

Reactions to gender egalitarian men: Perceived feminization due to stigma-by-association

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Abstract

Gender egalitarian men are vital for women's progress, yet attitudes toward and beliefs about them are underinvestigated. In three experiments, women liked gender egalitarian men more so than men did, but both genders stigmatized them as more feminine, weak, and likely to be gay, compared with control male targets. This was true even when the gender egalitarian was an actual presidential candidate for the American Psychological Association (Experiment 3). We examined whether stigmatization was due to (a) gender egalitarians' presumed affiliations with women and/or gay men (stigma-by-association); (b) the gay male feminist stereotype; or (c) a threat to men's gender identity. Results supported stigma-by-association, but only for affiliations with women (not gay men). The gay male feminist stereotype was robust, but did not account for stigmatization, and men's reactions to male gender egalitarians were independent of their gender identity. Implications of these findings for gender equality are discussed.

Keywords

stigma-by-association, stereotypes, sexism, gender equality, gender egalitarians, male feminists

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Despite enormous gains, women's status continues to lag behind men's even in Western cultures with respect to equal opportunity, economic compensation, recognition, and prestige (England, 2006; Ridgeway, 2001, 2006). In fact, it can be argued that women's advancement has stalled or even reversed, compared with previous decades (Rudman & Glick, 2008; Valian, 1999). For example, women who worked full time in 2008 earned 71% of what comparable men earned—slightly less than what they earned in 1990 (U.S. Census Bureau, 2008). Further, women have not made significant inroads into occupations that bestow the highest economic and social rewards, such as corporate lawyers, politicians,

or CEOs (Catalyst, 2012; U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010). A large body of research shows that women's access to leadership roles is encumbered by both negative stereotypes of their competence and discrimination against women who disconfirm the stereotypes (for reviews, see Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Glick, & Phelan, 2012;

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Rudman & Phelan, 2008). Moreover, prejudice against strong, self-confident women stems from motives to defend the gender hierarchy (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012). Therefore, female gender remains a source of stigma, whereby “having a status that is devalued in the wider society can lead to concrete forms of discrimination” (Link & Phelan, 2001, p. 371). Consequently, even the most optimistic scholars acknowledge that the successful protection and enlargement of women’s rights rests on continued activism (Jackson, 1998).

What is the prognosis for continued activism? Research on attitudes toward feminist women suggests that female activists are viewed unfavorably (Haddock & Zanna, 2006; Unger, Hilderbrand, & Madar, 1982), and that even women shy away from identifying as feminists, stereotyping them as “man-hating lesbians” (e.g., Rudman & Fairchild, 2007; Swim, Ferguson, & Hyers, 1999). But what about gender egalitarian men? Scant research has examined this issue, much of it concerned with how people respond to the feminist label. Anderson (2009) asked subjects to evaluate the categories, “man,” “woman,” “feminist woman,” and “feminist man.” The latter was judged relatively high on weak and likely to be gay (revealing a gay male feminist stereotype), yet a feminist man was well liked by both male and female participants. Similarly, male feminists were viewed as warmer and more likely to achieve their family goals, but also less likely to achieve their career goals, compared with female feminists (Rickabaugh, 1995). Thus, a male feminist may be liked but nonetheless, viewed as less than a “real man” (see also Twenge & Zucker, 1999). To date, participant gender differences have not been observed, with one exception. When Breen and Karpinski (2008) described male or female targets as feminists (but also as explicitly heterosexual), women evaluated a feminist man more positively than men did.

The paucity of research examining reactions to male gender egalitarians is surprising because many men endorse gender equality (without claiming to be feminists). For example, in a survey of professional men ($N = 178$, 60% of whom were senior managers), 74% of the sample agreed

that gender equality was an important goal, yet few were willing to champion women’s causes in their organization (Prime & Moss-Racusin, 2009). Why? As summarized by a male manager interviewee, a principle reason given was that men feared being stigmatized if they were to advocate openly for the women in their workplaces:

What are men who are identified with “women’s issues” or men who are, publicly or privately, seen as supporting equality? It’s always their manhood is undermined. They’re a wimp. Their heterosexuality is questioned. These are... powerful policing mechanisms that keep men silent... If it was understood that men who are supportive of women’s efforts for equality are strong men—[that] it actually takes more strength as a man—that changes the conversation. (2009, p. 15)

The primary objective of the present research was to investigate the extent to which gender egalitarian men are stigmatized as feminine, weak, and gay (qualities that are proscribed for men; Moss-Racusin, Phelan, & Rudman, 2010; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, et al., 2012), using multiple male targets and controls. In Experiment 1, we contrasted a male feminist with a benevolent sexist; in Experiment 2, we contrasted a gender egalitarian with a biologist and a psychologist; in Experiment 3, we modified the online materials of actual APA presidential candidates, one of whom is a gender egalitarian. In addition, we used a range of implicit as well as explicit measures to obviate demand. Further, we examined three explanations that might account for feminization stigma, as we describe next.

Accounting for Stigmatizing Gender Egalitarian Men

Our primary hypothesis is that men who support women’s causes are at risk for *stigma-by-association*, whereby people are viewed as similar to low-status group members simply by affiliating with them (Goffman, 1963; Kulik, Bainbridge, & Cregan, 2008). Evidence of stigma-by-association has

been obtained with various stigmatized groups. For example, White male targets who were merely pictured in proximity to an obese woman or a Black man suffered social and economic penalties (Hebl & Mannix, 2003; Pryor, Reeder, Monroe, 2012). More generally, relatives and partners of AIDS victims, the incarcerated, drug addicts, and the mentally ill have reported experiencing stigma-by-association effects (for a review, see Kulik et al., 2008). In the case of gender egalitarian men, they may be stigmatized because they advocate for women and therefore, are likely to be perceived as having more female than male associates (i.e., friends and colleagues). In essence, the qualities associated with women may be transferred to gender egalitarian men, causing them to be perceived as more feminine and weak than nonegalitarian men. This hypothesis stems from evidence that men who associate themselves with women suffer a loss in status whether they work for female bosses (Brescoll, Uhlmann, Moss-Racusin, & Sarnell, 2012) or work with women in groups (West, Heilman, Moss-Racusin, Gullett, & Magee, 2012). Men who align themselves with women's causes are likely to be perceived as deliberately choosing to associate with a lower status group. Consequently, a man's choice to work with women, for women, is likely to be perceived as a meaningful relationship that evokes the dictum, "birds of a feather flock together" (Pryor et al., 2012, p. 225).

Stigma-by-association also applies to the heterosexual male friends of gay men. That is, straight men who befriend gay men are perceived to be homosexual (Neuberg, Smith, Hoffman, & Russell, 1994). Research suggests that gay men are perceived to be more feminine and less masculine than heterosexual men (i.e., they are viewed as gender inverters; Kite & Deaux, 1987). The corollary is that a man who is perceived to be high on feminine qualities (because he supports women's rights and thereby, associates himself with women) might be assumed to be gay (Fagot, Rodgers, & Leinbach, 2000). Moreover, because of the stereotype that male feminists are gay (Anderson, 2009), it was possible that gender egalitarian men would suffer stigma-by-association for their presumed affiliations with gay men. Therefore, we

measured the extent to which presumed affiliations with either women or gay men might account for stigmatizing gender egalitarian men as feminine, weak, and likely to be gay.

Alternatively, the gay male feminist stereotype (Anderson, 2009), might best account for inferences that gender egalitarian men are feminine, weak, and gay. That is, *the group-based stereotype hypothesis* proposes that stigmatization against gender egalitarian men will be explained (i.e., mediated) by the stereotypic belief that they are actually likely to be gay. This explanation stems from a large literature showing that category-based judgments are routinely and automatically applied to individual group members (for reviews, see Brewer, 1988; Fiske, 1998; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).

Note that neither the stigma-by-association or stereotype explanations imply gender differences in stigmatizing gender egalitarian men. In contrast, a third explanation relies on men reacting more negatively to gender egalitarian men than women in order to defend men's own masculinity status. This account is derived from the fact that men show more sexual prejudice than women (e.g., Herek, 2002), plausibly because men have a stronger need to differentiate themselves from gay men to protect their masculinity (Falomir-Pichastor & Mugny, 2009). A similar motive might cause men to derogate male gender egalitarians more so than women.¹ Thus, the *identity threat hypothesis* proposes that stigmatizing gender egalitarian men will be moderated by men's need to defend their masculinity, as observed by interactions between participant gender and gender identity.

Whatever the reason for stigmatizing gender egalitarian men, our findings will have implications for women's advancement. Heterosexuality is arguably the strongest prescription for men (Herek, 1989; Kimmel, 2004), and research suggests that being mislabeled as "gay" is often a serious insult for heterosexual men (Burn, 2000; Murphy, 2004; Thurlow, 2001)—one that many men are motivated to avoid (Bosson, Prewitt-Freilino, & Taylor, 2005; Bosson, Taylor, & Prewitt-Freilino, 2006). Therefore, if gender egalitarian men are viewed as feminine, weak, and

suspected of being gay, it is likely to present a significant obstacle to men's willingness to actively and publicly support gender equality.

Wanted: Male Ambassadors for Gender Equality

There are at least three reasons why it is important to investigate reactions to men who advocate for women. First, just as Whites' support was critical for advancing Blacks' civil rights, male ambassadors for women's causes are vital for gender equality. For example, because they hold many judicial and policy-making positions, men's support is essential for advancing protective legislation (e.g., pay equity laws, affirmative action, and family leave). Moreover, gender egalitarian men can sometimes be more effective than female counterparts. For example, compared with women, men who confronted sexism were viewed as more reasonable and were more likely to invoke compunction in both male and female perpetrators (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). In addition, women who were subjected to sexism reported more self-confidence and were less likely to show test performance deficits when men commiserated with them, as opposed to women; they were also more likely to claim they would report the sexism (Cihangir, Barreto, & Ellemers, 2011). These findings suggest that men who combat sexism are important allies for women.

Second, employers who implement gender progressive policies improve work-life balance for both genders, which increases employee morale and productivity, suggesting that organizations benefit by supporting women's causes (e.g., Grover & Crooker, 1995; Kinicki, Carson, & Bohlander, 1992; for a review, see Rudman & Glick, 2008). Because men are more likely than women to be in charge of organizations, men are better poised to spearhead changes that benefit all employees. However, to do so, they must not be stigmatized when they enact gender-fair policies. As noted, interviews with professional male managers suggested that fear of effeminate stigmatization was a major reason why they shied

away from advocating for women in the workplace (Prime & Moss-Racusin, 2009).

Third, contrary to popular beliefs (Rudman & Fairchild, 2007), feminism has positive effects on close relationships. For example, an online survey of adults showed that both genders paired with feminist mates expressed greater relationship quality, stability, and sexual satisfaction, compared with respondents paired with nonfeminist partners (Rudman & Phelan, 2007). In addition, married men who identified as a feminist reported greater marital satisfaction, compared with nonfeminist husbands (Rudman & Mescher, 2012). Further, couples who strive toward gender egalitarian marriages report happier unions (Blaisure & Allen, 1995; Burn & Ward, 2005). Thus, the evidence points to male feminism and feminist work policies as generally advantageous for people's personal and professional well-being.

Overview of the Research

The present research was designed to examine the scope of stigmatizing gender egalitarian men, as well as to determine which of three competing explanations (stigma-by-association, the gay male feminist stereotype, or identity threat) would best account for these effects. To do so, we investigated attitudes toward and beliefs about gender egalitarian men, using the four sets of gendered attributes known to be prescribed and proscribed for men (agency and weakness, respectively) and women (communality and dominance, respectively; Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, et al., 2012). Each study also employed global ratings of femininity, masculinity, and the likelihood that targets were gay.

In Experiment 1, participants read a debate about women's rights that ostensibly took place between a male feminist and a benevolent sexist male target. Attitudes and beliefs were measured with the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). Compared with the benevolent sexist, both genders automatically associated the male feminist with feminine (rather than masculine) attributes, and rated him higher

on global ratings of feminine and gay, but lower on masculinity, thus providing initial support for the stigmatization of gender egalitarians. In the remaining experiments, we examined three explanations for this effect.

In Experiment 2, participants read an interview with a male target who either aspired to be a gender researcher (the gender egalitarian), a biologist, or a clinical psychologist. In Experiment 3, targets were presidential candidates for the APA; the gender egalitarian served as an expert witness in gender discrimination cases and was committed to mentoring female students. Attitudes and gender stereotype attributions were assessed with self-reports in Experiment 2 and with Brief IATs (Sriram & Greenwald, 2009) in Experiment 3, which allowed us to disentangle perceptions of weakness, agency, communality, and dominance. To assess the stigma-by-association hypothesis, we obtained estimates of the extent to which gender egalitarian men associated with women and with gay men (as friends and colleagues). To assess the group-based stereotype hypothesis, we measured perceivers' stereotype that male feminists are likely to be gay. To assess the identity threat hypothesis, we measured gender identity to determine whether men whose masculinity is central to their identity might be especially likely to react negatively to male gender egalitarians (Falomir-Pichastor & Mugny, 2009). Our overarching goal was to investigate whether professional men's fear of stigmatization if they support gender equality is justified (Prime & Moss-Racusin, 2009) and if so, whether stigma-by-association, the group-based stereotype, or men's threatened gender identity, can best account for this effect.

Experiment 1

Participants read transcripts of an interview ostensibly recorded for a previous study of "social issues." The topic of the interview was gender equality, during which one target proclaimed his support for women's rights and the other target countered the need for activism by espousing benevolent sexism (e.g., paternalistic beliefs that

men should provide for and protect women; Glick & Fiske, 1996). We chose benevolent sexism (BS) as a counterpoint to gender egalitarianism because no research has investigated automatic reactions to men who espouse BS, an ideology that superficially benefits women while covertly undermining their progress (Glick & Fiske, 1996; Jackman, 1994; Rudman & Glick, 2008). Moreover, when compared with hostile sexism, BS is less recognized as sexist (Good & Rudman, 2010; Kilianski & Rudman, 1998).

To assess stigmatization, we administered (a) an IAT obliging people to categorize the male targets with both feminine (communal and weak) and masculine (agentic and dominant) attributes, and (b) participants also reported the extent to which they viewed each target as feminine, masculine, and likely to be gay. Further, we administered an attitude IAT, which obliged people to categorize the male targets with both positive and negative attributes. We included the IAT in the event that it would be more sensitive to bias, compared with self-reports (Greenwald, Poehlman, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). In addition, participants rated their liking for each target. Because feminists seek to level the gender hierarchy, we tentatively expected men to dislike the egalitarian man more so than women (see also Breen & Karpinski, 2008). However, we expected that both genders would stigmatize the gender egalitarian as feminine and likely to be gay (Anderson, 2009). Our specific predictions were as follows:

Hypothesis 1: Women will like the gender egalitarian target more so than the BS target, whereas men will prefer the BS target, using implicit (and possibly also explicit) measures.

Hypothesis 2: Both genders will automatically associate the gender egalitarian man with feminine attributes more than with masculine attributes using the IAT. Participants should also explicitly rate the gender egalitarian man higher on femininity, lower on masculinity, and more likely to be gay, compared with the BS target.

Method

Participants and design. Volunteers ($N = 203$, 125 women) participated in exchange for partial fulfillment of their Introductory Psychology research requirement. Of these, 90 (44%) were White, 54 (27%) were Asian, 23 (11%) were Hispanic, 19 (9%) were Black, and 17 (8%) reported another ethnic identity. The design was a 2 (male target: gender egalitarian, benevolent sexist) \times 2 (egalitarian target's name: Mark, John) \times 2 (participant gender) mixed factorial, with repeated measures on the first factor. Preliminary analyses showed that counterbalancing the feminist and BS targets' name produced null effects; therefore, we collapsed across this factor. In addition, analyses in each experiment ruled out participant race effects.

Implicit measures

Attitude IAT. The attitude IAT contrasted the targets' names (*John, Copeland, John Copeland* vs. *Mark, Wheeler, Mark Wheeler*) with good and bad adjectives (*good, honest, terrific, likable* vs. *bad, terrible, harmful, annoying*). The IAT effect is the difference in response latencies when performing tasks that oblige associating John with good (and Mark with bad), compared with reversed associations, John with bad (and Mark with good), such that high scores indicate more favorable implicit attitudes toward the gender egalitarian. The order in which participants performed these two tasks was counterbalanced, a procedural variable that did not influence results. In each study, we followed recommended procedures for calculating the D statistic (which standardizes the IAT effect separately for each individual; Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003).

Stereotype IAT. The stereotype IAT contrasted targets' names with positive and negative feminine and masculine attributes (drawn from Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, et al., 2012; see also Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Williams & Best, 1990). Feminine attributes were: *feminine, warm, good listener, supportive, humble, emotional, naïve, weak*, and *insecure*. Masculine attributes were:

masculine, assertive, competitive, confident, strong leader, aggressive, dominant, intimidating, and arrogant. The IAT effect was computed such that high scores indicate associating the gender egalitarian with more feminine attributes than the benevolent sexist, for whom masculine associations would be stronger. As with the attitude IAT, counterbalancing the order of the stereotype IAT tasks did not influence results.

Explicit measures and procedure

Explicit attitudes. We used a 7-item scale from previous research (Feldman & Crandall, 2007) to measure liking for each target, on scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 10 (*strongly agree*). Sample items included, "John (Mark) appears to be a likeable person," "I would like John [Mark] to be a close personal friend," and "John [Mark] is the kind of person that I tend to avoid" (reverse coded). The items were combined to form the likeability index ($\alpha = .93$).

Gender-related measures. Participants rated the femininity and masculinity of each target and their likelihood of being gay using the prompt, "How much did John (Mark) strike you as..." and scales ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 10 (*very much so*).

Procedure. Participants were escorted to a cubicle by the experimenter, who started a computer program. The program explained that the study involved reading about an interview that ostensibly took place last semester between two participants obliged to discuss gender equality for a study about "social issues." The program then counterbalanced two versions of the interview that differed only in targets' names (John Copeland and Mark Wheeler). The Appendix presents an excerpt from the interview. After reading the interview, participants completed a manipulation check in which they identified the targets' names (all participants passed), followed by the dependent measures in the order described before. The program randomly presented items for each measure. Upon completion, participants were fully debriefed and compensated.

Results and Discussion

Implicit attitudes and stereotypes. Consistent with Hypothesis 1, women automatically preferred the gender egalitarian target to the BS target, $D = .12$ ($SD = .35$), a result that differed significantly from zero, $t(124) = 3.69, p < .001, d = .32$. Although we predicted that men would favor the BS target, they in fact showed no preference, $D = .05$ ($SD = .40$), $t(77) = 1.14, p = .25$. Consistent with Hypothesis 2, women implicitly associated the gender egalitarian with feminine more than masculine attributes, $D = .13$ ($SD = .33$), a result that differed significantly from zero, $t(124) = 4.65, p < .001, d = .40$. Men's results were similar, $D = .11$ ($SD = .35$), $t(77) = 2.75, p < .01, d = .33$. There were no significant gender differences for either IAT, both $t_s(201) < 1.23, p_s > .22$.

In summary, the IATs revealed the expected automatic favoring of the gender egalitarian man on the part of women, but also the predicted stigmatization effect, whereby both genders associated him with feminine attributes more so than with masculine attributes.

Explicit attitudes and gender-related measures. The dependent variables were submitted to 2 (male target: gender egalitarian, benevolent sexist) x 2 (participant gender) mixed ANOVAs, with repeated

measures on the first factor. Table 1 shows the results, including effect sizes for gender differences (Cohen's d).

Explicit attitudes. Likeability ratings showed a main effect for target, qualified by a significant Target x Participant Gender interaction, $F(1, 201) = 31.38, p < .001$. Supporting Hypothesis 1, women liked the gender egalitarian target more than the BS target, $d = .87$ (and more so than men did). However, men liked the BS target more so than women did, but not more so than the gender egalitarian target, $d = .09$. Thus, contrary to expectations, men did not explicitly (or implicitly) favor the BS target over the gender egalitarian. Instead, their relative attitudes are best described as neutral.

Gender-related measures. Femininity and masculinity ratings showed only main effects for target, both $F_s(1, 201) > 42.50, p_s < .001$. Supporting Hypothesis 2, the gender egalitarian target was rated as more feminine and less masculine compared with the BS target, by men ($d_s = .57$ and $-.42$, respectively) and by women ($d_s = .77$ and $-.50$, respectively). Likelihood of being gay also showed a main effect for target, and a significant Participant Gender x Target interaction, $F(1, 201) = 9.51, p < .01$. Men judged the gender

Table 1. Dependent variables by target and participant gender (Experiment 1).

	Feminist target				d	Benevolent sexist target				d
	Men		Women			Men		Women		
	M	SD	M	SD		M	SD	M	SD	
Likeability	6.02_a	1.72	7.24_a	1.85	-.65	5.79_a	1.71	4.50_b	1.92	.46
Feminine	5.33 _a	2.55	4.98 _a	2.18	.15	3.41_b	2.29	2.75_b	1.93	.32
Masculine	5.54_a	2.14	6.21_a	2.00	-.32	6.96_b	1.98	7.55_b	2.01	-.30
Likely Gay	4.67_a	2.71	3.56_a	2.29	.44	2.67 _b	2.07	2.92 _b	2.06	-.30

Note. Means not sharing a subscript differ as a function of target within-participant gender, all $p_s < .05$. Means in bold differ between women and men, all $p_s < .05$. Effect sizes (Cohen's d) reflect participant gender differences. By convention, large, medium, and small effect sizes correspond to .80, .50, and .20, respectively (Cohen, 1988).

egalitarian target as more likely to be gay than the BS target ($d = .59$), as did women ($d = .22$). However, the interaction signified that men showed this pattern more so than women, whereas no gender differences emerged for the BS target (see Table 1). Nonetheless, in line with Hypothesis 2, both genders showed evidence of stigmatization by rating the gender egalitarian target as more feminine and less masculine than the BS target, and also as more likely to be gay.

To summarize, Hypothesis 1 was partially supported whether we used implicit or explicit measures: women favored the gender egalitarian over the BS target (whereas men's attitudes were neutral). In support of Hypothesis 2, both genders stigmatized a feminist man as more feminine, less masculine, and more likely to be gay, compared with the BS target. Because the gender egalitarian was associated with feminine attributes using the IAT, as well as with self-reports, demand is not likely to explain our findings.

Experiment 2

A limitation of Experiment 1 is that reactions to the gender egalitarian target were obtained in the context of reactions to a BS target, which was necessary due to the relative nature of the IAT. Therefore, ratings for the feminist target may have been subject to contrast effects (e.g., Manis, Nelson, & Shedler, 1988). Because he labeled himself as a feminist (see the Appendix), the gender egalitarian target may have been viewed as extreme (Unger et al., 1982). In addition, the IAT's relativity clouds interpretation, given that the BS target may have been associated with more masculine traits than the gender egalitarian, rather than the gender egalitarian being viewed as more feminine. Moreover, Experiment 1's stereotype IAT combined positive and negative attributes (communal and weak for feminine and agency and dominance for masculine). To address these concerns, Experiment 2's participants were randomly assigned to evaluate either a gender egalitarian man, a male biologist, or a male psychologist. Further, we employed self-reports that allowed us to tease apart the four gender rules (Rudman,

Moss-Racusin, Phelan, et al., 2012). Because prior research suggests that men "who act like women" (e.g., who behave modestly or request a family leave) suffer a weakness penalty (Heilman & Wallen, 2010; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010; Rudman & Mescher, in press), we expected a gender egalitarian man to be rated higher on this dimension than control targets. Because the attributes that comprise the weak index are strongly proscribed for men (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Glick, et al., 2012), the "wimp penalty" signals low status and respect (Brescoll et al., 2012; Heilman & Wallen, 2010; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010). Moreover, because the weak attributes are strongly aligned with both women and low status (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Glick, et al., 2012), we expected it to cohere with male targets' femininity ratings and likelihood of being gay.

In Experiment 1, two gender differences emerged consistent with the hypothesis that male feminists threaten men's gender identity: compared with women, men reported greater dislike of the gender egalitarian target, and they were more likely to view him as gay. Experiment 2 will test whether men's reactions to male egalitarians are a function of masculinity defense, and examine whether presumed social affiliations, or the stereotype that male feminists are likely to be gay, can best account for stigmatizing gender egalitarian men. Our aim was to conceptually replicate Experiment 1's results while illuminating the reasons why gender egalitarian men are stigmatized. In addition to expecting women to like the gender egalitarian target more so than men (as in Experiment 1), we had the following hypotheses:

Hypothesis 3: Both genders will stigmatize the gender egalitarian man by rating him as weaker, more feminine, and more likely to be gay, compared with either the biologist or psychologist male targets.

Hypothesis 4: To support the identity threat hypothesis, men who strongly identify with their gender should be especially likely to show prejudice against, and to stigmatize, a male gender egalitarian.

Hypothesis 5: To support stigma-by-association, target differences in stigmatization should be mediated by perceptions that a gender egalitarian man associates himself with women and/or gay men.

Hypothesis 6: To support the group-based stereotype hypothesis, target differences in stigmatization should be mediated by the stereotype that male feminists tend to be gay.

Method

Participants and design. Volunteers ($N = 153$, 93 men) participated in exchange for partial fulfillment of their Introductory Psychology research requirement. Of these, 62 (41%) were White, 53 (35%) were Asian, 9 (14%) were Black, 4 (3%) were Hispanic, and 25 (16%) indicated another ethnicity. The design was a 3 (male target: gender egalitarian, biologist, psychologist) \times 2 (participant gender) between-participants factorial.

Target manipulation. Participants were told that they would read a transcript of a recorded interview that ostensibly took place last semester between an experimenter and a recent alumnus for a project designed to “follow the progress of the university’s graduates.” To bolster the cover story, we told participants that we had changed the real name of the alumnus, who was referred to as “Mark Smith,” a 2009 graduate. All participants learned that Mark was employed full time, but his (unspecified) job was not fulfilling so he wanted to return to school for graduate work. When asked what type of graduate work he was interested in, the interview transcript differed by condition. The gender egalitarian stated that he had mostly enjoyed his women’s studies courses, so he would like to become an academic researcher who studied gender equality in order to inform government diversity policies. The biologist stated he had mostly enjoyed his biology courses, so his goal was to become an academic researcher who studied biology in order to inform government medical policies. The psychologist stated he had mostly enjoyed his clinical

psychology courses, so his goal was to become an academic researcher who investigated treatments for schizophrenia in order to inform government mental health policies. Because psychology attracts many women and because associating with the mentally ill can also lead to stigma-by-association effects (Kulik et al., 2008), Experiment 3 provides a conservative test of our hypotheses that a gender egalitarian man will encounter stigmatization (i.e., be viewed as more feminine, weak, and gay than comparison targets) and that this effect will be mediated by his greater perceived associations with women and/or gay men.

Explicit dependent measures. We used the same attitude measure from Experiment 1, with the exception that the target was always named Mark ($\alpha = .87$). We also used the same global items assessing the target’s perceived femininity, masculinity, and homosexuality.

Gender stereotypes. Using the prompt, “How much did Mark strike you as...” and a scale ranging from 1 (*not at all*) to 5 (*very much so*), participants rated the target on four attributes that formed the communal index (*warm, emotional, humble, and supportive*; $\alpha = .72$); the weak index (*weak, moody, insecure, and naïve*; $\alpha = .79$); the agentic index (*independent, assertive, strong leader, and confident*; $\alpha = .79$); and the dominant index (*dominant, aggressive, controlling, and arrogant*; $\alpha = .71$). These attributes were used in Experiment 1’s IAT and were drawn from past research (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, et al., 2012). Specifically, the communal and agentic indexes consist of traits prescribed for women and men, respectively, whereas the weak and dominant indexes consist of traits proscribed for men and women, respectively (see also Moss-Racusin et al., 2010; Prentice & Carranza, 2002).

Target affiliations. To assess stigma-by-association, participants responded to two items: “What percentage of Mark Smith’s friends and associates are likely to be women (gay men)?” The scales ranged from 0–100%.

Feminist stereotypes. Participants indicated the percentage of male feminists who are likely to be gay. For comparison purposes, they also indicated the percentage of female feminists who are likely to be lesbians, and the percentage of male biologists and psychologists who are likely to be gay. The scales ranged from 0–100%.

Gender identity. Participants completed the gender-specific, 5-item identity subscale of the Collective Self-Esteem Scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) on scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 10 (*strongly agree*). Sample items include, “In general, I strongly identify with my gender,” “Being a woman or a man is an important part of my self-image,” and “In general, I am glad to be a member of my gender” ($\alpha = .85$).

Procedure. Participants arriving for a “person perception” project were escorted to a cubicle by the experimenter, who started a computer program that randomly assigned them to read about a gender egalitarian man, a male biologist, or a male psychologist. The program randomly presented items for each measure. After reading the interview, participants completed the dependent measures in the order described. After completing demographics (gender and race), participants were fully debriefed and compensated.

Results and discussion

The dependent variables were submitted to 3 (male target: gender egalitarian, biologist, psychologist) x 2 (participant gender) ANOVAs unless otherwise noted. Table 2 shows the results, including effect sizes for gender differences (Cohen’s *d*).

Explicit attitudes. Likeability ratings showed only a significant Target x Participant Gender interaction, $F(2, 147) = 3.13, p = .01$. In accord with Hypothesis 1, men liked the gender egalitarian target less than either the biologist ($d = -.77$) or the psychologist ($d = -.60$), who were rated similarly. Women liked the gender egalitarian target more than men did ($d = -.74$), but they rated all three targets similarly.

Gender-related measures. Femininity, masculinity, and likelihood of being gay showed only main effects for target, all $F_s(2, 147) > 9.54, p_s < .001$. Conceptually replicating Experiment 1, the gender egalitarian target was rated as more feminine, less masculine, and more likely to be gay than either the biologist or psychologist, by both men ($M d_s = 1.25, -.25, \text{ and } 1.02$, respectively) and women ($M d_s = .95, -1.15, \text{ and } .94$, respectively). These findings support Hypothesis 3.²

Gender stereotypes. The four stereotype indexes were submitted to a 2 (stereotype: feminine,

Table 2. Dependent variables by target and participant gender (Experiment 2).

	Gender egalitarian target				<i>d</i>	Biologist target				<i>d</i>	Psychologist target				
	Men		Women			Men		Women			Men		Women		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	
Likeability	5.44_a	1.67	6.47_a	1.13	-.74	6.52 _b	1.28	6.13 _a	.84	.28	6.28 _b	1.11	6.73 _a	1.69	-.32
Feminine	6.57 _a	2.19	5.41 _a	2.54	.47	3.59 _b	2.02	3.29 _b	2.01	.12	3.39 _b	1.96	2.95 _b	1.81	.18
Masculine	4.70 _a	2.39	3.86 _a	1.81	.42	5.26 _a	1.87	6.00 _b	1.41	-.37	5.16_a	1.76	6.38_b	1.69	-.61
Likely Gay	6.20 _a	2.75	5.59 _a	2.13	.24	3.67 _b	2.15	3.50 _b	2.44	.06	3.58 _b	2.20	3.13 _b	1.51	.18

Note. Means not sharing a subscript differ as a function of target within-participant gender, all $p_s < .05$. Means in bold differ between women and men, all $p_s < .05$. Effect sizes (Cohen’s *d*) reflect participant gender differences. By convention, large, medium, and small effect sizes correspond to .80, .50, and .20, respectively (Cohen, 1988).

masculine) x 2 (valence: positive, negative) x 3 (target: gender egalitarian, biologist, psychologist) x 2 (participant gender) mixed model ANOVA, with repeated measures on the first two factors. Results showed a significant Target x Stereotype interaction, $F(2, 149) = 7.27, p = .001$. Figure 1 shows the results. In further support of Hypothesis 3, the gender egalitarian man was rated as significantly weaker than both the biologist, $t(91) = 2.06, p < .05, d = .44$, and the psychologist, $t(110) = 3.42, p = .001, d = .63$.³ No differences emerged for the biologist and the psychologist, all $t(99) < 1.30, ps > .19$.

In summary, Experiment 2 extended Experiment 1's finding that both genders stigmatized a gender egalitarian man as more feminine, less masculine, and more likely to be gay, compared with two control targets. New to Experiment 2, the gender egalitarian man was rated as weaker than the biologist and the psychologist. By showing that gender egalitarianism results in a weakness penalty, these results echo prior research suggesting that men who "act like women" are likely to be viewed as wimps (Heilman & Wallen, 2010; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010; Rudman & Mescher, 2012).

Are reactions to the gender egalitarian motivated by masculinity defense? To support Hypothesis 4, men who strongly identify with their gender should be especially biased against a male gender egalitarian, and gender identity should moderate the gender gap in prejudice against the male

egalitarian (Falomir-Pichastor & Mugny, 2009). We regressed the egalitarian's likeability on participant gender (coded 0 = men, 1 = women), the gender identity index (mean-centered), and their interaction. Results showed only the known main effect of participant gender, $B = .92, p = .04$. The main effect for gender identity, $B = -.38, p = .64$, and the interaction, $B = .21, p = .67$, were negligible. Therefore, it does not appear that prejudice against the male gender egalitarian was motivated by men's defense of their masculinity.

Further, there were no significant main or interaction effects of participant gender and gender identity for rating the gender egalitarian man as masculine or gay, all $ps > .48$. However, there were significant (or marginal) interactions for rating him as feminine, $B = -1.51, p = .04$, and weak, $B = -.86, p = .07$. Simple effects for men showed weak positive relationships between gender identity and these ratings, both $rs(28) < .16, ps > .41$. In contrast, women showed significantly negative correlations between gender identity and these ratings, both $rs(20) = -.50, ps < .02$. Thus, there was no evidence that men stigmatized the gender egalitarian to protect their masculine identity. Instead, women high on feminine identity were less likely to view him as feminine or weak. Because these findings were unexpected and are not replicated in Experiment 3, we view them with caution.




Figure 1. Explicit stereotype ratings for male targets (Experiment 2). The gender egalitarian target was rated as significantly weaker than either the biologist or the psychologist, both $ps < .05$.

Target's social affiliations and feminist stereotypes

Target's social affiliations. Planned comparisons showed that, compared with the biologist, participants viewed the gender egalitarian as having more friends and colleagues who were women (70% vs. 50%), and more friends and colleagues who were gay men (48% vs. 25%), both $t_s(91) > 4.12$, $p_s < .001$ (all percentages rounded up). Similarly, the psychologist was estimated to have fewer female (52%) and gay male (25%) affiliations than the gender egalitarian, both $t_s(110) > 4.71$, $p_s < .001$. No gender differences emerged on these measures, all $t_s < 1.43$, $p_s > .15$.

Feminist stereotypes. All participants reported the percentage of male and female feminists who were likely to be gay or lesbian, respectively. Depending on condition, they estimated the percentage of either biologists or psychologists who were likely to be gay. Paired sample t tests showed that participants gave higher percentages for gay male gender egalitarians (54%) than gay male biologists (26%) and gay male psychologists (27%), both $t_s > 8.67$, $p_s < .001$ (all percentages rounded up). No gender differences emerged on these measures, all $t_s < 1.60$, $p_s > .11$. Remarkably, over half of male feminists were perceived to be gay (54%), a result that was higher than participants' estimates of lesbian feminists (45%), $t(152) = 4.51$, $p < .001$. Thus, there was evidence for a gay male feminist stereotype (Anderson, 2009). Not surprisingly, the correlation between the percentages of feminist lesbians and gays was positive, $r(151) = .41$, $p < .001$.

Social affiliations account for stigmatization. To form a measure of stigmatization, we factor analyzed the ratings for gay, feminine, masculine, and all four gender stereotypes, using a principle components analysis with varimax rotation. Results showed that feminine, gay, and weak formed the first factor (all loadings $> .82$), whereas masculine, agentic, dominant, and communal formed the second factor (all loadings $> .64$), with 66% of the variance explained. We therefore combined the feminine, gay, and weak ratings into a single stigmatization index ($\alpha = .79$).

Hypothesis 5 predicted that target differences in stigmatization would be mediated by perceptions that a gender egalitarian man associates himself with women and/or gay men (to support stigma-by-association). Hypothesis 6 predicted that instead, the mediator would be the group-based stereotype that male feminists tend to be gay. After standardizing all variables, we hierarchically regressed the stigmatization index on target condition (Step 1), followed by either female associates, gay associates, or the gay male feminist stereotype (Step 2). We used a bootstrapping macro provided by Hayes and Preacher (2012) that affords using more than two categories for the independent variable and that does not rely on assumptions of normality. Each model used indicator coding for the three targets, with the gender egalitarian target as the referent condition, and was based on 5,000 samples.

Table 3's Models 1–2 (left half) show the results for social affiliations. Model 1 tested targets' presumed associations with women. It demonstrated successful mediation because the confidence intervals of the indirect effect did not include zero, regardless of whether the gender egalitarian was contrasted with the biologist or the psychologist. Model 2 tested gay male associates. It was also successful; the confidence intervals did not include zero for either indirect effect. Table 4's Model 3 (left half) tested the gay male feminist stereotype; it was unsuccessful because the confidence intervals of the indirect effects included zero.

However, to have confidence in mediation it is important to switch the dependent variable and the mediator in new analyses because reversed causality is equally plausible. For example, stigmatizing the gender egalitarian might account for participants' inferences about his social affiliations. Therefore, Table 3 (right half) shows Models 1–2 reversed. Reversed Model 1 was not supported because the confidence intervals included zero; therefore, it appears that people did not rely on stigmatization when they inferred the targets' female associates. In contrast, reversed Model 2 was successful. In fact, because it yielded near total mediation, it was more effective than Model 2: the paths for c' decreased to marginal

Table 3. Social affiliation mediators of target effects on stigmatization (feminine, weak, gay) and reversed models (experiment 2).

Path/Effect	B	95% CI	Path/Effect	B	95% CI
Model 1 (Y = Stigma)			Model 1R (Y = Women Associates)		
<i>a</i> (Target → Women associates)			<i>a</i> (Target → stigma)		
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-1.16***		1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-1.01***	
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-1.10***		2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-1.14***	
<i>b</i> (Women associates → stigma)			<i>b</i> (Stigma → women associates)		
	.21**			.15	
<i>c</i> (Target → stigma)			<i>c</i> (Target → women associates)		
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-1.01***		1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.77***	
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-1.15***		2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.38*	
<i>c'</i> (Target → stigma)			<i>c'</i> (Target → women associates)		
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.77***		1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.55*	
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.92***		2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.21	
Indirect effect (<i>a</i> × <i>b</i>)			Indirect effect (<i>a</i> × <i>b</i>)		
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.24*	-.52, -.01	1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.15	-.42, .05
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.23*	-.49, -.01	2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.17	-.45, .06
Model 2 (Y = Stigma)			Model 2R (Y = Gay Male Associates)		
<i>a</i> (Target → gay male associates)			<i>b</i> (Stigma → gay male associates)		
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.84***			.49***	
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.86***		<i>c</i> (Target → gay male associates)		
<i>b</i> (Gay male associates → stigma)			1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.84***	
	.42***		2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.87***	
<i>c'</i> (Target → stigma)			<i>c'</i> (Target → gay male associates)		
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.65***		1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.35	
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.78***		2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.31	
Indirect effect (<i>a</i> × <i>b</i>)			Indirect effect (<i>a</i> × <i>b</i>)		
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.36*	-.58, -.17	1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.49*	-.77, -.25
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.37*	-.60, -.18	2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.56*	-.84, -.31

Note. Target was dummy coded using the gender egalitarian as the referent. Estimates are unstandardized. Confidence intervals are for the indirect effect. Intervals that do not include zero support rejecting the null hypothesis that the indirect effect = 0.

In Models 1–2, the *c* paths are identical. In reversed Models 1R–2R, the *a* paths are identical.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

significance for contrast 1 ($p = .06$) and contrast 2 ($p = .08$). Although this might suggest that people inferred higher gay male affiliations for the gender egalitarian because they stigmatized him, it is more likely that our effects are due to statistical mediation (because stigmatization was measured first, followed by estimates of gay male affiliates). By contrast, statistical mediation does not explain Model 1 because the reversed causal model was unsuccessful.

Finally, although Model 3 was unsupported, Table 4 (right half) shows that reversed Model 3 yielded total mediation. Thus, participants tended to give higher stereotypic estimates of gay feminists in the gender egalitarian versus control conditions, but that effect was fully mediated by stigmatization. This suggests that people used their inferences

about the gender egalitarian (as feminine, weak, and gay) to estimate that more feminist men are gay.

In summary, Experiment 2 supported Hypothesis 5's prediction that gender egalitarian men are stigmatized because people are viewed as similar to low-status group members simply by affiliating with them (Goffman, 1963). In the case of gender egalitarian men, the culpable affiliation concerns women associates, rather than gay male associates (cf. Neuberg et al., 1994). Therefore, Experiment 2 provides direct evidence for the proposed stigma-by-association mechanism and identifies women as the social group responsible for it. By comparison, there was no support for the alternative hypotheses that (a) people stigmatize a male gender egalitarian because of the stereotype that male feminists are gay (Anderson, 2009);

Table 4. Feminist gay male stereotype as a mediator of target effects on stigmatization (feminine, weak, gay) and reversed model (experiment 2).

Path/Effect	B	95% CI	Path/Effect	B	95% CI
Model 3 (Y = Stigma)			Model 3R (Y = Gay Feminist Stereotype)		
<i>a</i> (Target → gay feminist stereotype)			<i>a</i> (Target → stigma)		
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.34		1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-1.01***	
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.35		2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-1.14***	
<i>b</i> (Stereotype → stigma)	.24***		<i>b</i> (Stigma → gay feminist stereotype)	.32***	
<i>c</i> (Target → stigma)			<i>c</i> (Target → gay feminist stereotype)		
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-1.01***		1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.34*	
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-1.15***		2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.34*	
<i>c'</i> (Target → stigma)			<i>c'</i> (Target → gay feminist stereotype)		
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.93***		1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.01	
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-1.06***		2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	.03	
Indirect effect (<i>a</i> × <i>b</i>)			Indirect effect (<i>a</i> × <i>b</i>)		
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.08	-.21, .01	1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.33*	-.57, -.13
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.09	-.20, .01	2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.37*	-.62, -.15

Note. Target was dummy-coded using the gender egalitarian as the referent. Estimates are unstandardized. Confidence intervals are for the indirect effect. Intervals that do not include zero support rejecting the null hypothesis that the indirect effect = 0. **p* < .05; ***p* < .01; ****p* < .001.

if anything, stigmatization increased stereotypic estimates, rather than the reverse, or (b) that men’s stronger dislike of a gender egalitarian man (relative to women) is moderated by a need to protect their own masculine identity (Falomir-Pichastor & Mugny, 2009).

Supplementary Analysis

In Experiment 2, men reported greater liking for the biologist and psychologist than the gender egalitarian. Was stigmatizing the gender egalitarian responsible for prejudice against him? To find out, we standardized all variables and then tested stigmatization scores as a mediator of men’s target differences in likeability, using the same bootstrapping strategy (Hayes & Preacher, 2012). Table 5 (top half) shows the results. As can be seen, Model 1 showed full mediation because the *c'* paths decreased to nonsignificance and the confidence intervals did not include zero. This result is consistent with the possibility that men disliked the gender egalitarian because they stigmatized him as feminine, weak, and gay. Table 5 (bottom half) shows the reversed Model 2. It yielded partial mediation (i.e., the *c'* paths remained significant, but the confidence intervals did not include zero). Therefore, it could also be the case that

men stigmatized the gender egalitarian because they were prejudiced against him.

Experiment 3

Although we found support for stigma-by-association using presumed affiliations with women, it was important to test our hypotheses using a different set of targets given that men who enroll in gender courses may be perceived as particularly likely to have women friends; they may also be viewed as gay because of the frequent academic alignment of women’s studies and LGBTB studies (Paletta, 2008). Because the psychologist in Experiment 2 did not suffer stigma-by-association effects, we focused on this group. To do so, we used two male candidates for APA’s presidency, only one of whom was gender egalitarian. Both candidates were described identically (e.g., as highly productive scholars and admired leaders) with the exception that only the gender egalitarian target had served as an expert witness in gender discrimination cases and was committed to mentoring female students. We modified the actual online materials used by candidates for APA president during the 2011 election (with permission, and with name and particulars changed to protect anonymity). As in Experiment

Table 5. Mediation of men's target effects on liking and stigmatization (experiment 2).

Path/Effect	<i>B</i>	<i>SE</i>	95% Confidence intervals
Model 1 (Y = Liking)			
<i>a</i> (Target → stigma)			
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-1.01***	.12	
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-1.14***	.18	
<i>b</i> (Stigma → liking)			
	-.47***	.09	
<i>c</i> (Target → liking)			
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	.59**	.24	
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	.65**	.11	
<i>c'</i> (Target → liking)			
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	.11	.21	
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	.12	.20	
Indirect effect (<i>a</i> × <i>b</i>)			
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	.48*	.14	.23, .77
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	.53*	.14	.28, .83
Model 2 (Y = Stigmatization)			
<i>a</i> (Target → liking)			
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	.78**	.25	
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	.60*	.24	
<i>b</i> (Liking → stigma)			
	-.41***	.09	
<i>c</i> (Target → stigma)			
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-1.18***	.21	
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-1.27***	.10	
<i>c'</i> (Target → stigma)			
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.87***	.23	
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-1.03***	.21	
Indirect effect (<i>a</i> × <i>b</i>)			
1. Egalitarian vs. biologist	-.31*	.15	-.65, -.07
2. Egalitarian vs. psychologist	-.24*	.13	-.52, -.04

Note. Target was dummy-coded using the gender egalitarian as the referent. Estimates are unstandardized. Confidence intervals are for the indirect effect. Intervals that do not include zero support rejecting the null hypothesis that the indirect effect = 0. * $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

2, the gender egalitarian target never described himself as a “feminist,” but his interest in promoting gender equality was evident.

However, because the targets were male leaders and leadership is strongly aligned with agency and dominance (e.g., Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, et al., 2012), it was possible that explicit ratings of stereotypic attributions would not differ between the two targets. To provide a more sensitive test of the weakness penalty found in Experiment 2, we also used the Brief IAT (Sriram & Greenwald, 2009) to measure stereotypic associations (as well as attitudes). A main advantage of this approach

is that it affords an independent assessment of the two targets rather than measuring relative implicit associations (which requires a within-subjects design and clouds interpretation of the *D* score, as in Experiment 1).

Based on women's greater explicit liking for the male egalitarian in Experiments 1 and 2, we expected women's implicit attitudes toward the gender egalitarian target to be more positive than men's. Our other, specific predictions were as follows:

Hypothesis 7: The strongest form of the weakness penalty would emerge if the gender

egalitarian target was automatically associated with weakness more so than with agency, communality, or dominance.

Hypothesis 8: By contrast, the nonegalitarian target should be associated with masculine attributes (agency and dominance) more so than with feminine attributes (communality and weakness).

Hypothesis 9: Consistent with Experiment 2, we expected the gender egalitarian leader to be perceived as more feminine, weak, and likely to be gay than the control leader, but that this effect would be mediated by estimates of the targets' affiliations with women (not with gay men).

By using actual candidates for APA's presidency, if Experiment 2's focal findings are conceptually replicated, we can be assured of the ecological validity and generality of our stigma-by-association results. In addition, Experiment 3 provided further tests of the gay male feminist stereotype and men's gender identity threat as alternative explanations.

Method

Participants and design. Volunteers ($N = 162$, 80 men) participated in exchange for partial fulfillment of their Introductory Psychology research requirement. Of these, 85 (53%) were White, 44 (27%) were Asian, 7 (4%) were Black, 16 (10%) were Hispanic, and 10 (6%) indicated another ethnicity. The design was a 2 (male target: gender egalitarian leader, control leader) \times 2 (participant gender) between-participants factorial.

Target manipulation. Participants were told they would be randomly assigned by the computer program to evaluate one of four actual APA presidential candidates for a study "investigating the factors that make good leaders." In reality, there were only two targets, named Kenneth Swanson. Using actual online materials (obtained

with permission and modified to protect anonymity), both were described as highly productive psychologists (e.g., with over 100 papers) who had received their PhD and JD from Columbia University and Harvard, respectively. The recipient of several awards (e.g., the Lifetime Achievement Award from the American Psychology-Law Society), they currently directed the Psychology and Law program at McGill University. Both were described as having served as APA's General Counsel for 10 years. In that capacity, the gender egalitarian target stated that he "authored 50 briefs in the U.S. Supreme Court and lower federal and state courts, informing these courts of social science evidence relevant to such issues as sex stereotyping, women's reproductive rights, domestic abuse, and jury decision-making, among others." For the control target, these issues were replaced with, "hospital privileges for psychologists, admissibility of psychological expertise, jury decision-making, client privacy rights, and eye-witness testimony, among others." The gender egalitarian (control) target had also served as an expert witness in gender discrimination (ethico-legal) cases. Both targets prided themselves on mentoring, but the gender egalitarian (control) target stated that he had

mentored 33 students, 28 of whom were women (10 of whom were people of color). Many of these women (my students) now hold important positions, including, for example, a U.S. Magistrate Judge and Director of the National Threat Assessment Center.

Finally, targets outlined the same pressing issues facing APA (e.g., restrictions in funding for research and the impact of technology on patient privacy) and stated that,

To deal with these issues, I believe APA needs a leader who represents all of us, a leader who can foster unity and growth and can offer the flexibility to adjust to changes that are occurring in our profession. I believe I am that candidate.

Materials and procedure. We used the same global measures of femininity, masculinity, and likelihood of being gay. Following Experiment 2, we used the same estimates of targets' affiliation with women and gay men, and the percentage of male feminists likely to be gay. The explicit gender stereotype indexes were identical to those used in Experiment 2 (all α s > .76), as was the gender identity measure (α = .86). New to Experiment 3, we measured implicit attitudes and gender stereotypes using Brief IATs (Sriram & Greenwald, 2009), which allowed us to (a) measure associations separately for each target, and (b) disentangle agency, communality, weakness and dominance associations.⁴

Implicit measures

Attitude Brief IAT. Figure 2 provides a schematic of the Brief IATs (B-IATs). The attitude B-IAT consisted of three blocks of 30 trials each. In Block 1, a practice block, the target's name was featured prominently as the category to be responded to using the right key ("P") and participants responded to anything else (i.e.,

background stimuli) using the left key ("Q"). We used the target's name (*Kenneth, Swanson, Kenneth Swanson*) and his discipline (*psychologist*) to represent "Kenneth"; neutral words served as background stimuli (e.g., *desk, paper, chair*). In the next two counterbalanced blocks, either "Kenneth and good" or "Kenneth and bad" were featured as the two categories to be responded to using the right key, with "good" and "bad" represented by the same positive and negative adjectives used in Experiment 1's attitude IAT (e.g., *good* and *likable* or *bad* and *annoying*). Background stimuli consisted of the same neutral words and either negative adjectives (for "Kenneth and good") or positive adjectives (for "Kenneth and bad"). Response latency differences between these two blocks were computed such that a high score reflects a positive attitude toward the target (again, as a *D* score). Counterbalancing Blocks 2 and 3 was a procedural variable that did not influence results.

Stereotype Brief IATs. We used four counterbalanced blocks of B-IATs to assess automatic stereotyping of male targets (see Figure 2). In

	<u>Weak</u>	<u>Dominant</u>	<u>Agentic</u>	<u>Communal</u>
Stereotype	Weak	dominant	Assertive	Warm
B-IAT	Naïve	Aggressive	Strong leader	Emotional
Items	Insecure	Controlling	Independent	Humble
	Gullible	Arrogant	Confident	Supportive
Respond Left (Background)		Respond Right		
Block 1	Neutral words: desk, chair, paper, door		TARGET: Kenneth, Swanson, Kenneth Swanson, psychologist	
Block 2	Neutral words, bad, failure, disgust, annoying		TARGET or GOOD words	
Block 3	Neutral words, good, likable, success, friend		TARGET or BAD words	
Block 4	Neutral words, dominant words		TARGET or WEAK words	
Block 5	Neutral words, communal words		TARGET or AGENTIC words	
Block 6	Neutral words, weak words		TARGET or DOMINANT words	
Block 7	Neutral words, agentic words		TARGET or COMMUNAL words	

Figure 2. Schematic of the B-IAT (Experiment 3). All blocks have 30 trials. Blocks 1–3 represent the attitude B-IAT, which starts by having subjects press the right key ("P") to identify the target and to press the left key ("Q") for background stimuli. In the next two counterbalanced blocks, subjects categorize the target with either good words or bad words, and press the left key for background stimuli. Blocks 4–7 represent the counterbalanced stereotype B-IATs. Subjects' attention is drawn to the focal categories while background stimuli reflect neutral words or words that are similar in valence (to prevent the task from measuring implicit attitudes).

one block, we measured associations between “Kenneth and weak” using weak adjectives (*weak, insecure, gullible, naïve*), with neutral words and dominant adjectives (*dominant, aggressive, controlling, arrogant*) as background stimuli. A second block used “Kenneth and dominant” as the focal categories, with neutral words and the weak adjectives as background stimuli. A third block used “Kenneth and communal” (*warm, emotional, humble, supportive*) as the focal categories, with neutral words and agentic words (*independent, assertive, strong leader, confident*) as background stimuli. A fourth block used “Kenneth and independent” as the focal stimuli, with agentic words in the foreground and communal words as background stimuli. We counterbalanced Blocks 4 and 5 with Blocks 6 and 7, a procedural variable that did not influence results (i.e., weakness was either the first or third stereotype assessed). In addition, we counterbalanced whether participants completed the attitude or stereotype B-IAT first, which also did not influence results.

The reason we did not build measures that used weakness as the focal category with communality as background (and vice versa) or that used agency as the focal category with dominance as background (and vice versa) was to avoid measuring implicit attitudes. When stereotype IATs are valenced (e.g., when warmth is contrasted with coldness), they assess evaluative rather than semantic associations (e.g., Rudman, Greenwald, & McGhee, 2001). Therefore, we contrasted negative feminine and masculine words in one B-IAT (i.e., weakness and dominance), and positive feminine and masculine words in the other B-IAT (i.e., agency and communality; see Figure 2). The reason the B-IAT uses good and bad (stereotypic) words as background stimuli for the attitude (stereotype) is to model the task on the logic of the traditional IAT, which results in similar psychometric soundness (e.g., Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2012).

Procedure. Participants were escorted to a cubicle by the experimenter, who started a computer program that randomly assigned them to read about one of the two candidates for APA

president. The cover story stated that we were interested in the qualities that make people appear to be good leaders for various types of organizations, and that participants would be randomly assigned to evaluate one of four candidates currently running for the presidency of the American Psychological Association, the largest psychological organization in the USA. After reading about the candidate, participants completed the dependent measures in the following order: global ratings of feminine, masculine, and likely to be gay; gender stereotypes; targets’ social affiliations; feminist stereotypes; and the B-IATs (either implicit attitudes followed by implicit stereotypes, or vice versa). Items within each measure were randomly presented by the computer program. After completing demographics (gender and race), participants were fully debriefed and compensated.

Results and Discussion

Implicit attitudes and stereotypes

Implicit attitudes. As expected, women showed more implicit liking for the gender egalitarian target ($D = .11, SD = .20$) than did men ($D = -.04, SD = .28$), $t(81) = 2.85, p < .01, d = .63$. By contrast, no gender differences emerged in implicit liking for the control target, $t(77) = 1.04, ns$ (for women, $D = -.03, SD = .21$; for men, $D = .03, SD = .24$). In addition, women marginally favored the gender egalitarian target over the control target, $t(80) = 1.94, p = .06$, but the effect size was moderately large, $d = .58$. Men showed no significant implicit preference between the two targets, $t(78) < 1.00, ns$.

Implicit stereotypes. The four stereotype B-IATs were submitted to a 2 (stereotype: feminine, masculine) \times 2 valence (positive, negative) \times 2 (target: gender egalitarian, control) \times 2 (participant gender) mixed ANOVA, with repeated measures on the first two factors. Results showed a marginally significant Target \times Stereotype \times Valence interaction, $F(1, 159) = 3.20, p = .07$. For the gender egalitarian target, simple effects revealed a main effect for valence, qualified by

a marginal Stereotype x Valence interaction, $F(1, 81) = 2.93, p = .09$. In line with Hypothesis 7, planned comparisons showed that the gender egalitarian leader was automatically associated with weakness faster than he was associated with agency, communality, or dominance, all $t(81) > 3.55, ps < .001$ ($Ds = .12, .12, \text{ and } .06$, respectively; $ds = .41, .42, \text{ and } .21$, respectively). Thus, the gender egalitarian target suffered the strongest form of a weakness penalty using B-IATs. For the control target, simple effects showed only a main effect for stereotype, $F(1, 77) = 4.04, p = .05$. Supporting Hypothesis 8, participants associated him with masculine attributes faster than with feminine attributes ($D = .05, SD = .19$). This contrast was significantly different from the same contrast for the gender egalitarian target, $t(160) = 2.65, p < .01, d = .42$, which was reversed, suggesting faster association with feminine than masculine attributes ($D = -.03, SD = .18$).

Explicit measures

Stigmatization. As in Experiment 2, we first factor analyzed the ratings for gay, feminine, masculine, and all four gender stereotypes, using a principle components analysis with varimax rotation. Results showed that feminine, weak, and gay formed the first factor (all loadings $> .62$), whereas masculine, agentic, and dominant formed the second factor (all loadings $> .47$), and communal formed the third factor, with 73% of the variance explained.⁵ We therefore combined feminine, weak, and gay into a single stigmatization index ($\alpha = .71$). A 2 (target: gender egalitarian, control) x 2 (participant gender) ANOVA revealed only a main effect for target, $F(1, 158) = 6.23, p = .01$. As in Experiment 2, the gender egalitarian target ($M = 4.18, SD = 1.55$) was stigmatized more than the control target ($M = 3.11, SD = 1.33$), $d = .71$.

Explicit stereotypes. The four stereotype indexes were submitted to a 2 (stereotype: feminine, masculine) x 2 (valence: positive, negative) x 2 (target) x 2 (participant gender) mixed model ANOVA, with repeated measures on the first two factors. Results showed a significant Partici-

pant Gender x Stereotype interaction, $F(1, 149) = 4.54, p < .05$. Simple effects showed that men rated *both* targets higher on feminine attributes (communality and weakness) than women did, $t(160) = 3.17, p < .01, d = .47$. By contrast, no gender differences were shown for masculine attributes, $t(160) < 1.00, ns$. Because there were no effects for target, explicit stereotypes did not reveal a weakness penalty for the gender egalitarian male leader. Thus, the B-IAT was a more sensitive measure of this effect.

Are reactions to the gender egalitarian motivated by masculinity defense? Following Experiment 2, we tested gender identity as a moderator of men's reactions using the same strategy. In Experiment 3, a gender difference emerged on implicit liking for the gender egalitarian leader, so we regressed his attitude B-IAT scores on participant gender (coded 0 = men, 1 = women), the gender identity index (mean-centered), and their interaction. Results showed only the known main effect of participant gender, $B = .30, p = .001$. There was no main effect for gender identity, $B = .10, p = .77$, and no two-way interaction, $B = -.13, p = .70$. Thus, the gender gap in implicit prejudice was not motivated by men's need to protect their gender identity.

Additional analyses within the gender egalitarian condition showed negligible results for implicit weakness associations, all $ps > .41$, explicit ratings of weak attributes, all $ps > .68$, and the global rating masculinity, all $ps > .49$. However, a marginal Participant Gender x Gender Identity interaction emerged on the stigmatization index, $B = -.50, p = .09$. Simple effects for men showed a weakly positive relationship between gender identity and this index, $r(41) = .14, p = .37$. For women, this relationship was weakly negative, $r(39) = -.23, p = .15$. (Examining feminine, weak, and gay separately revealed no significant effects.) These results do not support the hypothesis that men stigmatize a male gender egalitarian to defend their masculinity. They also do not replicate Experiment 2's finding that women high in feminine identity were less likely to view a male gender egalitarian as feminine and weak.

Target's social affiliations and feminist stereotypes

Target's social affiliations. Planned comparisons showed that, compared with the control target, the gender egalitarian was estimated as having more friends and colleagues who were women (45% vs. 24%), and more friends and colleagues who were gay men (31% vs. 23%), both $t(160) > 2.74, ps < .01$ (all percentages rounded up). No gender differences emerged on these measures, all $t(160) < 1.00, ns$.

Feminist stereotypes. All participants reported the percentage of male and female feminists who were likely to be gay or lesbian, respectively. They also estimated the percentage of male psychologists who were likely to be gay. Replicating Experiment 2, paired sample t tests showed that participants gave

higher percentages for gay male feminists (50%) than either gay male psychologists (27%) or lesbian feminists (41%), both $t(161) > 3.00, ps < .01$ (all percentages rounded up). No gender differences emerged on these measures, all $t(160) < 1.00, ns$. As in Experiment 2, the correlation between the percentages of feminist lesbians and feminist gay men was positive, $r(160) = .55, p < .001$.

Social affiliations account for stigmatization. After standardizing all variables, we then separately tested female associates, gay associates, and the gay male feminist stereotype as mediators of target differences in stigmatization. We used a bootstrapping macro provided by Preacher and Hayes (2004, 2008) that does not rely on assumptions of

Table 6. Social affiliation mediators of target effects on stigmatization (feminine, weak, gay) and reversed models (experiment 3).

Path/Effect	B	95% CI	Path/Effect	B	95% CI
Model 1 (Y = Stigma)			Model 1R (Y = Women Associates)		
<i>a</i> (Target → women associates)	.42***		<i>a</i> (Target → stigma)	.20*	
<i>b</i> (Women associates → stigma)	.25**		<i>b</i> (Stigma → women associates)	.08	
<i>c</i> (Target → stigma)	.20**		<i>c</i> (Target → women associates)	.57***	
<i>c'</i> (Target → stigma)	.09		<i>c'</i> (Target → women associates)	.56***	
Indirect effect (<i>a</i> × <i>b</i>)	.11*	.03, .20	Indirect effect (<i>a</i> × <i>b</i>)	.02	−.01, .064
Model 2 (Y = Stigma)			Model 2R (Y = Gay Male Associates)		
<i>a</i> (Target → gay male associates)	.21**		<i>a</i> (Target → stigma)	.20*	
<i>b</i> (Gay male associates → stigma)	.38**		<i>b</i> (Stigma → gay male associates)	.37***	
<i>c</i> (Target → stigma)	.20**		<i>c</i> (Target → gay male associates)	.21**	
<i>c'</i> (Target → stigma)	.12		<i>c'</i> (Target → gay male associates)	.14	
Indirect effect (<i>a</i> × <i>b</i>)	.08	.02, .17	Indirect effect (<i>a</i> × <i>b</i>)	.07	.02, .16
Model 3 (Y = Stigma)			Model 3R (Y = Gay Feminist Stereotype)		
<i>a</i> (Target → gay fem stereotype)	.52***		<i>a</i> (Target → stigma)	.20*	
<i>b</i> (Stereotype → stigma)	.14		<i>b</i> (Stigma → gay feminist stereotype)	.11	
<i>c</i> (Target → stigma)	.20***		<i>c</i> (Target → gay feminist stereotype)	.52***	
<i>c'</i> (Target → stigma)	.12		<i>c'</i> (Target → gay feminist stereotype)	.49***	
Indirect effect (<i>a</i> × <i>b</i>)	.07	−.03, .19	Indirect effect (<i>a</i> × <i>b</i>)	.02	−.01, .07

Note. Target was coded 0 (control target) 1 (gender egalitarian target). Estimates are unstandardized. Confidence intervals are for the indirect effect. Intervals that do not include zero support rejecting the null hypothesis that the indirect effect = 0.

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$.

normality. Table 6 (left half) shows results that conceptually replicate Experiment 2's finding that social affiliations (but not stereotypes) reliably account for stigmatization. Model 1 shows that estimated female associates fully mediated the target difference in stigmatization (i.e., the confidence intervals of the indirect effect did not include zero). Model 2's use of gay male associates as the mediator was similarly successful. Model 3's test of the gay male feminist stereotype was unsuccessful because the confidence interval of the indirect effect included zero. Repeating these analyses using participant gender as a covariate resulted in virtually identical results.

As in Experiment 2, we then reversed each model as a check on the validity of our claims for mediation. Table 6 (right half) shows results that echo Experiment 2's finding that Model 1R was unsuccessful, whereas Model 2R was even more successful than Model 2 because Path C decreased to marginal significance ($p = .06$) and the confidence intervals do not include zero. Thus, it is equally (if not more) likely that participants used their inferences about the egalitarian target's qualities (feminine, weak, and gay) to estimate his affiliations with gay men. As a result, the claim that his presumed affiliations with gay men led to stronger stigmatization is contradicted. By contrast, Hypothesis 9 was supported, bolstering the claim that presumed affiliations with women leads to stigmatizing gender egalitarian men. Finally, in a departure from Experiment 2, Model 3R was unsupported. Thus, there was no evidence that participants relied on their inferences about the gender egalitarian (as feminine, weak, and gay) to estimate that more feminist men are gay.

In summary, Experiment 3 provided an ecologically valid and conservative test of our hypotheses by presenting male leaders as targets and employing real-world materials, adopted from an actual gender egalitarian APA presidential candidate's website. Results showed that although women implicitly favored the male gender egalitarian leader more so than men, the male gender egalitarian leader nonetheless suffered an automatic weakness penalty on the part of both genders. Echoing Experiment 2, the gender egalitarian

leader was stigmatized more so than the control target, and this effect was fully mediated by his presumed associations with women, but not by the stereotype that men who advocate for women's rights are likely to be gay. As in Experiment 2, presumed affiliations with gay men mediated target differences in stigmatization, but the reversed model was, if anything, more successful. Also echoing Experiment 2, no evidence emerged that men's stigmatization of the male gender egalitarian was driven by their threatened gender identity.

General Discussion

The present research begins to fill a critical gap in the literature regarding reactions to men who serve as ambassadors for gender equality. Prior research has focused on reactions to the feminist label, comparing feminist women and men (Anderson, 2009; Breen & Karpinski, 2008; Rickabaugh, 1995; Twenge & Zucker, 1999), whereas our work compared reactions to men described as either gender egalitarians or not. Although we found evidence of a robust stereotype that male feminists are gay (Anderson, 2009), it did not account for the fact that male gender egalitarians were stigmatized as more feminine, weak, and likely to be gay, relative to control targets. We tested two other accounts for the stigmatization effect: stigma-by-association (Goffman, 1963), and men's motives to defend their gender identity (Falomir-Pichastor & Mugny, 2009). We found no evidence that men who identify with their gender are especially likely to stigmatize, or show prejudice against, male egalitarians. Perhaps men defend their masculinity only when they are are certain that a gender egalitarian is gay. Instead, our findings suggest that gender egalitarian men suffer stigma-by-association effects due to their perceived alignment with *women*—the low-status group who benefit most from their efforts. By contrast, although straight men who affiliate with gay men are likely to be viewed as gay (Neuberg et al., 1994), we cannot conclude that associations with gay men mediated target differences in stigmatization because the reversed causal model was, if anything, even more successful. Thus, our

research suggests that affiliating with *women* is the specific reason why gender egalitarian men risk stigma-by-association.

Because male egalitarians advocate for women's rights, it is not surprising that female participants generally (a) liked them more than male participants did (explicitly in Experiments 1 and 2, and implicitly in Experiment 3) and (b) preferred them to comparison targets (implicitly in Experiments 1 and 3). Perhaps more surprising was that men only showed a clear preference for comparison targets in Experiment 2, using self-reports. Thus, measures of liking may not always signify stigma-by-association effects (see also Pryor et al., 2012, Exp. 3, in which a White male job applicant seated next to a Black counterpart was judged as equally likable and competent, but less hireable, compared with when he was seated next to a White counterpart). Nonetheless, male egalitarians were stigmatized in each study by both genders (i.e., perceived as more feminine, weak, and likely to be gay, relative to comparison targets). Further, using the IAT, both genders automatically associated a gender egalitarian man with feminine more so than with masculine attributes (in Experiment 1), and with weakness more so than with communality, agency, or dominance (in Experiment 3). Using self-reports, a gender egalitarian man was rated as weaker than a male biologist or psychologist in Experiment 2, whereas this effect did not emerge in Experiment 3. Thus, presenting targets as leaders curbed the weakness penalty for gender egalitarian men using explicit, but not implicit, measures. Of importance, even the gender egalitarian leader encountered stigmatization that was mediated by his perceived associations with women. Because Experiment 2's clinical psychologist and Experiment 3's control psychology leader were not similarly stigmatized, we conclude that working for women's rights yields a feminizing stigma that cannot be explained by mere association with a "helping profession."

Perceiving men as "weak" or "effeminate" is a sign of low status and respect (Brescoll et al., 2012; Heilman & Wallen, 2010; Moss-Racusin et al., 2010; Rudman & Mescher, in press). Thus, it is disconcerting that women were just as likely

as men to stigmatize male egalitarians. However, the pattern is consistent with past research investigating backlash against atypical men. Men who challenge the gender hierarchy likely risk penalties because they undermine the perceived legitimacy of the status quo, whereby men possess greater power and resources than women for ostensibly justifiable reasons (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, et al., 2012). That is, members of dominant groups may be evaluated on the basis of whether or not their behavior justifies extant power disparities (Phelan & Rudman, 2010; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Glick, et al., 2012). Consistent with this view, men who behaved modestly during a job interview (Moss-Racusin et al., 2010), requested a family leave to care for a family member (Rudman & Mescher, in press), worked as a subordinate to a female boss (Brescoll et al., 2012), or who succeeded in a feminine job (Heilman & Wallen, 2010) suffered a weakness penalty—even when they were not presumed to be gay (e.g., because they were married). The present findings suggest that men who advocate for women's rights are similarly at risk for stigmatization, and uniquely showed that presumed social affiliations with women were responsible for this effect.

Limitations and Future Directions

The research is limited by our use of undergraduates as evaluators. Because the legacy of the women's movement is ultimately in the hands of young adults, their reactions to gender egalitarian men are crucial to investigate. Nonetheless, future research should explore reactions on the part of older adults. On the one hand, college students may be less informed about gender inequality and the need for male ambassadors; on the other hand, working adults may be even more cognizant of the penalties for gender deviance, as suggested by Prime and Moss-Racusin's interviews with male managers (2009).

As in past research (Anderson, 2009), the gay male feminist stereotype was even stronger than

the lesbian feminist stereotype, so future work should assess its accuracy. An online survey of adults found no evidence that female feminists are likely to be lesbians (Rudman & Phelan, 2007); among female respondents, there was virtually no correlation between identifying as a feminist and as a lesbian, $r(782) = .07, ns$. Among male respondents, there was a small but reliable correlation suggesting that self-identified feminist men are likely to be gay, $r(473) = -.13, p < .01$. Nonetheless, the sexuality of male feminists remains an empirical question.

In addition, contextual effects may have caused participants to overestimate the percentage of feminist men who are gay (approximately half). Priming the "gay male feminist" stereotype may help to explain why approximately one quarter of male psychologists (and biologists) were also judged as likely to be gay. Nonetheless, the differences between male feminists and male psychologists were robust and in the expected direction, yet the stereotype did not mediate stigmatization. Thus, stereotype overestimation was not likely to have caused our null results. However, further research is necessary to establish the magnitude of the gay male feminist stereotype.

Future research should also investigate possible explanations for the gay male feminist stereotype. For example, people may view gay men and feminists as having similar incentives (e.g., to increase diversity initiatives and work for equal rights). They may also view gay men as more empathic than heterosexual men to women's issues because both groups suffer from gender prejudice. Alternatively, people who challenge the gender hierarchy are mavericks, so people may extrapolate political nonconformity to sexual nonconformity (Unger et al., 1982). Further, men especially may use stigmatization as a means of discouraging other men from actively pursuing gender equality. Investigating these explanations should illuminate *why* male feminists are likely to be viewed as gay.

By uncovering evidence for stigma-by-association, the present research calls for investigating the extent to which men are aware of being stigmatized if they advocate for women's rights, and

if so, whether it deters them from actively working to increase gender parity (as the Prime & Moss-Racusin, 2009, interviews would suggest). Because people are motivated to avoid social penalties for behaving in gender atypical ways, we expect the answer to be affirmative (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Glick, et al., 2012). In addition, there are other obstacles to male feminism that should be investigated. Among them are men's apathy (e.g., beliefs that the gender revolution has been won), their fears that men are losing ground to women (i.e., belief in a zero-sum contest for equal rights), or that they would be viewed as traitors to their ingroup if they served as ambassadors for women's progress (Prime & Moss-Racusin, 2009).

Finally, the present research might be usefully extended to people who advocate for the causes of other minority groups. For example, do people who work for the rights of children, the disabled, or the elderly suffer stigma-by-association (e.g., are they perceived to be weak because they are assumed to affiliate with others who are stereotyped as weak)? Conversely, there may be groups for whom serving as an ambassador might lead to perceptions of strength as a result of their presumed affiliations (e.g., people who work for the rights of military veterans). Future research should explore the scope and generality of stigma-by-association to predict reactions to civil rights workers.

Conclusion

Although many men endorse gender equality, they may be reluctant to champion women's rights for fear of being stigmatized, resulting in stalled progress toward women's rights. The present research suggests that this concern may be realistic and that it stems, in part, from gender egalitarian men's presumed affiliations with women. Ultimately, the crux of the problem is that *women* are stigmatized, so the real challenge is to elevate women's cultural status. As long as women are devalued, men who work for gender equality risk being devalued, and women's social status will continue to suffer. It is therefore

critical to investigate factors that might alleviate barriers to gender egalitarianism, including educating people about the personal and professional benefits of advocating for women's rights and causes. Indeed, because male prescriptions demand that men be heroic and strong (Prentice & Carranza, 2002; Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, et al., 2012), labeling men who advocate for equal rights as champions might go a long way towards alleviating stigma-by-association. To revisit a male manager's insights, "If it was understood that men who are supportive of women's efforts for equality are strong men—by definition [that] it actually takes more strength as a man—that changes the conversation" (Prime & Moss-Racusin, 2009, p. 15). Indeed, this shift would also increase women's prospects for an accelerated trajectory toward gender equality.

Finally, it is important to note that we did not conduct this research with the intention of deterring men from advocating for gender equality. Rather, our hope is that uncovering the processes which may impede men's ability to champion gender diversity will help clear the way for them to serve as women's allies.

Notes

1. We thank an anonymous reviewer for this suggestion.
2. In addition, masculinity ratings also showed an unexpected Participant Gender \times Target interaction, $F(2, 147) = 4.17, p = .02$. Compared with men, women rated the psychologist as more masculine (see Table 2).
3. The gender egalitarian man was also viewed as marginally more communal than the biologist, $t(91) = 1.87, p < .07$, and marginally less agentic than the psychologist, $t(110) = 1.96, p = .05$.
4. The predictive utility of both attitude and stereotype IATs is well established (for a meta-analysis, see Greenwald et al., 2009). The Brief IAT is newer, but its psychometric properties are akin to the IATs (Bar-Anan & Nosek, 2012; Sriram & Greenwald, 2009), and a Black–White Brief IAT predicted voting intentions during the 2008 presidential election (Greenwald, Smith, Sriram, Bar-Anan, & Nosek, 2009). Further, Brief IATs assessing implicit female dehumanization (as animals and objects) were effective predictors of male sexual aggression (Rudman & Mescher, 2012).
5. In Experiment 2, communal traits loaded onto the masculine factor; here, they formed an isolated factor. Because communal traits are prescribed for women, it might seem odd that they did not factor with feminine, but the communal index consists of positive traits that are not proscribed for men (the way feminine, weak, and gay are)—likely because they are status neutral (Rudman, Moss-Racusin, Phelan, et al., 2012). Because no women were rated, the feminine, weak, and gay factor that emerged in both studies signals that these ratings are especially negative for male targets, whereas viewing men as warm and supportive is not penalizing them. In other words, the valence of the traits may have had much to do with how they factored out in judgments of only male targets.

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Appendix

Interview Excerpt: Experiment 1

INTERVIEWER: Do you support legal action to further women's rights?

JOHN: I definitely do. I've read some stuff about the Equal Rights Amendment. I'm not really sure why it hasn't already passed. I'm pretty sure it just says [that] equal rights under the law should not be denied based on sex. It seems pretty reasonable and straightforward to me.

MARK: I guess. But I think we kind of already do that. Women ought to be cared for, sure, but that should happen on a personal level, not really a legal one... As a guy, it's my

responsibility to protect and provide for the women in my life, you know? I think that's an important part of a relationship, taking care of her, which is something women need, and I want to be able to do it without a law.

INTERVIEWER: OK. What do you think about the role of feminism in the US?

JOHN: I think it's pretty important.

MARK: I'm not a fan. Everything a guy does seems to get called sexist. ... I'm not a sexist because I think women are more pure or moral

than guys most of the time...
[interrupted]

JOHN: I don't think you can say all women are like that. I think that we shouldn't be making judgments about people because of their sex. We have to just take them as individuals.

INTERVIEWER: So would either of you describe yourself as a feminist? Someone who champions women's rights?

MARK: Not me.

JOHN: Definitely yes.