Patterns and Processes of International Migration in the 21st Century

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Abstract:

By the end of the 20th century, all developed nations had become countries of immigration. The only question was whether or not they chose to recognize this fact officially. Given the emergence of sizeable migratory flows throughout the world, policies governing the number, characteristics, and terms under which foreigners enter nation states have become controversial and politically divisive. Since an enlightened consideration of policies necessarily begins with hard facts and objective knowledge about the phenomenon in question, I attempt to lay the foundations for a comprehensive understanding of international migration, first by describing the modern history of international population movements, then by delineating the size and structure of the world's leading migratory systems today, and finally by developing a synthetic multi-level theory to account for the initiation and perpetuation of migratory flows in the contemporary world. Lessons from this review are then applied to consider policies for the 21st century.

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A Brief History of International Migration

The modern history of international migration can be divided into four periods. During the *mercantile period*, from about 1500 to 1800, world immigration was dominated by flows out of Europe and stemmed from processes of colonization and economic growth under mercantile capitalism. Over the course of 300 years, Europeans came to inhabit large portions of the Americas, Africa, Asia, and Oceania (Tinker 1995; Lucassen 1995; Altman 1995; Heffernan 1995). Although the exact number of colonizing emigrants is unknown, the outflow was sufficient to establish Europe's dominion over large parts of the world. During this period, emigrants generally fell into four classes: a relatively large number of agrarian settlers, a smaller number of administrators and artisans, an even smaller number of entrepreneurs who founded plantations to produce raw materials for Europe's growing mercantilist economies, and in a few cases, convict migrants sent to penal colonies overseas.

Although the number of Europeans involved in plantation production was small, this sector had profound effects on the demographic history of the Americas. Given preindustrial technologies, the plantations they built required large amounts of cheap labor, a demand met partially by indentured workers from East Asia (Hui 1995; Vertovec 1995; Twaddle 1995). The most important source of plantation labor, however, was the forced migration of African slaves (Curtin 1969; Palmer 1992). Over three centuries, somewhere in excess of10 million African slaves were imported into the Americas and, together with the European colonists and the diseases they inflicted upon the continent's aboriginal peoples, they radically transformed the racial and ethnic composition of the New World.

The second, *industrial period* of emigration began early in the 19th Century and stemmed from industrial development in Europe and the spread of capitalism to former colonies in the New World (Hatton and Williamson 1998). The importance of emigration in European economic history is suggested by Table 1, which presents the number of intercontinental emigrants from Europe and Japan during the period 1846-1924 (see Massey 1988). Over this early period of industrialization, some 48 million emigrants left the continent of Europe, a figure

representing about 12% of the European population at the turn of the century. Nations with notably large percentages of emigrants included Britain (41% of its 1900 population), Norway (36%), Portugal (30%), Italy (29%), Spain (23%), and Sweden (22%). In the middle range were Denmark (14%), Switzerland (13%), Finland (13%), Austria-Hungary (10%), and Germany (8%); and in the low range were Belgium (3%), Russia-Poland (2%), and France (1%).

TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE

These figures suggest that large-scale emigration was common during Europe's period of industrialization, and that it did not stem from a lack of economic growth or development. Indeed, the first country to develop economically and the most advanced circa 1900 (Britain) sent the largest number of emigrants; and all countries experienced emigration to some degree. In 10 of the 15 countries shown, total emigration exceeded 10 percent of the turn-of-the-century population, and in six cases it exceeded 20 percent. Given this scale, emigration must have played an important role in the social, economic, and demographic transformation of Europe during the 19th and early 20th centuries.

Figure 1 demonstrates the relationship between industrialization and emigration using data taken from Massey (1988). The chart shows the year that large-scale emigration started (defined operationally as the year that emigration first exceeded 10,000 persons) in relation to the year that industrialization began (operationally defined as the year that railway track length first exceeded 1,000 kilometers). As can be seen from the upward distribution of points on the graph, there is a significant positive association between the onset of industrialization and the initiation of large-scale international movement. Indeed, the correlation coefficient is 0.59.

FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE

The period from 1800 to 1929 represents the first period of economic globalization, characterized by massive flows of capital, raw materials, and goods back and forth between Europe, the Americas, Asia, and the Pacific. Associated with this expanding global economy was the large-scale movement of people, itself rooted in structural transformations that overtook successive European nations as they industrialized and were incorporated into the global trading

regime. During the first era of globalization, European emigrants went to a small number of settler societies—former European colonies that were themselves in the throes of rapid industrialization and development. The United States by itself absorbed around 60% of Europe's total outflow, and another 25% of the emigrants were scattered among Argentina, Australia, Canada, and New Zealand (Massey 1988).

Large-scale emigration from Europe faltered with the outbreak of World War I, which brought European emigration to an abrupt halt and ushered in a four-decade *period of limited migration* (Massey 1995). The 1920s were characterized by the rise of autarkic economic nationalism in both Europe and the Americas. Chauvinistic restrictions were successively placed on trade, investment, and immigration to curtail international movements of goods, capital, and labor. Although the world economy hobbled along and immigration revived briefly during the 1920s, everything came crashing down in 1929.   The onset of the Great Depression stopped virtually all international movement, and except for a small amount of return migration, there was little movement during the 1930s. During the 1940s, international migration was checked by the Second World War. What movement there was consisted largely of refugees and displaced persons and was not tied strongly to the rhythms of economic growth and development (Kay 1995; Holmes 1995; Noiriel 1995; Sword 1995). Whereas an annual average of 621,000 immigrants entered the United States from 1900-1930, the figure dropped to just 53,000 in the 1930s and little more during the 1940s (Massey 1995).

The fourth period of *post-industrial migration* emerged during the middle1960s and constituted a sharp break with the past. Rather than being dominated by outflows from Europe to a handful of settler societies, immigration became truly global in scope, as the number and variety of both sending and receiving countries increased as the global supply of immigrants shifted from Europe to developing countries of the Third World (Castles and Miller 1993). Whereas migration during the industrial era brought people from densely settled, rapidly industrializing nations into sparsely settled, rapidly industrializing countries, migration in the post-industrial era brought people from densely-settled countries in the earliest stages of industrialization to densely-settled post-industrial societies.

Since 1960 Europeans have comprised an increasingly smaller fraction of world immigrant flows, and emigration from Africa, Asia, and Latin America has increased dramatically (Stalker 1994; Zlotnick 1998). The variety of destination countries has also grown. In addition to traditional immigrant-receiving nations in Oceania and the Americas, countries throughout Western Europe now attract significant numbers of immigrants—notably Germany, France, Belgium, Switzerland, Sweden, and the Netherlands (Anwar 1995; Abadan-Unat 1995; Hammar 1995; Ogden 1995; Hoffman-Nowotny 1995).

During the 1970s, even long-time countries of emigration such as Italy, Spain, and Portugal began receiving immigrants from the Middle East and Africa (Fakiolas 1995; Solé 1995); and after the rapid escalation of oil prices in 1973 several less developed but capital-rich nations in the Persian Gulf also began to sponsor massive labor migration as well (Birks and Sinclair 1980; Abella 1995). By the 1980s, international migration spread into Asia, not just to Japan but also to newly industrialized countries such as Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Malaysia, and Thailand (Loiskandl 1995; Bun 1995; Fee 1995; Hugo 1995).

Table 2 illustrates the new face of international migration by showing the top immigrant-receiving nations for the period 1960-1995 measured in both relative and absolute terms (using the counts and rates developed by Zlotnick 2004). As can be seen, the list of nations currently receiving large numbers of immigrants includes traditional receiving socieities such as the United States, Canada, and Australia; but it also includes European nations that earlier in the 20th century were countries of emigration, such as Germany, France, and the former USSR. It also includes the most important oil-exporting nation in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia. The importance of the Persian Gulf as a region of immigration is highlighted when rates of immigration are considered instead of absolute flows. The list of nations with high immigration rates includes the United Arab Emirates and Qatar as well as Saudi Arabia. In these countries, an absolute majority of the economically active population is foreign born.

TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE

The number and variety of immigrant-sending nations have also increased, as indicated by Table 3, which lists the top countries of emigration in terms of absolute and relative levels. As can quickly be seen, all entries in this table are developing nations. The largest absolute outflows are observed in Mexico, followed by Afghanistan, Bangladesh, the Philippines, Pakistan, China, Vietnam, and Colombia. In terms of rates, small nations prevail, including island states such as Samoa, Jamaica, and Cape Verde, as well as places of strife and civil disorder such as Rwanada, Liberia, and Lebanon. Although the most important sending nations are now in the Third World, rates and levels of emigration are not associated with population growth or demographic pressure (Zlotnick 2004) nor do emigrants come from the poorest, and least developed places (Massey et al 1998). With the exception of a few sources of refugees, international migrants tend to originate in nations whose economies are growing rapidly and fertility rates falling as a result of their incorporation into global trading networks.

Current Patterns of International Migration

The current period of extensive international trade constitutes a second era of globalization characterized by the return of extensive cross-national flows of capital, goods, raw materials, and information. Though the roots of the new globalization lie in the end of the Second World War, until 1990 globalization could not reach its full potential because of the Cold War, which cut off roughly one third of all humanity from the marketplace (the populations of China, the Soviet Union, and their various satellite countries) and mired much of the rest of the world in proxy confrontations (throughout Asia, Latin America, and Africa). The end of the Cold War finally allowed the global economy to return to the stage of development it had reached on the eve of World War I.

Since then we have witnessed an evolution toward liberal democracy among trading nations, the consolidation of stable international institutions, an acceleration of free trade, and a new global security regime guaranteed by the hegemonic power of the United States. Under U.S. domination, markets for land, commodities, capital, goods, raw materials, and information have globalized as never before, and once again the resulting flows are accompanied by rising

volume of international migration rooted structural transformation and incorporation into the global marketplace.

By the beginning of the 21st century, international population movements had evolved into five discernable migratory systems, each one characterized by a rough stability of migrant flows across time and space. In general, the flows of people within these systems parallel flows of goods, capital, and information that are partially structured by international politics. Figure 2 draws upon the data compiled by Massey et al. (1998) to show the regional composition of immigration within each of these systems. The North American system is the largest and oldest of the world's migration systems. It is dominated by flows into the United States, which are 5-6 times those into Canada, although in relative terms migration to the latter country is more extensive owing to its smaller population. As the first column reveals, the inflow into North America is dominated by Latin America and the Caribbean (around 45% of the total) and Asia (36%). By the late 20th century, Europeans had fallen to comprise a minor share of immigrants to North America (around 13%). Likewise, very few were from Africa, the Middle East, or Oceania.

FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE

International migration to the countries of Western Europe began during the second half of the 20th century (Castles and Kosack 1973; Stalker 1994). From 1950 to 1970, much of this movement was intra-continental. Workers left nations in southern Europe that were still relatively intensive in labor—Italy, Spain, Portugal, and Greece–for nations in the north and west that had become intensive in capital but scarce in labor—Germany, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Sweden (Martin and Miller 1980; Schierup 1995). By the late 1960s, however, southern Europe itself was on the verge of achieving the long-desired state of capital abundance, and during the 1970s, Italy, Spain, and Portugal also began importing migrant workers, mainly from the Middle East and North Africa.

The European shift from the exportation to the importation of labor was notable because it involved, for the first time, the widespread movement of migrants to countries that were not

sparsely populated settler societies. Another distinctive feature lay in the *way* that European labor migrants were brought in. Faced with rapid economic growth, tight labor markets, and a demand for workers that was impossible to fill from domestic sources (see Kindleberger 1967), but lacking an indigenous tradition of immigration or an ideology that favored permanent settlement, European governments sought to recruit "temporary" migrants—“gastarbeiter” or "guestworkers" in the language coined at the time--who would return to their countries of origin when the economic conditions that made their recruitment necessary disappeared (Martin 1991).

When this moment finally arrived, however, the "guests" failed to take the hints expressed by their "hosts" and return home as expected. On the contrary, large numbers opted to settle permanently in Europe and began petitioning for the entry of their spouses, children, and other relatives. Although the number of immigrant workers stopped growing, foreign populations continued to swell (Martin and Miller 1980). In response, countries adopted more restrictive admissions policies after the mid-1970s, but by then European governments faced the prospect of integrating growing populations of immigrants and their descendants and without making any explicit decision to do so, Western Europe had become a multi-racial, multi-ethnic society (Castles and Miller 1993).

As the second column in Figure 2 reveals, the European migration system is characterized by large inflows of immigrants from the Middle East and Africa. Around a third of all European immigrants are from the Middle East, mainly from nations such as Turkey and Lebanon; and about 30% are from Africa, mostly from nations in the Maghreb such as Algeria, Tunis, and Morroco. Around 18% come from elsewhere in Europe, mostly from eastern nations such as Poland, Russia, and other states of the former USSR. Relatively few immigrants arrive from the Americas, though around 10% are from Asia.

It was only during the last quarter of the 20th century, after the watershed event of the 1973 oil shock and the ensuing worldwide recession, that the outlines of a new post-industrial migratory order came into view, not just in Europe, but throughout the globe. The sudden infusion of petrodollars transformed the Persian Gulf into a capital-rich, labor-scarce region, and

as in Europe, political leaders in Gulf countries sought to recruit "temporary" workers to fill the resulting demand for labor, this time from labor-rich, capital-poor states elsewhere in the Middle East and in Asia (Birks and Sinclair 1980). With even weaker traditions of immigration and pluralism than in Europe, the Gulf states placed harsher restrictions on migrant workers in an effort to keep them temporary (Dib 1988). Despite the restrictive nature of these policies, however, immigrants became a permanent structural feature of economic and social life in the Gulf region.

Although recruitment efforts focused initially on Arab neighbors, during the 1980s policy makers in the Gulf region restructured their labor policies to incorporate Asians, first Muslims from Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh and later non-Muslim from Vietnam, Korea, and the Philippines. As the third column in Figure 2 shows, by the 1980s the vast majority of temporary workers (over 80%) were from Asia, compared with just 13% from elsewhere in the Middle East. This redirection of labor recruitment away from neighboring countries was undertaken deliberately to reduce the number of migrants with potential moral and political claims on the host societies (Arabs and Muslims), thus increasing state control and reducing the likelihood of permanent settlement.

By the 1980s, several "Asian Tigers" had joined the ranks of wealthy, industrialized nations. In addition to Japan, which had become one of the world's dominant economic powers, Taiwan, South Korea, Hong Kong, Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia achieved stunning rates of economic growth during the 1970s, and by the 1980s they too had become intensive in capital but poor in labor (Hugo 1995). Like the countries of southern Europe during the 1970s, many switched from exporting to importing labor, while others continued simultaneously to import and export workers. Throughout Asia and the Pacific, efforts were made to keep the new labor migration temporary to avoid the problems and tensions of racial and ethnic diversity created by permanent settlement.

Unlike other migratory systems discussed to this point, the Asia-Pacific system is multipolar—that is, the various receiving nations are not contiguous but widely scattered

geographically. Massey et al. (1998) identify four basic poles of reception in Asia and the Pacific: Australia, Japan, and newly industrialized countries (NICs) in South Asia and East Asia. Australia is the oldest and best-developed of the migratory systems, and like other traditional receiving countries immigrant origins have shifted markedly away from Europe and toward developing nations, mostly elsewhere in Asia and the Pacific. Japan began importing migrants during the 1970s, mainly from other nations in Asia but also from South America, where large numbers of Japanese had settled earlier in the 20th century. Japan was followed in the 1980s and 1990s by newly industrialized nations such as Korea, Taiwan, and Hong Kong in the east and Singapore, Thailand, and Malaysia in the south. As the fourth column of Figure 2 shows, for the system as a whole, 81% of immigrants originated in Asia, with around 7% each in the Americas and Oceania, and 4% from the Middle East.

Argentina is one of the world's oldest and most important immigrant-receiving nations. Along with Brazil and Uruguay, it experienced a period of rapid industrialization during the first period of globalization. During the late 19th and early 20th centuries these three countries formed the core of a well-defined international migration system that received massive inflows of migrants from Europe, principally from Italy, Spain, and Portugal (Ferenczi 1929; Germani 1966). According to Lattes (1983, 1985), from 1800 to 1970 some 13.8 million immigrants entered Latin America, with roughly three quarters settling in Brazil or Argentina. Nearly 60% came from southern Europe, 15% from elsewhere in Europe, and 11% were from Asia.

The last waves of European immigration occurred just after the Second World War, and thereafter the number of persons born in Europe began to decline steadily. Argentina now receives immigrant flows primarily from its immediate neighbors, notably from countries included in the MERCOSUR trade agreement, which established a free trade zone embracing Argentina, Paraguay, Brazil, and Uruguay. The Argentine subsystem thus differs from the four prior global migration systems in three ways: the scale of the movement is much smaller, it only has one core country, and little of the movement into Argentina is transcontinental. The vast majority of immigrants came from just four countries, all sharing a border with Argentina: Chile (33%), Uruguay (19%), Paraguay (15%) and Bolivia (14%). As seen in the fifth column of

Figure 2, 87% of all immigrants to Argentina originate in the Americas, 6% come from Europe, and 7% are from Asia.

The end of apartheid in 1994 appears to have resulted in the emergence of one final regional system centered on the Union of South Africa. Like Argentina, South Africa is historically a country of immigration and is the only sub-Saharan nation to have undergone a significant process of industrial growth and development, though neither economic growth nor immigration was on the scale observed in Argentina. According to Ferenczi (1929), over one million non-Africans entered South Africa between 1880 and 1924. After the foundation of the apartheid state in 1948, immigration of Europeans continued to be encouraged whereas the entry of Africans was strictly controlled and regulated.

A Synthetic Theory of International Migration

The simultaneous emergence of stable migratory systems throughout the world suggests the operation of common social, economic, and political forces. A comprehensive theoretical account of these forces requires addressing five fundamental questions: what are the structural processes in developing nations that produce emigrants? What are the structural forces in developed nations that create a demand for their services? What are the motivations of people who respond to these macro-level forces by moving internationally? What social and economic structures arise in the course of international migration and globalization to support and sustain international movement and how do they feed back on migratory processes? And, finally, how do national governments respond to the resulting flows of people and how effective are their policies likely to be?

The following synthetic theoretical account of international migration grows out of the work of an international, multi-disciplinary team of scholars appointed by the International Union for the Scientific Study of Population. It was asked to survey existing migration theories to identify areas of conflict, complementarity, and overlap and to assess the validity of different theoretical explanations with respect to the empirical research literature. The committee, whose

findings are reported in Massey et al. (1998), focused on six bodies of theory: *neoclassical economics* (Todaro 1976), the *new economics of labor migration* (Stark 1991), *segmented labor market theory* (Piore 1979); *world systems theory* (Sassen 1988); *social capital theory* (Massey, Goldring, and Durand 1994); and the theory of *cumulative causation* (Massey 1990). They evaluated each theoretical explanation against empirical research drawn from the world's major international migration systems, discerned the degree of support for propositions linked to each theory, and developed a synthetic explanation for the emergence and persistence of international migration at the dawn of the new century.

International migration originates in the social, economic, and political transformations that accompany the expansion of capitalist markets into pre-market and non-market societies (as hypothesized under world systems theory). Pre-market societies are those reliant on peasant agriculture whereas non-market societies are based on central planning, such as the command economies of the former Soviet Union, the People's Republic of China, and other nations in the pre-1989 socialist block. For ease of expression, I refer to both cases as structurally transforming societies.

In the context of a globalizing economy, the entry of markets and capital-intensive production methods into peasant or command economies disrupts existing social and economic arrangements and brings about the widespread displacement of people from customary livelihoods, creating a mobile population of people who actively search for new ways of achieving economic security and advancement. Studies consistently show that international migrants do not come from poor, isolated places that are disconnected from world markets, but from regions and nations that are undergoing rapid change as a result of their incorporation into global trade, information, and production networks. In the short run, international migration does not stem from a lack of market development, but from the development of markets themselves.

One means by which people displaced from traditional livelihoods seek to assure their economic well-being is by selling their services on emerging national and international labor

markets (neoclassical economics). Because wages are generally higher in urban than in rural areas, much of this process of labor commodification is expressed in the form of rural-to-urban migration, particularly in developing nations. This movement occurs even when the probability of obtaining an urban job is low, because when multiplied by high urban wages, the low employment probabilities still yield expected incomes above those prevailing in rural areas, where wages and employment are both low (Todaro 1976). According to the neoclassical model, if the difference between incomes expected in urban and rural sectors exceeds the costs of movement between them, as is typical, people migrate to cities to reap higher lifetime earnings.

Wages are even higher, of course, in developed countries overseas, and the larger size of these international wage differentials inevitably prompts some displaced people to offer their services on international labor markets. The tendency for international—as opposed to internal—migration is especially pronounced among people living in former command economies undergoing a structural transformation toward the market, since they are already quite highly urbanized and generally well educated, thereby possessing skills that are valued on global labor markets.

International wage differentials are not the only factor motivating people to migrate, however, or even the most important. Indeed, Massey et al.'s (1998) review found that most people displaced in the course of economic growth did not move hoping to reap higher lifetime earnings by relocating permanently to a foreign setting (although some did). Rather, households struggling to cope with jarring structural transformations used international migration as a means of overcoming market failures that threatened their material well-being (as predicted by the new economics of labor migration).

In structurally transforming societies, urban labor markets are volatile and characterized by wide oscillations that frequently render them unable to absorb streams of workers being displaced from pre-capitalist or non-capitalist sectors. Since national insurance markets are rudimentary and government unemployment insurance programs are limited or nonexistent,

households cannot adequately protect themselves from risks to well-being stemming from their under- or unemployment. Thus, the lack of access to unemployment insurance creates an incentive for families to self-insure by sending one or more members overseas for work. By allocating members to different labor markets in multiple geographic regions—domestic and foreign—a household can diversify its labor portfolio and reduce risks to income, as long as conditions in the different labor markets are weakly or negatively correlated.

Household members in rural areas who seek to participate in the ongoing structural transformation of agriculture, meanwhile, lack access to insurance markets for crops and futures. As households shift from subsistence to commercial farming, they are forced to adopt new production methods that make use of untested technologies, unfamiliar crops, and untried inputs. As they plunge into the unknown world of production for the market rather the self-consumption, the lack of insurance or futures markets leaves agrarian households vulnerable to economic disaster should these new methods fail, providing yet another incentive for them to self-insure against risk through international migration. Should crops fail or commodity prices fall precipitously, households with at least one worker employed overseas will not be left without a means of subsistence.

Structurally transforming countries also lack well-developed markets for capital and consumer credit. Families seeking to engage in new forms of agriculture or looking to establish new business enterprises need capital to purchase inputs and begin production. The shift to a market economy also creates new consumer demands for expensive items such as housing, automobiles, electronics, and appliances. The financing of both production and consumption requires rather large amounts of cash, but the weak and poorly developed banking industries characteristic of most developing nations cannot meet the demands for loans and credit, giving households one final motivation for international labor migration. By sending a family member temporarily abroad for work, a household can accumulate savings and overcome failures in capital and consumer credit markets by self-financing production or consumption.

Thus, whereas the rational actor posited by neoclassical economics takes advantage of a temporary geographic disequilibrium in labor markets to move abroad *permanently* to achieve higher lifetime earnings, the rational actor assumed by the new economics of labor migration seeks to cope with failures in insurance, futures, capital, and credit markets *at home* by moving abroad *temporarily* to repatriate earnings in the form of regular remittances or lump-sum transfers. In this way they control risk by diversifying sources of income and they self-finance production or consumption by acquiring alternate sources of capital.

Direct empirical contrasts between neoclassical economics and the new economics of labor migration are scarce and confined largely to the North American literature; but wherever they have been done, propositions associated with the new economics have proven to be more powerful and efficacious in explaining the migration behavior of individuals and households. Indeed, wage differentials often do not produce international movement (witness the lack of movement between south and north within the European Union), and migration often ceases before wage differentials have disappeared (witness the case of Puerto Rico and the United States), outcomes that are difficult, (though not impossible, to explain under neoclassical assumptions, but which are readily accommodated under the new economics of labor migration. In addition, the massive flows of remittances catalogued around the world (and the uses to which they are put) are anomalous under neoclassical theory, but specifically predicted by the new economics.

In sum, a preponderance of evidence from around the world suggests that wage differentials, the favored explanatory factor of neoclassical economics, account for some of the historical and temporal variation in international migration, but that failures in capital, credit, futures, and insurance markets—key factors hypothesized by the new economics of labor migration—create more powerful motivations for movement. In theoretical terms, wage differentials are neither necessary nor sufficient for international migration to occur. Even with equal wages across labor markets, people may have an incentive to migrate if other markets are inefficient or poorly developed. In practical terms, however, large-scale international movement is rarely observed in the absence of a wage gap; but the existence of a wage differential still does not guarantee international movement, nor does its absence preclude it.

While the early phases of market development in structurally transforming nations may create a mobile population seeking to earn more money, self-insure against risk, or self-finance production or consumption, post-industrial patterns of economic growth in wealthy market societies yield a bifurcation of labor markets. Whereas jobs in the primary sector provide steady work and high pay for native workers, those in the secondary sector offer low pay, little stability, and few opportunities for advancement, repelling natives and generating a structural demand for immigrant workers (as theorized by segmented labor market theory). The process of labor market bifurcation is most acute in certain *global cities*, where a concentration of managerial, administrative, and technical expertise leads to a concentration of wealth and a strong ancillary demand for low-wage services (world systems theory). Unable to attract native workers, employers turn to immigrants and often initiate immigrant flows directly through formal recruitment (segmented labor market theory).

Although instrumental in initiating immigration, recruitment becomes less important over time because the same processes of economic globalization that create mobile populations in developing regions, and which generate a demand for their services in global cities, also create links of transportation, communication, as well as politics and culture, to make the international movement of people cheaper, quicker, and easier (world systems theory). Immigration is also promoted by foreign policies and military actions that core developed nations undertake to maintain international security, protect foreign investments, and guarantee access to raw materials, foreign entanglements that create links and obligations which generate ancillary flows of refugees, asylees, and military dependents.

Eventually labor recruitment becomes superfluous, for once begun, immigration displays a strong tendency to continue through the growth and elaboration of migrant networks (social capital theory). The concentration of immigrants in certain destination areas creates a "family and friends" effect that channels immigrants to the same places and facilitates their arrival and incorporation. If enough migrants arrive under the right conditions, an enclave economy may

form, which further augments the demand for immigrant workers (segmented labor market theory).

The spread of migratory behavior within sending communities sets off ancillary structural changes, shifting distributions of income and land and modifying local cultures in ways that promote additional international movement. Over time, the process of network expansion itself becomes self-perpetuating because each act of migration creates social infrastructure capable of promoting additional movement (the theory of cumulative causation). As receiving countries implement restrictive policies to counter rising tides of immigrants, they create a lucrative niche into which enterprising agents, contractors, and other middlemen move to create migration-supporting institutions that also serve to connect areas of labor supply and demand, providing migrants with another resource capable of supporting and sustaining international movement (social capital theory).

During the initial phases of emigration from any sending country, the effects of market expansion, market failure, social networks, and cumulative causation dominate in explaining the flows, but as the level of out-migration reaches high levels and the costs and risks of international movement drop, movement is increasingly determined by international wage differentials (neoclassical economics) and labor demand (segmented labor market theory). As economic growth in sending regions occurs, international wage gaps gradually diminish and well-functioning markets for capital, credit, insurance, and futures come into existence, progressively lowering the incentives for emigration. If these trends continue, the country ultimately becomes integrated into the international economy as a developed, capitalist society, whereupon it undergoes a migration transition: net out-migration progressively ceases and the nation itself becomes a net importer of labor.

This emigration transition follows a characteristic trajectory, moving from low to high to low rates of out-migration, yielding an inverted U-shaped curve, which Martin and Taylor (1996) have called the "migration hump." Historically, the transition took about eight or nine decades, but recent evidence from Asia suggests that it has now been compressed into three or

four decades. Hatton and Williamson (1998) used historical data for 15 European nations from 1850 to 1914 to develop a stylized curve for the emigration transition—the pattern of out-migration experienced by nations as they underwent economic development. They found a standard pattern of transition from low to high back to low rates emigration that occurred over eight or nine decades, approximated by a simple quadratic equation: $ER = -0.35+2.66*t -0.27*t^2$, where ER represents the annual emigration rate and t represents the number of decades since the beginning of out-migration.

Figure 1 plots this curve to show the stylized emigration transition that prevailed during the classic "age of migration" before 1914. As can be seen, the transition lasted roughly nine decades, a period that Hatton and Williamson call "emigration time." Ninety years may seem like a long time for a country to accept immigrants while waiting for economic conditions to improve in sending regions. However, the transition in Europe occurred under a very different technological, governmental, and international circumstances, and evidence from the late 20th century suggests that emigration time is now much shorter than before 1914.

FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE

A good example is South Korea. In 1965 it ranked among the world's poorest nations with a per capita income of only $159, a mere 4% of that in the United States. By inserting itself into the global trading regime, however, and adopting a disciplined monetary strategy that encouraged a high rate of savings and investment, South Korean officials were successful in building a modern industrial economy in just 30 years. By 1995 the per capita income had risen to $9,700.

Despite its rapid economic growth and the accompanying sharp reduction in fertility, the Korean economy was not able to absorb *all* of the workers entering its non-agricultural workforce each year.. As in Europe, these "surplus" workers ended up as international migrants, and between 1965 and 1995 some 768,000 Koreans emigrated to the United States, representing about 4% of its total population increase. Such a level of emigration during development is not at all exceptional by historical standards. Between 1846 and 1924, Britain

exported nearly *half* of its demographic increase. What is remarkable about the Korean case is *how little* emigration occurred in the course of economic development.

Even more remarkable than the modest *scal*e of Korean emigration was its *timing*. Whereas European nations took eight or nine decades to complete their transition, South Korea did it in three or four. Figure 1 also plots the rate of Korean emigration by emigration time (where 1965=0). The smaller scale of Korean emigration is not readily apparent from this graph, because rates are expressed as emigrants per 10,000 persons, whereas Hatton and Williamson expressed European rates per 1,000 people. Nonetheless, following the liberalization of U.S. laws in 1965, Korean emigration rapidly rose, reaching a peak value of 8.5 after 2 decades (around 1985). Thereafter the rate fell rapidly, reaching 2.9 by the middle of the third decade (the late 1990s). The Korean emigration transition corresponds roughly to the quadratic equation of $ER = 0.75 + 9.00*t - 2.4*t^2$, meaning that the rise and decline of emigration occurred roughly *three times faster* in Korea than was true historically in Europe.

The foregoing theoretical account barely mentioned the behavior of states. However, as already noted, all potential receiving nations currently attempt to restrict the number and regulate the characteristics of immigrants, something that was not true during the first era of globalization. Thus any theoretical treatment of international migration is incomplete unless it can explain why and how states act to influence flows of immigrants. Since 1990, a new body of theoretical and substantive knowledge has accumulated to describe the state and its ability to influence patterns and processes of immigration. Massey (1998) recently reviewed this work to derive three basic conclusions about the determinants of policy in immigrant-receiving societies.

First, even though doubt remains about which economic conditions are most relevant in explaining state actions, it is clear that a country's macroeconomic health plays an important role in shaping immigration policy. Periods of economic distress are associated with moves toward restriction, whereas economic booms are associated with expansive policies. Analyses undertaken by Timmer and Williamson (1998) suggest that wage inequality—more than unemployment or absolute wage levels—may be the crucial factor in triggering restrictive

policies. Second, immigration policy is sensitive to the volume of international flows: higher rates of immigration generally lead to restrictive policies, even though in the long run such shifts may be mitigated as growing immigrant populations come to exerts influence within legislative districts (an effect that is obviously limited to representative democracies that also enfranchise immigrants or their children). Third, immigration policy is associated with broader ideological currents, tending toward restriction during periods of social conformity and toward expansion during periods of support for open trade and periods of intense geopolitical conflict.

Taken together, these conclusions suggest that developed countries will increasingly move to restrict in-migration from the developing world, even as they act to lower barriers to movement among themselves. Although passport controls have been eliminated among states within the European Union, and while most OECD countries do not require visas for short term travel among themselves, since the late 1980s all have moved forcefully toward impeding the entry of migrants from developing countries. The past two decades have been associated with a rising volume of immigration, increasing inequality, and, outside of North America, persistent unemployment, precisely the conditions that theory and research reveal to be associated with tighter immigration restrictions. At the same time, the end of the Cold War eliminated a major foreign relations motivation for developed countries to accept international migrants from poor countries. Only the continued hegemony of free trade ideology augurs for more open immigration policies; but on balance recent economic and political trends suggest a more restrictive immigration policy regime in the next century.

Relatively few analysts have considered the role of the state within immigrant-sending societies; yet even a cursory review of recent history underscores the importance that state policies have had. Well into the 1980s, the governments of the Soviet Union, China, and other socialist countries employed repressive measures to limit international travel by their citizens, holding rates of emigration well below those that might otherwise have prevailed. The opening of China, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the end of the Cold War ushered in a new era when these artificial constraints on international mobility have largely disappeared or at least been drastically reduced, unleashing a variety of new population movements (see Roberts 1997;

Frejka 1996; Pieke 1997). The number of emigrants from Russia, for example, grew from just 16,294 during 1985-89 to more than 102,000 in 1990-94, a sixfold increase in just a few years; likewise, the number of officially registered workers emigrating from China grew from zero in 1980 to 135,000 by 1990 (Zlotkik, 1998).

In retrospect, it is clear that the end of the Cold War was a watershed event in the history of global migration, ending a policy regime that had held world emigration rates at artificially low levels for more than 40 years. The relatively open acceptance by Western democracies of refugees from communist countries in the East was always predicated on the assumption that the latter would work assiduously to prevent emigration from occurring in the first place. When this implicit agreement on the regulation of emigration collapsed with the end of the Cold War, the expansive refugee and asylum policies of Western countries quickly ended.

A growing number of sending states have adopted policies to promote the export of migrant workers (Hugo 1995). Sending countries such as the Philippines, South Korea, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, China, Vietnam, and Egypt have all established special government-sponsored programs to encourage the emigration of labor as part of broader strategies to acquire foreign exchange, reduce unemployment, and develop skills. Some countries have established labor-export agencies to manage the outflows, control recruitment, train potential migrants, explore new labor markets, and encourage wealthy countries to employ their workers, although the precise mix of policies varies from setting to setting (see Shah and Arnold 1986; Abella 1992). Others have established financial programs to attract remittances (Shah and Arnold 1986; Athukorala 1993), while others have negotiated bilateral labor agreements on behalf of their migrant workers. A few countries provide assistance to migrants seeking to readjust after a period of work abroad (Athukorala 1990); and some have special programs to attract back emigrants who have acquired high levels of skill or accumulated significant wealth overseas (Shah and Arnold 1986; Athukorala 1993).

Current Migration Policies

The foregoing review suggests the emergence of a postmodern paradox at the dawn of the new century: while the global economy unleashes powerful forces that produce larger and more diverse flows of migrants from developing countries (market penetration and its associated structural transformations), it simultaneously creates conditions within developed nations that promote the implementation of restrictive immigration policies (greater inequality and segmented unemployment). These countervailing forces intersect at a time when artificial constraints to emigration from several populous regions have been eliminated by the end of the Cold War, and when developing countries increasingly find it in their interests to promote international labor migration. The central question for demographers seeking to project future migratory movements is which set of forces will prevail: those promoting the restriction of international migration, or those promoting its expansion.

Meyers (1995) divides receiving-country immigration policies into three basic categories: those affecting labor migrants, those affecting refugees, and those affecting permanent residents (which may include former labor migrants and refugees). Labor migration policies are generally determined bureaucratically by economic interest groups (employers and workers) who interact with public officials outside the public eye, yielding a "client politics of policy formulation" (Calavita 1992; Meyers 1995; Freeman 1995; Joppke 1998). Refugee policy is likewise formulated bureaucratically outside the public arena, yielding a slightly different "client politics of negotiation" between the executive branch and various social groups having political or humanitarian interests. The formulation of policies regarding permanent immigration, in contrast, takes place in public arenas where the interests of politicians, legislators, and ordinary citizens weigh more heavily than those of bureaucrats and special interests.

Most citizens tend to be at least mildly xenophobic and generally hostile to immigration. Smaller but quite vocal groups of citizens also oppose immigration on ideological grounds, as part of a commitment to zero population growth or reducing strains on the environment. Citizens, however, are poorly organized and politically apathetic, leaving immigration policies to be determined quietly by well-financed and better-organized special interests operating through bureaucratic channels. During periods of high immigration, stagnating wages, and rising inequality, however, the public becomes aroused, and some politicians inevitably draw upon this

arousal to mobilize voters, thus politicizing the process of immigration policy formulation and moving it from client politics to public politics.

During the period from 1945 to 1975, immigration policies in receiving countries reflected prevailing political and economic conditions. Rapid economic growth, falling inequality, and relatively low rates of international movement kept immigration largely off the public agenda, and in most developed countries was formulated primarily through a client politics of negotiation between bureaucrats and special interests. Immigration policy took the form of decisions made about temporary labor migration and the admission of political refugees. Since 1975, however, as the volume of immigration has risen, the presence of immigrants has become more permanent, economic growth has slowed, and wage inequality has increased, policymaking has progressively shifted from the bureaucratic to the public arena, and from client to electoral politics.

The politicization of immigration policy creates difficult dilemmas for political parties and politicians, because the interests favoring and opposing immigration do not fall neatly along party lines. On one side are special interests such as employers, ethnic lobbies, and humanitarian and libertarian groups that favor immigration; on the other side are nativist politicians, environmentalists, the general public, and unions who oppose it—both sides operating against a backdrop of globalization that encourages international movement. Given these alignments, Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield (1994) have noted the emergence of two common policy trends throughout the developed world: a convergence in the policy instruments chosen for immigration control and a widening gap between the goals served by these instruments and actual immigration outcomes.

In recent years, despite increasingly restrictive policies, virtually all developed countries have come to accept a large (although varying) number of "unwanted" immigrants (Joppke 1998). Even though most countries have enacted formal policies to prevent the entry and settlement of immigrants, liberal democratic states have found their abilities fully to enforce these restrictions constrained by several factors. First is the global economy itself, which lies

beyond the reach of individual national governments but which generates structural transformations and unleashes socioeconomic forces that tend to promote large-scale international population movements (Sassen 1996, 1998).

The second is internal constitutional order of liberal democracies, reinforced by the emergence of a universal human rights regime that protects the rights of immigrants and makes it difficult for political elites to address the racial or ethnic concerns of citizens (Hollifield 1992; Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994; Freeman 1995, 1998; Jacobson 1997). Although rights-based policies have taken different forms in different countries, the net effect has been similar in liberal democracies: increased civil rights for immigrants, an outcome that significantly undermines the capacity of states to control immigration. As Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield (1994:10) note, "it is the confluence of markets and rights that explains much of the contemporary difficulty of immigration control in Europe and the United States" (emphasis in original).

A third constraint on the restriction of immigration is the existence in most representative democracies of an independent judiciary that is shielded from the political pressures to which elected politicians must respond. Immigrants and their advocates turn to the courts to combat restrictive policies implemented by the legislative and executive branches. According to Joppke (1998), the rise of a liberal doctrine of human rights is not sufficient to protect the rights of immigrants and thwart governmental efforts at restriction. There must also be a means of guaranteeing those rights within a specific national polity, and this typically requires a written constitution and a strong, independent judiciary.

Faced with mounting public pressure to control immigration, but with the root causes of international migration lying largely beyond their reach in the forces of the global economy, and with formal policies of restriction under increasing moral and judicial challenge, politicians in many developed countries have turned increasingly to symbolic policy instruments to create an appearance of control (Calavita, 1992; Cornelius, Martin, and Hollifield 1994; Andreas 2000). Even in the industrial era of migration, policies had two functions: to change the status quo and

to signal to influential groups that their interests were being considered seriously (Timmer and Williamson 1998). Repressive policies such as vigorous border enforcement, the bureaucratic harassment of aliens, and the restriction of immigrants' access to social services may or may not be effective, but they all serve an important political purpose: they are visible, concrete, and generally popular with citizen voters (Espenshade and Calhoun 1993; Espenshade and Hempstead 1996). Forceful restrictive actions enable otherwise encumbered public officials to appear decisive, tough, and engaged in combating the rising tide of immigration.

Little research has been done outside North America to evaluate the efficacy of such policies, although it is clear that, despite the growing restrictions, undocumented migration is on the rise worldwide. The efficacy of restriction, however, is likely to vary substantially from country to country depending on five basic factors: the relative power and autonomy of the state bureaucracy; the relative number of people seeking to immigrate; the degree to which political rights of citizens and non-citizens are constitutionally guaranteed; the relative independence of the judiciary; and the existence and strength of an indigenous tradition of immigration.

The Future of Immigration Policy

Most policy makers and citizens in developed capitalist nations *think* they know why foreigners seek to enter their nations. Standards of living are low in structurally transforming societies and high in the developed, capitalist world, and by moving between the two regions migrants can expect to realize a net gain in their material well-being. In practical terms, migrants are assumed to make a cost-benefit calculation that weighs the projected costs of moving against the expected returns, monetary and otherwise, from living and working in a developed country. Since this balance is large and positive for most people outside the nations of the OECD, they rationally choose to emigrate.

As we have seen, however, reality is more complicated than this simple scenario suggests, which means that most policy makers in the world today are basing their actions on false assumptions and understandings. Policies, if they are to be successful, must be grounded in scientific truth. The two decades of theoretical and empirical research summarized in the

synthetic theory described above reveals several basic truths about international migration, and policy makers should be aware of them.

First, contrary to common belief, *international migration does not stem from a lack of economic growth and development, but from development itself*. As industrialization spread across Europe after 1800, its onset triggered waves of emigration in country after country; and in the current day, the poorest and least developed nations do not send the most international migrants today. The fact of the matter is that no nation has undergone transition to a developed market economy without a massive displacement of people from traditional livelihoods, which are mainly located in the countryside; and in numerous cases a large fraction of these people have ended up migrating abroad.

A second basic truth is that *immigration is a natural consequence of broader processes of social, political, and economic integration across international borders*. When the upheavals of market creation occur, those who adapt to changing circumstances through emigration do not scatter randomly, nor do they necessarily head for the *nearest* wealthy society. Rather, they go to places to which they are *already linked* economically, socially, and politically. Economic links reflect broader relations of trade and investment. Political links stem from formal treaties, colonial administration, and military deployments. Social ties stem from any institutional arrangement that brings people into contact with one another on a regular, sustained basis, such as overseas military deployments, student exchange programs, diplomatic missions, tourism, trade, and multinational corporate activities.

Third, when they enter developed capitalist nations, *immigrants are generally responding to a strong and persistent demand that is built into the structure of post-industrial economies*. Owing to shifts in the technology of production, the emergence of the welfare state, and the embedding of market relations in broader social structures, labor markets in developed nations have become increasingly segmented into a primary sector containing “good” jobs attractive to natives and a secondary sector of poorly paid “bad” jobs that natives shun. To fill the latter, employers turn to immigrants, often initiating flows through direct recruitment. If there were no

demand for their services, immigrants, particularly those without documents, would not come, as they would have means of supporting themselves.

A fourth basic fact about immigration that surprises many people is that *migrants who enter a developed country for the first time generally do not intend to settle there permanently*. Settlement intentions reflect underlying motivations for migration. The motivation that most people imagine when they think about immigrants is their desire to maximize earnings, which indeed involves permanent relocation. In reality, however, most moves are motivated by a desire to overcome incomplete markets for capital, credit, and insurance. People become migrants to solve economic problems *at home*. They seek to work abroad *temporarily* to generate earnings that can be repatriated to diversify risks, accumulate cash, and finance local production and consumption.

Recognizing the diversity of immigrant motivations yields another basic observation: *that international migration is often less influenced by conditions in labor markets than by those in other kinds of markets*. Immigration policies to date have implicitly assumed that immigrants come to maximize earnings and policies have consequently sought to influence conditions in labor markets. If migrants are moving to self-insure, acquire capital, or substitute for credit, however, then lowering expected wages may not eliminate or even reduce the impetus for international migration. More leverage on migration decisions might well be had influencing other markets, through programs designed to improve the performance and coverage of sending-country markets.

Whatever a migrant's original intentions, a sixth basic truth is that *as international migrants accumulate experience abroad, their motivations change, usually in ways that promote additional trips of longer duration, yielding a rising likelihood of settlement over time.* Although most migrants begin as target earners, they are changed by the migrant experience itself. Living and working in an advanced, post-industrial economy exposes them to a consumer culture that inculcates new tastes and motivations that cannot be satisfied through economic activities at home. Rather, the easiest path to their satisfaction becomes additional foreign labor.

As migrants spend more time abroad, they acquire social and economic ties to the host country and begin to petition for the entry of family members. Over time, temporary migrants thus have a way of turning into permanent settlers.

A seventh basic fact about international migration is that *it tends to build its own infrastructure of support over time*. As a result, migratory flows acquire a strong internal momentum make them resistant to easy manipulation by public policies. As politicians in country after country have discovered to their chagrin, immigration is much easier to start than to stop. The most important mechanism sustaining international migration is the expansion of migrant networks, which occurs automatically whenever a member of a some social structure emigrates to a high-wage country. Emigration transforms ordinary ties such as kinship or friendship into a potential source of social capital that aspiring migrants can use to gain access to a high-paying foreign job.

Finally, despite strong tendencies toward self-perpetuation and settlement, *immigrant flows do not last forever—they have a natural life that may be longer or shorter but are necessarily of limited duration*. Data indicate that most European nations underwent an "emigration transition" from low to high to low emigration rates with economic development. Historically, this process took eight or nine decades, which is admittedly a long time to accept immigrants while waiting for economic conditions to improve in sending regions; but recent experience suggests that the transition time has been considerably shortened. Not only is mass emigration temporally limited; recent evidence suggests that the time required for the emigration transition has shortened dramatically.

Immigration policy is often cast as a Hobson's choice between open and closed borders, between the free and unhindered movement of immigrants and the imposition of strict limitations on their numbers and characteristics. Whether they realize it or not, public officials generally rely on the conceptual apparatus of neoclassical economics when thinking about immigration. They see a world filled with millions of desperately poor people who, unless they are forcibly blocked or at least strongly discouraged, will surely seek to improve their lot by moving to developed nations. When framed in these stark terms, the necessity of a strict immigration

policy seems self-evident, and given the conceptual tools offered by neoclassical economics, the only realistic policy is to attempt to raise the costs and lower the benefits of immigration.

Such has been the logic employed by policy makers throughout Europe and North America in recent decades. As we have seen, however, the causes of international migration are by no means limited to those specified under neoclassical economics. International migration stems as much from mechanisms specified by the new economics of labor migration, social capital theory, segmented labor market theory, and world systems theory as those described by neoclassical economics. If a comprehensive understanding of international migration requires a synthesis of different theoretical viewpoints, so too does the formulation of an enlightened and efficacious immigration policy.

This realization suggests a *third way* between the extremes of an open border and draconian restrictions on international movement. Rather than attempting to discourage immigration through unilateral repression—seeking to stamp out flows that global trade policies otherwise encourage—policy makers should recognize immigration as natural part of global economic integration and work multilaterally *to manage it more effectively*. Much as flows of capital, commodities, and goods are managed for the mutual benefit of trading partners by multilateral agreements and institutions such as GATT and the WTO, labor migration can also be cooperatively managed to maximize the benefits and minimize the costs for both sending and receiving societies. In short, international migration must be recognized as an inextricable part of economic globalization and be brought under the aegis of broader multilateral agreements regulating trade and investment.

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Table 1. Total intercontinental emigration from European countries and Japan (in thousands) 1846-1924.

Region and Country	Thousands of Emigrants	Percentage of All Emigrants	Percentage of Country's Population in 1900
Europe			
Austria-Hungary	4,878	10.0	10.4
Belgium	172	0.3	2.6
British Isles	16,974	34.9	40.9
Denmark	349	0.7	14.2
Finland	342	0.7	12.9
France	497	1.0	1.3
Germany	4,533	9.3	8.0
Italy	9,474	19.5	29.2
Netherlands	201	0.4	3.9
Norway	804	1.7	35.9
Portugal	1,633	3.4	30.1
Russia-Poland	2,551	5.3	2.0
Spain	4,314	8.9	23.2
Sweden	1,145	2.4	22.3
Switzerland	307	0.6	13.3
Total Europe	48,174	99.2	12.3
Japan	405	0.8	0.9
Total	48,579	100.0	11.1

Source: Massey (1988)

Table 2. Countries with highest levels and rates of international in-migration 1960-1995.

Country or Area	Net Number of Migrants	Net Migration Rate
Highest Levels of In-migration		
United States	19,837	0.25
Germany	7,725	0.29
Canada	3,999	0.48
Saudi Arabia	3,668	0.94
France	3,459	0.19
India	3,148	0.01
Former USSR	3,097	0.03
Australia	2,911	0.61
Highest Rates of In-migration		
United Arab Emirates	1,379	3.42
Qatar	327	3.15
Djibouti	227	2.31
Western Sahara	109	2.23
Macau	114	1.08
Saudi Arabia	3,688	0.94
Gambia	235	0.92

Source: Zlotnik (2004)

Table 3. Countries with highest levels and rates of international out-migration 1960-1995.

Country or Area	Net Number of Migrants	Net Migration Rate
Highest Levels of Out-migration		
Mexico	-6,733	-0.30
Afghanistan	-4,161	-0.78
Bangladesh	-3,863	-0.13
Philippines	-3,684	-0.22
Pakistan	-3,271	-0.10
China	-2,190	-0.01
Vietnam	-2,175	-0.11
Colombia	-1,860	-0.21
Highest Rates of Out-migration		
Samoa	-92	-1.90
Suriname	-182	-1.45
Guyana	-316	-1.29
Rwanda	-1,750	-1.26
Liberia	-646	-1.17
Jamaica	-774	-1.08
Lebanon	-857	-1.01
Cape Verde	-84	-0.82

Source: Zlotnik (2004)

Figure 1. Year emigration first exceeded 10,000 by year when railroad track first exceeded 1,000 kilimeters.




Figure 2. Composition of immigration within leading migratory systems.
100%
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
Percentage from Region
North America
Western Europe
Persian Gulf
Asia-Pacific
Southern Cone
Migratory System
Oceania
Americas
Asia
Middle East
Africa
Europe

Figure 3. Emigration transition in prewar Europe and postwar Korea