The observation that redemocratization in Latin America is a fragile process has become a commonplace in the social science literature of the past few years. The social movements crucial to the return of procedural democracy have, we are told, lost their momentum to the very forces they helped to restore. Electoral democracy has returned in many places with neoclientelistic overtones that are eroding the gains in consciousness achieved in the nonelectoral years (Hagopian 1993). The absence of a common enemy, most often an authoritarian military regime, has tended to mask less visible but often equally pernicious enemies in the form of violence that is nonofficial but tolerated nonetheless (Pinheiro 1992). And although procedural democratic practices may have returned for the middle classes, nothing inherent in the transition to democracy guarantees either procedural or substantive democracy for the lower classes (Huggins, ed., 1991; O'Donnell 1992; Fox 1994a).

Political transition from authoritarian to procedurally democratic regimes has been accompanied in Latin America by an economic transition that has dramatically increased poverty. Generally recognized as a consequence of the debt crisis and the subsequent economic restructuring that required drastic reductions in state spending, the economic transition has hurt traditionally unprotected and vulnerable popular sectors disproportionately. The state usually has not participated in providing basic services such as health services, education, urban infrastructure, and a nonrepressive policing system, yet economic restructuring has helped create a space for alternative actors to assume an expanded role in the social, economic, and political spheres of popular sectors. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) have filled a considerable void in provision of basic services, but they are only one set of alternative actors operating to fill in the vacuum.

These shortcomings of democratic transitions and the deleterious effects of economic transitions have coincided, in the past decade, with the growth of what might be called Latin America's first indigenous multinational enterprise and its first true form of economic integration: the production, processing, and international distribution of cocaine (Quijano 1993). While the particular phase and form of the enterprise differs from country to country, the political and economic consequences in all countries of cocaine-related activities have fallen primarily on those economic sectors that have been denied the "benefits" of democratic transition. Consider the following well-publicized incident.

In the late 1980s, Brazil's largest squatter settlement, the favela of Rocinha in Rio de Janeiro's elite South Zone (Zona Sul) with an estimated population of 150,000 to
200,000, erupted in a show of violence against its middle-class surroundings that the local and national press sensationalistically labeled "a civil war." According to the official explanation put forth by the community's residents' association, the event began as a peaceful demonstration by Rocinha residents, protesting chronic police violence against favela residents. Unofficial explanations claimed that Rocinha was protesting the transfer of the favela's leader of the drug trade, who had recently been arrested, from a prison where he could maintain contact with the community to a tighter security prison where access was more difficult. Because Rocinha occupies a massive hill through which a tunnel has been built to link two major elite residential areas, favela residents gathered to protest in a four-lane viaduct, the entrance and exit to the tunnel. This strategy caused a traffic jam eight kilometers long. Typically violent police treatment of the protesters, which included beatings and tear gas, was ineffective in dispersing the population and stimulated some residents to start throwing rocks down the hill onto cars coming through the tunnel. The police could not control this sniper-type action. The rock attacks did not stop, some claimed, until the drug lord called from prison to call off the assault.

This incident exemplifies a contradictory set of conditions expanding in the five hundred favelas and public low-income housing projects (conjuntos) of Rio de Janeiro. Residents of these areas constitute about a third of the municipal population. Distribution and sale of cocaine from these communities primarily to the middle and upper classes have created a complex set of economic and political relationships among the communities, the drug gangs, and the state. These relationships have largely resulted from the selective presence and absence of the state, constituting what I call "structural violence" and continuous violence and repression against the lower classes. This article deals more broadly with the constraints on redemocratization and governance at the grassroots level in the Brazilian urban periphery when adverse socioeconomic conditions and a repressive state presence stimulate alternative, extralegal forms of economic and political organization. This study seeks to explain the fact that as the larger Brazilian polity grows more democratic procedurally, democracy at the local level in working-class settlements is being increasingly shortchanged. Squatter populations in particular are caught between the illegal violence of drug dealers and the official violence of security forces.

More particularly, this article will discuss the political use and effects of the distribution and sale of cocaine in urban low-income neighborhoods in Rio de Janeiro. I will argue that the physical and criminal violence resulting from the drug trade is a visible and tangible form of the violence used by the state and that it masks a structural-institutional and more hidden violence while perpetuating neoclientelistic political relationships with these low-income communities. The state's manner of responding to drug-dealing in favelas represents a latter-day example (following a series of historical parallels) of repressing lower-class "aberrant behavior" and thereby repressing significant segments of an entire class. More important, the omnipresence of drug dealing threatens the fragile process of building grassroots democratic structures that could empower and mobilize low-income communities.

The State as Protector--For Whom and against What?

The overwhelming images emanating recently from Rio de Janeiro in the national and international press portray a city under siege, one needing protection from the armed
forces because the institution traditionally assigned to safeguarding the public—the police—had become too corrupt and too involved with the trafficking in drugs and weapons that it was supposed to guard against. In allegedly protecting the populace, the armed forces invaded and occupied selected favelas just prior to the gubernatorial and presidential elections in November 1994. According to Brazilian security forces and the local and national media, the favelas were the source of drugs and weapons. How can this highly antidemocratic phenomenon at the local level be explained when Brazil seems to be proceeding with its democratic agenda at the national level? And why is the task of safeguarding the civilian population at all class levels so difficult to carry out in Brazil's major cities?

One answer lies in the ambiguous notion of the state as protector. If analysts are to assume that it is the duty of the state to protect its citizens against certain basic dangers—such as threats to personal safety, property, and civil and human rights—we must also assume that all segments of society have the right to be equally protected and that some consensus exists as to what constitutes threats to safety, whether to individuals or to society as a whole.

A decade ago, Charles Tilly voiced his concerns about the growing importance of military rule in Third World countries in an essay on state-making as organized crime (see Tilly 1985). Based on his earlier historical work on the formation of nation-states in Europe, he argued that banditry, gangland rivalry, policing, and making war all belong on the same continuum in the process of state building, which tends to monopolize the concentrated means of violence. Key to his argument was the notion that states act as protectors of their populations from both external and internal dangers, whether real or perceived, legitimate or fabricated. Tilly explained,

To the extent that the threats against which a given government protects its citizens are imaginary or are consequences of its own activities, the government has organized a protection racket. . . . Political observers have recognized that, whatever else they do, governments organize and, wherever possible, monopolize violence. It matters little whether we take violence in a narrow sense, such as damage to persons and objects, or in a broad sense, such as violation of people's desires and interests; by either criterion, governments stand out from other organizations by their tendency to monopolize the concentrated means of violence. (Tilly 1985, 171)

The idea of the state as double-edged protector—one that creates the perception of danger from which the country is to be saved—is a useful organizing principle for my examination of the emergence of parallel powers at the local level and the role of the state in that process. This article will begin by discussing the origins of current organized crime in Rio in the repressive era of the 1960s and 1970s. In an effort to "protect society" from the two perceived evils of common criminals and leftist political militants, the Brazilian state inadvertently created the form of organized crime against which it now seems compelled to protect society. Next, the article will describe the dynamic of the "local-level protector" operating within the context of "nonprotected communities"—the favelas. These communities are only one category among an array of comparative examples of the emergence of parallel polities resulting from the perceived absence of the state. The following sections will analyze the political impact on the organization of local-level communities and the role of the state in perpetuating that impact.
The Roots of Parallel Power

The present scope and structure of drug distribution in Rio have largely resulted from actions taken by the military regime in the late 1960s to address concerns alleged about "national security." First of all, the military decided in 1969 to classify both political prisoners (many of whom had been involved in bank robberies to finance political activities) and "common bank robbers" (assaltantes with no political motives) as national security risks. These two groups were separated from the rest of the "common criminals" and housed together in the same section of a Rio maximum-security prison, the Penitenciário Cândido Mendes on Ilha Grande, an island off the coast of Rio. Appalling conditions in the prisons included systematic torture and no basic amenities (mattresses, linens, blankets, soap).

The political prisoners, who were mostly middle-class, educated, and leftist, came to prison with an organizational structure and an ideology of the "collective" that they passed onto the "common bank robbers," who were later called "o coletivo" (the collective). The collective adopted the organizational form and some of the anti-state ideology of the political prisoners, if only to secure their own rights as prisoners. They also learned from the political prisoners principles of political organization and a collective consciousness that was new to the Brazilian prison system. The limits of such politicization and the form it took were described by a former political prisoner. When I interviewed him in 1988, he was holding a position of responsibility in a municipal secretariat of Rio de Janeiro: "In truth, there existed a very great potential for revolt essentially because the larger system had as its dominant values what they [the prisoners] could not hope to attain. So it didn't become a revolt against the system, but rather a revolt to gain what the system had to offer. The common prisoners inherited a little of the radical discourse of the Left; they inherited much of the value system of current society and many of the practices of traditional politicians." That basic conservatism, despite "radical" training, still tends to dominate the current relationship of drug groups to the favelas, a point that will be discussed further.

In the mid-1970s, the political prisoners were transferred back to prisons on the mainland. The coletivo was integrated into the rest of the prison population and came to be known as the "lei de segurança" (the law of security), presumably because they maintained order within the prison population by punishing inmates who engaged in robbery and rape. The group developed a code of behavior, the basis of an internal system of authority not unlike that described for prison systems in the United States. Building on their collective consciousness, the lei de segurança began a system of voluntary monetary contributions from prisoners, which constituted a "kitty" for obtaining basic necessities as well as for financing prison escapes. They had learned from the political prisoners the techniques of hunger strikes and sending letters to the press and other entities to denounce violations of human rights.

The prison authorities found these new tactics troublesome and therefore integrated the group into the larger mass of prisoners, hoping to dilute their strength and organization. Instead, the power of the coletivo was strengthened and expanded. In an attempt to diffuse the new organizational strength, prison authorities then transferred the members of the lei de segurança to several other prisons, which effectively spread and further reinforced the notion of collective action. Today, the organization is known as the Falange Vermelho, or more recently as the Comando Vermelho, the largest and best-
organized of five separate and often competing prison organizations. The current leaders of the Comando Vermelho have become folk figures, if not heroes, among the favelas and the population at large, thanks to the press. By now, the "coletivo" generation of the 1970s has largely been replaced by new leaders who have learned to use organizational skills, inside prisons and in favelas, to build lucrative cocaine-dealing networks, but largely without the coletivo mentality.

The emergence of cocaine as a lucrative new commodity in the late 1970s radically changed the opportunities for prison-based organized crime. The Comando leadership perceived cocaine dealing as a way to maintain high profits without having to provide the large police payoffs often required for robbing banks. After cocaine dealing became the main enterprise, one prominent member of the Comando leadership (a resident of a favela in the North Zone) reportedly proclaimed, "now we are self-sufficient." Consequently, when police repression against drug dealers increased during the gubernatorial administration of Wellington Moreira Franco in 1987 and 1988, bank robberies increased markedly.

By the late 1980s, a supplementary crime appeared: kidnapping well-to-do members of the upper and upper-middle classes and using ransom money to buy cocaine in the neighboring producer countries. By 1994, sophisticated weaponry had been added to the portfolio of commodities to be traded. Certain groups of traffickers, mainly in favelas located near the airport and port areas, have begun to specialize in selling weapons to drug traffickers in other favelas for defense against invasion by police and rival drug-trafficking groups. Thus when conditions permit, dealing in cocaine and related commodities increases, and with it the involvement of the traffickers' communities. Because the leaders of the Falange or Comando Vermelho in the late 1970s and early 1980s were rooted in favelas throughout Rio, the growth of the drug trade in those communities naturally followed. Falange leaders viewed the favelas as a relatively safe venue with a modicum of community support. Drug-dealing, primarily in marijuana, has gone on in favelas for decades, with the boca de fumo ("mouth of smoke" or drug distribution point) being a constant feature of favela life. The power accompanying the financial gains from cocaine, however, has boosted drug-dealing to unprecedented prominence in the economic and political life of the community. Although the precise extent of the power of the Comando is not known, its scope has grown markedly during my eight years of studying its presence in favelas.

Brazil is primarily a country of cocaine distribution and transshipment rather than cocaine production and processing. As such, the level of cocaine-related activity in Brazil varies according to the amounts of the drug being produced in the primary supplier and processor countries of Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. The dramatic rise in coca-leaf production in Bolivia from 35,000 metric tons in 1978 to 171,000 metric tons in 1985 in the Chapare region alone (Healy 1986, 112) and the estimated current value of the cocaine trade in the Peruvian economy of 1 to 1.2 billion dollars (Mason and Campany 1993) both correspond to the massive increase in the value of cocaine distributed in Rio during the same period. Although a large cocaine trade flourishes in São Paulo and lower levels in other cities, Rio has become the major distribution location for transshipment to Europe and the United States and for sale to the tourist trade, which is vital to the Rio economy. The Brazilian Polícia Federal reported in 1994 seizing 11.8 metric tons of cocaine on its way from Colombia to Europe and the United States. This total surpasses the 1993 figure of 7 metric tons (U.S. Department of State 1995). The monetary value of cocaine in Brazil is considerably less than the billions of
dollars reported for the Andean countries. But the amounts reported suggest a multimillion dollar business benefiting a wide range of the Brazilian population.

As with most economic activities and most organized criminal activity, the drug trade in Rio is structured hierarchically, with the cocaine distributed from favelas and conjuntos at the lower end of the distribution chain and sales mainly to a middle-class clientele. The kingpin wholesalers of Rio's drug trade are rarely identified (unlike the situation in Colombia), and if they appear in public, it is usually in the society columns with no mention of their illicit activities. A bitter complaint made by the lower-level traffickers is that the anonymous *tubarões* (sharks or "big boys") are rarely touched, while the lower-class distributors are often violently hunted down. Within the class structure of the drug trade, these distributors are the vulnerable and exploited ones. But within the social structure of favelas, they are either revered or grudgingly respected or feared. Their presence is never neutral.

**The Context**

Favelas have existed in Rio since the end of the nineteenth century, populated first by refugees of the Canudos War in Bahia in the late 1800s along with freed slaves after slavery was formally abolished in 1888. The first growth spurt in favelas occurred during the push to industrialize during the era led by Getúlio Vargas in the 1930s and 1940s and then another during the massive migration from the Brazilian Northeast to Rio and São Paulo in the 1960s and 1970s. Current estimates of the favela population in Rio range from a million to two and a half million persons, depending on who is counting. Favelas have sprung up in all sections of the city, elite as well as working-class industrial areas. They vary in size from a few hundred residents to more than two hundred thousand and are found on terrain ranging from steep hills to swampy flatlands. The terrain of a favela and the manner in which it was settled (whether it has wide urbanizable streets or the narrow winding paths preferred by drug dealers) determine its "suitability" for illegal activity. The legal status of favela land is equally varied, with landownership ranging from private parties to municipal, state, or federal government, church entities, the military, or even favela residents themselves.

Favelas are generally stable communities involving long-term residence and populations that span several generations, depending on the age of the settlement. This relative stability has produced in most favelas a social cohesion and sense of community that (despite complaints about physical hardships) usually creates loyalty to and a sense of identity with a particular community as well as with being a *favelado*. Favelas have improved a good deal physically in the last twenty-five years, largely due to the residents' efforts, but they still exemplify the oppressive inequality prevailing in Brazilian society. The most relevant examples of this inequality for the Rocinha community are the totally inadequate facilities for education and health. Only four elementary schools within the boundaries of the community serve at most 1500 students out of a population of 150,000 to 200,000. Children not served by these schools try to get into public schools in the surrounding middle-class communities but often fail. Some fifteen day-care centers and seven community preschools serve children up to five years old. Rocinha has no secondary schools, although one of the Catholic community centers runs occupational training classes for adolescents. The entire community is served by only two small health clinics, one run precariously by the municipality of Rio and another by the residents' association of a subneighborhood of Rocinha. Almost all
medical needs must be absorbed by the inadequate public hospitals in the surrounding middle- and upper-class areas.

A significant majority of favela residents are employed in industry or the growing service sector, with periods of unemployment mirroring employment conditions in the larger society. Although the economic crises of the last decade in Brazil are reflected at the local level in elevated rates of unemployment, underemployment, and self-employment, various forms of informal sector economic activity, legal or illegal, have always been part of favela life. The international growth of cocaine dealing in the last decade has affected strongly favelas and conjuntos with physical structures conducive to clandestine activity. Any illegal informal-sector activity carries with it implications that are absent from many "legal" informal-sector activities. Like many "legal" informal-sector activities, clandestine activity feeds off and is fed by social and economic inequities. But its illegality requires a certain environment, a certain space that only some favelas and housing projects can provide.

*Cocaine, Clients, and Parallel Community Power: Local-Level Protectors*

Of the five hundred favelas and housing projects in the municipality of Rio de Janeiro (excluding the municipalities of the metropolitan area outside the city), virtually all have drug-dealing groups, even though the scope of operations and local impact may vary considerably. The number of people in a single community involved economically in drug activity can total as many as several hundred. In the larger communities, drug-generated work manifests a diverse set of specializations, such as women who wrap packages of cocaine (*endoladoras*), young boys who are lookouts (*olheiros*), somewhat older boys who make deliveries (*aviões*) or sell at locations within the favela (*vapores*), older adolescents who patrol the area sporting visible weapons (*seguranças*), accountants who keep the books, the man who handles "public relations" to stay on good terms with the community, and the drug lord (*dono*). Locals refer to the drug groups variously as "o grupo," "a quadrilha" (the gang), "a rapaziada" (the boys), or more recently, "o movimento." Whatever the specific position held, most of those participating in drug-related activity find it one of the few viable economic options open to them.

The nature of the interaction between the drug group and the community is determined by the personality, leadership style, and personal philosophy of the drug leader. Such interaction includes support and protection offered to the community, the drug group's relationship with the residents' association, public display of armed strength, and the extent of drug use among members of the group. Characteristics of a "good dono" include appearing concerned about the basic welfare of community residents, eschewing gratuitous violence, and discouraging drug use among youngsters. This kind of dono usually grew up in the community and enjoys a certain amount of respect within it. Respect for him extends even to those who want nothing to do with the drug trade. An example found in the favela called Morro do Sossêgo (Tranquility Hill) in the North Zone (Zona Norte) of Rio points to the somewhat contradictory and conservative nature of the "good dono." As of 1995, a form of gun-exchange operated there in which children exchanged toy guns for crayons and paper. When asked who paid for the drawing supplies, the woman who was running the program replied that it was the dono. The powerful and well-respected dono is best exemplified by "Meio Kilo," the folk-hero of Jacarezinho, one of Rio's largest favelas (about 150,000 inhabitants). Meio
Kilo was killed in 1987 after a daring attempt to escape from prison. His funeral drew thousands. Two weeks after his death, a record was produced with a song honoring him, and the segment of the community that revered him most sought unsuccessfully to erect a bust in his honor in one of the favela's public squares. Meio Kilo's successor as drug lord, in contrast, tended to be unnecessarily violent and cared little about community welfare. When he was killed several months later, few attended his funeral, and nothing was done to commemorate him.

It clearly matters that the drug groups have the "support" of the community, which must not cooperate with the police. In fact, anyone in the community suspected of being an informer by the drug group is dealt with harshly--either expelled from the community or even killed. Although favela residents are usually uneasy about such forced cooperation, they have little or no respect for the police, who traditionally have treated favela residents with disdain and violence simply because they are favelados or live in a particular public housing project.

The use of excessive force and similarly discriminatory actions against marginalized populations represent a universal phenomenon. The consequences of such actions, however, vary according to the organizational and social-structure options available to the oppressed population. In the inner cities of the United States, one reaction could be prolonged urban rioting. In Rio, as well as in many U.S. inner cities, a longer-term consequence is accepting to various degrees an alternative security or welfare system.

For example, in exchange for the "protection" and anonymity that a community may offer the drug group, it can often expect in return an array of services ranging from internal security, to money for an ambulance or taxi to the hospital, to money for medicines, soup kitchens, day-care centers, parties for children on special occasions, and other emergency funds in cases of extreme hardship. The local dono determines the extent of redistribution of drug profits. While a smaller percentage of the community may receive direct monetary benefits from this drug-created alternative welfare system, the community as a whole benefits from the internal security system provided by the drug group. In most favelas and housing projects, robbery, rape, and other kinds of interpersonal violence are often met by equally violent reactions by the dono, who may mete out his own form of justice. Comments were made frequently by a wide range of residents, such as the favela resident in Rocinha who observed, "I can sleep with my doors and windows open. Now I have no fears about my daughter walking through the favela at 1 a.m."

Such a comment reveals the importance to the local population of the security provided by the drug group as well as the informal means of resolving problems with "antisocial behavior." Just as the larger society (the segment of the citizenry served to some degree by the formal institutions of the society) defines what is acceptable or aberrant behavior, drug groups that have gained significant power impose their own code on the surrounding community, defining what kind of violence is allowed and who is permitted to carry it out. The perception by favela residents--indeed, by most of the working class--that the formal justice system does not work for them has led a portion of that population to accept an alternative justice system.

Such acceptance is revealed in a 1987 study carried out by the Rio branch of the Ordem dos Advogados do Brasil (OAB), the Brazilian counterpart of the American Bar
Association. It set up a law clinic in the North Zone favela of Morro de Coroa. Lawyers working in the clinic found that 56 percent of the sample surveyed preferred "informal channels" of resolving conflict, as compared with 20 percent who preferred formal processes of adjudication and 24 percent who expressed no preference (OAB 1987, 34). The study concluded that the sense of alienation from formal institutional channels felt by favela populations fosters an autonomous system of maintaining order (OAB 1987, 50). 38

The press has exhibited a tendency to romanticize the drug groups and leaders like Meio Kilo and his colleague from the North Zone favela of Juramento, the still imprisoned "Escadinha," as social bandits, modern-day Robin Hoods righting the wrongs of an unjust and violent society in the tradition of Lampião, Brazil's most famous social bandit. Although these figures may feel an obligation to give something back to their communities, they are first and foremost businessmen who are using the physical space of the favela or conjunto as the locus of operation for a highly lucrative informal-sector activity. For that space to be available and protected, they must offer something in return. The services mentioned are valuable only because the state does not provide them and because the state entities charged with providing essential security services--the Polícia Militar and the Polícia Civil--act instead as a corrupt and repressive force that often persecutes and kills instead of protecting.

**The Repressive Presence of the State: Police Violence, Corruption, and Parallel Security**

The public service most conspicuously absent from Rio's favelas (and consequently the most prevalent "alternative" service offered by Rio's drug gangs) is internal security. Although many favelas and conjuntos have a post of the Polícia Militar stationed within the physical space of their communities, few favelados have enough confidence in the police to seek them out when a problem arises. This lack of trust in the police stems from a long-standing tradition of Brazilian police abuse and violence against the lower classes in general and favela and conjunto residents in particular. 39

Such abuse is carried out with equal severity by the two branches of the police that deal with public security. The Polícia Militar is a uniformed state force (not military but civilian, despite its name). Its traditional role for the past 150 years has been to ensure public security (Holloway 1993). Its current role is to serve as a publicly visible uniformed force for patrolling streets and controlling traffic and to provide shock-troop details for special operations. During the most repressive phase of the military regime, the Polícia Militar was subsumed under the armed forces in 1969 for the alleged purpose of "defending Brazil's national security interests." Controlling social and political unrest, including counterguerrilla warfare, became a political justification for using repressive tactics against the civilian Brazilian population of all classes. After 1974, when the regime believed the political threat had decreased, the Polícia Militar was assigned the role of combating conventional crime, but it continued to employ the same heavy-handed and violent techniques used against guerrillas (Pinheiro 1991b, 172). The involvement of the Polícia Militar in a "war on crime" was expanded further in a 1977 amendment awarding it the same legal guarantees that existed during the late 1960s, "thus obliterating the boundaries between the 'ongoing war' against guerrillas and the control of common crime" (Pinheiro 1991b, 173). Thus the Brazilian state once again created a mechanism for violence by fusing common or civilian elements with
political and military segments. As when the state brought together common criminals and political prisoners during the dictatorship and inadvertently helped reshape violent criminal organization into its current form, the state similarly helped create the mechanism of violent police repression by assigning a military role and raison d'etre to a civilian police force.

For example, it has become common practice in Brazil for the police, on the pretext of searching for criminals, to carry out "blitzes" in favelas, routinely knocking down residents' doors, arresting residents for vagrancy who happened to be without identity cards when stopped, flying helicopters so low that roofs are blown off, indiscriminately firing weapons, and extorting cash and drugs from residents under threat of arrest. The head of the Batalhão de Choque (shock troops) of the Polícia Militar in Rio told me that when competing drug groups stage shoot-outs in favelas, the police's task is made easier. In reality, these actions create a situation in which the boundary between police and criminal activity is eliminated, and thus favela populations no longer know whom they can trust.

The second force, the Polícia Civil, is a plainclothes organization with a largely investigatory function. It has the dubious distinction of being the more corrupt of the two police forces. The fact that the police in Rio and many other Brazilian municipalities are corrupt is hardly open to debate. Interviews with high-ranking police and justice officials yielded such observations as these: "Few crimes are committed without the knowledge and permission of the police"; "When we talk about "organized crime," we're really talking about the police"; and "Brazil's overriding problem is that of impunity." In a study of corruption among the Polícia Civil in Rio in the mid-1980s, Julita Lemgruber quoted police officials who acknowledged that police involvement in illegal activities is routine, and when one source of illicit revenues dries up, they turn to others. Lemgruber reported, "The police are entering into other areas because they lost the money from the bicho [jogo de bicho, the illegal numbers racket], which they always considered a complement of their salary" (Lemgruber 1987, 25). Moreover, the police, like the drug traffickers, have turned to kidnapping in the past decade to supplement their revenues. Clearly, the police do not operate in a vacuum and are responding to the norms prevailing in other segments of the criminal justice system. As one high-ranking member of the Rio criminal justice system commented, "It is less expensive for a lawyer to pay off a member of the Polícia Civil at the initial stages of an investigation than to pay off a judge at a later stage."

While society as a whole suffers from police corruption and violence, the lower classes, especially those living in favelas, suffer disproportionately. Documentation of police involvement in drug dealing has established the police role in escorting shipments of drugs and guns to favelas as well as in killing of other corrupt police and blaming the favela drug dealers for those murders. The most violent example of such involvement was the massacre by plainclothes policemen (acting as a rogue death squad) of twenty-one innocent residents of the favela of Vigário Geral in August 1993, only a month after the Candelária police massacre of eight street children in downtown Rio. Originally explained as retaliation for the killing of four members of the Polícia Militar by drug traffickers from Vigário Geral, the killer police were in fact retaliating against the drug dealers for having cheated them out of a shipment. In taking no action against transgressors within its ranks, the state has thus become an accomplice and a partner in crime. In favelas at least, democracy has been preempted by the creation of a
"narcocracy . . . , the economic and political structures evolving from a widespread direct and indirect involvement in the drugs business" (Sage 1989, 49).

Defining Aberrance

The defining by the state or by dominant classes of certain behaviors and practices among the popular classes as aberrant or antisocial and therefore subject to repression has occurred repeatedly in history. Brazil is no exception. Studies by Thomas Holloway (1989, 1993) and Martha Huggins (1985) have investigated police repression throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of capoeiras, young male slaves and members of the free black lower classes who engaged in dancelike fighting techniques based on African-linked martial arts. Capoeiras served as bodyguards for influential individuals and helped keep peace at public events such as processions and festivals (Huggins 1985, 123). They were nonetheless viewed by the police as a problem requiring social control and regulation (Holloway 1989, 674; 1993, 223-28). It is not far-fetched to draw parallels between capoeira gangs of the nineteenth century and today's favela-based drug dealers who engage in activities subject to repression when practiced by the lower classes but often tolerated when practiced by the middle class or by the police themselves. In both instances, the gangs have served certain positive social functions in a segment of society where social and political institutions did not or do not function. Today, however, capoeira as an art form is accepted by society as a valid cultural expression of Afro-Brazilian life.

Other practices accepted today as valid cultural expressions of working-class life were similarly repressed in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Brazil. For example, public celebration of Carnival by the lower classes was prohibited and subject to Police persecution in an era when only white persons of means could celebrate in the streets (Queiroz 1985, 18; Raphael 1980, 52, 54, 76). Houses of candomblé and other forms of Afro-Brazilian religious expression were also declared illegal and subjected to police repression (Maggie 1988). These practices (or at least the modern-day versions of them) are now accepted as valid and legal and are practiced even by segments of the middle classes. But the issue of drugs and their distribution and consumption has remained a pretext for control and repression of the lower classes for over a century.

Accusations of drug taking and trafficking historically have been applied selectively to underclass and minority populations. For example, John Helmer's (1975) study, Drugs and Minority Repression, reported for the United States that throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, minority populations have been unjustly accused of drug use and distribution far beyond the evidence. Helmer asserts that the allegedly excessive use of opium by Chinese immigrants in the late nineteenth century, of cocaine by blacks in the early twentieth century, and of marijuana by Mexicans during the depression were all myths created during periods of economic constraint. In each case, these targeted populations were displacing U.S.-born white workers in the labor markets of San Francisco, New York, and the Southwest. Whether the issue is accessibility to jobs or accessibility to other kinds of resources (such as living space in preferred urban areas), drug use as a pretext for class repression has been widespread in both countries. Blaming favelas for the drug-related ills of society easily becomes a pretext for viewing favelas as the source of all Brazilian social ills and calling once more for their eradication.
A system of repression that has existed for a hundred and fifty years and the behavior adopted to enforce its norms are not easily changed. During the first gubernatorial term of Leonel Brizola (1983-1987), an attempt was made to improve the human rights record of the police and the correction system by creating a more benign relationship between the Polícia Militar and favelas. Police were prohibited from carrying out blitz-type attacks and arresting favelados simply for carrying no identity card. The success of the effort depends on which segment of the population one asks. Favela residents recognized and appreciated the change during the earlier Brizola years. But a large segment of the middle-class population attacked Brizola for his populist and demagogic methods and accused him stimulating the drug trade by tying the hands of the police. The commander of the Polícia Militar in Rio, whose idea it was to create a more responsive police force better integrated with the community, acknowledged with frustration the difficulty of changing in a year or two a police mentality built up over a century and a half.  

*Parallel Power Systems in Comparative Perspective*

The emergence of alternative political and social groups as a general response to societal inequities has been well documented in various cases throughout history: the phenomenon of banditry (as documented by Eric Hobsbawm and Anton Blok for Southern Europe and by Benjamin Orlove for Peru and Peter Singelmann for Brazil); gangs in the United States (see Moore 1977; Jankowski 1991; Padilla 1992); and the drug cartels in Colombia (Bagley 1986; Thoumi 1987), Jamaica (Gunst 1995), and Sendero Luminoso in rural and urban Peru (Burt 1994). The specific roles in society played by these groups vary markedly, but they share certain key characteristics. The most basic is the precondition of economic crisis and social tension in a given society that combine to produce increasing levels of poverty. Hobsbawm's early analysis of the causes of banditry in Southern Italy noted, "it tended to become endemic in terms of pauperization and economic crisis" (1969, 17). Banditry became "not a program for peasant society, but a form of self-help to escape peculiar circumstances" (1969, 20).

Banditry flourished best where inaccessibility and administrative inefficiency and complication were the rule. Orlove, describing the phenomenon of *abigeato* (cattle rustling) in the Southern Peruvian highlands of the early 1970s, observed that inaccessibility (lack of roads and police stations) and a complicit peasant population willing to provide safe haven largely determined the success of cattle rustlers. Orlove's description of the sanctuary provided by peasant communities could well describe the relationship of drug traffickers to favela communities. As long as either bandits or traffickers appeared to be providing benefits to the community, they were given the benefits of protection. According to Orlove, "The complicity of the peasantry in helping the rustlers to escape is perhaps the crucial factor. . . . When hacendados and policemen attempt to capture rustlers, the peasants claim not to have seen them and offer no information on their movements. Similarly, rustlers can rely on most of the local populace to warn them of these pursuers, especially the police, and conceal them if necessary" (Orlove 1980, 190).

Benefits to the community clearly differ according to the particular historical and geographical context. Highland Peruvian peasants who felt oppressed by large landowners' increasing encroachment on communal agricultural and grazing lands felt "protected" by cattle rustlers who refused to raid peasant enterprises. In the eyes of the
peasantry, the rustlers were limiting the landowners' power while allying themselves with the peasants (Orlove 1980, 191). Two decades later, the growing presence of Sendero Luminoso in Lima's barriadas, in an urban revival following the arrest of Abimael Guzmán, reflects economic crisis, increased poverty, and a calculated strategy to provide goods and services (often "offered" coercively) in exchange for political support and loyalty (see Burt 1994; Burt and López Ricci 1994).

Whether involving rural peasants, urban gang members, or revolutionaries, a social and political relationship emerges because of the injustice in society perceived by the community and the opportunity to profit from "unprotected spaces" perceived by "the outlaws." U.S. gangs operating in the inner cities of most large urban centers offer the kind of security and protection the police rarely provide. Protection from criminals in other neighborhoods, exploitive merchants, or developers seeking to remove or gentrify a neighborhood are all "services" documented by several recent studies of U.S. urban gangs. In all three studies to be cited, long histories of police harassment created a prime rationale for the mutual protection service--the neighborhoods providing the gangs with safe haven from police in return for gang protection from noncommunity predators (including harassing police). The dynamic of the community-bandit relationship is a complex and shifting one, sometimes seeming to take on overtones of social or political protest while at others seeming more fundamentally business-oriented. As Blok and Orlove have noted regarding Southern Italian banditry, "the image of the heroic brigand in popular consciousness can serve to awaken and maintain a sense of protest, but this image is usually contradicted by the actual behavior of the bandit" (Orlove 1980, 181).

Frequently the labels that society attaches to members of an underclass provide the very identity that gang members (in U.S. and Latin American cities) can use to justify their activities. Félix Padilla observed about Puerto Rican gang behavior in Chicago, "the most obvious response was to act out the part implied in the deviant label" (Padilla 1992, 6). Joan Moore remarked in her study of Los Angeles Chicano gangs, "as a symbolic response to the world, the gang sub-culture develops its own logic" (1977, 37). And the outlaw image projected by some of the more notorious drug traffickers in Rio's favelas originated in the "marginal" label attached to favelas by the middle and upper classes and also in the image projected in the Rio press of the romantic but violent and anarchistic bandit. Drug dealers, in proclaiming that they are carrying out the "law of the hill" (lei do morro) or the "law of smoke" (lei do fumo, a name dating back to the days when marijuana was the main illegal substance), frequently act out the self-fulfilling prophecy established by society "lá em baixo" (down below, as opposed to up on the hill). 52

Drugs and "Legitimate" Local-Level Authority

The presence of the drug trade in almost all Rio's favelas and housing projects has serious implications for legitimate power and authority and for the independence of local-level political organization and governance. Virtually all favelas and housing projects have residents' associations whose officers are elected by members of the community. The association and its leaders represent the community to the formal administrative structures of the municipality or the state and act as a mediator vis-à-vis the external polity. As the drug groups become more powerful in favelas, tension increases over the real or potential threat to elected authority. Because of their financial
advantage and formidable armed strength, the drug groups often pressure local elected officials on community policy and even run for office, thus seeking to become "legitimate" and respectable within the community.

The following incident was related by the leader of a North Zone favela, a woman of thirty-four who was being pressured constantly to share her power with the drug leader. As president of the favela residents' association, which built and operated the community nursery, she was asked by the drug lord to let him become the vice-president of the association. Such a position would give him legitimacy and allow him to dispense favors in the community. Because the day-care center employed ten favela residents, he argued that he would be able to hire five people and thus make them indebted to him. It would also give him access to a space for holding parties and other drug-related activities. The president responded in a way that reduced her isolation and vulnerability by placing herself within the collectivity. Instead of replying as an individual, she convened a meeting of the community, which was attended by eighty favela residents. The community members responded to the drug group by saying, "Look, we're very satisfied with the way [the association president] works. She is someone who really fights for the community, who has really brought some organization to the hill. If you guys want to work [with us], then let's unite our forces, not divide the movement." The president then explained to the drug group the democratic way of running a favela organization: "I will not substitute anyone on my slate. The only way that will happen is in the next election. If you want to run your own slate of candidates, you can." The drug group remained unconvinced. They wanted power sharing without the responsibility of the position, and the impasse was never resolved to either side's satisfaction.

This kind of episode, which has occurred repeatedly in favelas, reveals the delicate balance between the fledgling democratic community organization and local-level authoritarian forces with the potential to threaten legitimate leaders into submission. As the former president of a well-known South Zone favela remarked, "You have to have political savvy and survival skills (jogo de cintura) to know when to stand firm and when to give way." One of the most difficult issues facing elected community officials is their stance vis-à-vis law enforcement, especially during moments of intergang rivalry or police invasion to search for and arrest or kill drug traffickers. Community leaders, who themselves have usually been maltreated by the police, are acutely aware of the community's aversion to violent police tactics. They have little respect for police but are nevertheless often perceived as taking sides, labeled either as linked to the drug group if they do not cooperate with police or as police informers if they do not assert their authority as community leaders to keep the police out. A growing tendency is to expel or even kill community leaders who are perceived by drug traffickers as police informers.

Nowhere is this situation more evident than in the favela of Santa Marta, where drug traffickers were able to take advantage of the community's aversion to police violence. Protesting police violence but keeping silent about the traffickers' violence ended up strengthening the hand of the latter. In the late 1980s, traffickers managed to win control of the residents' association by supporting a slate of candidates whom they perceived as sympathetic to their interests and therefore less likely to involve police in matters of community security. In 1990 the reigning traffickers invaded the headquarters of the residents' association to prevent the installation of a community telephone, presumably
fearing that it would give the favela more access to the police. The secretary of the association protested the traffickers' action and was killed two months later, accused of being a police informer. At his funeral, the president of the association accused the drug traffickers of killing the secretary. The president too was assassinated three months later, along with his wife.55

Because of basic distrust of the police by favela residents, a dialogue between favela associations and the police has become increasingly difficult. Residents are never sure when their civil rights will be violated or whether the police themselves are involved with the drug traffickers. One favela president commented, "We're between a rock and a hard place. It ends up being a perverse reversal, whereby the absence of the state [in the form of the police] becomes beneficial. The more the state intervenes, the more it tries to overstep boundaries, and the more the credibility of the residents' association is placed in doubt."56

The development of parallel power systems, in part the result of repression and corruption by official forces, means that favela populations are caught between two armed forces--the police and the drug groups. A recent study carried out by a nongovernmental human rights organization in Rio underscores the fundamental dilemma of being trapped between these two forms of violence. Protest of police violence and corruption by a collective demonstration may be allowed by the rules of democratic process and may reinforce the empowerment of local-level associations. But protesting the violence of drug groups means risking one's life and ends up dividing and destroying local-level collective action. Thus the climate of fear imposed by the drug groups erodes the sense of collectivity (Centro Bento Rubião 1994, 64). Such tension-filled intracommunity relationships have grave implications for the viability of local-level popular participation in democratizing. Local associations run the risk of being removed from their mediating role with the state by the actions of the drug gangs.57

The State and Drug Dealing: Creating the Perception of Threat and Re-creating Clientelism

The often delicate balance of power within a community and efforts by community leaders to build a strong grassroots movement in the face of threats like those posed by the drug groups can be upset and thwarted by strategies of a state or municipal government that frequently uses the presence of the drug groups for its own political ends. Brazil's favelas have been a political commodity for the larger polity for decades. In the 1950s and prior to the crackdown by the military hard-liners in the 1960s, when elections were permitted and parties operated relatively openly, one of the few political resources available to favelas were clientelistic relationships established with politicians (Leeds and Leeds 1976; E. Leeds 1978). Votes were traded (or at least promised) in exchange for meager favors from politicians, either to individuals in favelas or to the community as a whole. The relationship between favelas and the outside polity was a symbiotic one, with each side extracting some good or service from the other. Thus the channels through which the squatters dealt with the outside polity were limited to a series of manipulations of patronal ties in a context where political parties were largely elitist and a lack of mass-based parties provided little possibility for substantial gains through the formal party system. As in all such patronal relationships where resources are uneven, outside politicians attempted to create favelas' dependency on their benefactors at election time. Only so much was promised at any one election in order to
leave the favela needing favors at the next election and ready once again to swap favors for votes.

In the mid-1960s, a burgeoning statewide favela federation emerged that sought to question the basic state and national policies that had created favelas in the first place. This group demanded that the state provide the kinds of services that would eliminate clientelistic and dependent relationships. But in the increasingly repressive yet clientelistic political atmosphere of the authoritarian regime in the late 1960s and early 1970s, the federation as an independent political body did not last long. It evolved into yet another of the many clientelistic channels of the gubernatorial administration of Antônio de Pádua Chagas Freitas in the 1970s, which became a well-oiled political machine within the military regime.\textsuperscript{58}

The events of the last two decades have created a somewhat different dynamic between favelas and the outside polity. The opposition movements created during the later years of the military regime in the late 1970s and early 1980s brought with them the resurgence of a favela movement with a renewed sense of political consciousness—the concept of citizenship and the right to demand from the state what rightfully belongs to citizens. Thus favelas added to their set of political resources a great deal more leverage than in the 1950s and early 1960s, before heavy repression began under the military regime. Clientelism has not entirely disappeared, however. In fact, in dealing with a more sophisticated and demanding electorate in the favelas, the state has found it necessary to counter the new consciousness with more elaborate efforts to maintain the existing clientelistic relationships. The set of state practices of the earlier period, known today as the "política de bica d'agua" (politics of the water tap) has been recreated at the end of the twentieth century on a larger scale, by politicians running for office as well as by incumbents wishing to retain electoral support. The emergence of parallel political forces resulting from drug dealing has facilitated the re-creation of clientelistic relationships, as shown by the following example.

This episode demonstrates public officials' exploiting the presence of drug groups as a pretext for intervening with force in the name of public safety and good government while using the drug groups to attain political access to the community. A few months before the municipal elections in November 1988, the Governor of the state of Rio de Janeiro at the time, Wellington Moreira Franco, tried to make good on a 1986 election pledge to do away with drugs and violence in Rio in a period of six months. Moreira Franco adopted a plan using hunt-and-kill tactics in favelas that aimed to purge the most notorious favelas of their drug gangs and thereby ease middle-class fears that Rio was becoming what the press called "another Beirut." Following the massacre of several drug dealers in Rocinha, the governor set up a program that claimed to provide expanded health care, legal aid, a job bank, and "all the basic sanitation that had been lacking for years." As one of Rio's largest favelas, Rocinha clearly represented a potential goldmine of votes. But the governor's claim of saving Rocinha from drugs and violence three months before the election held little credibility for residents who had heard such promises many times before. A year later, little remained but the promises, and in the following election, the governor's operatives were making deals with the new drug dealers to allow unimpeded campaigning by his party's candidates.\textsuperscript{52}

As already mentioned, a similar operation called Operação Rio was carried out from October 1994 through July 1995. Although the idea had been discussed as early as May
1994, the decision to send in the army to occupy selected favelas was not actually implemented until just before the November gubernatorial and presidential elections. The operation was billed as a plan to disarm favelas, rid them of drugs, reduce crime rates in Rio, and incorporate favelas into the rest of the city with the rights of citizenship in the fullest sense. The actual operation accomplished none of these goals. A few drug dealers were arrested, but crime rates citywide continued to rise (Fernandes and Carneiro 1995, 31), and innocent favela residents suffered gross abuses of their human rights. Once again the primary beneficiary of the campaign was the middle class, which experienced a temporary and illusory sense of security, along with the politicians who could claim to be cleaning up Rio. And once more, the issue of violence was perceived narrowly as that of drugs emanating from favelas.

Political exploitation of the drug issue can take several forms. Playing on the public's fear by proposing superficial quick fixes that frequently exacerbate the violence within favelas is just one. Another more blatant form is creating alliances between candidates for public office and drug groups that tend to occur in communities where the drug groups are particularly powerful. These kind of linkages recall the earlier period in the 1950s and 1960s, when a candidate's cabo eleitoral (ward heeler) was often a political leader in the favela who could guarantee a certain number of votes through personal influence. More recently, especially in favelas with an educated leadership, favela leaders have attempted to remain noncommittal, to allow open access and encourage an open dialogue with all candidates, frequently by means of such events as candidates' night. But that trend has been countered by the growing power of the drug groups. Less scrupulous candidates have been known to bypass legitimate authorities in favelas, preferring to gain more exclusive access to the favela via drug groups that can allow the candidate to campaign in any way or can pressure the residents' association to prohibit campaigning by other candidates. One community leader in Rocinha described the death threats he received when he was campaigning for a mayoral candidate opposed by the residents' association and the drug group. Drug groups can also pressure residents to vote in a particular way. The trade-off is votes for the candidate in exchange for money and legitimate influence for the traffickers, who often want to get rid of their "marginal" images while gaining powerful friends in the right places. Just like the political education of prisoners during the military dictatorship, who learned to use the methods of collective action for their own survival, the drug groups' involvement in electoral politics is similarly aimed at survival. But in learning to play the electoral game, the drug groups run the risk of distorting the democratic process with the help of vote-hungry politicians and of helping re-create an even more pernicious form of patronage politics.

Conclusions

Comparatively speaking, the extent and monetary value of Brazil's drug dealing is significantly less than that reported for the Andean countries. Similarly, the degree of violence associated with drug dealing is also markedly less in Brazil as a whole. Why, then, should researchers be concerned about an activity that, in global perspective, is relatively insignificant? The answer lies in the idea that local-level democratic governance is essential for democratization of the larger polity. In a society like Brazil, where the poorer segments of the population are frequently ignored by the state except in the form of police repression, the need to create autonomous local forms of decision making and service provision becomes part of survival. When those forms are
eroded by parallel, authoritarian, and frequently violent power structures, then formal
democratic structures of the national polity become meaningless.

The form that drug dealing has taken in favelas, due to the state's failure to provide
basic services and its repression in creating the perception of danger to justify heavy-
handed police or military action, has permitted the establishment of new channels of
clientelistic relationships. The drug dealers themselves have in many instances created a
forced symbiosis--alternative welfare "services" in exchange for protection and
anonymity--while undermining the authority of legitimately elected local leaders.
During the eight years in which I have monitored the relationship between drug groups
and favela associations, the autonomy of these associations has gradually been eroded.
What in earlier years was described by favela leaders as a delicate balance of coexisting
forces has now become the dominance of the drug groups in a majority of favelas.

The Brazilian state has used the presence of drug groups as an excuse for repressive
tactics that, during this period of redemocratization, can be legitimized only if certain
activities are defined as aberrant, antisocial, and requiring protection. Paradoxically, that
process has created a situation in which favela populations are better off without the
presence of the state when the state is represented by police and security forces. The
state and those candidates seeking to become a part of the state continue their traditional
practice of courting votes with promises, using the violence associated with drug
dealing and the lack of services in favelas as pretexts for clientelistic overtures. Parallel
power structures thus have arisen in a space left empty by the lack of truly protective
state structures. In Rio, the state is absent in fundamental ways but remains ready to
intervene to take advantage of situations arising out of that vacuum.

NOTES

*This article is part of a larger study on the relationship between squatters and the state
in Brazil. Research has been supported by the Social Science Research Council in an
Advanced Grant on Latin America and the Caribbean, the Bunting Institute of Radcliffe
College, the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation in an institutional grant to
the Center for International Studies at Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the
office of the Dean of the School of Humanities and Social Sciences at MIT. Interviews
were carried out with government officials, community leaders in twenty-five favelas,
like to thank my research assistant Maria Severa da Silva, community leaders, and
especially those associated with the Centro de Direitos Humanos Bento Rubião for their
many hours of sharing experiences and insights. For obvious reasons, they must remain
anonymous. I would also like to thank Martha Huggins, Susan Eckstein, and Mick
Moore as well as the anonymous LARR reviewers for perceptive comments on earlier
drafts of this article.

1. Procedural democratic practices are defined here as those that support free speech,
open elections, freedom of association, and the unhindered operation of political parties.
These practices are employed as criteria as distinct from the notion of substantive
democracy suggesting that equal opportunity for all segments of the population through
such rights as adequate education, health, and housing should be considered an essential
part of democratization. Whether social and economic variables should be considered part of the definition of democracy is a major issue in current discussions of democratic transition. See, for example, the points made by Terry Karl (1990). Although she defines democracy in terms of procedural political practices (1990, 2), she notes the importance of substantive issues in the survivability of democracies in the Latin American context. Karl observes, "Ironically, the conditions that permit democracies to persist in the short-term may constrain their potential for resolving the enormous problems of poverty and inequality that continue to characterize the continent. . . . [E]ven as these democracies guarantee a greater respect for law and human dignity when compared to their predecessors, they may be unable to carry out the substantive reforms that address the lot of their poorest citizens. If this scenario should occur, they would become the victims of their successful consolidation, and the democratic transitions of the 1980s that survive could prove to be the 'frozen' democracies of the 1990s" (Karl 1990, 13).

2. See, for example, the unpublished proceedings of the conference Models of Development and the Elimination of Poverty in Latin America, organized by the Latin American Program at the Woodrow Wilson Center, Washington, D.C., 1-3 Dec. 1993, particularly the paper by Charles A. Reilly, "Revisiting Participation and Reinventing Empowerment: NGOs and Local Authorities in Latin America." See also Reilly (1994).


4. Estimates of favela populations are notoriously inconsistent and inaccurate. Estimates of the Rocinha population range from a low of about 32,966 (Cavallieri 1986, 21) to the 200,000-250,000 range often cited in the press. The absurdly low estimate is based on the official figures of the Instituto de Planejamento of Rio de Janeiro (IPLAN-Rio), derived from the Cadastro de Favelas of 1983. The Cadastro was conducted by the Secretaria Municipal de Desenvolvimento Social (SMDS), using as its base the 1980 census taken by the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE). The latter figures are viewed as problematic by SMDS personnel. Yet one finds inconsistencies in IPLAN-Rio's own figures from the same period. For example, the figure of 722,424 was given as the total favela population for the municipality of Rio in a 1986 IPLAN publication (Cavallieri 1986, 20), while the figure of 1,700,000 was given in the 1983 Cadastro de favelas (Rio de Janeiro 1983, 5). The Cadastro reported 377 favelas, but a 1988 municipal publication cited 1,600,000 people living in 480 favelas and on 487 loteamentos clandestinos (clandestine lots) (Bielschowsky 1988, 11-12). For purposes of this article, I consider the higher figures more accurate.

5. Structural violence or institutionalized violence is defined here as conditions that cause or lead to highly unequal distribution of basic resources, such as poor or nonexistent health services and inadequate public education, mass transportation, and urban services that result in high rates of subnutrition, infant mortality, dropping out of school, alcoholism, and similar characteristics of an urban underclass. This list, while not exhaustive, typifies most developing countries and increasingly of significant segments of U.S. urban populations.

6. I have deliberately used the more generalized term Brazilian urban periphery even though this study is based primarily on the case of Rio de Janeiro. Rio's unique characteristics include its geographical configuration, its role as Brazil's prime tourist
attraction, its overpublicized level of violence, and the particular form in which criminal organization has evolved, but it nonetheless shares certain tendencies with several other Brazilian larger cities. Briefer research trips to São Paulo, Porto Alegre, and Belo Horizonte have located several of the variables crucial to the formation of "parallel polities": drug dealing in favelas, high levels of police corruption and violence, and educational systems and labor markets that offer adolescents few "legitimate" economic options.

7. While this article analyzes the effects of drug dealing on the social and political life of favelas, the violence associated with organized crime in Rio de Janeiro has become part of the daily consciousness of the Brazilian population in general. "Organized crime" used to refer to the illegal numbers game (the jogo do bicho) but has now come to mean in the public mind the favela-based organizations engaged in drug dealing, supplemented by robberies and trafficking in weapons. Although the general population is aware of the presence of organized crime, largely via mass media, those who reside in favelas and low-income housing projects are the ones who must live with the daily threat of violence and the arbitrary rule of parallel systems of power.


9. An interesting parallel exists between Brazil and Jamaica in terms of the consequences of state action on the direction and form of drug trade. See Gunst's (1995) analysis of the Jamaican government's role in constraining marijuana production and distribution in the 1970s while creating space for cocaine and crack selling as well as the growth of posses (gangs) in Jamaica and the United States.

10. For accounts of the origins of the Falange Vermelha on Ilha Grande see the ghost-written memoir of William da Silva Lima, one of its founders, Quartocentos contra um: Uma historia do Comando Vermelho (Lima 1991) and the study by Eduardo Campos Coelho (1987).

11. Coelho remarked about prisons in the mid-1970s, "the deplorable conditions of the prisoners and the abandonment by the state removes all credibility from the implementation of humanizing policies, impels the prison population toward a brutal struggle to gain the minimum comforts of prison, and reinforces the natural inclination of the system to be closed, rigid, and repressive" (Coelho 1987, 114). Since that time, prison conditions have improved little (see Americas Watch 1989).

12. William da Silva Lima reported that the two groups did not coexist without tensions, claiming that the middle-class political prisoners wanted to retain their separateness, their identity as political prisoners as distinct from the nonpolitical prisoners. This separateness contradicted "an old tradition of prisons in which revolutionaries and political prisoners, when sharing the same floor and bread (chão e pão) grew together
sharing the same ideal." The actions of the political prisoners were based on political motivations: they were intended to contradict the claims of the military dictatorship that there were no political prisoners in Brazil and to make the national and international public aware of their plight (Lima 1991, 47-49). Although recognizing the political strategy, the "mass" found this stance elitist. For an account of earlier collaborations in the 1930s between revolutionaries and "common prisoners," see Ramos (1953).

13. Joan Moore made a similar observation in her (1977) study of Chicano gangs in Los Angeles. Although they challenged the outside world (meaning rival gangs and the Anglo community) with graffiti, talk, and symbolic vandalism, the real challenge, especially for older gang members, was to make it in the Anglo world and gain a certain respectability. Moore commented, "Gang members are extraordinarily proud of those clique members who have made it in the Anglo system. . . . Older member of the powerful Clanton gang formed an association that now holds reunions, accompanied by good dance bands, good liquor, and the other signs of making it" (1977, 38).

14. A number of authors writing on social banditry in Latin America have pointed out the essential conservatism of banditry, that "more often than not, banditry represents an adaptation to, rather than resistance against, an exploitative regime and that in the process, it works to maintain that system" (Joseph 1990, 10).

15. Moore (1977) discussed a similar dynamic in her study of Chicano gangs in Los Angeles. Her chapter entitled "Prisons and the Barrios" describes the complex relationships existing among barrio gangs, the community, and prison-based organizations (1977, 93-127).

16. The original name of the Comando Vermelho was the Grupo União Grêmio Recreativa e Esportiva do Presídio Ilha Grande. The name "Falange Vermelho" (and later "Comando Vermelho") was created by prison personnel who wanted to project the image of a dangerous and politically subversive alternative military group. The names Falange and Comando Vermelho were then picked up by the press and have stuck since the 1970s. This information surfaced in an interview with a former police reporter and novelist well acquainted with that period. As William da Silva Lima explained, 'the 'Comando Vermelho'. . . was not an organization but, above all, a kind of behavior, a way of surviving in times of adversity. What kept us alive and united was not a hierarchy or a material structure but a sympathy that we developed with one another during the most difficult time of our lives" (Lima 1991, 83-84).

17. Edmundo Campos Coelho contrasted the more "normative" Lei de Segurança of the 1970s with the currently more calculating and profit-oriented Comando in terms of two representative leaders: "William [da Silva Lima, of the older bandit generation] exercised a type of normative power; Escadinha [a younger bandit] a remunerative power. The Lei de Segurança sought to mobilize an involvement of a moral nature; the new leaders, of a 'calculating' nature" (Coelho 1988, 114).

18. A distinction should be made between the organized crimes of drug dealing, bank robbing, and kidnapping as practiced by groups like the Falange (or Comando) Vermelho and the organization of the technically illegal numbers racket, the jogo de bicho. While bicheros (participants in the numbers racket) have a marked presence in favelas, they do not depend on symbiotic relationships like those between favelas and
the drug groups. The sales points of the jogo de bicho are found all over Rio and relatively openly, while much of the drug dealing centers in favela communities, thus requiring a degree of cooperation between the residents and traffickers. Another fundamental difference between the two forms of organized crime is the essential base of their power. The jogo de bicho, although not devoid of violence, has traditionally depended on a process of negotiating and creating clients in which the personalistic and paternalistic structure of each group (usually led by a single individual) is maintained by ties of loyalty of a familial kind. The more collective nature of drug-based crime maintains its power through violence or threat of it. The latter point was made by Luis Antonio Machado da Silva (see Silva 1994, 164).

19. The costs and risks associated with bank robbing exceeded the money received, according to William da Silva Lima: "bank robbing doesn't pay off as well as you might think. It requires a lot of people, and if the presence of a specialized gang is noted by the police, then the repression increases for everyone" (Lima 1991, 85).

20. Related in an interview with former police reporter Valério Meinel, whose novel Avestruz, guia e cocaína is a thinly veiled fictional account of certain segments of organized crime in Rio.

21. Antônio Carlos (Caio) Ferraz, leader of the community of Vigário Geral, reported the response of the favela's drug trafficker, Flávio Negão, when asked what he would do if drugs were legalized: "Man, you can legalize, but we'll find another racket." See Ferraz (1995).

22. Between 1989 and 1992, the number of kidnappings in the state of Rio de Janeiro increased by 133 percent (from 39 in 1989 to 124 in 1992). The rates remain elevated, with 90 kidnappings recorded in 1994 (Fernandes and Carneiro 1995, 17). Kidnapping is by no means limited to drug traffickers, however. Police involvement in kidnapping was recently publicized in "Golpe no bom astral," Veja, 1 Nov. 1995, pp. 75-76.

23. Weapons are obtained in several ways. They may be stolen from military munitions depots or imported by air or sea, thanks to customs officials (under the jurisdiction of the federal police) who accept bribes to let the merchandise into the country without notifying authorities. Interviews with high-level police officials in the state of Rio de Janeiro in 1994 suggested that arms smuggling and trafficking are now considered a far greater problem than cocaine sales. Elise Ackerman's article in the Miami-based weekly New Times described the means by which arms smuggling from Miami to Brazil is carried out. See Ackerman (1995).

24. According to William da Silva Lima, "We began to install ourselves in favelas as a matter of security. We respected the community and were welcomed" (Lima 1991, 85).

25. Although journalistic reports of the scope of the Falange or Comando Vermelho should be read with skepticism, they nevertheless convey some sense of its power. Carlos Amorim reported a 1990 Globo figure estimating that 90 percent of Rio's 480 favelas were dominated by the group, some two and a half million residents of Rio (see Amorim 1993, 29). A more realistic assessment of the current situation, based on interviews with favela leaders in July 1994, suggests a pattern of alliances rather than any strict organization, with allegiances currently split between two prison or crime
organizations, the Comando Vermelho and the Terceiro Comando. Groups of favela drug-dealing organizations tend to ally themselves with one group or the other without strict or all-encompassing control.

26. Virtually all the recent literature on drugs in Latin America rarely mentions Brazil. Exceptions are a one-sentence notation by Peter Reuter that almost all the cocaine in Europe is shipped through Brazil (1985, 90) and the article by Velez and Lado (1995), which discusses Brazil’s potential as a drug superpower. A form of cocaine called epadú has begun to be cultivated in the northwestern Brazilian Amazon, but quantities are relatively insignificant in comparison with Andean cocaine.

27. The difficulty of estimating the total economic value of the cocaine trade for specific countries has been noted by various researchers writing on Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. For example, Alvarez (1992) described the problems in estimating the total land-use potential and the amount of labor involved in trying to determine the value of coca production in Peru. She estimated that its aggregate value falls between 500,000,000 and 1.2 billion (2 to 4 percent of Peru’s gross domestic product), an industry generating 3 to 4 percent of all Peruvian employment. In Bolivia, the producer country that most directly affects the amount of cocaine flowing into Brazil, coca production in 1987 represented nearly a third of total national agricultural output in 1987. In 1988, it totaled 6.4 percent of Bolivia’s gross national product and almost 60 percent of the total manufacturing sector. Some 150,000 persons are engaged in the coca-cocaine cycle (coca cultivation, sulfate production, and the processing industry), equaling 7 percent of the economically active population in Bolivia (Machicado 1992). For a comprehensive essay discussing the economic value of cocaine, see "Recent Literature on Drugs in Bolivia" in Healy (1995). Estimates of export values present an entirely different set of problems and divergent figures. In discussing the difficulties in estimating the size of the Colombian illegal income from drugs, Francisco Thoumi has suggested that profits have fluctuated between 2 and 5 billion dollars annually (1995, 199). Similar discussions of the economic value of coca and cocaine can be found in Tullis (1995, esp. chaps. 2 and 5) and in Bagley and Walker (1995).

28. Estimates of the monetary value of cocaine dealing in Rio are even less reliable than the coca and cocaine figures cited for the the Andean countries. The most accessible come from the Rio and São Paulo dailies and the national newsweeklies, but none of them are particularly reliable given that most publications have their own political agendas regarding such sensitive statistics. In 1987, the more active favelas were reported to have taken in some 350,000 dollars each per month, with 66 drug-dealing points in Rio totaling around ten million dollars per month. See "A explosão do droga nos guetos do Rio," Isto É, 2 Sept. 1987, pp. 21-22. A more recent discussion of the size of the Rio cocaine trade by Juliana Resende, a reporter for O Estado de São Paulo, refers to 344 locations selling monthly a total of two tons of marijuana and cocaine, with fifteen of the most active favelas selling 962 kilos per month (no monetary value given) (see Resende 1995, 61). The difficulty in obtaining accurate drug statistics arises from the decentralized structure in which much of the trading is carried out. Additionally, the significant amount of cocaine siphoned off by various police agencies would suggest that the police are not interested in divulging accurate statistics on drugs.

29. The complex hierarchy of drug dealing is mirrored in all countries involved in cocaine trade. In the countries that produce and process cocaine, the lowest and most
exploited level is occupied by peasant smallholders producing coca leaves (*campesinos*), the coca transporters (*zepes* or *motobones* in Bolivia), and producers of the sulfate base (*pisacocas*). Specialization continues, involving decreasing numbers as the refined product reaches its destination and the relatively small numbers in the "narcobourgeoisie" accumulate monopolistic profits (see Suárez Salazar 1993, 88, 90). Except for the well-known Colombian kingpins who have been captured or killed in recent years (only to be replaced by other entrepreneurs), those profiting the most from cocaine tend to keep a low profile and frequently enjoy a certain protection from prosecution. On the situation in Peru, Edmundo Morales cited a local saying that the group in power "no pueden jugar con fuego porque tienen cola de paja." "the group in power cannot afford to play with fire because they have tails of straw" (Morales 1990, 102).

30. In the 1960s, when I first started my research in favelas, the term *favelado* was used by the middle and upper classes as a term of derision, equivalent to *marginal* or *criminal*. Today, it is often used as a badge of identity by favela residents themselves, usually in relation to "the outside" to designate a kind of class pride, as in "Eu sou favelado." The term is not generally used that way within favelas. For a discussion of political uses of the term inside favelas, see Segala (1991, 317-18).

31. Although economic conditions have deteriorated significantly in the past decade throughout Brazil, Rio has experienced a particularly severe decline, losing ground to São Paulo, Belo Horizonte, and Porto Alegre in industrial and financial investment. A recent national study by the Brazilian census bureau, the Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística (IBGE), found that in the state of Rio de Janeiro during the 1980s, the real income of the poorest fifth of the population declined by 24 percent while the overall per capita income of the state fell by 15 percent. The inability to attract new investment combined with a drastic cut in federal public investment and a 50 percent decrease in jobs in the civil construction sector have led to a mushrooming of informal-sector jobs, most of which were not connected to the national welfare system (Oliveira 1991, 7). This is in the larger context of the trend in Brazil in the 1980s toward loss of salaried jobs with correspondly fewer Brazilians being entitled to benefits from the social welfare system (IBGE 1994, xxv). A study by IBGE researcher Jane Souto de Oliveira pointed out that in the difficult task of measuring the size of the informal sector, a fine line barely separates work, unemployment, begging, and illegal activities (Oliveira 1991, 6). Similarly, a study by Sônia Rocha of the Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada (IPEA) showed that of nine state capitals studied, Rio de Janeiro was one of only two in which the percentage of the poor increased during the 1980s, from 27 to 32 percent (Rocha 1994, 126).

32. The name comes from the word *dolar* (dollar), reflecting the fact that the paper customarily used to wrap marijuana packets was green. Another of the few jobs held by women are *mulas*, who transport large packets of cocaine (two to three kilos) from favela wholesalers to retail outlets in other favelas. Women generally participate only in limited ways in favela-based drug dealing because the men in charge tend to hold traditional views regarding the role of women. For a discussion of the role of women in trafficking and the relatively rare instances of women in positions of control in the drug groups, see Zaluar, esp. chap. 23, "Mulher do bandido: Crônica de uma cidade menos musical" (1994, 224-34).
33. Robert Shirley's ethnography of Morro da Cruz, the largest squatter community in Porto Alegre, estimates that the main economic activity in the community is drug trafficking, which employs "a large number, probably hundreds of young people of the region as lookouts, runners, and couriers" (Shirley 1990, 265).

34. I would like to thank architect and urban planner Manuel Ribeiro for sharing this information with me. For a profile of another "good dono" in Rio, see Ventura (1994), which contains a lengthy interview with the recently deceased Flávio Negão of the favela Vigário Geral.

35. In an insightful political ethnography of the associational life and politics in the favela of Santa Marta in Rio's Zona Sul, Atílio Machado Peppe pointed out the inherent long-term potential danger of the good dono becoming a role model for the youth of the favela. He observed, "Bandits who are strategically 'good,' 'charming,' and 'sociable' can attain their spurious objectives more effectively than the taciturn and brutal thugs of other gangs" (Machado 1992, 432).

36. Alternative security systems in favelas actually existed well before drug dealers. Alison Raphael noted the role of "bambas" (tough guys) in the 1920s in policing and maintaining order within the favelas (1980, 38).

37. The erosion of official institutions and the emergence of alternatives has also been noted as a consequence of drug dealing in Colombia. According to Thoumi, "An even more important effect on government is the weakening of official institutions which occurs as many activities began to fall outside the legal system. . . . For instance, personal security begins to be provided by the private sector. . . . However, since contracts in the underground economy cannot be enforced through the official court system, a new justice system evolves in which accounts tend to be settled violently. . . . One result of this situation is the impotency of formal institutions in providing adequate protection to the weak as the level of social aggression rises. . . ." Thoumi (1987, 47). Although a parallel with the Brazilian situation exists in Colombia, a significant difference is that in Colombia, those institutions had functioned in the past, whereas for the segment of the Brazilian population affected most by drug dealing, the same types of institutions had never functioned effectively in Brazil. Thus the alternative institutions created by the drug dealers filled a void that had always been there.

38. The OAB study noted that the punishments applied to those violating the "lei do fumo" (law of the drug group) varied from house arrest to summary execution, with such intermediate measures as being barred from certain areas of the favela, temporary or permanent expulsion from the favela, beating, shooting the hand of a thief, or pronouncing a death sentence on a rapist.

39. See the study by Maria Victoria Benevides (1985, 239) on police violence and the need to fill daily quotas of arrests. Such quotas are filled most easily by arresting favela residents, who are perceived by police as potential criminals. Police abuse has also been documented by Chevigny (1991) and Americas Watch (1993b).

40. Anthropologist Alba Zaluar studied Cidade de Deus, a housing project built in the 1960s on the periphery of Rio to which residents were sent when several favelas were eradicated (1983). Zaluar noted a frequent comment made by adolescents who opted to
join the drug dealers: "It's the police who create the bandits." She also noted the "process of repression-fear-revolt" among the youths and the menacing and threatening presence of police that she witnessed innumerable times during her fieldwork. The local police station did not even bother to hide using torture on those arrested, guilty or not: "On the contrary, this well-known fact is part of the image of the all-powerful police that guarantees the fear they [seek to] inspire" (1983, 254).

41. Interview in Rio, July 1994. The subtext of this comment seems to be, "Let them kill each other off so that we don't have to do it." No consideration is given to the innocent majority of the community whose lives are placed at risk. See also the description of violent action by the Polícia Militar during the war between rival drug gangs in the favela of Santa Marta in August 1987 (Machado 1992, 397-98).

42. In a seminar on the media and urban violence, Coronel Nazareth Cerqueira, head of the Polícia Militar of the state of Rio de Janeiro, noted the intense media scrutiny of arms possessed by drug traffickers. He pointed out that little attention is paid to the police corruption, the "great weapon that organized crime has at its disposal to allow it to operate freely" (FAPERJ 1993, 37).

43. The following section is based on interviews with Antonio Carlos Biscaia, former Attorney General of the state of Rio de Janeiro; Hélio Luz, newly appointed head of the Polícia Civil of the state of Rio de Janeiro; other officials in the justice system of Rio de Janeiro; and members of the judiciary and human rights community in Belo Horizonte and Porto Alegre. See also the interview with Hélio Luz in Xico Vargas and Telma Alvarenga, "Um estranho no ninho," Veja-Rio, 23 Aug. 1995, p. 4.

44. See also Lemgruber (1985). Regarding the involvement of the Polícia Civil in recent kidnappings, see the declarations of Helio Luz reported in "Golpe no bom astral," Veja, 1 Nov. 1995, pp. 75-76. A recently released internal report of the Polícia Civil estimated that 80 percent of the police (9,600 members of a force of 12,000) were dishonest and were collecting a million dollars a month in extortion money from drug dealers and kidnappers. See Diana Jeano Schemo, "A Common Bond: Fear of Each Other," The New York Times, 24 Dec. 1995, p. A15.

45. Personal interview with an anonymous member of the criminal justice system, 17 July 1995, Rio de Janeiro.

46. See Americas Watch (1993a); Ventura (1994, esp. 48-52, 67, 191); and Ferraz (1994). Ferraz is a favela leader and director of Casa da Paz in Vigário Geral. In figures paralleling U.S. statistics on inner cities, the age group most affected by drug-related violence is adolescents, mainly boys between the ages of twelve and seventeen. Four-fifths of the deaths in this age category stem from police intervention or gang wars (Fernandes and Carneiro 1995, 14).

47. Peter Singelmann studied a similar phenomenon in the Brazilian Northeast, where armed bandits (cangaçeiros) frequently clashed with landlords (coroneis). The landlords maintained their own independent militias, whose activities resembled those of the bandits. According to Singelmann, "The difference was that the landlords, through their control of the police and the courts, were able to have the cangaçeiros labeled criminals" (1975, 60).
48. Brazil (especially Rio) is no exception to this pattern. See the study by Júlio César Adiala (1986) arguing that the myth of the connection linking the use of marijuana as an African derivation to the Afro-Brazilian population has served to fortify racially discriminatory policy in Brazil. Former public defender Lizst Vieira observed, "It is not the middle class who is indicted. Those indicted in the criminal courts are the poor, the popular sectors." The sons and daughters of the middle and upper classes bribe officials before they ever reach the indictment stage: "Those who have money escape indictment" (Vieira 1985, 80, 84).

49. The argument is also made in a 1992 book by Mathea Falco, a lawyer who served as Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters in the Jimmy Carter administration. In explaining the adoption of the Marijuana Tax Act in 1937, during the depression when competition for jobs by foreign laborers was viewed as a threat, Falco commented, "once these drugs were linked in the public mind with dangerous foreigners and racial minorities, popular attitudes formed that persist until today" (Falco 1992).

50. In interviews in 1988, 1991, and 1994, Colonel Carlos Magno Nazareth Cerqueira, commander of the Polícia Militar of Rio de Janeiro, expressed great frustration over dealing with entrenched practices and attitudes within the ranks of the police. Nilo Batista, then Secretary of Justice and Lieutenant Governor of the state, oversaw both the civil and military police and assumed the governorship when Leonel Brizola entered the presidential race in early 1994. Batista said in a published interview on the model for reorganizing police services to the community, "what we have to conquer are the relations within the corps and that's a gradual process" (Batista 1994, 70). The difficulty in reforming long-entrenched police institutions has been documented extensively in a 1992 study by Guaracy Mingardi that examined the failed attempts by the Franco Montoro administration in the state of São Paulo to create lasting reforms within the Polícia Civil. During both Brizola administrations, the state government's attempt to establish a new model of community-police relations took the form of a pilot project entitled Centros Comunitários de Defesa da Cidadania. Established initially in three communities, the centers claim to include local offices for civil defense; public defenders; municipal clerks for obtaining official identity cards, labor cards, and birth, marriage, and death certificates; local branches of the civil and military police; mediation services; small claims courts; social workers to deal with family problems, benefits, and welfare services; an employment office; and a bank.

51. The subject of social banditry and specifically the response to Hobsbawm's agenda-setting works, *Primitive Rebels* and *Bandits*, has developed into a virtual growth industry. See Gilbert Joseph's comprehensive discussion of the phenomenon with regard to Latin America (1990). My article does not seek to engage in that discussion but rather to point out certain historical parallels with the preconditions leading to banditry in its various forms (rural and urban) and with some of the consequences of banditry.

52. The distinction between "lei do morro" and "lei do asfalto" certainly existed long before the dominating presence of drug traffickers (see Segala 1991 on the complexities of the distinction). But the terms have taken on new connotations in the last decade, now that the "lei do morro" has come to mean the power of drug dealers.

53. A similar dynamic has existed among coca growers in Peru, the forces of Sendero Luminoso, and the coca-eradicating and security forces of the Peruvian government.
Coca growers find themselves in a situation paralleling that of favela leaders in Rio. Coca growing is viewed by the Peruvian government as political support for Sendero, while Sendero guerrillas have interpreted refusal to grow coca as political support for the government. As Mason and Campany have pointed out, "To grow coca is to risk harsh sanctions at the hands of the Government and to refuse to grow coca is to risk sanctions at the hands of Sendero" (Mason and Campany 1993, 3). Similarly, migrants to the area near Lima's Carretera Central who had fled the violence of the Ayacucho region found themselves caught between the demands of Sendero in Lima to grant favors and the suspicions of the security police (Smith 1992, 134).

54. The Federação de Favelas do Estado de Rio de Janeiro (FAFERJ) recorded more than twenty-five assassinations of favela leaders between 1987 and 1995.

55. This account is based on interviews with community leaders of Santa Marta in 1992 and on descriptions of events in Machado (1992, 429-30). Two rival newspapers in Rio, the Jornal do Brasil and O Globo, were filled with accusations and counteraccusations regarding the association leaders' involvement with the drug traffickers. But whether or not these leaders were tied to the drug trade is irrelevant to the larger point. Either way, the unscrupulous power of the drug dealers and the dilemma that leaders face over calling in the police means that the community as a whole is constantly exposed to dangers on both sides from two violent armed forces.

56. The generalizability of this phenomenon to other Brazilian large cities is noted in Teresa Caldeira's study of the effects and perpetuation of violence in São Paulo. Speaking of a working-class community (one of several São Paulo neighborhoods examined), she observed, "they fear both the police who confuse them with criminals and the criminals who threaten them in their neighborhoods. . . . Working-class people feel paralyzed between the fear of the police, the fear of the criminal's vengeance, and . . . a view that the justice system is unable to provide any justice" (Caldeira 1992, 183). Caldeira concluded, "One of the most paradoxical effects of the experience of continuous arbitrariness and injustice suffered by the working classes is that the rule of law is perceived as an additional form of injustice" (1992, 190).

57. See also Alba Zaluar's comment, "The intimidation of witnesses and leaders of residents' associations in various parts of the state of Rio de Janeiro has grave consequences, for it destroys what has come to be the way out of the cycle of poverty and violence: the demands for political, social, and civil rights as a part of this nation, as its citizens" (Zaluar 1994, 95).

58. For a thorough discussion of the Chagas Freitas machine, see Eli Diniz (1982), especially chap. 4, "Articulando bases de sustenção." This period is also discussed in Valladares (1978) and Gay (1994).

59. See in particular Adriana Bacellar, "Rocinha vive de promessas," Jornal do Brasil, 12 Sept. 1988, city section, p. 5. Use by the state of a perceived security threat to further its own political agenda is certainly not new. In addition to Charles Tilly's work, Brown (1990) noted about Egypt in the 1920s that defining banditry as a national problem was an integral part of state building (p. 259). One reason that banditry drew such attention was that Egyptian rulers "could further their ambitious state-building program by discovering a threat to public security and by the national crisis of law and order created
by banditry. If banditry was a national problem, then the Egyptian state would have to meet the challenge; it would have to construct new institutions or strengthen the existing ones in order to defeat the newly discovered threat" (Brown 1990, 268).

60. Human rights abuses that occurred during Operação Rio are thoroughly documented in the 1996 report made by Human Rights Watch/Americas (see Americas Watch 1996) and in Resende (1995).

61. Partisan politics and electoral considerations were clearly factors in the timing of Operação Rio. Fernando Henrique Cardoso had just been elected president in the first round of the election on 3 Oct. 1994. In the second round on 15 Nov. 1994, the two front-runners in the gubernatorial election were the Partido Democrático Trabalhista (PDT), the party of Leonel Brizola, and the Partido Social Democrático Brasileiro (PSDB), Cardoso's party. The agreement between the state and federal governments to provide joint military operations was signed on 31 October. It was initially opposed by the current PDT governor and the PDT gubernatorial candidate as potentially threatening to human rights. The PSDB candidate blamed Rio's rising tide of violence and drug dealing on the liberal policies of the PDT, depicting Rio as unprotected and in need of federal intervention. Cardoso's victory in the first round gave him clout to take a pro-intervention stance. When the tide of public opinion turned in favor of intervention, both candidates supported the idea, but the PSDB candidate won the election. See Americas Watch (1996, 14) and Resende (1995, 22).

62. Drug traffickers also create alliances with legitimate business owners in the favela to gain economic and political advantages. Machado has described the dual-purpose alliance functioning in the favela of Santa Marta in 1988-1989, when traffickers used local businesses for money laundering as well as creating ties with Brizola's PDT. The PDT had won control of the municipality in 1988 and sought to unseat the longtime slate of officers in the residents' association (who had served for eight years) because they were aligned with the Partido de Trabalhadores (PT). The drug traffickers perceived their interest as better served by aligning themselves with the PDT, and they were therefore happy to help unseat the PT officers of the association (see Machado 1992, 407).

63. A parallel situation on a grander scale has developed in Colombia, where large-scale drug dealing led the biggest kingpins to attempt to establish political power. Carlos Lehder (now imprisoned in the United States) founded a political party called the Movimento Cívico de Liberación Nacional, which has been characterized by observers as "a kind of eclectic blend of fascism and anarchy" (Bagley 1986, 95). Lehder attracted a following in the poor barrios of several Colombian cities where he and his henchmen distributed large sums of money.

64. See the discussion by Jonathan Fox of the importance of democratization at the local level as a fortifier of democratic consolidation at the national level: "If authoritarian enclaves persist, democracy's consolidation at the national level may be jeopardized. Long-standing exclusionary practices will not disappear because of the signing of decrees or the transfer of the sash of power in national capitals" (Fox 1994b, 106).
REFERENCES

ACKERMAN, ELISE

ADIALA, CESAR

ALVAREZ, ELENA

ALVES, MARIA HELENA MOREIRA
1985 State and Opposition in Military Brazil. Austin: University of Texas Press.

AMERICAS WATCH (HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH/AMERICAS)


AMORIM, CARLOS

BAGLEY, BRUCE

BAGLEY, BRUCE, AND WILLIAM O. WALKER III, EDS.

BATISTA, NILO

BENEVIDES, MARIA VICTORIA.

BIELSCHOWSKY, RICARDO

BLOK, ANTON

BROWN, NATHAN

BURT, JO-MARIE

BURT, JO-MARIE, AND JOSE LOPEZ RICCI

CALDEIRA, TERESA PIRES DO RIO.

CARVALHO, MARIA ALICE REZENDE DE

CAVALLIERI, PAULO FERNANDO

CENTRO DE DEFESA DE DIREITOS HUMANOS BENTO RUBIÊO

CHEVIGNY, G. PAUL