

---

## The retreat of the upper and middle classes to gated communities in the poststructural adjustment era: the case of Trinidad

---

Michelle Mycoo

Graduate Programme in Planning and Development, Department of Surveying and Land Information, The University of the West Indies, St Augustine, Trinidad;

e-mail: mmycoo@eng.uwi.tt

Received 17 September 2004; in revised form 7 December 2004

---

**Abstract.** The emergence of gated communities of the upper-income and middle-income classes can be directly traced to the failure of governments to close the growing divide between rich and poor and to solve the accompanying wave of crime and fear of violence. It is also a result of an abandonment of faith in governments' capacities to deliver and maintain infrastructure and civic services. State failure has influenced people's decisions to encircle their living space, defend it, and to service their needs autonomously like citizens of the ancient walled cities. The trend toward social exclusion and spatial segregation is characteristic of these modern ministates, which poses planning, policy, and administrative questions for decisionmakers. In this paper I first set out to understand the emergence of gated communities as a global phenomenon, but particularly in the Latin American and Caribbean context. Secondly, I seek to examine the retreat of the upper and middle classes to gated communities in the poststructural adjustment years, using Trinidad as a case study. Finally, I put forward conclusions and policy prescriptions of relevance to cities in addressing the emerging issues.

### **Gated community living: a global and developing-country phenomenon**

The ancient self-contained walled cities were places of grandeur where all members of the community had access to shared facilities such as baths, recreation space, churches, and community meeting places, and walls served as a mechanism for defence against invaders. The modern gated community is a residential area with restricted access, where normally public spaces have been privatised, and public goods are privately provided or maintained. It has its own 'architecture of fear' (Marcuse, 1997). Access is controlled either by physical design, using walls, fences, traffic barriers, or electronic devices such as automatic gates, smart-card-operated gates, or entry-phones, or by 24-hour security personnel. Caldeira (2000) describes these types of development as fortified enclaves, which are turned inward, away from the street, the public life of which they explicitly reject. She notes they are controlled by armed guards and security systems, which enforce rules of inclusion and exclusion.

The contemporary gated-community phenomenon first appeared in the United States in the 1970s, twenty years before it first emerged in the developing world, beginning around the mid-1990s (Webster, 2001). Friedman and Goetz (1982), as well as Sassen (1996), argue that global economic restructuring has influenced the rise of gated communities in global cities. They contend intense international competition leads to many workers in low-value-added services being disempowered by stagnating wages and unemployment. Economic restructuring then gives rise to a new class structure: a transnational elite and a burgeoning class of economically excluded. Harloe and Fainstein (1992) argue, using the global-city–dual-city hypothesis, that social polarisation leads to a dual-city structure, where the guarded enclaves are the places in which transnational elites organise their administration, consumption, production, leisure, education, and housing.

Webster et al (2002) argue that interpreting gated housing as a physical manifestation of the dual economy provides insight into the international dimension of the phenomenon, and its timing with globalisation. They note that this perspective is,

however, weak in allowing for or explaining regional differentiation. It is also weak in explaining the growth of gated communities within domestic markets, including nonelite markets. Global-economy–dual-economy explanations offer no plausible arguments for the rise of gated developments outside of global cities, or why global cities such as Tokyo and Paris have few gated communities. Webster et al (2002) suggest that this hypothesis ignores the role of regional inventiveness, and the process by which global influences are adapted by domestic markets for the benefit of domestic-market participants. They also state it ignores the institutional evolution such imports stimulate, as local markets and governments negotiate to handle third-party social costs, for example social exclusion and civic fragmentation.

Research on the changing tastes and values of individuals also provides reasoned arguments for the rise of private guarded residential complexes. For example, Jürgens and Gnad (2002) and O'Neill (1986) see the relationship between the search for personal security, quality local public goods, a socially homogeneous neighbourhood, and prestige naturally leading to clustering and segregation. Other authors, among them Coy and Pöhler (2002), and Glasze and Alkhayyal (2002), stress Western influences on the taste of the local elites. This is a complementary argument to the global-city–dual-city hypothesis, but allows for the emergence of indigenous gated-housing markets with their own locally constructed rationales (Webster et al, 2002).

The emergence of gated communities is also attributed to the decisions of individual households, which may be influenced by the global diffusion of consumer preferences via electronic media and international migration (Appadurai, 1996). The danger in using this explanation is that it ignores how the local housing market works in specific cultural contexts. Again, there may be compelling international trends in taste, but these transform differently, in the context of locally specific social and environmental capital, argue Webster et al (2002). These authors give recognition to the importance of local variations in: the institutions that govern housing; capital and labour markets; entrepreneurial abilities and cultures; and values governing interpersonal and intergroup relationships.

The rise and demand for gated communities are also related to the institutional context in which certain social groups make their consumption decisions. It is not only dictated by economic capital. Rather, social institutions govern the individual's cooperation with the market, governments, and voluntary organisations. The evolution of gated communities, modern proprietary developments such as shopping malls, retirement communities, and condominiums are the product of institutional reform—a new form of territorial organisation.

### **The rise of gated communities in Latin America and the Caribbean**

The exact period in which gated communities have emerged in the developing world varies. Webster et al (2002) note that in many rapidly urbanising countries, gates and guards appeared at a time of double-digit economic growth in the last two decades of the 20th century. However, in Latin America and the Caribbean, gated communities are a poststructural adjustment phenomena of the 1990s, emerging in a period of single-digit economic growth. Today, all over cities in Latin America and the Caribbean—Caracas, São Paulo, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, Kingston, Puerto Rico, Port-au-Prince, and Port of Spain—the upper and middle classes are opting to live in gated communities.

There are various reasons that can be linked to the boom-like expansion of gated communities in the cities of Latin America (Coy and Pöhler, 2002) and the Caribbean. Fear of crime is one such reason, which is justifiable given that Latin American megacities have one of the highest rates of homicides and other violent crimes in the world.

---

The upsurge of crime in the poststructural adjustment years of the 1980s is associated with drastic cuts in public spending, unemployment, and poverty that became entrenched among the masses.<sup>(1)</sup> This is also confirmed by Caldeira (2000) who notes the increase in violent crime between 1984 and 1996 in São Paulo, Brazil. Caldeira (2000), Hall and Pfeiffer (2000), and Vanderschueren (1996) argue that increasing violence is directly related to growing inequality in Latin-American societies. Interestingly, Caldeira (2000) observes in relation to Brazil that violent crime affects the poor especially. However, it is the upper and middle classes that are demanding residential security, which Webster (2001) argues is a function of many factors including fear, income, income inequality, and social and cultural heterogeneity.

The rise of modern gated communities in Latin America and the Caribbean is also attributed to the growth in urban fiscal stringency. It is an economic motive, which has reinforced the desire of better off citizens to take control of their own residential environments and to secure the provision of civic services of their choice. A similar situation has developed in Lebanon where these enclaves of well-being are closing the gap left by an insufficient supply of public goods and weak public regulations, argue Glasze and Alkhayyal (2002).

As Webster (2001) notes, innovative developers, aggressive marketing, accommodating or powerless municipal governments, and a heightened demand for better urban living environments influenced by the media, have spurred the process of the creation of high-quality residential areas. Throughout Latin America and the Caribbean, individuals are entering into contractual arrangements to ensure a supply of civic goods that are best delivered by the private sector, given state failure in provision. Webster (2001) refers to this trend as 'private municipal governance'. Foldvary (1994) argues that there is merit in this type of private arrangement, which he sees as economically efficient, for it allows communities to collectively consume civic goods and services that are supplied in optimal quantities by the market.

Gated communities in Latin America and the Caribbean are also an expression of the increasingly diverging lifestyles of urban society under the influence of globalisation, as noted by Caldeira (2000), Coy and Pöhler (2002), and Sassen (1996). For example, Coy and Pöhler (2002) found that in the case of gated communities in the Metropolitan Area of Buenos Aires, following the influence of globalisation on a wave of privatisation and strong economic growth, the rich got richer, and there was an exodus of the elite away from the crowded, busy city centre to the suburbs. These gated areas were marketed as a new way of life, copied from the North American model. They are characterised by 'artificial worlds' of shopping centres, housing, and leisure ghettos that represent spaces for the realisation of their consumption needs and image, as well as the new spaces of social contact. These artificial worlds also exist in the cities of the Caribbean where elites share space in glitzy shopping malls, citadels of luxury housing, and members-only clubs. Atkinson and Flint (2003) argue that, although various 'defended' territories exist in cities, such as gang 'turf', ethnic enclaves, and gentrified neighbourhoods, gated communities provide a force for exclusion in new and different ways to other residential patterning. They represent almost total exclusion and minimal contact between the upper and middle classes, and the poor. Atkinson and Flint (2003) see gated communities as providing a refuge to which may be connected social networks, leisure, schooling, and the workplace via paths deliberately separated from unwanted social contact en route to and at the destination.

<sup>(1)</sup> Vanderschueren (1996) notes that, at least once in every five years, 60% of those living in cities with 100 000 or more inhabitants are victims of one form of crime or another.

Social segregation has always existed in Latin American and Caribbean cities, like those in the Arab world as noted by Glasze and Alkhayyal (2002). But the increasing fortification of communities of the privileged is a visible consequence of an intensification of social disparities and spatial fragmentation. With gated communities, new islands of wealth have emerged in an ocean of poverty, which characterises the increasingly fragmented structure of the Latin American (Coy and Pöhler, 2002) and Caribbean cities. Upper-income and middle-income households have elected to leave inner cities and live in the suburbs among people of a similar disposition, as Coy and Pöhler (2002) found in the case studies of Rio de Janeiro, São Paulo, and Buenos Aires. Yet, gated communities of Latin America and the Caribbean are not ethnic enclaves. They represent residential segregation as opposed to racial segregation. For example, Garcia-Sanchez (2004) argues that Caracas' private urban communities are the result of a process of class-based sociospatial segregation and homogenisation driven by security needs. Broadly speaking, because of the growing crime wave in the cities of Latin America and the Caribbean, residential segregation and homogenisation are primarily motivated by a need for security. This is in stark contrast to Saudi Arabia's gated communities that give a sense of privacy and identity separate from expatriate Westernised communities. In Saudi Arabia, gated communities are aimed at containing expatriate culture, for the benefit of those inside the gates and those outside (Glasze and Alkhayyal, 2002), whereas in Latin America and the Caribbean they are developed to serve the security needs of locals and expatriates.

The attraction to living in gated communities in Latin America and the Caribbean is not limited to the very rich or transnational elite. Ordinary middle-class urban professionals are generating a demand for private 'quarters' that provide a better living environment. Savage et al (1988) describe such groups as the new 'service class', whose demand for quality communal infrastructure and security is so high that there is a willingness to pay for these goods and services, although state taxes are paid for the provision and enjoyment of 'privatopia' as McKenzie (1996) describes it.

The literature also highlights that gated communities represent a form of economic segregation, which is not new, as zoning and city planning were designed, in part, to preserve the position of the privileged, by subtle variances in building and density codes (Blakely and Snyder, 1997). Gating is an extension of the separation and distinction that covenants already provide, acting as an additional way to define boundaries, guarantee property values (Bible and Hsieh, 2001), and effectively prohibit neighbourhood change. However, in some Latin American case studies such as Brazil, although condominiums have covenants, and are segregative, historically they have not been considered an instrument of the real-estate industry (Caldeira, 2000), as in the case of the United States (McKenzie, 1996). It is only in the last generation of very large condominiums that developers have begun to include their own restrictions, notes Caldeira (2000).

Researchers studying Latin America have found that another motivation for gated-community living is speculation in property-value appreciation. Gated communities are offered in increasing numbers and, with great success as new products on the real-estate market in Latin America, have a high return of capital (Coy and Pöhler, 2002).<sup>(2)</sup> This finding is consistent with that of Thuillier (2002), who reported that, before the Argentine economic crisis in 2001, the economic prospects in Argentina were bright and there was much speculation in the property market leading to a multiplication of

<sup>(2)</sup> Earlier research by Newman (1980) in the United States revealed higher property values for housing, higher assessed valuations, and higher rates of homeownership in gated communities. La Cour-Little and Malpezzi (2001) found in their research on the United States that the perception of security, privacy, and control are capitalised into higher housing prices.

---

gated developments, which were in high demand, growing from about 100 in 1995 to 351 in 2000.


In this section I have provided background information in attempting to understand the genesis of gated communities in the context of Latin America and the Caribbean. To date there is no research on the rise of gated communities in the Caribbean. In this paper I seek to examine the reasons for the rise of gated communities and the urban planning, policy, and administrative implications of gated-community living, from a Caribbean perspective, using empirical evidence from Trinidad. Finally, I put forward conclusions and policy prescriptions of relevance to developing cities.

### **Background information on Trinidad**

Trinidad has had more than two centuries of systematic sociospatial segregation. Upper-income neighbourhoods have historically attracted certain segments of society on the basis of wealth, which Smith (1965), and Clarke and Howard (1999) observed was synonymous with colour and class in the British West Indies. However, the rise of the gated community in Trinidad is a more recent trend, which has occurred in the last ten years. Following the economic recession around 1986 onwards, there has been an upsurge of crime due to rising unemployment, inequality, poverty, and drug trafficking as a result of Trinidad's proximity to South America where a significant portion of the narcotics trade originates. Today, both the upper and middle classes are retreating to these protected suburban enclaves.

An overview of Trinidad's socioeconomic history from the postindependence era of 1962 to the present period is critical to understanding the rise of gated communities. The emphasis in the late 1960s was redistribution with growth. However, the failure of income redistribution in Trinidad led to deep social and ethnic cleavages, which was precipitated by the Black Power riots of 1970. Approximately 18% of Trinidad and Tobago's households lived in poverty in the late 1960s and the unemployment level was 14%. Although employment increased in the late 1960s, an acute sense developed among the lower income groups, and especially among the urban black population, that the benefits of growth were bypassing them. On the other hand, the traditional local elite or 'gatekeepers' (strategically placed individuals, groups, and institutions with the ability to control access to society's rewards or resources) who were invariably of white or French-Creole ancestry, were able to take advantage of the fiscal incentives for industry. The Black Power riots of 1970 were therefore, in some sense, the tangible reaction to a perceived failure of income redistribution, and to increased inequality.

The 1970 riots surely unnerved the government, which derived most of its political support from the predominantly black urban population, and this forced the government into a redistributive stance, made possible by the oil boom. Experiences of Trinidad in the context of basic needs were notably different from that of other developing countries in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. Two dynamic socioeconomic forces in its history helped shape a strategy for the fulfillment of primary needs. First, the peculiar nature of the colonial plantation economy, the historical experience of slavery and indentureship, and the concomitant disparate ethnic and economic groups in the society required a development strategy at the earliest stage of nationhood which addressed the fundamental needs of disadvantaged groups in society. These groups did not have equal access to shelter, education, and jobs in preindependence times and the immediate postindependence period starting from 1962. Second, although other countries were discussing the importance of meeting their population's basic needs, and much of this remained development rhetoric, the global oil crisis of 1973 led to boom times, providing Trinidad with the actual means to embark on major social and economic projects. For Trinidad the 1970s was marked by excessive



**Figure 1.** Historical trends in world oil prices 1973–1994 and Trinidad’s gross domestic product (GDP) at 1985 prices

government intervention and subsidies in education, housing, health, and water provision (Mycoo, 1996).

By the mid-1980s Trinidad had entered into a debt crisis, as oil prices tumbled from US\$37 per barrel in 1981 to US\$15 per barrel in 1986 (figure 1). However, the government continued to maintain all its welfare programmes based on a philosophy of state paternalism. By 1987 the country was in dire economic straits. That same year a World Bank mission to Trinidad reported that, although, from a social point of view, the government’s provision of heavily subsidised services was laudable, tax measures were needed to effect economic recovery. In adopting the World Bank’s recommendations for a programme of policy reform and renewed growth, measures of fiscal discipline were introduced to ensure that the adjustment plans were consistent with the objectives of economic restructuring.

It remains enigmatic that a small country of 1.2 million people, rich in oil and natural gas, which made impressive economic gains in the 1970s to mid-1980s, and then the late 1990s and onwards, still has so many poor people, notes Deosaran (2000). By 1990, the poverty rate had risen to over 30%. The gross domestic product (GDP) dropped from US\$8.9 million (TT\$21.5 million) in 1982 to US\$4 million (TT\$16 million) in 1988, while the unemployment level rose from 10% to 20% within the same period. The economy recovered slowly following the implementation of structural adjustment measures. By 1998, the unemployment level had fallen to 14%. However, social-sector spending remained low and gave rise to the social malady of poverty and crime. Public-health expenditure between 1990 and 2000 averaged 2.3% of the GDP, while public expenditure on education grew from 2.5% of the GDP in 1990 to 4% in 2000.

The sudden, steep rise of high levels of unemployment and poverty in the post-structural adjustment era, starting in 1989, was accompanied by an outbreak of protest that culminated in a failed attempt to overthrow the government in 1990. Poverty and the ‘underclass’ occupied a central place in the rationale of the rebels and the ensuing national debate (Deosaran, 2000). For five days, the Prime Minister and parliamentarians were held hostage by rebels and a state of emergency was declared, lasting three months. That government lost the elections in 1995 because of the harsh economic measures that were imposed.

During the election campaign of 1995 the opposition placed crime as ‘its number one priority’ if elected (Deosaran, 2000). The World Bank (1996) reported the disturbing increases in crime and violence, which accompanied the poverty trends, and concluded that, “although individuals of all socio-economic groups are affected, the urban sector is particularly vulnerable to these social problems.” A government report

---

in 1996 indicated that 90% of the population shared in the income distribution between 1988 and 1992, but in actual terms, benefits were not evenly shared. Lower-income groups received only 17.3% of the income shared in 1988 and 15.7% in 1992. The removal of several subsidies, lowered social spending, and revenue raising, aggravated the situation for households, making some poor and others poorer (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 1996).

Trinidad has made impressive strides in stabilising the economy in the poststructural adjustment era. From the late 1990s to the early 21st century, the country has been fortuitous in finding new oil and natural-gas fields offshore. Oil prices were at an all-time high in 2003 and 2004 (and have continued to rise since), reaching US\$55 per barrel. Today, the country has all the signs of conspicuous wealth: highly visible commercial centres, impressive business and state edifices in the capital (Deosaran, 2000), luxurious condominiums, and the latest models of cars and sport utility vehicles imported from Japan and the United States. However, 36% of the population lived below the poverty line of US\$200 per month in 2000. Moreover, there is mounting evidence of state failure to perform basic state functions such as the provision of a reliable water service, sound quality health, education, and security for citizens. The upper and middle classes have privatised responses to state failure. The persistent unreliability of water provision has led households to build private water-storage facilities to adjust to the water rationing. Most of the elite and middle classes now send their children to private primary schools, and a growing number to private secondary schools. Also, they do not attend public health institutions because of the long waiting lists and the perception of a poor quality of service and medical equipment. The ultimate failure of the government is its weakened capacity to provide basic law and order, leading to the upper and middle classes seeking refuge in gated communities. In the last decade there were 17 000 serious crimes reported in Trinidad, of which only a meagre 10% reached conviction (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2004). The murder rate has steadily increased in a five-year period, growing by 68% between 1999 and 2003.

### **Research findings on gated communities in Trinidad**

As noted earlier, Trinidad did not always have gated communities, although the upper and middle classes lived in upscale suburban neighbourhoods. Gating is recent, having started in about 1995. However, it has been booming in the last five years, especially between 2002 and mid-2004. Kidnappings of wealthy individuals (including children) for ransoms since 2002, a crime that had not been perpetrated before, has provided a further catalyst for a retreat of the elite and middle classes to gated communities. The rate of kidnapping is approximately five per month, which is high for a country of 1.2 million people. Crime is highest in the capital city of Port of Spain, followed by the northern, western, and northeastern areas, which constitute the Capital Region. The Capital Region comprises 10% of the country's land area and accommodates 45% of the total population, making this zone the most densely populated in the country. Professional town planners, real-estate agents, and developers see the trend toward gated-community living as continuing, because people no longer feel safe as a result of weak policing and crime escalation.

Up to mid-2004, the number of gated communities in Trinidad was 201, the majority located in the Capital Region, which suggests there is a link between the incidence of crime and the establishment of gated communities. The first generation of gated communities emerged in the western portion of the country where the more affluent are concentrated. The next generation appeared in the east, where poverty and growing crime is causing the middle classes to barricade themselves in gated communities that

---

are marketed by real-estate agents and developers as safe havens and salubrious living environments. The whole range of property-market actors—developers, landowners, investors, and consumers—has collectively shaped a new genre of modern suburban living.

A survey of 250 households living in twenty gated communities, spread over the Capital Region, was conducted in the period 2002 to mid-2004. Methodologically, the use of the systematic stratified sample gave a good representation of the different characteristics of gated communities by size, location, topography, age of community, income, demographic, housing types (apartments, townhouses, and single-family houses), and residential densities. For comparative purposes, the survey sampled ten communities located in the west and ten in the east because of possible differences in crime rates and quality of services depending on location. Topographically, communities located in flat and hilly areas were chosen to assess if there was any relationship between topography and the need for security or self-reliance in the provision of goods and services. Income and demographic characteristics are usually key variables that influence the choice of living in gated communities. Communities that differed in these characteristics were chosen to determine the level of significance of such variables. Housing type and density also influence the household's sense of security. In the survey I therefore attempted to measure if there were any differences among communities living in single-family houses, townhouses, and apartments that would influence the need for restricted access. Further, in-depth interviews were conducted with professional town planners, real-estate agents, and developers, to determine their views on gated communities in Trinidad.

The survey results on the socioeconomic profile of gated communities in Trinidad show that they appeal to the wealthy, middle classes, and an expatriate community. At least 94% of the respondents were upper-income (30%) and middle-income (64%) households, namely persons earning the equivalent of over US\$12 000 per annum. A transnational elite that has migrated to work for the British and US oil-exploration companies and construction firms from the late 1990s onwards also live in these gated communities. An estimated 10% of the upper-income persons living in the gated communities surveyed belonged to this transnational group. Also, real-estate agents confirmed in interviews that the demand for gated-community living was very high among expatriates who wanted to live in areas of the west with the highest security measures. This group represented 30% of their real-estate portfolio.

There is a spatial differentiation among gated communities based on income and crime levels. The more affluent and upper-middle classes live in the west, whereas the middle-middle and lower-middle classes live in the east. Most of the very rich, upper-middle classes and expatriates live in the gated communities of the west because crime is higher in the east. Additionally, all the gated communities in the survey were built in the suburbs, away from the inner city of Port of Spain, where crime rates are highest. The superrich gated communities in the western suburbs also represent a new sociospatial dimension, in that they are surrounded by spaces of marginalisation, where the lower classes and squatters live. Historically, Trinidad's poorer classes built squatter settlements in the hilly areas with the most scenic views of the sea. With these lands now totally invaded and captured by the poor, the rich have purchased waterfront properties with picturesque vistas that are adjacent to these poor communities.

There were no ethnic enclaves in the modern gated communities surveyed. Trinidad's upper-income and middle-income groups lived in segregated neighbourhoods in the colonial and the postindependence era. Residential areas were ethnic enclaves up until 1970, when the Black Power riots changed the economic distribution of wealth.



Prior to this, social barriers excluded the poor from living in such districts, but did not prevent the physical access of the poorer classes to these neighbourhoods. Private luxurious leisure clubs, such as the 'Country Club' and the yacht clubs, had already existed in 1960s and 1970s for the upper and middle classes. Suburban housing areas for the wealthy, with names such as Bayshore, Westmoorings, Goodwood Park, St Clair, and Maraval, sprung up around these leisure clubs. However, the erection of physical barriers and gating is a recent phenomenon, starting from the mid-1990s, which correlates strongly with an upsurge in crime. Trinidad's gated communities are a specific and relatively new expression of the increasing social disparities in the society contributing to the deepening of social segregation in urban areas. Nevertheless, they remain multiethnic in composition.

The Trinidad gated communities are expressions of social homogenisation that provide "a refuge to social groups that are connected through social networks, leisure, schooling and the workplace via paths separated from unwanted social contact en route and at the destination" as described by Atkinson and Flint (2003). These spaces are also more-or-less segregated and prevent social contact between different social groups. It was observed that residents socialise in the same places, their children attend the same private schools, and they work in similar companies. Social fragmentation in the wider society is now more physically visible. The group-specific place of everyday activities of the privileged are concentrated mainly in access-controlled enclaves, such as shopping centres, sport clubs, and weekend activities in the bars, marinas, beaches, and other entertainment venues in locations surrounding the gated communities. These new 'extraterritorial spaces', which are generally beyond public management and control, are the product of globalisation in that they reflect the North American lifestyle popularised by cable television.

The profile of Trinidad's gated communities also reflects a distinctive gender and marital status among residents. Gated communities appeal to many single professional women (see figure 2). The survey's findings confirmed that 45% of the respondents were single females, the majority of whom were between the ages of 29 and 49 years. Of these single female respondents, 70% were professionals. They chose to live in gated communities mainly because they felt safer than living in nongated residential areas with loose security arrangements. Single females have fled to gated communities because of the high incidence of violent crimes against women. Crime statistics indicate that the attacker's profile is young, unemployed, and male. Studies from the Centre for Gender Studies at University of the West Indies (St Augustine, Trinidad campus) show that young males are frustrated by persistent unemployment, and feel emasculated and threatened by the success of women in society.



**Figure 2.** Marital status and occupation of women in gated communities of Trinidad.

**Table 1.** Profile of respondents and reasons stated for living in a gated community.

Type of respondent	Security (%)	Exclusivity or prestige (%)	Services (%)	Future real-estate value (%)
Upper income	100	0	50	10
Middle income	100	20	70	90
Middle-aged	100	15	90	100
Elderly	100	5	100	50
Professional	100	95	100	100
Business persons	100	80	25	100
Single females	100	45	100	100
Family households	100	5	100	100

One of the survey's most significant findings is that the decision to live in a gated community in Trinidad has little to do with exclusivity: it is one of necessity.<sup>(3)</sup> The upsurge of crime and fear of robberies, kidnappings, or physical harm have influenced all respondents to insulate themselves from crime by seeking refuge in a gated community, although some respondents had been the victim of crime within the gates. A diverse spectrum of households has chosen gated communities essentially for security (see table 1). The successful marketing of walled residential areas can mainly be accounted for by a justifiable, psychosis-like fear of crime, which is the Trinidad reality in an era of poststructural adjustment. In particular, the upper classes and the elderly are not concerned with prestige, but safety, given recent kidnappings of wealthy individuals, as table 1 shows. However, 20% of middle-income respondents, and among the professional and business groups, 95% and 80%, respectively, indicated prestige had some influence on selecting a gated community as a place of residence.

Two types of gated communities exist in Trinidad; older suburban exclusive residential areas that have converted into gated communities by adding security measures, and new gated communities that are built with strict security measures. The 'architecture of fear' in both types of communities is exhibited in a reliance on community-wide facilities such as walls, restricted access via electronic gates, and security-guard booths. About 90% of households in the survey lived in gated communities with electronic gates at the entrance, while an additional 8% lived in communities with either guard booths with security guards at night only, or posted 24 hours.

Trinidad's households have been building fortresses as their psychological fear of crime has led them to take maximum-security measures. In many cases, these gated communities, like their Latin American counterparts, have a higher degree of fortification than do those in North America. Homeowners invested individually in additional layers of security as a backup measure, building their own walled residences with a multiplicity of security devices. All respondents used burglar proofing, half also combined this with an electronic gate, and over a quarter had guard dogs. Police data show the incidence of crime is lower in the west than in the east, yet persons living in gated communities in the west have taken more security measures than those in the east. This may be related to a psychosis-like fear of crime among the more affluent who live in

<sup>(3)</sup> Research by Wehrhahn (1999) found that the reasons for the increase in gated communities in Spain are also mainly based on security, and not on prestige, status, or lifestyle. However, Atkinson and Flint (2003) found that the general perception among planning officers, and to an extent developers in the UK, was that the demand for gated community living was driven by exclusivity as well as by security. Dillon (1994), McKenzie (1996), Helsey and Strange (1999), and Wilson-Doenges (2000) all found that in the United States, a compelling reason for gated community living was a sense of fear.

---

the west, suggesting there is an exponential relationship between fear of crime and income in that the more affluent a person, the greater the level of fear.

Public-agency failure leads to private costs as found in the survey where households individually invested in a slide gate and burglar proofing, and spent an average of US\$1825. In gated communities where electronic gates have been built at the entrance, these cost between US\$2935 and US\$7500, which is shared by all households. Armed guards provided by private security firms are expensive, ranging from US\$900 to US\$1800 per month, making this mode of security accessible to only a small percentage of gated communities.<sup>(4)</sup> Privatisation of security is an admission of no-confidence in the state's capacity to protect citizens given mounting crime. Nonetheless, fear has a price. In reality, this is an inefficiency in resource allocation because residents are paying twice for security, through user fees and taxes, without a commensurate reduction of fear. Free-market forces have responded swiftly, making a business out of crime and security, as is evident from the mushrooming numbers of private security companies.<sup>(5)</sup>

Trinidad's gated communities have also attracted a new 'service class' of local professionals and transnational elites. Approximately 30% of the locals in gated communities were professionals, such as lawyers (13%), architects (2%), doctors (7%), and professors (8%). The remainder were businesspersons who felt the need for greater security given that the business class was being targeted by kidnappers for a ransom. The safety in numbers that high-density living afforded seemed to be the most feasible living option, according to most of these respondents. This new 'elite service class' is not, however, seeking security services only, but is concentrated in areas with good services and facilities, and high-quality social, visual, and physical environments. Those in the international professional class are particularly accustomed to enjoying a high quality of life in the global cities, and so want to maintain such a lifestyle, it being one of the perks of an overseas posting.

Many local professionals migrated to the United States and Canada during the economic recession from the mid-1980s to mid-1990s. Such persons have returned to Trinidad owing to its renewed economic prosperity since the late 1990s. In keeping with Appadurai's (1996) argument about the impact of international migration on tastes, these returning residents have grown accustomed to the North American lifestyle and want higher quality, efficiently provided goods and services in their residential communities. The net effect is that gated-community residents are demanding a higher quality of goods and services that has transformed the modality for service delivery and the provision and maintenance of infrastructure. In Trinidad, property taxes are small and go to a general fund, as opposed to the locale in which the property is owned. As a result, there is no relationship between taxes and the quality of services provided by the local authority. Furthermore, central government dictates the budget and expenditure of the local authority. The local authority is therefore unable to supply the quality of infrastructure that is demanded by persons living in these neighbourhoods. As a consequence, developers provide infrastructure in the short term and recover costs through land sales; local authorities assume long-term responsibility for infrastructure upkeep after five years, provided that the developer has maintained the infrastructure in an acceptable condition in the interim. However, citizens—especially those living in hilly areas—have often been compromised when developers renege on their infrastructure-maintenance obligations, and local authorities fail to undertake adequate maintenance once the

<sup>(4)</sup> This is similar to the European Union, where private security is accessible to only 5% of the population (Vanderschueren, 2000).

<sup>(5)</sup> This is reflective of global trends, which show a 30% and 8% annual growth of these companies in the Southern and Northern hemispheres respectively, in the late 1990s (Vanderschueren, 2000).

---

infrastructure is transferred to them. Gated-community residents are solving their own problems.

In response to the neglect by the state, developers, and local authorities, Trinidad's gated-community households have turned to microgovernance of infrastructure maintenance. Approximately 40% of the communities surveyed maintained their own streets and drains. It is the classic example of private solutions to state failure. Most of these communities, especially those in hilly areas, have engaged in private municipal governance by establishing management companies that assume responsibility for the maintenance of road and drainage infrastructure, water pumps, and the front-entrance electronic gate. Residents, in exchange for the delivery of these goods and services, pay to the private company a monthly recurrent fee averaging between US\$50 and US\$100. Although this is economically efficient, as it allows communities to collectively consume civic goods and services that are supplied in optimal quantities by the market, the social costs need regulating.

The survey found that demand for quality communal infrastructure and security is so high that individuals are willing to pay for these goods and services, although they already pay state taxes for their provision. However, from a revenue perspective there may be some difficulty in increasing revenue. Revenue generation at the local government level is problematic as, if households already absorb the cost of security, infrastructure, and service provision, it is difficult to justify increases in taxes when such goods and services are not supplied to them by local government. Communities are not yet revolting against double taxation, or asking for rebates on the cost of public works and public safety services they provide independently. Nonetheless, questions have been raised by upper-class and middle-class citizens about the mis-spending of public funds because they have not witnessed any improvement in the quality of infrastructure and services, despite paying as much as 30% of their monthly income in taxes to central government. They have legitimately increased calls for greater accountability in public spending.

Microgovernance trends at the gated-community level are indicative of population demand for the devolution of decisionmaking power. Traditionally, power was vested at the central-government level. The need articulated by gated-community residents in the survey for devolution and decentralisation to local government is new. But the demand by gated communities to exercise control over land-use regulations, and the provision of high-quality goods and services adds an additional spatial dimension to governance. This phenomenon reflects a shift of power from the hands of the state to individual communities.

In Trinidad two types of regulation govern the use of land, building, and engineering standards in Trinidad: one is public regulation under the Town and Country Planning Act, and the other is the private regime of restrictive covenants. The restrictive covenant is similar to the planning regulations used by the Town and Country Planning Division, as the restrictive covenant gives communities direct control over land use, housing densities, and architectural design. All the gated communities in the survey rely heavily on restrictive covenants to impose land-use and architectural standards, given the weak enforcement capacity of the Town and Country Planning Division, which is yet another example of state failure. Many residents have been highly critical of the ineffectiveness of the agency in enforcing land-use and building regulations in Trinidad. In this context, public regulation has much less relevance than the interests of private capital. Not surprisingly, gated communities are fast becoming ministates that operate independently of the state machinery.

The use of restrictive covenants is a privatisation of planning, which lends itself to social exclusion. Meeting stringent design specifications such as building height,

---

floor-area ratio, fences, and building colours make it affordable only to the rich and middle classes. There is a policy vacuum on gated communities in Trinidad, as the planning agency has over the years treated these as private estates that have the right to enclosure and 'defensible space', as Newman (1980) describes it. The exclusive control of gated-community space by private capital via restrictive covenants can be interpreted as an integral part of a development pattern, characterised by de facto deregulation, and flexibility, which has emerged in the context of globalisation and neoliberalism.

These findings confirm there is a paradox in residents' demands for less governmental intervention but more local control. However, these ministates present the potential for social conflict within communities. In the gated communities surveyed, homeowners have surrendered their individual rights to restrictive covenants and a hyperregulation culture prevalent within privately governed communities. However, internal conflicts occur among residents, and between residents and management companies. These sociospatial arrangements work well when all members are operating in concert for the collective good, but disintegrate if there are dissenting individuals. Social cohesion and community spirit within gated communities in Trinidad is strong and about 78% of the survey respondents felt that their relationship with their fellow homeowners was good, but 22% of the respondents reported conflicts. Residents observed that this cohesiveness can breakdown should one member be a free-rider, failing to pay management fees, abide by the restrictive covenant, or consent to proposed changes.

Apart from security, a demand for localised control of high-quality infrastructure, services, and aesthetics, an appreciation of property value is also a motivating factor for living in gated communities in Trinidad. Real-estate agents have confirmed that property resale value in gated communities appreciated by over 100% from 2000 to 2004. In the Trinidad context, land and property markets have been structured by the social dilemma of crime in a poststructural adjustment society. Real-estate agents are capitalising on this social malady by marketing gated communities as safe havens. The survey found there is a strong correlation between age, income, and choosing gated communities for reasons of speculation. Only 10% of upper-income respondents compared with 90% of middle-income respondents chose to live in a gated community for the speculative reason of property value appreciation (see table 1). The wealthy and the elderly are more preoccupied with safety and quality services than investment appreciation. All the rich persons in the survey have a diversified property investment portfolio and already own real estate elsewhere, which has appreciated in value. For the middle classes, property-value appreciation is considered important because these groups comprise young, middle-aged, upwardly mobile households.

Trinidad's gated-community complexes are not as large as Latin American gated communities. The size of gated communities varied according to the type of dwelling unit financed and marketed by real-estate companies. Townhouse gated communities were small, consisting of an average of 27 units, single-family ones were larger, and averaged 79 houses, and apartments averaged 117 units. The population size of townhouse communities is about 72 persons, single-family housing communities are about 320 persons, and apartment compounds house around 351 persons.

Within the gated communities there are variations in the type of dwelling the upper and middle classes occupy. Upper-income gated communities are mostly luxury apartments, whereas middle-income ones are mainly single-family dwelling units and townhouses. About half of the 30% of wealthy persons now living in up-market gated communities had previously lived in single-family dwelling units in upper-income residential areas. They sold their properties on retirement to live in luxury apartments where the security, services, and leisure facilities are of a very high

standard, and the apartments are spaciouly designed and luxuriously equipped. The trend toward luxury apartments aimed at the richest of the rich is as recent as five years. The real-estate market has also promoted an 'elitisation' of apartment living. On the other hand, middle-income households still had young families, and therefore preferred to live in single-family dwelling units, or large townhouses that satisfied larger space requirements.

The Trinidad survey findings raise many policy considerations. The following section draws the main conclusions and policy prescriptions that respond to a growing demand to live in enclosed privatised space.

### **Conclusions and policy prescriptions**

Gated communities are ancient walled cities or citadels that house communities in environments similar to Howard's (1902) garden cities. However, with modern gated communities, new layers of protection have been added by enclosing entire neighbourhoods, using physical features or electronic devices or by restricting access by posting guards. The retreat of the upper and middle classes is a segregation based primarily on security needs, and to a lesser extent, prestige and exclusivity. Unabated crime, which stems from inequality, poverty, and unemployment in the poststructural adjustment era, has been driving the boom in gated communities over the last five years in Trinidad.

These gated communities have also spawned new layers of servicing and have created a new hierarchy of decisionmaking, shifting from central and local governments to microgovernance within gated communities. It is a reaction of Trinidad's upper and middle classes to state failure in the provision of public goods and services. The new privatisation in the delivery of such goods and services is also a response to a lessened state paternalism in an era of poststructural adjustment, instigated by the wisdom of the international lending agencies.

Gated communities are not exclusive to megacities. Even in small islands where urban crime has been a by-product of persistent inequality and poverty, we see the emergence of this new genre of urban living. As the Trinidad case study has proven, a sophisticated market has emerged in entire suburban neighbourhoods, comprising gated homes, community infrastructure, service, and microuban governance. They are the outcome of a deliberate measure (as opposed to spontaneous attempt) at residential homogeneity and political autonomy.

Gated communities pose challenges to urban planners, sociologists, political scientists, and economists. In a wider context they challenge the spatial, organisational, and institutional order that shapes contemporary cities. The central policy issues that require strategic thinking on the part of decisionmakers and policymakers are those of poverty alleviation, pro-poor resource redistribution, city-centre revitalisation to arrest prevailing sociospatial segregation, governance, and decentralisation.

### **Poverty alleviation**

The major issue that warrants attention if gated communities are to become less widespread and segregated is that of poverty alleviation. The upper and middle classes have opted to minimise their fear of crime and violence by agreeing to use physical design or electronic devices to protect their properties and themselves. However, gates do not alleviate crime; they only reduce it. At the root of crime and violence is poverty, and, unless society and governments take steps to reduce such dysfunctionalities, the gated community phenomenon will grow and persist. Disparities between the gated glamour communities and the urban war zones, as described by Sassen (1998), is likely to contribute to further brutalisation of the conflict: the indifference and the greed

---

of the new elites versus the hopelessness and rage of the poor. The way forward in alleviating poverty is to ensure a more equitable distribution of wealth and educational advancement. As Blakely and Snyder (1997) succinctly articulate, no solution that denies the problem has great longevity. Much more has to be done to improve the human condition and attack poverty in an effort to reduce crime and violence in society as a whole, but especially against women.

Although cuts in public expenditure has been the practice in the era of structural adjustment throughout the 1980s and 1990s, gated communities have inadvertently allowed governments at all levels to abdicate their basic functions by not demanding that security and infrastructure be delivered, and privately undertaking to provide these goods and services themselves. Although the wealthy can substitute governments' provision of civic goods and services, the poor are more vulnerable. Civil society can be engaged as a partner in poverty reduction, but it remains the primary responsibility of the state to ensure that the needs of the poor are met. Gated communities reduce the burden on the state to provide these goods and services to their residents. The state should therefore capitalise on the resources that are freed and seize the opportunity to reform its approach in meeting the needs of the disadvantaged.

#### **City-centre revitalisation**

Researchers such as Sennett (1970; 1977) and Amin et al (2000) view gated-community residential location based on social homogeneity as unpalatable. From their perspective, everyday exposure to difference is a key aspect of socialisation and to participatory modes of governance, which city centres have facilitated. Lasch (1996) and Sennett (1970) perceive that there is a large-scale retreat by political and social elites to enclaves. Sennett (2000) views the new elite and middle classes as withdrawing from the public realm and abandoning the city to the lower classes.

Gated-community living has spread into many suburban areas leaving city centres devoid of a cross-section of the population. However, the flight of upper-income and middle-income residents from the city centre threatens the sustainability of cities globally. The central city has been demoted as the most powerful place in the metropolitan hierarchy in terms of housing, industrial, and commercial functions in many parts of the developing and developed world. Driven by high costs, crime, and environmental degradation, this trend is likely to continue unabated. Land-use planners must work in concert with local governments in providing incentives to retain population and attract new residents to the city centre. This involves incentive zoning, improved services such as security, better quality infrastructure, and relaxed property taxes.

Strategic decisions regarding city-centre housing provision need to be made, as there have been major social changes in the growth of young professionals, childless women, single parents, broken families, and the widowed, who are all natural city dwellers. They may favour the urban qualities of proximity, access, gregariousness, and conviviality of the city centre against the conventional calm and space of the suburbs (Ratcliffe and Stubbs, 1996). Postmodernists will find consensus with this perspective. The postmodernists celebrate complexity, diversity, difference, and pluralism of cities, and the buzz and excitement of city life over the modernists emphasis on simplicity, order, uniformity, and tidiness that many gated communities have become. Planning policy needs to be framed to address these city-centre housing needs. This has started in some Latin American countries such as Argentina and in Europe where city centres are being repopulated using condominium developments.

---

**Governance**

Healey (1997) argues convincingly that we are developing interests in, and ways of collaborating to do something about, the problems we face, as we coexist in shared spaces and seek to turn spaces into places. She notes we categorise and classify each other, making divisions between ourselves and others, particularly those we see as different in some way. Through these processes, we articulate the abstract structures around us in finding ways to shape places in our fragmented societies. We carry power along with us. A great deal of the practice of land-use regulation is harnessed to the attempts by some groups of people to keep different 'others' out of neighbourhoods in the practice of 'exclusionary zoning' (Huxley, 1994; Ritzdorf, 1986). Cox and Johnston (1982) describe it as locational conflict or a 'politics of turf'.

Gated-community residents have formed themselves into what Healey (1997) describes as political communities in which members by common consent find themselves part of a collective entity. These communities have inadvertently reduced the role of formal government. This is happening at a time when neoliberal philosophers aim to 'roll back' the state and when there is an 'off-loading' of what were previously government responsibilities. Local communities are therefore providing and managing facilities and are being asked to invent their own governance institutions. A partnership approach is needed that builds the synergies of the state and private sectors so that each actor does what it does best.

**Decentralisation**

Gated communities manifest a number of tensions, between notions of civic responsibility and exclusionary aspirations rooted in fear and protection of privilege; between the trend toward privatisation of public services and the ideals of the public good and general welfare; and between the need for personal and community control of the environment and the dangers of creating outsiders of fellow citizens (Blakely and Snyder, 1997). In the long term, reform of the state sector in the delivery of basic civic goods and services should be the goal. This will help curtail the need for gated communities. A reversal of the gated-community trend warrants sweeping changes in the legislation, revenue generation, and human-resource development policies that allow local governments to become more involved in meeting the range of needs of communities. A strong case can be made for decentralisation but as Dillinger (1994) has argued, there must be a linking of revenues and expenditure, balancing regulation with political accountability and synchronising the elements of reform.

Ultimately, the effects of the process of social exclusion require policymakers to come together to discuss ways of arresting enclave development, while making it safe for people to carry on with their lives without fear of crime and violence. Spatial segregation and social exclusion are more than a simple withdrawal of the elites and middle classes into suburban enclaves in search of privatopia. A retreat in defence of space and personal safety is taking place and has blotted out concerns for the poor. The state has failed to use revenues collected from taxes paid by the upper and middle classes to alleviate poverty and provide quality goods and services to these classes. They in turn have taken matters into their own hands, and feel increasingly disconnected with the plight of the poor because they have become their victims of violent crime. There has been a shift in attitude and a deepening of the 'not in my backyard syndrome' (Dear, 1992) by the rich and middle classes.

The whole process of gating represents a privatisation of state functions in the provision of public goods. These classes have also embarked on a privatisation of traditional elements of the public realm such as streets and parks. The social fragmentation that is occurring as a result of privatisation can have dire consequences.



Inequality, poverty, and crime are social problems, while the gates provide only physical solutions to limit access. Social problems require social solutions. The bad news is that if inequality and poverty are ignored, utopia may become an illusive dream should the poor retaliate.

**Acknowledgements.** Research for this paper was funded by a grant from the Canadian International Development Agency to research partners in the North and South, including the Graduate Programme in Planning and Development of the University of the West Indies, St Augustine, Trinidad. It forms part of a larger research project on access to housing in developing countries, being undertaken with colleagues from McGill University, Montreal, Canada, and supported by the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada.

## References

- Amin A, Massey D, Thrift N, 2000 *Cities for the Many Not for the Few* (Policy Press, Bristol)
- Appadurai A, 1996 *Modernity at Large: Cultural Dimensions of Globalization* (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, MN)
- Atkinson R, Flint J, 2003, "‘Fortress UK?’ Gated communities, the spatial revolt of the elites and time–space trajectories of segregation", keynote paper presented at Gated Communities Conference, Glasgow, 19 September; copy available from Department of Urban Studies, University of Glasgow, Glasgow
- Bible D, Hsieh C, 2001, "Gated communities and residential property values" *Appraisal Journal* **69** 140–145
- Blakely E, Snyder M, 1997, "Divided we fall: gated and walled communities in the United States", in *Architecture of Fear* Ed. N Ellin (Princeton Architectural Press, New York) pp 85–99
- Caldeira T, 2000 *City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in São Paulo* (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA)
- Clarke C, Howard D, 1999, "Colour, race and space: residential segregation in Kingston, Jamaica during the late colonial period" *Caribbean Geography* **10** 3–15
- Cox K, Johnston R, 1982 *Conflict, Politics and the Urban Scene* (Longman, Harlow, Essex)
- Coy M, Pöhler M, 2002, "Gated communities in Latin American megacities: case studies in Brazil and Argentina" *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design* **29** 355–370
- Dear M, 1992, "Understanding and overcoming the NIMBY syndrome" *Journal of the American Planning Association* **58** 288–300
- Deosaran R, 2000 *Psychonomics and Poverty: Towards Governance and a Civil Society* (University of the West Indies Press, Kingston)
- Dillinger W, 1994, "Decentralization and its implications for urban service deliver", DP 16, Urban Management Programme, World Bank, Washington, DC
- Dillon D, 1994, "Fortress America" *Planning* **60** 8–12
- Foldvary F, 1994 *Public Goods and Private Communities: The Market Provision of Social Services* (Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Glos)
- Friedman J, Goetz W, 1982, "World city formation: an agenda for research and action" *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* **6** 309–344
- Garcia-Sanchez J, 2004, "Private urban communities: security and socio-spatial homogenisation in Caracas" *L’Espace Géographique* **2** 114–130
- Gasze G, Alkhayyal A, 2002, "Gated housing estates in the Arab world: case studies in Lebanon and Riyadh, Saudi Arabia" *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design* **29** 321–336
- Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 1996 *Determination and Measurement of Poverty in Trinidad and Tobago* Ministry of Social Development, Government of Trinidad and Tobago, pp 1–22
- Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 2004 *Trinidad Guardian: News Special* page 11
- Hall P, Pfeiffer U, 2000 *Urban 21: Der Expertenbericht zur Zukunft der Städte* [Urban Future 21: a global agenda for 21st century cities] (Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, Stuttgart)
- Harloe M, Fainstein S, 1992, "Conclusion: the divided cities", in *Divided Cities: New York and London in the Contemporary World* Eds S S Fainstein, I Gordon, M Harloe (Blackwell, Oxford) pp 236–268
- Healey P, 1997 *Collaborative Planning: Shaping Places in Fragmented Societies* (Macmillan, London)
- Helsley R, Strange W, 1999, "Gated communities and the economic geography of crime" *Journal of Urban Economics* **46** 80–105
- Howard E, 1902 *Garden Cities of Tomorrow* 2nd edition (S Sonnenschein, London)
- Huxley M, 1994, "Planning as a framework of power: utilitarian reform, enlightenment logic and control of space", in *Beasts of Suburbs: Reinterpreting Culture in Australian Suburbs* Eds S Ferber, C Healey, C McAuliffe (Melbourne University Press, Melbourne)

- Jürgens U, Gnad M, 2002, "Gated communities in South Africa—experiences from Johannesburg" *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design* **29** 337–353
- LaCour-Little M, Malpezzi S, 2001, "Gated communities and property values", paper presented to the American Real Estate and Urban Economic Association's Meeting, Washington, DC
- Lasch C 1996 *The Revolt of the Elites and the Betrayal of Democracy* (W W Norton, London)
- McKenzie E, 1996 *Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Government* (Yale University Press, New Haven, CT)
- Marcuse P, 1997, "Walls of fear and walls of support", in *Architecture of Fear* (Princeton Architectural Press, Princeton, NJ) pp 101–114
- Mycoo M, 1996 *Water Provision Improvements: A Case Study of Trinidad* unpublished PhD thesis, School of Urban Planning, McGill University, Montreal
- Newman O, 1980 *Community of Interest* (Anchor Books, Garden City, and Doubleday, NY) pp 124–156
- O'Neill M M V C, 1986, "Condomínios exclusivos: un estudo de caso" [Gated condominiums: a case study] *Revista Brasileira de Geografia* **48** 63–81
- Ratcliffe J, Stubbs M, 1996 *Urban Planning and Real Estate Development* (UCL Press, London)
- Ritzdorf M, 1986, "Women and land use zoning" *Urban Resources* **3**(2) 23–27
- Sassen S, 1996, "Cities and communities in the global economy: rethinking our concepts" *American Behavioural Scientist* **39** 629–651
- Sassen S, 1998 *Globalization and Its Discontents* (New Press, New York)
- Savage M, Dickens P, Fielding T, 1988, "Some social and political implications of the contemporary fragmentation of the 'service class'" *Journal of Urban and Rural Research* **12** 455–476
- Sennett R, 1970 *The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity and City Life* (Knopf, New York)
- Sennett R, 1977 *The Fall of Public Man* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge)
- Sennett R, 2000, "Reflections on the public realm", in *A Companion to the City* Eds G Bridge, S Watson (Blackwell, Oxford) pp 380–387
- Smith M G, 1965 *The Plural Society in the British West Indies* (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA)
- Taylor N, 1998 *Urban Planning Theory Since 1945* (Sage, London)
- Thuillier G, 2002, "Gated communities in the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires (Argentina): a challenge for town planning", paper based on PhD geography thesis, Department of Geography, University of Toulouse, France
- Vanderschueren F, 1996, "From violence to justice and security in cities" *Environment and Urbanization* **8** 93–112
- Vanderschueren F, 2000, "The prevention of urban crime", paper presented at the Africities 2000 Summit, Windhoek, unpublished, copy available from Urban Poverty Advisor, Technical Cooperation Division of UNCHS (Habitat), PO Box 30030, Nairobi, Kenya
- Webster C, 2001, "Gated cities of to-morrow" *Town Planning Review* **72** 149–170
- Webster C, Glasze G, Frantz K, 2002, "The global spread of gated communities" *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design* **29** 315–320
- Wehrhahn R, 1999, "Gated communities in Spain", paper presented at Workshop on Gated Communities as a Global Phenomenon, Hamburg, unpublished
- Wilson-Doenges G, 2000, "An exploration of sense of community and fear of crime in gated communities" *Environment and Behaviour* **32** 597–611
- World Bank, 1996 *Poverty Reduction and Human Resource Development in the Caribbean Report* 15342 LAC, World Bank, Washington, DC

**Conditions of use.** This article may be downloaded from the E&P website for personal research by members of subscribing organisations. This PDF may not be placed on any website (or other online distribution system) without permission of the publisher.