspective makes certain assumptions about the nature of international and domestic politics. In realism and liberalism, the usefulness of the assumptions lies in their capacity to generate empirically testable and falsifiable propositions about phenomena such as balancing vs. bandwagoning, institutional vs. cultural causes of the democratic peace, and so forth. I argue that the same applies to the new *raison d'état* perspective. Whatever its importance for normative international theory, its usefulness for empirically oriented political research depends on its capacity to inspire more specific hypotheses that can be weighed against the evidence. The main purpose of this article is to show how falsifiable hypotheses can be extracted from the general idea, and how comparative analysis can be employed to evaluate them.

In order to distinguish between the new *raison d'état* as a way of looking at world politics and the specific empirical hypotheses on international cooperation that are inspired by it, in this article I will refer to the latter as the 'collusive delegation' thesis. The new *raison d'état* perspective suggests looking at the world in a different light than recommended by either realism or liberalism. The aim of the collusive delegation thesis is more limited — explaining a significant part of international cooperation, rather than supplanting other explanatory approaches. This is in line with the position of many International Relations scholars who, while identifying themselves primarily with one research tradition, do not expect their theories to explain fully the phenomena they are interested in.³

While the empirical study of collusive delegation can be conducted using various methods — notably the historical investigation of specific decisions (process tracing) — this article focuses on a particular research strategy, which so far has been neglected by existing attempts to uncover instances of collusive delegation. This research strategy consists in the formulation of important observable implications of the theory and a *comparative* investigation aimed at determining to what extent these implications are supported by cross-national evidence. This comparative strategy is illustrated here by examining a persistent puzzle in European Union (EU) studies — the diversity of the positions of EU member states regarding the creation of a supranational foreign and security policy. The argument here is that collusive

delegation accounts for part of this diversity, thus complementing other, more established, explanations.

In the next section, I first present the theoretical logic of collusive delegation and then I report some evidence of the operation of this logic in various settings and discuss the problem of deducing observable implications from the general thesis. In the third section I examine whether the collusive delegation thesis can contribute to explaining the diversity of the preferences among European governments concerning the institutional depth of their foreign and security policy cooperation. The conclusion discusses the implications of the case study for the role of collusive delegation in explaining international cooperation and for the new *raison d'état* interpretation of world politics.

2. The Collusive Delegation Thesis

The Argument

Various authors have argued that participation in international policy making can increase the independence of a government from the domestic actors that are supposed to check its behaviour. More than thirty years ago, Karl Kaiser (1971: 706) observed that '[t]he intermeshing of decisionmaking across national frontiers and the growing multinationalization of formerly domestic issues are inherently incompatible with the traditional framework of democratic control'.

Kaiser remarked that concerted policy making within international institutions allows national governments to elude parliamentary control, at least to some extent, since they can refer to the collective character of the decision taken and to the high costs for the country if the parliament rejected the agreement that was negotiated by the governments. Moreover, the executive can use the complexity and the lack of transparency of international negotiations to prevent unwelcome intrusions by the parliament or by public opinion before an agreement is concluded. The parliament's capacity to control the government's negotiating behaviour is generally limited by the (real or alleged) need for secrecy and by its dependence on information provided by the government itself. If opportunities for control are scarce when governments take decisions by unanimity, Kaiser remarked, they are even more restricted when decisions are taken by majority and some powers are delegated to supranational bureaucracies.

In the context of European unification, these effects are now widely debated at the political and at the academic level under the heading 'democratic deficit'.⁴ A concise description of the democratic deficit problem is the following: legislative functions are increasingly performed by European

institutions and the resulting diminution of national parliamentary control is not offset by democratic controls at the European level. The collusive delegation thesis accepts this diagnosis, but adds a crucial element: it maintains that the democratic deficit is not merely a *by-product* of the transfer of powers to supranational institutions, but also one of the *purposes* of this transfer. Governments pool their authority in order to loosen domestic political constraints. The collusive delegation thesis maintains further that this logic operates not only in the context of the European Union, but in all settings where the executive can expect to be the gatekeeper between domestic groups and the international environment.

Given their assumption of self-seeking behaviour on the part of public officials, scholars belonging to the 'public choice' school have little difficulty in explaining international organization in terms of a collusion among politicians or bureaucrats of various countries against their respective electorates.⁵ This collusive behaviour can provide several advantages to decision-makers, such as the possibility of using the approval of their respective policies by foreign politicians and international organizations against domestic critics, to elude responsibility for unpopular policies and to 'sell' those policies as an unavoidable part of an international package deal. Politicians and officials in charge of foreign policy use those institutions in order to circumvent domestic opposition to their preferred policies, or to shift onto others the political costs of unpopular policies.

Andrew Moravcsik (1993a, 1994, 1997a, 1998a) has presented a rich theoretical framework for studying collusive delegation. His approach is based on three general theoretical propositions. The first proposition is that international negotiation and cooperation can have the effect of redistributing the political resources that confer influence in the domestic political arena. Specifically, international cooperation can (1) shift agenda-setting power; (2) redistribute opportunities for participation in domestic decision-making procedures; (3) amplify informational asymmetries; and (4) change ideological justifications for policies. In brief, international cooperation and institutions can alter four I's: initiative, institutions, information and ideas.

The second proposition is that the redistribution of domestic political resources favours those directly in charge of international cooperation, which generally are national executives. The third proposition is that this redistributive effect feeds back into intergovernmental bargaining, generally increasing the executive's incentive to reach an agreement. This can happen because those in charge of the negotiation value cooperation not only because of the substantive and explicit benefits it brings, but also because it strengthens them vis-a-vis other actors in the domestic arena, such as members of parliament, subnational governments and interest groups. In extreme cases national executives might choose to support a multilateral

limitation of national autonomy even if the substantive gains from collective action are minimal, if this move can increase their control over domestic affairs. By forming ‘executive cartels’, governments can help each other to bring the direction of policies closer to their own preferences.

Referring specifically to the European Community, Moravcsik argues that:

While the use of qualified majority voting undermines the ‘external sovereignty’ of the nation-state, in that each can be overruled by a coalition of the others, it simultaneously contributes to the domestic influence of executives by making it more difficult for opponents in any individual Member States to mobilize a blocking minority. (Moravcsik, 1994: 19)

Generally the ‘two-level games’ approach — according to which who is negotiating an international agreement ‘plays’ simultaneously at the domestic and at the international table — emphasizes the negotiators’ interest in ‘having their hands tied’, i.e. to reduce the number of agreements that are acceptable to the domestic actors who have the power to reject or ratify the agreement (that may be the legislature, powerful interest groups or the electorate). The reason is that the negotiators’ bargaining leverage at the international table is greater if their ‘win set’ — i.e. the set of international agreements that can be ratified domestically — is smaller, and this creates an incentive to shrink it.⁶ The two-level game implied by the collusive delegation thesis works differently. The priority given to domestic politics might persuade governments to use international politics in order to loosen their domestic constraints. Which of the two logics prevails — ‘tying hands’ or ‘cutting slack’ — depends on the specific circumstances (Moravcsik, 1993b, 1994).

While for Moravcsik executives are interested in widening their room for manoeuvre only insofar as this helps them to achieve concrete policy goals, Wolf goes further and suggests that states have an a priori interest in expanding their autonomy vis-a-vis society.⁷ The generic goal of maintaining and increasing spaces of autonomous action takes precedence over any specific policy preferences that government may have. This is because ‘[a]utonomy is an instrument to be employed for very different reasons, but the self-assertion it implies and the discretion it creates are pre-conditions for successfully pursuing any substantial preferences. Autonomy provides the room to make other, more concrete choices under more specific circumstances’ (Wolf, 1999b: 243).

Wolf broadens considerably the significance and scope of collusive practices by governments, embedding them into a sweeping interpretation of the relationship between state and society as it emerged in the early modern era. He looks at collusion not simply as one of many strategies

available to political leaders facing a variety of incentives and constraints, but as the manifestation of a drive to self-assertion that is inherent in the differentiation and contraposition of state and society. In his view, this condition has not changed substantially since the heyday of the Westphalian state. Now as then, states seek to maintain control of a turbulent societal environment, and only the means have changed. According to Wolf, states used to help each other mainly by perpetuating a threatening external environment, while now they tend to achieve the same effect by creating binding intergovernmental arrangements.⁸ This shift reflects a growing demand for societal participation and increasing transnational interdependence. In the end, however, Wolf stresses the continuities between the old and the new *raison d'état*, noting that this concept was always related to what Eric Nordlinger called 'the state's autonomy-enhancing capacities and opportunities to somehow forestall, neutralize, transform, resist, or overcome the societal constraints imposed upon them' (Nordlinger, 1981: 30).⁹ Intergovernmental cooperation can provide many opportunities of this kind, and governments are willing to take advantage of them. In a nutshell, 'states can cooperate against societies' (Thomson, 1995: 221).

As noted in the Introduction, Wolf's conception of a new *raison d'état* is situated at the same level of abstraction and generality as realism and liberalism, two central research traditions in International Relations theory. This sets him apart from authors such as Moravcsik, who are more interested in identifying specific mechanisms that may (or may not) have a role in stimulating governments to cooperate with each other. The new *raison d'état* perspective shares with the realist approach the assumption that the state is a strategic actor aiming for self-assertion, but departs significantly from realism in that (1) it focuses on state–society interactions as well as the interaction among states, and (2) it does not consider intergovernmental self-binding as an anomalous phenomenon, but as a normal instrument in the toolbox of states. On the other hand, the *raison d'état* perspective shares with the liberal approach the assumption that domestic politics determines the possibility and form of international cooperation, but departs from liberalism in that the state is not conceptualized as a problem-solver aiming at satisfying societal demands, but as a self-interested actor aiming at maximizing its own room for manoeuvre.

According to the liberal conception of international relations, 'the state is not an actor but a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors' (Moravcsik, 1997b: 518). The new *raison d'état* approach is thus distinct from the liberal tradition — unless one is willing to consider key state officials simply as one set of societal actors competing with other societal actors for the opportunity to influence public policies.

The collusive delegation thesis developed in this article draws on the new *raison d'état* idea, but it focuses on hypotheses that can be falsified empirically and is not necessarily incompatible with other explanations (in other words, it embodies a *ceteris paribus* clause). Reformulating the insights of Wolf as well as those of the other authors discussed in this section, the collusive delegation thesis can be summarized as follows:

- Governments value their capacity to act autonomously not only vis-a-vis the international environment but also vis-a-vis their own domestic environments.
- Participation in intergovernmental negotiations and institutions tends to increase the domestic autonomy of governments and shift in their favour the distribution of influence in the domestic arena.
- Governments, when considering the advantages of creating, modifying or joining an international institution, take into account not only the direct benefits that derive from international policy coordination, but also its effects on their domestic autonomy and power resources.
- When they have to decide whether to support or oppose transfers of decision-making competences to international settings, governments may face a trade-off between external and internal autonomy, and — *ceteris paribus* — choose the solution that improves their overall autonomy.

These propositions have two important corollaries. The first is that each government faces different incentives depending on the degree of internal autonomy it already possesses. If the institutional and political system of a country already grants to the executive a high degree of autonomy and power vis-a-vis other actors in the domestic arena, then an upward transfer of powers could result in a 'net' loss of autonomy, and for the government this might be a reason for resisting this transfer. An executive that is weaker domestically could have more reason to seek internal autonomy through internationalization.¹⁰

The second corollary is that the incentive to delegate authority is stronger in those policy areas where the executive faces particularly tight domestic constraints. If a government is relatively free to pursue its preferred policy on certain issues, it has less reason to delegate the handling of those issues to international governance structures. Both these corollaries indicate that the collusive delegation thesis promises to be especially useful in comparative investigations.

Confronting the Argument with the Evidence

Do governments really cooperate with each other in order to shift the domestic distribution of influence in their favour or gain autonomy vis-a-vis

societal groups? Is the collusive delegation thesis able to shed light on important instances of intergovernmental cooperation? Wolf himself has stressed that the new *raison d'état* approach creates serious problems for any attempt at falsification. He points out that his thesis suffers from the basic problem of any conspiracy theory — ‘the proof of its truth consists precisely in the fact that (if the uncovered conspiracy is successful) no evidence of it can be found’ (Wolf, 2000: 101, my translation). It is reasonable to expect that collusive delegation is never declared by those who make use of it and thus can only be inferred from actions and outcomes.

However difficult to identify, the International Relations literature has indeed uncovered some instances of collusive delegation. Since this article asserts the plausibility of collusive delegation as an explanation of international cooperation, it is useful to summarize some relevant research.

An interesting case of internationalization caused by a governmental actor's desire to shift policy outcomes towards its preferences and away from those of other domestic actors is reported by Judith Goldstein (1996). The 1988 Free Trade Agreement between Canada and the US (later extended to Mexico) created a dispute resolution mechanism centred on bilateral panels that hear appeals on particular trade issues. These panels make binding decisions on whether a national administrative decision in an anti-dumping or countervailing duty case is legal or not. Since the panels rule frequently against the trade authorities of the most powerful member of the agreement, the US, the question arises as to why the US agreed to establish this procedure in the first place. Goldstein points to the constellation of domestic interests regarding trade policy. Because of his structural position, the US President is generally in favour of free trade and against the use of US ‘fair trade’ law to protect domestic producers from foreign competition. Yet his pro-free trade policies were hampered by the US Congress and especially by protectionist trade bureaucracies — the US International Trade Administration and the International Trade Commission — that used their power to implement ‘fair trade’ law in a way that benefited special domestic interests. By moving the final veto power to the hands of a structurally pro-free trade binational panel mechanism, the President disempowered those protectionist bureaucracies and brought the pattern of Canada–US trade closer to his own preferences.

Goldstein concludes that:

. . . binding arbitration is one more way in which the executive office has succeeded in reining in Congress, the US bureaucracy, and import-competing interest groups. Thus, the President's acquiescence to an independent international organization moved US policy in a free trade direction without decreasing his domestic authority. (Goldstein, 1996: 560)

Further evidence is provided by the history of European monetary cooperation. Andrew Moravcsik (1994, 1998a) looks at the attempts at monetary integration in Europe during the 1970s and 1980s and finds that the heads of the governments that supported integration tried to use the European Community to break domestic resistance to the sort of monetary policy they preferred — by presenting the question as a European issue they expected their influence to be strengthened, through the mechanisms of agenda-setting, of decisional procedures, of information control and of ideological legitimization.

Kenneth Dyson and Kevin Featherstone (1999) trace the history of the Maastricht Treaty's EMU provisions and find strong evidence that especially in Italy a technocratic elite within the core executive considered monetary integration as a means to achieve monetary and fiscal reforms that otherwise would have been unattainable because of domestic opposition. These liberal technocrats exploited the strong support for European integration to be found among both the Italian public and its political class in order to increase their influence vis-a-vis their statist and protectionist opponents. The Maastricht negotiations were conducted by a group of officials within the Italian Central Bank and key ministries who 'sought to bind Italy by external ties and obligations — a *vincolo esterno* — in order to secure domestic reforms of an essentially liberal character' (Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 463). Guido Carli, Italy's Treasury Minister and chief negotiator at the Intergovernmental Conference on EMU, came close to openly acknowledging the logic of collusive delegation when he remarked that '[o]ur agenda at the table of the Intergovernmental Conference on European Union represented an alternative solution to problems which we were not able to tackle via the normal channels of government and parliament' (quoted by Dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 452).¹¹

The field of financial markets regulation provides an example that the use of collusive delegation is not a prerogative of chief executives or cabinets, but can be utilized also by other public agencies that are in charge of negotiating international agreements. David Zaring argues that international financial regulatory organizations 'are attractive to national regulators not only because they provide useful fora for solving international regulatory problems, but also because they serve as a means of increasing the domestic autonomy of regulators' (Zaring, 1998: 312).

A case in point is participation in the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. Created in 1974, it consists of representatives of 12 central banks that oversee the activities of the world's most important financial markets. The Committee is frequently described as a 'club of gentlemen who get together', and seeks to maintain a low public profile. Nevertheless, it is an influential actor in global governance. Its main achievement is the 1988

Accord on capital adequacy standards for international banks, which subsequently have been adopted not only in the countries represented in the Committee, but also by the most important banks in non-G10 countries. The stated purpose of the Accord is to improve the stability of the international banking industry by a concerted effort to ensure its financial soundness. Since banks subjected to lower capital requirements have a competitive advantage vis-a-vis those with higher requirements, uncoordinated policies risk triggering a regulatory 'race to the bottom', where regulators lower standards in order to benefit the banks located in their own countries.

According to Enrico Colombatto and Jonathan Macey, however, the negative effects of regulatory competition are not sufficient to explain why Japan, a central player in international banking, eventually joined the Accord, considering that Japanese banks were both successful and already solidly capitalized. They suggest a different explanation:

For the Japanese regulators, the Accords were a means of obtaining more power vis-a-vis the banks they were supposed to regulate. Japanese bureaucrats could not obtain the power unilaterally to impose minimum capital requirements on their own banks because Japanese banks were able to resist this attempt. But while the Japanese banks could constrain the regulators domestically, the agency costs between the banks and the regulators were too high in the international context. Thus, from the point of view of the Japanese, the Basle Accords represented a hands-tying strategy in which the Japanese bureaucrats were able to collude with bureaucrats from other countries in order to obtain more discretionary regulatory authority. (Colombatto and Macey, 1996: 944)

Zaring describes how in the US participation in the Basle Committee 'has allowed US financial regulators to draft regulations without domestic administrative constraints, such as formal notice and comment procedures' (Zaring, 1998: 321–2). Banks and other interested parties are informed of the content of Basle Committee agreements after a decision has been taken. 'This presentation of a *fait accompli* to domestic interests concerned with banking regulation underscores the effectiveness of a turn to international regulation to achieve domestic ends with reduced regulatory discomfort' (Zaring, 1998: 322).

Formulating Falsifiable Hypotheses

The examples just mentioned show that collusive delegation is likely to be more than just academic speculation.¹² The next section of this article examines in this light the question of a common European foreign and security policy and compares the member states of the EU. The comparative

approach is chosen because focusing on the two corollaries mentioned at the end of the previous section seems a good way to address the falsifiability problem of the collusive delegation thesis. These corollaries generate observable implications of the thesis, which can be assessed through comparative methods. Two research hypotheses can be derived from them:

1. In any particular policy area, an executive that is comparatively less autonomous from parliamentary and other domestic coalitions will be more inclined to support the internationalization of governance than an executive that is more autonomous, *ceteris paribus*.
2. The same government will be more inclined to support the internationalization of the governance of a policy area over which it has relatively little control than a policy area where it has a relatively high degree of internal autonomy, *ceteris paribus*.

The *ceteris paribus* clause should be stressed because the proponents of the collusive delegation thesis do not necessarily claim that the expected gain in internal autonomy is the only, or even the main, reason why some governments are willing to join international agreements and institutions.

The second hypothesis aims at explaining, for instance, why European integration is less advanced in foreign and security policy than in other domains, such as external economic policy. For a variety of reasons, most governments are more autonomous from societal pressures in the former domain than in the latter, and thus the benefits of delegation are lower and higher, respectively. However, in the remainder of this article I do not pursue this line of inquiry and focus instead on the first hypothesis, i.e. I look at cross-national variation rather than variation across policy domains.

3. European Governments and their Common Foreign and Security Policy

The CFSP: A Candidate for Collusive Delegation?

There was and is considerable variation in the preferences of European governments concerning their integration in foreign and security policy. The optimal level of political unification in the European Union is a matter of intense controversy not only among its citizens, but also among its member governments. These differences are evident especially at the outset of the Intergovernmental Conferences (IGCs) that determine the institutional trajectory of European integration. These conferences produce 'grand bargains', whose terms are generally written into the basic treaties of the European Union.

In these settings, European governments regularly express diverging positions on the form and depth of foreign and security policy integration, and as a consequence long and difficult negotiations have ensued.¹³ Those fierce negotiations on European treaty reform reflect the existence of significant disagreements among governments about the depth of integration in foreign and security policy. Can the collusive delegation thesis contribute to explaining this diversity?

If the collusive delegation thesis is true, then we should expect governments with less autonomy in foreign and security policy to be more willing to delegate powers to supranational institutions than governments with a higher degree of autonomy, *ceteris paribus*. The benefits of collusive delegation, in fact, are higher for the former than for the latter. In the context of foreign and security policy, the crucial relationship here is that between the executive branch and the legislative assemblies, as societal demands in this policy area tend to be channelled principally through partisan elites acting in parliament. The central question is then to what extent policy makers in the national executives are constrained by parliamentary control in the conduct of foreign and security policy.

The relationship between domestic autonomy on the one hand and constitutional preferences on the CFSP is explored here by means of two different research strategies. The first involves a survey of all current EU member states and aims at establishing the existence of a statistically significant relationship between the two variables, controlling for other plausible causal factors. Given the very small number of observations on which it is based, this analysis should be seen as exploratory rather than definitive. The second strategy involves a closer look at the four largest (and arguably most influential) member states of the EU, i.e. France, Germany, Britain and Italy. When comparing these four countries, my aim is not causal inference but a refined understanding of the institutional context of collusive delegation. Since the purpose of this article is to show how cross-national comparisons can be used for assessing the plausibility of the collusive delegation thesis, it does not provide documentary evidence on specific decisions taken by key policy makers that would reveal directly the operation of collusive delegation.

Comparing all EU Member States

In this section I assess the plausibility of the collusive delegation thesis in explaining government positions on CFSP reform by means of a regression analysis applied to all current EU member states. This method requires an operationalization of the outcome and explanatory variables, as well as

Table 1
Support for Supranational Integration in Foreign and Security Policy, 1996

| | A | B | D | DK | E | F | FIN | GR | I | IRL | L | NL | P | S | UK |
|---|------|-----|------|------|------|-----|------|------|------|------|------|-----|------|------|----|
| Allow QMV in Council for decisions of principle | yes | yes | yes | no | yes | no | no | no | yes | no | yes | yes | yes | no | no |
| Allow QMV for decisions of implementation | yes | yes | yes | no | yes | yes | yes | n.a. | yes | n.a. | yes | yes | yes | n.a. | no |
| Unify the institutional structure of the EU | yes | yes | yes | no | yes | no | no | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | no | no | no |
| Increase the powers of the European Commission | yes | yes | n.a. | no | n.a. | no | no | yes | n.a. | n.a. | yes | yes | yes | n.a. | no |
| Increase the powers of the European Parliament | n.a. | yes | yes | n.a. | n.a. | no | no | yes | yes | n.a. | n.a. | yes | n.a. | n.a. | no |
| Finance CFSP through the Community budget | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | yes | n.a. | yes | yes | n.a. | yes | yes | n.a. | n.a. | no |
| Score | 5 | 6 | 5 | -3 | 4 | -2 | -3 | 3 | 5 | -2 | 5 | 6 | 2 | -2 | -6 |

Note: yes = reform supported; no = reform opposed; n.a. = no position or missing data. Score: number of 'yes' minus number of 'no'. QMV: qualified majority voting. A: Austria. B: Belgium. D: Germany. DK: Denmark. E: Spain. F: France. FIN: Finland. GR: Greece. I: Italy. IRL: Ireland. L: Luxembourg. NL: The Netherlands. P: Portugal. S: Sweden. UK: United Kingdom.

Sources: Austria: *Regierungskonferenz 1996*. Osterrische Grundsatzzpositionen, 26 March 1996. Leitlinien zu den voraussichtlichen Themen der Regierungskonferenz 1996, June 1995. Belgium: *Note politique du gouvernement au parlement concernant la CIG de 1996*, October 1995. *Mémorandum de la Belgique, des Pays-Bas et du Luxembourg en vue de la CIG*, March 1996. Denmark: *Bases of Negotiations: An Open Europe — Intergovernmental Conference 1996*, 30 November 1995. Agenda for Europe: *The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference. Report of the Danish Foreign Ministry*, June 1995. Finland: *Memorandum Concerning Finnish Points of View with Regard to the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference of the European Union*, 18 September 1995. *The IGC and the Security and Defence Dimension — Towards an Enhanced EU Role in Crisis Management*, Memorandum by Finland and Sweden, 24 April 1996. *Finland's Points of Departure at the Intergovernmental Conference — Report to the Parliament*, 27 February 1996. France: *Déclaration du Gouvernement sur la PESC — séminaire franco-allemand des Ministères des Affaires étrangères à Fribourg*, 27 February 1996. *Confidential Memorandum on France's Guidelines for the IGC 1996*, published in *Le Figaro*, 20 February 1996. Germany: *Deutsche Ziele für die Regierungskonferenz*, 26 March 1996. Greece: *For a Democratic European Union with Political and Social Content — Greece's Contribution to the 1996 IGC*, 22 March 1996. Ireland: *Challenges and Opportunities Abroad: Irish White Paper on Foreign Policy*, 26 March 1996. Italy: *Posizione del Governo italiano sulla Conferenza intergovernativa per la revisione dei Trattati*, 18 March 1996. *Dichiarazione del Governo italiano sulla Conferenza intergovernativa*, 23 May 1995. Luxembourg: *Aide-mémoire du gouvernement luxembourgeois sur la CIG 96*, 30 June 1995. *Mémorandum de la Belgique, des Pays-Bas et du Luxembourg en vue de la CIG*, 7 March 1996. The Netherlands: *Between Madrid and Turin: Dutch Priorities on the Eve of the 1996 IGC. Communication of the Government to the Parliament*, March 1996. *European Foreign Policy, Security and Defence: Towards Stronger External Action by the European Union*, 30 March 1995. *Mémorandum de la Belgique, des Pays-Bas et du Luxembourg en vue de la CIG*, 7 March 1996. Portugal: *Portugal e a conferencia intergovernativa para a revisao do tratado da uniao europeia*, March 1996. Spain: *Elementos para una posición española en la Conferencia intergubernamental de 1996*, March 1996. Sweden: *Memorandum on the Fundamental Interests of Sweden with a View to the 1996 IGC*, 2 March 1995. *Government Report. The EU Intergovernmental Conference 1996*, 30 November 1995. *The IGC and the Security and Defence Dimension — Towards an Enhanced EU Role in Crisis Management*, Memorandum by Finland and Sweden, 24 April 1996. United Kingdom: *A Partnership of Nations: The British Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference 1996*, 13 March 1996. *Memorandum on the Treatment of European Defence Issues at the 1996 IGC*, 2 March 1995.

relevant control variables, that is sufficiently general to allow comparisons between 15 countries.

The first task is to operationalize the outcome variable, i.e. the preferences of governments concerning the degree of supranationalism in their foreign and security policy cooperation. In this section I rely on the public statements that the governments themselves have issued in order to illustrate the position they intended to promote at the Intergovernmental Conferences for the institutional reform of the European Union. The audiences for these statements were their own parliaments and publics, as well as the governments of other member states. The pre-negotiation phase of the IGC held in 1996–7 seems a useful context in which to elicit these positions, since all 15 governments prepared and publicized papers outlining their stance on a broad range of issues expected to be on the negotiating table.¹⁴

The position of each member state on the most important treaty revisions concerning the CFSP is summarized in Table 1. The information contained in this table is used to assign a supranationalism score to each government. This score ranges from +6, for governments that support all institutional innovations, to –6, for governments that oppose them all.

The explanatory variable I am interested in is the degree of autonomy of national executives vis-a-vis their parliaments in foreign and security affairs. In the comparative politics and International Relations literatures I found no measurement of this variable that would allow a comparison of all member states of the EU. Therefore, as a proxy of the relative power of executives in foreign and security affairs, I consider a measure of the balance of power between executives and legislatures that is not specific to any single policy area. To my knowledge, Jaap Woldendorp, Hans Keman and Ian Budge (2000) have made the most systematic effort to measure this dimension across a large number of countries. Their ‘Executive–Legislative Balance’ variable is an index that takes into account a number of institutional aspects of the relationship between executives and legislatures, notably the necessity and consequences of parliamentary votes of investiture and confidence, the right to dissolve parliament, the roles of the head of state and specifically whether s/he also has executive powers (which generally are in the domain of foreign and defence policy). While this ‘Executive–Legislative Balance’ variable focuses on formal powers and does not measure directly the dynamic aspects of political interaction, for the purposes of this article it can be considered a fairly good approximation of the phenomenon to be studied.

In addition to the outcome variable and the explanatory variable, I include in the model a number of control variables that might plausibly affect the outcome variable. The control variables I have selected for

inclusion are material power capabilities, levels of European identification among the public, and domestic regional governance. The reasons for including these possible causal factors, as well as their operationalization, are discussed briefly in the following paragraphs.

Relative power capabilities should be controlled for because according to many observers of the EU the incentives for deepening integration vary substantially between stronger (larger) and weaker (smaller) states. Joseph Grieco, for instance, has suggested a 'neorealist' interpretation of the EU's Economic and Monetary Union, according to which the institutional arrangement agreed upon at Maastricht reflects the interest of countries such as France and Italy to gain 'voice opportunities' vis-a-vis Germany in determining monetary policy in Europe (Grieco, 1996).

In the context of the CFSP, it can be argued that governments whose power resources allow them to conduct an independent and effective foreign policy should see no need to relinquish their autonomy and have their hands tied by supranational institutions. Weaker countries, on the contrary, should be interested in an integrated foreign and security policy for at least two reasons. First, these countries can expect their influence on world affairs to increase when the European Union acts as a unity. The autonomy they would lose would be offset by the collective power of the supranational polity they are part of. Second, a tight institutional structure would be a way to constrain the stronger member states, whose independent foreign policy might eventually become a threat to the interests of the smaller countries. By this logic, supranational integration enhances the security of smaller states by augmenting their external influence and by constraining potential sources of tension.

The expectation is therefore that governments with higher power capabilities will be less supportive of supranational integration in foreign and security matters than governments with lower capabilities. For the purpose of the following analysis, to measure power capabilities I rely on the Composite Index of Material Capabilities (CIMC) developed by the Correlates of War (COW) Project, which probably is the most commonly used power index in the International Relations literature.¹⁵

The second control variable is the degree of European identity among the public of each country. Many observers of European affairs hold that European integration 'has been accompanied by a weakening of exclusive nationalism and by what might be described as multiple identity, that is, the coexistence of identities to local, regional, and supranational territorial communities, alongside an identity with the nation'.¹⁶ However, it is generally held that there are substantial differences among countries in the degree to which collective identities are Europeanized, for reasons such as the diversity of historical experiences, especially those related to wars, and

geographical features of countries, such as peripheral location or insularity. Many authors, especially constructivists, argue that the attitude of national governments vis-a-vis European integration is shaped by the way their populations and/or their elites relate themselves to Europe. A widespread perception of belonging to a European entity, in addition to or even as a substitute for national belonging, is considered as a major determinant of government policies on supranational integration (Larsen, 1997; Marcussen et al., 1998; Banchoff, 1999; Risse, 2001). The expectation is therefore that governments of countries with widespread public identification with the European Union will be more supportive of supranational integration in foreign and security policy than governments of countries with less European identification. In the absence of detailed discourse analyses covering all EU member states, in this article European identity is measured by looking at *Eurobarometer* opinion polls.¹⁷

The third and last control variable is the strength of regional governance within each state. Compared to relative power and collective identities, few students of the EU have put this variable in relation with the willingness of governments to integrate. However, previous research has shown that it might have an important role and therefore it is included here.¹⁸ The hypothesis that there is a link between multilevel governance within a state and the attitude of its leaders towards multilevel governance beyond the state reflects the more general idea that 'where states have an opportunity, they will seek to create international rules and institutions that are consistent with domestic principles of political order' (Ikenberry, 1998: 163).¹⁹ In the context of the European Union, it has been noted that adaptation to supranational integration is easier for some countries than for others. In particular, the institutional structures of the European Union strongly resemble those of the Federal Republic of Germany, ensuring a high degree of 'congruence' between the two constitutional orders (Bulmer, 1997; Schmidt, 1999). It can plausibly be argued that this good 'fit' makes European political integration more welcome to the German political and administrative elites than to other Europeans, such as the British, whose domestic state structures are considerably different from the EU. Wolfgang Wagner (2002) has shown that, during the negotiations on the Maastricht Treaty, the governments of countries with entrenched parliamentary representation at the regional level wanted a stronger European Parliament, whereas the countries with no regional parliaments were opposed.

Based on these considerations, the third control variable is the constitutional culture that prevails in a country, and specifically the legitimacy and practice of multilayered governance in the domestic context. The expectation is that governments of countries where a monocentric conception of sovereignty prevails will find it more difficult to accept a supranational

transfer of powers than governments of countries where the pluricentric constitutional culture is stronger. Again, in the absence of detailed investigations into the political culture of all EU member states, I assume that the actual institutional structure of the polity can be considered a proxy of that culture, as it is plausible to assume a broad correspondence between the predominant views about the legitimate distribution of public authority and the rules governing regional governance in each country. In the analysis I use Liesbet Hooghe and Gary Marks's index of regional governance in EU countries.²⁰

Table 2 reports the results of a multivariate regression of support for supranationalism on the legislative–executive balance and the three control variables. The explanatory variables account for about 80% of the variation in the outcome. All coefficients have the expected sign and are statistically significant at conventional levels.²¹ This result supports the hypothesis that, controlling for other possible explanations, the degree of autonomy of a government vis-a-vis the parliament affects its willingness to deepen European integration in foreign and security policy. To illustrate the substantive significance of this effect it can be said that increasing the legislative–executive index from the value of an executive-dominated system

Table 2
OLS Regression of Support for Supranational CFSP by EU Governments,
1996

| | |
|-------------------------------|-------------------|
| Executive–legislative balance | 2.069* (.875) |
| Material capabilities | –.280** (.079) |
| European identity | .068* (.026) |
| Regional governance | .839** (.171) |
| Constant | 1.287 (.771) |
| R^2 | .846 |
| Adjusted R^2 | .784 |
| F change | 13.694*** |

Note: $N = 15$. Second column: unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test).

such as Britain to the value of a balanced system such as Italy results, *ceteris paribus*, in an increase of about three points in the supranationalism score developed earlier (see Table 1). Given the very small number of observations, however, these results must be interpreted with appropriate caution.

The task of comparing a substantial number of countries makes it necessary to adopt indicators that drastically reduce the complexity of national political life. In particular, the 'Executive–Legislative Balance' index on which the previous analysis is based offers a useful but rough approximation of the complex relationship between governments and parliaments in the determination of foreign and security policies. The next section tries to make up for this shortcoming by looking more closely at how that relationship is configured in four countries.

Comparing France, Germany, Britain and Italy

Since the end of the Cold War, the governments of the four largest EU member states have expressed very different views on the future of political unification of Europe. Those of Germany and Italy have promoted a federalist vision, in which the competence for foreign policy and defence is transferred to common institutions. Those of Britain and France, by contrast, have clung to national sovereignty and rejected any treaty reform that might curtail their external freedom of action. France, and to some extent Britain since 1999, have promoted a degree of European cooperation in foreign and military policy, but have ruled out 'self-binding', i.e. institutional arrangements that would prevent them from taking autonomous action whenever they wanted. In the case of France, European cooperation is usually seen as a useful way to gain influence vis-a-vis the United States within the transatlantic alliance, but genuinely binding arrangements have never been seen as necessary to achieve this goal or worth the sovereignty cost.²²

According to the collusive delegation thesis, this difference between France and Britain on the one hand and Germany and Italy on the other should reflect differences in the degree of policy-making autonomy executives possess vis-a-vis other actors in the domestic political arena, notably those represented in parliament. The remainder of this section examines executive–legislative relationships in the field of foreign and security policy in the four countries.

(a) *France.* To Charles de Gaulle the independence and the international influence of France were objectives of the highest importance, and the institutional structure of the Fifth Republic was shaped in order to facilitate the attainment of those objectives. The Constitution of the Fifth Republic

itself is ambiguous about which institutional actor is entitled to ultimate decision-making power in foreign and security policy. Article 5 says that the President of the Republic is ‘the defender of national independence and of national integrity’, but it does not confer on him/her many explicit powers in this domain. The President appoints military officials (article 13) and is supreme commander of the armed forces (article 15), but these provisions do not differ from what is usual in parliamentary democracies. The Constitution, on the other hand, confers on the Prime Minister the task of ‘leading’ the government, which ‘decides and leads the policies of the Nation’, and specifically makes him/her responsible for national defence (articles 20 and 21).

Contrary to the constitutional text, however, in the French Fifth Republic the direction of foreign and security policy lies firmly in the hands of the President. From a formal point of view, the disempowerment of the Prime Minister started with the Decrees of 18 July 1962, and 15 January 1964. The first established the bodies chaired by the President as the central decision-making sites for security policy, and the second granted to the Defence Council, de facto to the President, the power to decide the use of nuclear forces. Thus, since the 1960s France is what has been called a ‘nuclear monarchy’ (Cohen, 1986).

In order to describe the position of the President in foreign and defence policy some observers use the concept of a *domaine réservé* — as opposed to the *domaine surveillé*, which is managed by the government under the supervision of the President, and the *domaine délégué*, concerning minor matters. This is not a constitutional principle, and indeed all Presidents since de Gaulle have denied the existence of a *domaine réservé* — a denial that did not prevent them from practising it and opposing vigorously all attempts to eliminate it (Kessler, 1999: 23–5).

In the history of the Fifth Republic every important decision in the area of foreign and defence policy has been taken autonomously by the President. Among the results of a personal decision of the President are the rapid construction of a French nuclear deterrent, the withdrawal from the military organization of Nato in 1966, various military interventions in Africa and the Middle East, e.g. in Zaire (1978), Lebanon (1982–4), Chad (1983 and 1986) and Togo (1986), the 1991 Gulf War, the suspension of nuclear tests in 1992 and their resumption in 1995. As noted above, the absolute preponderance of the President in foreign policy and defence matters is not predetermined by the Constitution, but was established by the political practice of de Gaulle and consolidated under subsequent Presidents. What by now has become an entrenched constitutional practice has not been challenged in a significant way during the periods of cohabitation (1986–8, 1993–5, 1997–2002) — under these circumstances the President must take

into account the position of the Prime Minister, but his power remains predominant (Yost, 1994: 252–5; Kimmel, 1997; Enjalran and Husson, 1999: 66).

If the Prime Minister and his government participate only marginally in the formulation of foreign and security policy, the parliament is even more removed from effective power. In general, the parliament of the Fifth Republic represents an extreme example of the disempowerment of parliamentary institutions in modern representative political systems. As a reaction to the extreme ‘assemblearism’ of the Fourth Republic, the drafters of the Constitution of 1958 gave the National Assembly a marginal role in the political process. The bias in favour of the executive branch is evident in every policy domain, but it is especially clear in foreign and defence policy. Most observers agree that in these policy areas parliamentary control ‘tends to zero’ (Cohen, 1977: 380; Cot, 1980: 11; Kimmel, 1997: 31).

Parliamentary committees are weak and ill informed. The distribution of legislative and budget powers does not allow members of parliament to participate in or even simply control foreign and defence policy. Not only is the matter regulated mostly by decree, but the government has effective means of pressure (article 44(3) — block vote, article 49(3) — vote of confidence). The planning laws, which determine the general goals of defence policy and spending over several years, need the approval of the National Assembly, but its members can only accept or reject them without amendment. The authorization of the declaration of war by the parliament has no practical importance. None of France’s many armed interventions abroad after World War II has been preceded by a declaration of war, which can be considered an obsolete procedure by now. Often the parliament did not even have the opportunity to debate the matter. Nor does the parliament’s influence increase during the periods of cohabitation (Cottrel, 1983; Kimmel, 1997; Kessler, 1999: 51–71).

The case of the 1991 Gulf War is particularly revealing. France took part in the conflict without issuing a declaration of war, being an action of collective security according to Chapter VII of the UN Charter. At the beginning of the war, although it was not a legal requirement, the government allowed the Parliament to express its opinion through a vote on a statement by the government (yet the President communicated that France would participate in the military operations whatever the result of the vote). But after this episode, the parliament was marginalized and had no other role in the crisis (Kimmel, 1997: 32–3; Kessler, 1999: 53–4).

In sum, as one author has summarized the comparative evidence, ‘among all Western polyarchies, the Fifth Republic is the one that absolutely imposes less internal constraints to the international action of its highest political authority’ (Panebianco, 1997: 203).

(b) *Germany*. The Bundestag is one of the most powerful legislatures in the Western world. Nevertheless, in Germany as well, the role of the parliament in foreign and security affairs is smaller than in other public policy sectors.

The Constitution of 1949 confers on the President of the Republic the task of representing the state abroad, and signing international treaties (article 59), but the management of international affairs is in the hands of the government, and de facto the President acts on behalf of the latter. The Bundestag can ratify or reject international treaties that have a political character. Parliamentary control is exercised also through the budgetary power, which enables the Bundestag to control effectively military spending and therefore security and defence policy: while the British and French parliaments can only approve or reject the defence budget in its totality, the Bundestag — like the US Congress — examines the defence budget in detail, becoming a participant in decision-making (Wöckener, 1996: 104). The Bundestag declares a state of war and, more importantly, in 1994 the Federal Constitutional Court ruled that its prior assent (by simple majority voting) is necessary for any deployment of German armed forces outside the NATO area. The parliamentary committees of the Bundestag are relatively influential. The Constitution explicitly provides for a foreign affairs committee and a defence committee, and grants to the latter the strong powers of a committee of inquiry (article 45a). On the basis of these and other elements, one analyst has concluded that ‘the control exercised with regard to past performances of the government and to current affairs is tight’ (Tomuschat, 1980: 40).²³

As in most parliamentary democracies, in Germany the partisan link between the members of the executive and the members of the parliamentary majority generally prevents the emergence of intense conflicts between them, since they share weighty political and electoral interests. Nevertheless, a government cannot always expect the unconditional support of its parliamentary majority, whose opinions on foreign and defence affairs must be taken into account. In Germany parliamentary parties (*Fractionen*) have an identity that is neatly separated from the government, unlike the United Kingdom where the members of government, and especially the Prime Minister, are also parliamentary leaders. The Chancellor and the leader of the parliamentary majority at the Bundestag, on the contrary, occupy very distinct roles, and the latter is rarely a ‘servant’ of the former (King, 1976: 27).

Among the factors allowing parliamentary participation in foreign policy, especially important is the right of each parliamentary grouping to take the Government to the Federal Constitutional Court. In the 1950s the Social Democratic opposition used this tool to fight the treaties signed with the Western Allies, while in the early 1980s the Greens tried this way to block

the deployment of 108 US Pershing missiles on German territory. That this is a significant instrument is proved by its use in the main domestic controversy over foreign policy during the 1990s, which concerned the legitimacy of sending armed forces on humanitarian, peacekeeping and peacemaking missions outside the NATO area, and the competencies of the state organs in this matter. Opinions among the parties, and to some extent within them as well, were severely divided on these questions. Some considered politically and constitutionally illegitimate any German participation in multinational peace operations, while others hoped for a 'normalization' of Germany concerning the use of military force. During the Gulf War, most political sides concurred that no German soldiers should be employed in combat operations, but the war in former Yugoslavia ignited a heated controversy on Germany's international role.

The Federal Constitutional Court was called in April 1993 to resolve a controversy between government and opposition, and between the two parties making up the governing coalition, about the participation of German personnel in the AWACS missions that monitored the no-fly zone over Bosnia. The Social Democrats (SPD) and the Liberal Democrats asked the Court to block the deployment of German personnel that had been decided by the government, pending the final resolution on the constitutional legality of out-of-area missions. Two months later, the SPD parliamentary party requested the Court to stop the deployment of German soldiers in Somalia within the UNOSOM II mission, declaring that the co-decision rights of the Bundestag had been violated. Whereas the Court did not stop German participation in the AWACS over Bosnia, this time it ruled that the mission in Somalia needed the formal assent of the Bundestag. The Court's final decision on the Bundeswehr's out-of-area missions came on 12 July 1994. According to the ruling the German Constitution allows the government to use German armed forces in multilateral military operations conducted on behalf of the United Nations, but this requires the prior approval of a majority in the Bundestag.

The out-of-area missions of the Bundeswehr were the topic of the most heated security policy controversy since reunification.²⁴ The controversy had several aspects (constitutional, inter-party, intra-party), but what is interesting here is the use of the EU, the Western European Union (WEU) and NATO by the supporters of a more activist role for Germany. Political leaders, especially in the ruling Christian Democratic party (CDU), argued that what was at stake in the out-of-area debate was the ability of Germany to fulfil its obligations under the Atlantic Alliance — what was frequently called *Bündnisfähigkeit*. But the European institutions also provided ammunition in the dispute. 'Bonn perceived the close relationship between WEU

and EU as a means of influencing the domestic climate regarding legitimizing defence after the Cold War and the debate on participating in out-of-area operations' (Jopp, 1994: 9).

Of the four mechanisms of collusive delegation identified by Moravcsik and referred to earlier, gaining influence over policies by appealing to the legitimizing effect of the EU was especially significant in the German case. The CDU leadership argued that a German refusal to take on an active military role would endanger the European integration process.²⁵ They strengthened their position by equating their preferred security policy with '*Europafähigkeit*'.²⁶ Defence Minister Volker Rühle was particularly insistent in making this connection. He argued that, 'There will never be a common foreign and defense policy, nor a European Defense nor an effective crisis management policy management in the Alliance so long as Germany must regularly note its reservations regarding the using of force. This endless constitutional debate [about out-of-area operations] is restricting the process of European integration which is essential for us.'²⁷

The way 'Europe' has been used by German leaders to circumvent domestic pressure has been summed up by Johannes Bohnen (1997: 62–3):

The progress made by the EU/CFSP, the WEU and Eurocorps was used by the government as a vehicle to influence the domestic debate — a debate which was dominated by Germany's reluctant attitude towards military engagement. The government aimed to externalise internal conflicts about Germany's participation in combat missions in order to ease societal strains and to foster the achievement of its goals. The fact that further European political integration would inevitably have to comprise the area of defence provided a powerful argument for the government. European calls for action within CFSP and the WEU framework helped the government to establish its autonomy on the out-of-area issue and in its defence policy more generally.

As Bohnen (1997: 63) further notes, 'That the government was able to use European pressures for its purposes was due to the fact that European considerations have been internalised both by the public and the politicians in Germany.' This is also why the 'Europe argument' was unlikely to be equally successful in other, less 'Europeanized' member states.

(c) *The United Kingdom*. The heated controversy over Germany's international role that took place in parliament, parties and public opinion, shows that its government is tightly constrained with regard to its foreign policy. This is not the case in Britain. Here 'the most obvious unchanging reality which persists over the years is the fact of executive dominance in the foreign policy process' (Clarke, 1988: 72). The British political system

... ensures that the Prime Minister, in its role of head of government and at

the same time head of the majority party, enjoys a degree of freedom of action — both in domestic and foreign policy — that is unknown to US Presidents and especially to the heads of government in consensual or acephalous democracies. (Panebianco, 1997: 208)²⁸

The involvement of the parliament in foreign policy making is still affected by a deep-rooted constitutional principle, according to which responsibility for the external relations of the United Kingdom belongs to the ministers who act under the authority of the Royal Prerogative, i.e. ‘the residue of discretionary or arbitrary authority which at any time is legally left in the hands of the Crown’ (Richards, 1973: 245; see also Carstairs and Ware, 1991a: 167). In fact, most studies devoted to the influence of the Westminster Parliament on foreign policy confirm that this influence is generally limited.²⁹

Until 1924 Parliament had no role in the ratification of international treaties, which was a pure prerogative matter. In that year the ‘Ponsbony Rule’ was established, according to which treaties requiring ratification must be presented to Parliament at least three weeks before the vote. Each year Parliament approves the defence budget (defence estimates), but ‘this is very much a formal obligation, for to reject outright what the administration proposes is to take an extreme course in British politics, possibly precipitating a general election’ (Greenwood, 1994: 290).

Until 1979, moreover, the House of Commons lacked a committee devoted specifically to foreign affairs. These were debated in the sub-committee for foreign policy and defence of the treasury committee, but this body devoted much more time to the organization of the armed forces than to foreign policy (Allen and Byrne, 1980: 354). The establishment of a foreign affairs committee in 1979 did not change substantially the situation, since with regard to foreign policy matters the government is particularly successful in withholding information from Parliament. This applies not only to information that is (or should be) supplied by the Foreign Office, but also to information from the Ministry of Defence, whose scarce attention to the need of parliamentary scrutiny repeatedly provoked, at least until a few years ago, the protest of the corresponding committee in the House of Commons (Allen and Byrne, 1980: 351; Burrige, 1998: 55). Moreover, Parliament’s powers of scrutiny over the activities of the intelligence services are weaker than in other European countries, and the principle of secrecy and executive privilege in matters that concern national security is stronger (Dandeker, 1994: 336–8).³⁰

The effects of the institutional architecture are reinforced by the public’s low interest in foreign policy matters, which reduces further its electoral salience.

. . . on most foreign policy issues the Foreign and Commonwealth Office is able to enjoy the benefits of public apathy. Except in moments of extreme crisis, the British public has never been much interested in foreign affairs, and the FCO has been left to get on with it without having to worry unduly about the kind of intrusive scrutiny to which most senior ministries in Whitehall are subjected. The fact that foreign policy is not usually a party political issue and the FCO not a big spender may have had something to do with this relative freedom of the executive in the area of foreign relations. (Martin and Garnett, 1997: 75)

(d) *Italy*. Italy is no exception to the rule that foreign policy is an area where parliamentary and partisan scrutiny is relatively weak, if compared with other issue areas such as economic and social policy. Nevertheless, if the comparison is made with the British or the French situation, the Italian executive appears to have much less autonomy vis-a-vis other political actors such as members of parliament, party leaders and to some extent pressure groups in society. Like and probably more than their German colleagues, Italian decision-makers face a set of particularly tight constraints that limit their capacity for manoeuvre on the international stage (Isernia, 1996: 145; Panebianco, 1997: 242–3; Molinari, 2000).

These constraints are due only indirectly to the Italian Constitution, since the only provision directly relevant to the relationship between parliament and government in foreign policy — article 80, which regulates the ratification of international treaties — does not confer on the parliament powers that are particularly wide-ranging. In fact, the practice since 1948 has supported the view of those legal commentators who hold that with regard to international treaties the executive has the main role.

More important, however, is the role of the parliament in scrutinizing and partly pushing the government's foreign policy in directions that are compatible with the preference of the majority of political groups. In accordance with the logic of parliamentary democracy, the impact of the parliamentary opposition on the decisions of the government is different — and weaker — than the impact of the political forces that support the government. But the influence of the latter is magnified by the fact that Italy is usually ruled by multi-party governments.

The lack of a single majority party and the consequent need for coalition governments . . . reduces the autonomy of the executive branch and leaves crucial decisions in the hands of party leaders, while parliamentary groups are characterized by a strict discipline. This means that most decisions are reached by a skilful but slow process of bargaining and consensus building among parties. (Andreatta and Hill, 1997: 80–1)

Individual parties in the governing coalition are able to destabilize the government by supporting foreign policy positions that do not correspond

to the position chosen by the government or the rest of the coalition. The government cannot take for granted that its partisan/parliamentary basis will support its foreign policy choices. For instance, in 1982 the governing coalition was shaken by disagreements concerning the appropriate response to the conflict between Britain and Argentina over the Falklands. Socialist parliamentarians — supported by some Christian Democrats — threatened to withdraw their support from the government if the latter maintained the economic sanctions against Argentina decided by the European Community. For this reason the government decided to suspend the sanctions, although most other parties supported them (Massai, 1984: 599).

Similar episodes occurred frequently during the 1990s. In various moments foreign and security policy issues threatened to deprive the executive of its parliamentary support basis. For instance, the government's multi-party majority in parliament fractured over the question (1) whether Italy should participate in the multilateral operation to pacify Albania (spring 1997), (2) whether Italy should support or oppose US military threats against Iraq for its refusal to allow in UN weapons inspectors (February 1998), (3) whether to grant asylum to the Kurdish leader Abdullah Ocalan and thus indirectly over Italy's relations with Turkey (winter 1998–9), (4) whether to authorize NATO's eastward enlargement (June 1998) and (5) whether to support NATO's war over Kosovo (1999) (Molinari, 2000). In these episodes, the executive was not simply compelled to come to terms with a small number of dissenting parliamentarians, but faced major political crises that could well have resulted in its end. In some cases, only the support of opposition parties prevented damaging defeats in parliamentary votes.

The experience of the 1990s confirms the conclusion of an investigation that covers an earlier period of parliamentary involvement in Italian foreign policy: 'The impact of the control phase is certainly very strong, both in absolute terms and compared to what happens in most other European states' (Massai, 1984: 600).³¹

The vulnerability to domestic political controversies on foreign policy choices, especially those involving the use of military force, made most members of Italian executives willing to shift important questions of national security to international fora. During the Cold War,

... the government was quite happy to surrender sovereignty to international organizations if this meant removing defence from the political debate. ... It has exploited its international commitments to legitimise defence activity domestically, while it has justified its minimal commitments to international bodies on the grounds of internal weaknesses. (Andreatta and Hill, 1997: 68)³²

This pattern continued after the Cold War. At the end of 1990, just before the Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union, Italy's foreign minister Gianni De Michelis proposed adding a military dimension to the EU by merging it with the Western European Union. The main purpose of this proposal was to improve the domestic legitimacy of Italy's participation in the military coalition against Iraq (Salmon, 1992: 237). Also the integrationist position held at the Intergovernmental Conference of 1996/7 was due at least in part to the desire to avoid damaging domestic political conflicts by Europeanizing foreign policy decision-making.³³

(e) *Conclusion.* This section has shown that, in foreign and security policy, the autonomy of French and British executives is substantially greater than that of German and Italian executives. As noted at the beginning, French and British executives are also much less prepared to deepen European integration in this domain than the German and Italian ones. This section has discussed briefly how low domestic autonomy and supranationalist preferences are linked in the German and Italian cases. France and Britain are negative cases — i.e. cases where a collusive delegation strategy has not been attempted. The collusive delegation hypothesis states that the French and British executives' demand for supranationalism was low because their structural position vis-a-vis parliaments did not create incentives for delegation. Insofar as this expectation was borne out, it reinforces the finding of the correlational analysis of the previous section.

4. Conclusion

This article has appraised the new *raison d'état* perspective as a source of empirical hypotheses about international cooperation. Specifically, it has formulated one of these hypotheses and confronted it with the evidence concerning institutional change in the common foreign and security policy of the European Union.

The new *raison d'état* approach asserts that intergovernmental cooperation can be the result of collusive delegation, i.e. the attempt by government to loosen domestic constraints by shifting decision-making to international settings and organizations. Governments will pursue this strategy if the expected gain in internal autonomy more than offsets the loss of external autonomy entailed by intergovernmental self-binding. The terms of this trade-off are different according to the domestic structures of each state.

If the logic of collusive delegation operates in the context of CFSP, we should expect that EU governments do not respond all in the same way to the opportunity of loosening domestic political constraints through internationalization, and that the differences reflect the domestic institutional

and political environment in which each of them acts. *Ceteris paribus*, executives that are comparatively less autonomous from parliamentary actors in foreign and security affairs should be more inclined to support a binding CFSP than executives that enjoy more room for manoeuvre in this policy area. In other words, the incentive to 'cut slack' depends on the 'slack' the government already has.

Regression analysis indicates that, controlling for other factors, the balance of power between parliaments and executives affects the preferences of the latter regarding the institutional depth of European cooperation in foreign and security policy — weaker executives are more integrationist. Case studies of the four largest EU member states confirm that the two executives whose foreign and security policy is less constrained by parliamentary scrutiny — France and Britain — are more reluctant to delegate significant powers to common European institutions than the two executives with less domestic autonomy — Germany and Italy. Taken together, these results support the existence of a link between domestic structures and government policies.

The purpose of this exercise was to show that the new *raison d'état* perspective can be useful in shedding light on interesting research puzzles, but only once precise and testable hypotheses are deduced from the general statements. While this article has laid emphasis on hypotheses requiring cross-national comparisons (also because existing work on collusive delegation has neglected this avenue of research), this is certainly not the only explanatory strategy available for ascertaining the role of collusive delegation. Ideally, a correlational study would be complemented by the detailed process-tracing of specific decisions, which would focus on individual motivations and agency rather than on structural dimensions.³⁴ Also the examination of successive governments in the same country (with different partisan coalitions, parliamentary support bases, etc.) would be useful to capture the dynamic aspects of this phenomenon. For each specific context of cooperation, a thorough understanding of how collusive delegation works is likely to emerge from the use of diverse methodologies at different levels of analysis.

While the cross-national investigation of CFSP reform reported in this article confirms the fruitfulness of the collusive delegation thesis, it also confirms that the latter cannot be expected to provide a complete explanation of international cooperation. As noted in the Introduction, explanatory factors stressed by different research programmes (realism, liberalism, constructivism, new *raison d'état*, and others) are likely to be part of any satisfactory explanation of the external behaviour of states. The assumptions of those perspectives might be very different, but politics is the

realm of complexity and the hypotheses inspired by them can be complementary as well as alternative.

The exploration of the diversity of government preferences concerning the institutional structure of CFSP suggests that collusive delegation is best seen as part of a multicausal account of intergovernmental cooperation rather than as an explanation superseding all others. This is one reason why it is appropriate to distinguish the collusive delegation thesis — a set of empirically testable hypotheses — from the new *raison d'état* perspective — a conceptual lens that makes visible certain patterns in world politics. This lens is useful because it sharpens the awareness that certain mechanisms are at work and inspires the development of research designs that are able to capture them.³⁵ Considering the predominance of functional approaches in the study of intergovernmental cooperation, the new *raison d'état* perspective adds a useful corrective by highlighting discrepancies between explicit justifications and hidden motivations. In this sense, it can help to increase the (small-cap) realism of political research.

Notes

I am grateful to Filippo Andreatta, Daniele Archibugi, Chris Brown, Nicola Dunbar, Fabio Franchino, Ettore Greco, David Held, Christopher Hill, Leonardo Morlino, Angelo Panebianco, Mark Thatcher, Elko Thielemann and two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. I am responsible for any errors. Research for this article was made possible by a Marie Curie Fellowship awarded by the European Commission.

1. Zürn (2004) defines executive multilateralism as 'a decision-making mode in which governmental representatives (mainly cabinet ministers) from different countries coordinate their policies internationally, but with little national parliamentary control and away from public scrutiny'. In a similar vein, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye (2001) refer to the 'club model' of multilateral cooperation.
2. Two views of the problem are presented by Held (2003) and Keohane (2003). On the debate see also Archibugi (2003).
3. See for instance Grieco (1996: 282), Russett and Oneal (2001: 90), Legro and Moravcsik (1999: 49) and Checkel (2001: 243). Wolf (1999a: 348) himself does 'not claim to have identified the only key to the explanation or even the initial cause of intergovernmental self-commitments'.
4. On the democratic deficit debate see for instance Weiler et al. (1995), Scharpf (1999), Schmitter (2000), Moravcsik (2004) and Lord and Beetham (2001).
5. On the public choice approach to European and international governance see Vaubel (1986, 1994, 1995), Colombatto and Macey (1996) and Dunleavy (2000).
6. Putnam (1988). On the two-level games approach see also Evans et al. (1993) and Milner (1997).

7. On the concept of state autonomy see especially Krasner (1978), Skocpol (1979) and Nordlinger (1981, 1987).
8. Steve David (1991) argues that leaders of contemporary developing countries choose their international alliances and alignments with an eye to counter not only external threats but also threats to their leadership coming from their own society. For David, considering that a much larger number of Third World leaders have been removed from power by internal enemies than by outside invasions, traditional balance of power theory is an inadequate explanation of alliance behaviour and has to be supplanted by an 'omnibalancing' theory of alignments that takes into account both external and internal threats. One should add that this kind of behaviour is not limited to contemporary developing countries, however, as shown for instance by the Convention of Münchengrätz signed by the Russian and Austrian empires in 1833.
9. A British diplomat expressed this will to autonomy by remarking that 'the Foreign Office can manage very well without Parliament, and would rather it weren't there at all' (cited by Wallace, 1977: 94).
10. This corollary links the collusive delegation approach to the 'domestic structures' approach, which emphasizes variations in political institutions — and particularly the distinction between 'strong' and 'weak' executives in democratic polities — as causes of variations in the external behaviour of states. See Katzenstein (1978), Krasner (1978), Risse-Kappen (1991) and Evangelista (1997).
11. On collusive delegation in European monetary cooperation see also Frieden (1994), Sandholtz (1993) and Buller (2000). For evidence in European telecommunications policy see Thatcher (2004).
12. For other cases of international cooperation that could be interpreted as instances of collusive delegation see Moravcsik (1994) and Wolf (2000: 101–52).
13. On the Maastricht negotiations see Baun (1996), Forster (1998), Laursen and Vanhoonacker (1992), Mazzucelli (1997) and Moravcsik (1998b). On the IGC of 1996/7, which led to the Amsterdam Treaty, see McDonagh (1998).
14. These documents are listed at the bottom of Table 1. These official documents are treated here not as indicators of the optimal level of integration preferred by each government in absolute terms, but as indications of their *relative* location on the continuum from national sovereignty to supranational governance.
15. The CIMC results from demographic, economic and military indicators (Singer et al., 1972). For each of these indicators, the COW research team calculates the total score for the international system in a given year, determines the percentage share held by each state, and calculates the average of these percentage shares. In this article, however, I consider each state's share of the EU total, since I am interested in the differences in power among member states only. The CINC used here is for 1992, the last year for which data are currently available in the National Material Capabilities Dataset (Singer and Small, 1990/1999).
16. Hooghe and Marks (2001: 43).

17. The survey question that is used in this article is the following: 'In the near future do you see yourself as . . .?', where five possible answers are: (1) Austrian/Belgian/Danish/etc. only, (2) Austrian/Belgian/Danish/etc. and European, (3) European and Austrian/Belgian/Danish/etc., (4) European only, (5) don't know. For each country I construct a 'European identity score', which equals the difference between the percentage of respondents indicating 'nationality only' and the sum of the percentages of all respondents indicating 'European' as (part of) their identity. I pooled the data from four different Eurobarometer surveys, which were conducted between March 1992 and December 1995. The Eurobarometer surveys used are: No. 37 (fieldwork: March–April 1992), No. 40 (fieldwork: October–November 1993), No. 43.1 (fieldwork: April–May 1995), and No. 44.1 (fieldwork: November–December 1995). See Reif and Melich (1995, 1997), Reif and Marlier (1998a, 1998b). These surveys were selected because they included the questions relevant for the hypothesis. Figures for Austria and Sweden are taken from surveys Nos 43.1 and 44.1 only; figures for Finland are taken from Nos 40, 43.1 and 44.1.
18. Koenig-Archibugi (2004).
19. On this connection see also Maoz and Russett (1993), Burley (1993) and Deudney (1996).
20. Hooghe and Marks (2001: 191–212). Their 12-point index is based on the degree of constitutional federalism, the presence of special territorial autonomy, the role of regions in central government and the existence of regional elections. In the following analysis I use the scores they assign to each EU member state for 2000, with one modification — one of their four dimensions: special territorial autonomy — is left out because it is often seen as an exceptional solution to a specific political problem rather than as the institutional consequence of a distinctive way of conceiving political authority.
21. VIF and tolerance values show no multicollinearity. Inspection of residuals, Cook's distances and leverage values reveals no cases with undue influence on the model, although a DFBeta value above 1 suggests that the UK could be influential; re-estimating the model without the UK does not alter substantially the results. The residuals are normally distributed (Shapiro-Francia test), not serially correlated (Durbin-Watson test), and not heteroscedastic (Cook-Weisberg test). The model has no omitted variable bias (Ramsey RESET test).
22. See for instance Hill (1996), Regelsberger et al. (1997) and Manners and Whitman (2000).
23. The powers of the Bundestag regarding foreign and defence policy are examined in detail by Weiß (1971), Wilker (1988), Schäfer and Stechow (1988), Ehrenzeller (1993: 173–214), Frowein and Hahn (1994) and Wöckener (1996: 92–7).
24. On the whole dispute cf. especially Philippi (1997). See also Brunner (1993), Lutz (1993) and Siedschlag (1995).
25. See the references in Philippi (1997: 84).
26. Philippi (1997: 84).
27. Quoted by Asmus (1995: 20). Rühle's use of the European argument was carried

- on by his successor in the defence ministry, Rudolf Scharping (SPD), after the change of government in 1998. Scharping justified his opposition to a cutback in military expenditure saying that Germany risked losing its *Bündnisfähigkeit* and *Europafähigkeit* (Boysen, 2000).
28. Birkinshaw and Ashiagbor (1996: 499) write that ‘Parliament’s domination by Government means effectively that no comparable system of democratic government in the modern world concentrates so much power in the executive. Lord Hailsham, a former Conservative Lord Chancellor, summed it up in the memorable phrase “an elective dictatorship”’.
 29. This is the assessment of Richards (1970: 164; 1973: 246), Allen and Byrne (1980: 360) and Smith (1986).
 30. For detailed examinations of Westminster’s role in foreign and defence policy see Brownlie (1980), McIntosh (1990: 38–62, 211–22), McDonald (1992), Templeman (1994) and especially Carstairs and Ware (1991b).
 31. Garavoglia (1984: 639) reaches the same conclusion, and a similar picture emerges also from Cassese (1980), Bognetti (1994) and Casu (1994).
 32. In Moravcsik’s terminology, the Italian government tried at the same time to cut slack and tie its hands. See also Zucconi (1998: 121).
 33. Author’s interviews, Ministero degli Affari Esteri and Ministero della Difesa, Rome, 1999.
 34. On process tracing see for instance the study by Dyson and Featherstone (1999) on EMU quoted above.
 35. It might be the case that the main interest of the new *raison d’état* interpretation of international governance lies in its implications for debates about alternative institutional architectures of global governance and the possibility of democratizing global public policy. These are central concerns of Wolf (1999a). Considering the assumptions of this approach, the assessment of the democratic legitimacy of ‘executive multilateralism’ is bound to be negative. However, not all authors studying how governments gain domestic autonomy through internationalization agree that those practices are objectionable from a democratic point of view. For instance, according to Moravcsik executives are generally responsive to a broader range of interests compared to the pressure groups that dominate channels of political representation in democratic states. Considering that national arenas often privilege particularistic interests over general but diffuse interests, ‘the insulation of national executives from domestic rent-seeking groups not only facilitates international cooperation; it can also be justified as a more broadly “representative” outcome than direct democracy would generate’ (Moravcsik, 1994: 56; see also Moravcsik, 2004). In a similar vein, Miles Kahler (2004) notes that, ‘Paradoxically, “opening” the WTO to a wider array of interests in the name of accountability might make negotiation outcomes *less* representative of the interests of the electorate as a whole.’ While these are questions of great normative and practical importance, they lie beyond the scope of this article.

References

- Allen, David and Paul Byrne (1980) 'Parlament und Außenpolitik: Das britische Beispiel', *Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen* 11(2): 345–60.
- Andreatta, Filippo and Christopher Hill (1997) 'Italy', in Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon (eds) *The European Union and National Defence Policy*, pp. 66–86. London: Routledge.
- Archibugi, Daniele (ed.) (2003) *Debating Cosmopolitics*. London: Verso.
- Asmus, Ronald D. (1995) *Germany's Contribution to Peacekeeping: Issues and Outlook*. Santa Monica, CA: RAND.
- Banchoff, Thomas (1999) 'German Identity and European Integration', *European Journal of International Relations* 5(3): 259–89.
- Baun, Michael J. (1996) *An Imperfect Union: The Maastricht Treaty and the New Politics of European Integration*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Birkinshaw, Patrick and Diamond Ashiagbor (1996) 'National Participation in Community Affairs: Democracy, the UK Parliament and the EU', *Common Market Law Review* 33: 499–529.
- Bognetti, Giovanni (1994) 'The Role of Italian Parliament in the Treaty-Making Process', in Stefan A. Riesenfeld and Frederick M. Abbott (eds) *Parliamentary Participation in the Making and Operation of Treaties: A Comparative Study*, pp. 89–107. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Bohnen, Johannes (1997) 'Germany', in Jolyon Howorth and Anand Menon (eds) *The European Union and National Defence Policy*, pp. 49–65. London and New York: Routledge.
- Boysen, Jens (2000) 'News from Germany', *Central European Review* 2(18), <http://www.ce-review.org/00/18/germanynews18.html> (accessed: 23 October 2003).
- Brownlie, Ian (1980) 'Parliamentary Control over Foreign Policy in the United Kingdom', in Antonio Cassese (ed.) *Parliamentary Control over Foreign Policy: Legal Essays*, pp. 1–10. Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff.
- Brunner, Stefan (1993) *Deutsche Soldaten im Ausland: Fortsetzung der Außenpolitik mit anderen Mitteln?* München: Beck.
- Buller, Jim (2000) *National Statecraft and European Integration: The Conservative Government and the European Union, 1979–97*. London: Pinter.
- Bulmer, Simon J. (1997) 'Shaping the Rules? The Constitutive Politics of the European Union and German Power', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) *Tamed Power: Germany in Europe*, pp. 49–79. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Burley, Anne-Marie (1993) 'Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law, and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State', in John Gerard Ruggie (ed.) *Multilateralism Matters: The Theory and Praxis of an Institutional Form*, pp. 125–56. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Burridge, Brian (1998) *Defence and Democracy: The Control of the Military*. London: Centre for Defence Studies.
- Carstairs, Charles and Richard Ware (1991a) 'Conclusions', in Charles Carstairs and Richard Ware (eds) *Parliament and International Relations*, pp. 160–77. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.

- Carstairs, Charles and Richard Ware (eds) (1991b) *Parliament and International Relations*. Milton Keynes: Open University Press.
- Cassese, Antonio (1980) 'Foreign Affairs and the Italian Constitution', in Antonio Cassese (ed.) *Parliamentary Control over Foreign Policy: Legal Essays*, pp. 65–109. Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff.
- Casu, Antonio (ed.) (1994) *Parlamento e sicurezza nazionale*. Ancona: Nuove Ricerche.
- Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2001) 'Constructivism and Integration Theory: Crash Landing or Safe Arrival?', *European Union Politics* 2(2): 240–49.
- Clarke, Michael (1988) 'The Policy-Making Process', in Michael Smith, Steve Smith and Brian White (eds) *British Foreign Policy: Tradition, Change and Transformation*, pp. 71–96. London: Unwin Hyman.
- Cohen, Samy (1986) *La monarchie nucléaire. Les coulisses de la politique étrangère sous la Cinquième République*. Paris: Hachette.
- Cohen, Simon (1977) 'Le contrôle parlementaire de la politique de défense', *Revue du droit public* 93: 377–446.
- Colombatto, Enrico and Jonathan R. Macey (1996) 'A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation and the Decline of the Nation State', *Cardozo Law Review* 18(3): 925–56.
- Cot, Jean-Pierre (1980) 'Parliament and Foreign Policy in France', in Antonio Cassese (ed.) *Parliamentary Control over Foreign Policy: Legal Essays*, pp. 11–24. Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff.
- Cottrel, Yves (1983) 'Note sur le contrôle du parlement sur la politique étrangère de la France sous la V République. Importance du rôle des Commissions des Affaires étrangères', *Revue de droit public* 99: 965–82.
- Dandeker, Christopher (1994) 'National Security and Democracy: The United Kingdom Experience', *Armed Forces and Society* 20(3): 353–74.
- David, Steven (1991) *Choosing Sides: Alignment and Realignment in the Third World*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Deudney, Daniel (1996) 'Binding Sovereigns: Authorities, Structures, and Geopolitics in Philadelphian Systems', in Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber (eds) *State Sovereignty as Social Construct*, pp. 190–239. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Dunleavy, Patrick (2000) 'Explaining the Centralization of the European Union: A Public Choice Analysis', in Peter Moser, Gerald Schneider and Gebhard Kirchgässner (eds) *Decision Rules in the European Union: A Rational Choice Perspective*, pp. 163–200. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Dyson, Kenneth and Kevin Featherstone (1999) *The Road to Maastricht: Negotiating Monetary and Economic Union*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Ehrenzeller, Bernhard (1993) *Legislative Gewalt und Aussenpolitik*. Basel und Frankfurt a.M.: Helbing & Lichtenhahn.
- Enjalran, Paulette and Philippe Husson (1999) 'France. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "something new, but which is the continuation of our past . . ." (Paul Claudel — *Le soulier de satin*)', in Brian Hocking (ed.) *Foreign Ministries: Change and Adaptation*, pp. 59–74. Basingstoke: Macmillan.

- Erasmus, Desiderius (1515) 'Antipolemus; or, the Plea of Reason, Religion, and Humanity Against War. A Fragment; translated from the Latin of Erasmus', in Vicesimus Knox, *The Works*, Vol. 5, pp. 405–97. London: J. Mawman (1824).
- Evangelista, Matthew (1997) 'Domestic Structure and International Change', in Michael W. Doyle and G. John Ikenberry (eds) *New Thinking in International Relations Theory*, pp. 202–28. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Evans, Peter B., Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds) (1993) *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Forster, Anthony (1999) *Britain and the Maastricht Negotiations*. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Frieden, Jeffrey (1994) 'Making Commitments: France and Italy in the European Monetary System, 1979–1985', in Barry Eichengreen and Jeffrey Frieden (eds) *The Political Economy of European Monetary Unification*, pp. 25–46. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Frowein, Jochen Abr. and Michael J. Hahn (1994) 'The Participation of Parliament in the Treaty Process in the Federal Republic of Germany', in Stefan A. Riesenfeld and Frederick M. Abbott (eds) *Parliamentary Participation in the Making and Operation of Treaties: A Comparative Study*, pp. 61–87. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Garavoglia, Guido (1984) 'Parlamento e politica estera: un esame comparato', *Quaderni costituzionali* 4(3): 605–39.
- Goldstein, Judith (1996) 'International Law and Domestic Institutions: Reconciling North American "Unfair" Trade Laws', *International Organization* 50(4): 541–64.
- Greenwood, David (1994) 'The United Kingdom', in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti (eds) *The Defense Policy of Nations: A Comparative Study*, pp. 278–304. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Grieco, Joseph M. (1996) 'State Interests and Institutional Rule Trajectories: A Neorealist Interpretation of the Maastricht Treaty and European Economic and Monetary Union', in Benjamin Frankel (ed.) *Realism: Restatements and Renewal*, pp. 261–305. London: Frank Cass.
- Held, David (2003) 'From Executive to Cosmopolitan Multilateralism', in David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds) *Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance*, pp. 160–86. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Hill, Christopher (ed.) (1996) *The Actors in Europe's Foreign Policy*. London and New York: Routledge.
- Hooghe, Liesbet and Gary Marks (2001) *Multi-Level Governance and European Integration*. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Ikenberry, G. John (1998) 'Constitutional Politics in International Relations', *European Journal of International Relations* 4(2): 147–77.
- Isernia, Pierangelo (1996) 'Bandiera e risorse: la politica estera negli anni ottanta', in Maurizio Cotta and Pierangelo Isernia (eds) *Il gigante dai piedi d'argilla. La crisi del regime partitocratico in Italia*, pp. 139–88. Bologna: il Mulino.
- Jopp, Mathias (1994) *The Strategic Implications of European Integration* (Adelphi

- Paper 290). London: Brassey's for the International Institute for Strategic Studies.
- Kahler, Miles (2004) 'Defining Accountability Up: The Global Economic Multilaterals', in David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds) *Global Governance and Public Accountability*. Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming.
- Kaiser, Karl (1971) 'Transnational Relations as a Threat to the Democratic Process', *International Organization* 25(3): 706–20.
- Katzenstein, Peter J. (1978) 'Conclusion: Domestic Structures and Strategies of Foreign Economic Policy', in Peter J. Katzenstein (ed.) *Between Power and Plenty: Foreign Economic Policies of Advanced Industrial States*, pp. 295–336. Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. (2003) 'Global Governance and Democratic Accountability', in David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds) *Taming Globalization: Frontiers of Governance*, pp. 130–59. Cambridge: Polity Press.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S. Nye, Jr (2001) 'The Club Model of Multilateral Cooperation and Problems of Democratic Legitimacy', in Roger B. Porter, Pierre Sauvé, Arvind Subramanian and Americo Beviglia Zampetti (eds) *Efficiency, Equity, and Legitimacy: The Multilateral Trading System at the Millennium*, pp. 264–94. Washington: Brookings Institution Press.
- Kessler, Marie-Christine (1999) *La politique étrangère de la France. Acteurs et processus*. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po.
- Kimmel, Adolf (1997) 'Die institutionellen und verfassungsrechtlichen Rahmenbedingungen der französischen Sicherheitspolitik', in Hanns W. Maull, Michael Meimeth and Christoph Neßhöver (eds) *Die verhinderte Großmacht. Frankreichs Sicherheitspolitik nach dem Ende des Ost-West-Konflikts*, pp. 20–36. Opladen: Leske + Budrich.
- King, Anthony (1976) 'Modes of Executive–Legislative Relations: Great Britain, France, and West Germany', *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 1(1): 37–65.
- Koenig-Archibugi, Mathias (2004) 'Explaining Government Preferences for Institutional Change in EU Foreign and Security Policy', *International Organization* 57(1): 137–74.
- Krasner, Stephen D. (1978) *Defending the National Interest: Raw Material Investments and US Foreign Policy*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Larsen, Henrik (1997) *Foreign Policy and Discourse Analysis: France, Britain and Europe*. London: Routledge.
- Laursen, Finn and Sophie Vanhoonacker (eds) (1992) *Intergovernmental Conference on Political Union: Institutional Reforms, New Policies and International Identity of the European Community*. Maastricht: European Institute of Public Administration.
- Legro, Jeffrey W. and Andrew Moravcsik (1999) 'Is Anybody Still a Realist?', *International Security* 24(2): 5–55.
- Lord, Christopher and David Beetham (2001) 'Legitimizing the EU: Is There a "Post-parliamentary Basis" for its Legitimation?', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 39(3): 443–62.

- Lutz, Dieter S. (ed.) (1993) *Deutsche Soldaten weltweit? Blaubelme, Eingreiftruppen, 'out of area' — Der Streit um unsere sicherheitspolitische Zukunft*. Reibbeck: Rowohlt.
- McDonagh, Bobby (1998) *Original Sin in a Brave New World: An Account of the Negotiation of the Treaty of Amsterdam*. Dublin: Institute of European Affairs.
- McDonald, Oonagh (1992) *The Defence Select Committee, 1979–92*. London: Brassey's for The Centre for Defence Studies.
- McIntosh, Malcolm (1990) *Managing Britain's Defence*. London: Macmillan.
- Manners, Ian and Richard G. Whitman (eds) (2000) *The Foreign Policies of European Union Member States*. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
- Maoz, Zeev and Bruce Russett (1993) 'Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946–1986', *American Political Science Review* 87(3): 624–38.
- Marcussen, Martin, Thomas Risse, Daniela Engelmann-Martin, Hans Joachim Knopf and Klaus Roscher (1998) 'Constructing Europe? The Evolution of French, British, and German Nation-State Identities', *Journal of European Public Policy* 6(4): 614–33.
- Martin, Laurence and John Garnett (1997) *British Foreign Policy: Challenges and Choices for the Twenty-first Century*. London: Royal Institute of International Affairs.
- Massai, Alessandro (1984) 'Parlamento e politica estera: l'Italia', *Quaderni costituzionali* 4(3): 559–603.
- Mazzucelli, Colette (1997) *France and Germany at Maastricht: Politics and Negotiations to Create the European Union*. New York: Garland.
- Milner, Helen V. (1997) *Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International Relations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Molinari, Maurizio (2000) *L'interesse nazionale. Dieci storie dell'Italia nel mondo*. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1993a) 'Preferences and Power in the European Community: A Liberal Intergovernmentalist Approach', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 31(4): 473–524.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1993b) 'Introduction: Integrating International and Domestic Theories of International Bargaining', in Peter B. Evans, Harold K. Jacobson and Robert D. Putnam (eds) *Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics*, pp. 3–42. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1994) *Why the European Community Strengthens the State: Domestic Politics and International Cooperation*. Center for European Studies Working Paper Series No. 52. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1997a) 'Warum die Europäische Union die Exekutive stärkt: Innenpolitik und internationale Kooperation', in Klaus Dieter Wolf (ed.) *Projekt Europa im Übergang? Staat und Demokratie in der Europäischen Union*, pp. 211–69. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1997b) 'Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics', *International Organization* 51(4): 513–53.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1998a) 'Does International Cooperation Strengthen National

- Executives? The Case of Monetary Policy in the European Union', paper presented at the third workshop on Europeanization and Domestic Political Change, Florence, European University Institute, 19–20 June.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (1998b) *The Choice for Europe: Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Moravcsik, Andrew (2004) 'Is there a "Democratic Deficit" in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis', in David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds) *Global Governance and Public Accountability*. Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming.
- Nordlinger, Eric A. (1981) *On the Autonomy of the Democratic State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Nordlinger, Eric A. (1987) 'Taking the State Seriously', in M. Weiner and S. Huntington (eds) *Understanding Political Development*, pp. 353–90. Boston: Little, Brown.
- Panebianco, Angelo (1997) *Guerrieri democratici. Le democrazie e la politica di potenza*. Bologna: il Mulino.
- Philippi, Nina (1997) *Bundeswehr-Auslandseisätze als außen- und sicherheitspolitisches Problem des geeinten Deutschland*. Frankfurt a.M.: Lang.
- Putnam, Robert (1988) 'Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games', *International Organization* 42(3): 427–60.
- Regelsberger, Elfriede, Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent and Wolfgang Wessels (eds) (1997) *The Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
- Reif, Karlheinz and Anna Melich (1995) Euro-Barometer 37.0: Awareness and Importance of Maastricht and the Future of the European Community, March–April 1992 [computer file]. 4th edn. Colchester, Essex: The Data Archive [distributor], 4 December 1995. SN: 2930.
- Reif, Karlheinz and Anna Melich (1997) Euro-Barometer 40: Poverty and Social Exclusion, October–November 1993 [computer file]. 2nd edn. Colchester, Essex: The Data Archive [distributor], 13 January 1997. SN: 3258.
- Reif, Karlheinz and Eric Marlier (1998a) Eurobarometer 43.1: International Trade and Radiation Protection, April–May 1995 [computer file]. 2nd edn. Colchester, Essex: The Data Archive [distributor], 11 May 1998. SN: 3681.
- Reif, Karlheinz and Eric Marlier (1998b) Eurobarometer 44.1: Education and Training Throughout Life, and the Common European Currency, November–December 1995 [computer file]. Conducted by INRA (Europe), Brussels, on request of the European Commission. ZA 2nd edn. Cologne, Germany: Zentralarchiv für Empirische Sozialforschung [producer and distributor], 1998, and Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for Political and Social Research [distributor], 1998.
- Richards, Peter G. (1970) *Parliament and Foreign Affairs*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Richards, Peter G. (1973) 'Parliament and the Parties', in Robert Boardman and A.J.R. Groom (eds) *The Management of Britain's External Relations*, pp. 245–61. London: Macmillan.

- Risse, Thomas (2001) 'A European Identity? Europeanization and the Evolution of Nation-State Identities', in Maria Green Cowles, James Caporaso and Thomas Risse (eds) *Transforming Europe: Europeanization and Domestic Change*, pp. 198–216. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Risse-Kappen, Thomas (1991) 'Public Opinion, Domestic Structure, and Foreign Policy in Liberal Democracies', *World Politics* 43(4): 479–512.
- Russett, Bruce M. and John Oneal (2001) *Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations*. New York and London: W.W. Norton.
- Salmon, Trevor C. (1992) 'Testing Times for European Political Cooperation: The Gulf and Yugoslavia, 1990–1992', *International Affairs* 68(2): 233–53.
- Sandholtz, Wayne (1993) 'Choosing Union: Monetary Politics and Maastricht', *International Organization* 47(1): 1–39.
- Schäfer, Helmut and Christian von Stechow (1988) 'Kontrolle der Sicherheitspolitik', in Uwe Thaysen, Roger H. Davidson and Robert G. Livingston (eds) *US-Kongreß und Deutscher Bundestag*, pp. 421–35. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Scharpf, Fritz W. (1999) *Governing in Europe: Effective and Democratic?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Schmidt, Vivien A. (1999) 'European "Federalism" and its Encroachments on National Institutions', *Publius* 29(1): 19–44.
- Schmitter, Philippe C. (2000) *How to Democratize the European Union . . . And Why Bother?* Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Siedschlag, Alexander (1995) *Die aktive Beteiligung Deutschlands an militärischen Aktionen zur Verwirklichung Kollektiver Sicherheit*. Frankfurt a.M.: Lang.
- Singer, J. David and Melvin Small (1990/1999) *National Material Capabilities Data, 1816–1993* [computer file]. Ann Arbor: J. David Singer, University of Michigan, and Detroit: Melvin Small, Wayne State University [producers]. Originally created July 1990, updated April 1999. Available at <http://www.umich.edu/~cowproj>.
- Singer, J. David, Stuart Bremer and John Stuckey (1972) 'Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820–1965', in Bruce M. Russett (ed.) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, pp. 19–48. Beverly Hills: Sage.
- Skocpol, Theda (1979) *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Steve (1986) 'Reasons of State', in David Held and Christopher Pollitt (eds) *New Forms of Democracy*, pp. 192–217. London: Sage.
- Templeman, Sydney (1994) 'Treaty-Making and the British Parliament', in Stefan A. Riesenfeld and Frederick M. Abbott (eds) *Parliamentary Participation in the Making and Operation of Treaties: A Comparative Study*, pp. 153–76. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff.
- Thatcher, Mark (2004) 'Varieties of Capitalism in an Internationalized World: Domestic Institutional Change in European Telecommunications', *Comparative Political Studies*, 37(7).

- Thomson, Janice E. (1995) 'State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory and Empirical Research', *International Studies Quarterly* 39(2): 213–33.
- Tomuschat, Christian (1980) 'Parliamentary Control over Foreign Policy in the Federal Republic of Germany', in Antonio Cassese (ed.) *Parliamentary Control over Foreign Policy: Legal Essays*, pp. 25–51. Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff.
- Vaubel, Roland (1986) 'A Public Choice Approach to International Organization', *Public Choice* 51(1): 39–57.
- Vaubel, Roland (1994) 'The Public Choice Analysis of European Integration: A Survey', *European Journal of Political Economy* 10(1): 227–47.
- Vaubel, Roland (1995) *The Centralisation of Western Europe: The Common Market, Political Integration, and Democracy*. London: Institute of Economic Affairs.
- Wagner, Wolfgang (2002) 'The Subnational Foundations of the European Parliament', *Journal of International Relations and Development* 5(1): 24–36.
- Wallace, William (1977) *The Foreign Policy Process in Britain*. London: George Allen & Unwin.
- Weiler, Joseph H.H., Ulrich R. Haltern, and Franz C. Mayer (1995) 'European Democracy and its Critique', *West European Politics* 18(3): 4–39.
- Weiß, Siegfried (1971) *Auswärtige Gewalt und Gewaltenteilung*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Wilker, Lothar (1988) 'Bundestag und Außenpolitik', in Uwe Thaysen, Roger H. Davidson and Robert G. Livingston (eds) *US-Kongress und Deutscher Bundestag*, pp. 383–99. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.
- Wöckener, Holger (1996) *Politischer Willensbildungsprozeß und Verteidigungsanstrengungen in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot.
- Woldendorp, Jaap, Hans Keman and Ian Budge (2000) *Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–1998): Composition — Duration — Personnel*. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
- Wolf, Klaus Dieter (1999a) 'The New Raison d'État as a Problem for Democracy in World Society', *European Journal of International Relations* 5(3): 333–63.
- Wolf, Klaus Dieter (1999b) 'Defending State Autonomy: Intergovernmental Governance in the European Union', in Beate Kohler-Koch and Rainer Eising (eds) *The Transformation of Governance in the European Union*, pp. 231–48. London and New York: Routledge.
- Wolf, Klaus Dieter (2000) *Die Neue Staatsräson: Zwischenstaatliche Kooperation als Demokratieproblem in der Weltgesellschaft*. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
- Yost, David S. (1994) 'France', in Douglas J. Murray and Paul R. Viotti (eds) *The Defense Policy of Nations: A Comparative Study*, pp. 233–77. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Zaring, David (1998) 'International Law by Other Means: The Twilight Existence of International Financial Regulatory Institutions', *Texas International Law Journal* 33(2): 281–330.

- Zucconi, Mario (1998) 'Italy', in Michael J. Brenner (ed.) *NATO and Collective Security*, pp. 116–38. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
- Zürn, Michael (2004) 'Global Governance under Legitimacy Pressure', in David Held and Mathias Koenig-Archibugi (eds) *Global Governance and Public Accountability*. Oxford: Blackwell, forthcoming.