

The Impact of State Relationships on If, When, and How Conflict Management Occurs¹

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This paper examines *if*, *when*, and *how* states act to manage militarized disputes. I argue that the relationship between the third party and disputants, the management history, and the characteristics of the conflict help us understand when management occurs and the management techniques employed. I find substantial evidence that biased third parties are quick to offer management services and to employ economic and diplomatic techniques. Conditions that increase the perceived probability of conflict resolution, such as previous conflict management, and factors that lower the cost of conflict management, such as costly conflict, lead to the timely use of diplomatic and verbal techniques. The findings offer significant contributions to both the conflict management and alliance literatures.

In 1905, President Theodore Roosevelt met with Russian and Japanese delegates to discuss the Russo-Japanese War, finally mediating after over a year of fighting and an estimated 130,000 casualties (Morris 2001). Conversely, Roosevelt acted immediately when France and Germany collided over the division of Morocco (Roosevelt 1985). While some conflicts, like that between France and Germany, are managed early on, other disputes, such as the Russo-Japanese War, must wait for outside management to occur. Still other conflicts never involve the international community at all. Although the Roosevelt presidency was marked by an active approach to foreign policymaking,² the very nature of the foreign policy decision process involves trade-offs, leaving some disputants to resolve differences on their own. Recently, the conflicts of Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sudan continued for prolonged periods without significant intervention despite extensive violence. Why did these conflicts continue while the international community took action in other conflicts before they turned deadly? Is there a systematic explanation of which conflicts receive the interest of outside parties and the timing of conflict management activities?

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² Roosevelt saw it as the duty of developed nations to help the underdeveloped world move forward. In Cuba, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and the Panama Canal Zone, he used the army's medical service to eliminate the menace of the yellow fever and install a new regime of public health. He used the army to build up the infrastructure, building railways, telegraph and telephone lines, and upgrading roads and port facilities.

This paper examines variation in state-sponsored conflict management occurrence and timing.³ Understandably, there is much interest in creating knowledge about management outcomes (Bercovitch, Anagnoson, and Wille 1991; Regan and Stam 2000; Greig 2001). However, to evaluate the success of management requires knowledge of its goals. While management would not occur if it did not have some positive benefit, it is impossible to understand these benefits without understanding what management is intended to achieve and whether management occurs when these objectives are likely (Beardsley 2010). Thus, by examining third-party decisions to manage, we can better understand the goals third parties hope to attain with their activities.

Recent scholarship recognizes the need to further understand the incidence of management, especially in the mediation literature. Research focuses on the importance of the context within which the disputants act, examining the characteristics of the dispute and the relationship of the disputants (Bercovitch and Diehl 1997; Bercovitch and Jackson 2001; Greig 2005; Terris and Maoz 2005). These scholars argue third-party management offers a path to peace for disputants looking for a way out of costly conflict. While the characteristics of the conflict and the nature of the relationship between the disputants clearly have important implications for management occurrence, the relationship between the third party and the disputants is also important and can help explain when management occurs.

Employing expected utility logic, I argue that policymakers' utility of obtaining an agreement in the conflict, the expected costs of mediating, and the probability that their efforts will be successful influence the timing of third-party efforts. I argue that the key component to understanding third-party decisions is the triadic relationship between the disputants and the third party. While this relationship has been examined in terms of the ways in which it affects mediation outcomes (Princen 1995; Walter 2002; Rauchhaus 2006; Kydd 2007), the impact of this relationship on the timing of management has remained largely overlooked.⁴

Empirical findings using triadic data of all militarized interstate disputes from 1946 to 2001 confirm that conflict management occurrence and timing are largely the result of the relevant actors' relationships with one another. Event history models show that early conflict management is likely to occur when the third party has biased alliance, democratic, geographic, or colonial ties to a disputant. Additionally, states account for conflict management history and costs before acting.

Existing Scholarship

The existing literature on conflict management focuses almost exclusively on understanding the conditions under which third parties successfully resolve conflicts, comprehensively examining how characteristics of the dispute, the disputants, and the third party affect the outcomes of management efforts such as mediation (Regan and Stam 2000; Greig 2001; Hansen, McLaughlin Mitchell, and Nemeth 2008) and economic sanctions (Pape 1998; Hart 2000; Allen 2005). However, recent work argues that only focusing on management occurrence produces a selection bias (Greig 2005; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Svensson 2006). In brief, these authors posit that the factors motivating third

³ I define a conflict manager as an outside state that chooses to become involved in a dispute and has a preference for deescalating the dispute exceeding their preference for one side's victory. Conflict managers are not required to be neutral or unallied; however, the third party does not overtly join a side of the conflict. See Siverson and Starr (1991) and Werner and Lemke (1997) for the studies of dispute expansion.

⁴ For a study that addresses the role of this relationship in the intrastate conflicts, see Greig and Regan (2008). Melin and Svensson (2009) examine how this relationship impacts mediation occurrence in intrastate wars compared with interstate ones.

parties to act also affect the outcomes of third-party actions. Third parties may not necessarily go where they are most needed (Svensson 2006). Rather, involvement is the result of actors making strategic decisions based on their anticipation of the consequences of those decisions. The management process affects why certain conflicts get outside involvement and the effects of such involvements. This paper builds on the research examining conflict manager selection as part of a larger process (Regan 2000; Greig 2005; Greig and Diehl 2006; Beardsley 2008).

The most prolific research on the selection of conflict managers is the scholarship examining mediation occurrence. These studies focus primarily on the characteristics of the conflicts that gain mediation and the relationship between the disputants. Bercovitch and Diehl (1997) explore mediation in international military rivalries and find mediation is ten times more likely to occur in these cases than in less intense conflicts. Greig (2005) finds that characteristics of the dispute and the disputants help explain when mediation between enduring rivalries is likely to occur. Bercovitch and Jackson (2001) find that mediation tends to be used in international disputes characterized by high complexity, high intensity, long duration, and unequal and fractionated parties, and where the willingness of the parties to settle peacefully is in doubt. Finally, mediators account for their ability to transform the conflict before acting as a mediator (for example, Touval and Zartman 2001; Bercovitch 2002). While the nature of the fighting and the characteristics of the disputants are clearly important, I argue the relationship between the disputants and the third party is also an important deciding factor in management occurrence. Thus, while existing research focuses on the demand for management, I offer a more complete understanding of its supply.

This paper offers three main contributions to existing scholarship. First, the mediation literature can and should be united with research on other methods of conflict management (see Dixon 1996; Regan 2000; Frazier and Dixon 2006). Studies of mediation remain exceptionally isolated from those addressing other methods of dispute resolution. Yet different conflicts may initiate similar responses, and there are multiple responses to comparable conflicts (Most and Starr 1984, 1989). For purposes of this paper, conflict management encompasses the many management tactics third parties employ in practice, thereby yielding a more complete analysis of the process.⁵ Specifically, I examine the substitutable choice of employing economic intervention, verbal management, diplomatic efforts, or remaining uninvolved. By doing so, I am able to further our understanding of the third-party choice of involvement: inquiring into the causes of various management techniques rather than singularly focusing on one management method.

Additionally, this paper accounts for variations in the timing of conflict management efforts. Why do some third parties act as a conflict manager early in the conflict and others wait until the conflict has continued for many years? Considering the timing of conflict management efforts provides a richer picture of variation in the conflict management process beyond simply examining its occurrence. Early, costly management efforts may signal a different commitment to conflict resolution and be fundamentally different from actions taken years into a lengthy dispute, having both different causes and effects. When conflict management occurs, the management method employed therefore may have important implications for the outcome of conflict management efforts

⁵ I examine any course of action taken by a nondisputant aimed at either preventing the further escalation of the conflict or resolving it completely (Dixon 1996; Butterworth 1978). This includes a broad range of activities (Regan 2000). I incorporate various measures into my theoretical argument and empirical analysis, which include diplomatic, verbal, and economic efforts.

(Zartman 1989; Regan and Stam 2000). I argue the relationship and characteristics of the third party and the nature of the conflict help us understand *when* and *how* management occurs. I expect to find that the characteristics that raise a third party's utility for conflict resolution, such as a cooperative relationship with the disputants, will decrease the time to management and increase the use of diplomatic and economic (both costly) management techniques. Things that increase the perceived probability of conflict resolution, such as previous conflict management, and things that lower the cost of conflict management, such as costly conflict, will decrease the time to conflict management and the use of diplomatic and verbal management methods.

The relationship between the third party and the disputants is a central focus of the paper. While this relationship has been examined in terms of the ways in which it affects mediation outcomes (Princen 1995; Walter 2002; Rauchhaus 2006; Kydd 2007), the impact of this relationship on management occurrence and the choice of management method has remained largely overlooked.⁶ This relationship affects when conflict management occurs both through the strategic interests a third party has at stake and through the third party's ability to influence the disputants. I argue that the nature of the relationship between these actors impacts when and how conflict management occurs.

A Holistic Approach to Conflict Management

Actors outside a dispute may play varied roles in ongoing disputes. This paper does not seek to explain outside parties that join as an additional disputant (for research on this topic, see Siverson and Starr 1991; Heldt and Hammarström 2002; Melin and Koch 2010) but instead focuses on third parties that act as conflict managers. Third-party conflict managers can help disputants deal with the information asymmetries and credible commitment problems that often lead to conflict (Beardsley 2006).

Conflict management represents an attempt to do something about reducing, limiting, or eliminating the level, scope, and intensity of violence in conflict and building a structure where the need to resort to violence in future conflicts is controlled (Deutsch 1973; Maoz 2004). Management activities span from verbal condemnation of a conflict to direct military intervention (Regan 2000). This paper focuses on nonbinding unilateral and multilateral management, thereby examining the conflict management process from the third party's viewpoint.⁷ I am interested in why third parties get involved in a dispute that is not their own. Actions may include verbal calls for resolution, offers to mediate the conflict, and economic sanctions, all of which do not require the consent of the disputants themselves. The primary contribution of the analysis in this study is that of a much-needed holistic approach to the conflict management process. Adequately studying the complexities of foreign policy decision making requires accounting for the substitutability framework Most and Starr (1984, 1989) developed. Policymakers have a wide array of available options for approaching any range of policy issues, since any cause may have a number of effects and any

⁶ See Greig and Regan (2008) for a study of how third-party interests impact mediation occurrence in civil wars. Crescenzi, Kadera, McLaughlin Mitchell, and Thyne (2005) also show that alliance ties, issue salience, and distance influence mediation decisions.

⁷ Broadly speaking, the numerous tools available for conflict prevention, management, and resolution can be grouped into three different categories: (i) unilateral, which involve conflict management without the consent of the disputants, such as military intervention; (ii) bilateral, which involves direct talk between the disputants, such as negotiation; and (iii) multilateral, which takes place with the consent and cooperation of the disputants, such as mediation or adjudication. By focusing on unilateral and multilateral efforts, I offer a supply side approach to management. Whether the effort is unilateral or multilateral has important implications for the probability that the effort will be successful.

effect can stem from several causes (Morgan 2000). Different conflicts may lead to similar responses (as in US mediation efforts with Israel and Egypt in the 1970s, Vatican efforts in the Falkland conflict between Argentina and the UK in 1982, and Congolese efforts with Burundi and Rwanda in 1966), and there are multiple ways to respond to similar conflicts (as was the case of the UN observers sent in 1992 to Yugoslavia compared to the later NATO military intervention in Kosovo). The framework of substitutability is applicable to third-party reactions to conflict: economic sanctions, diplomatic efforts, and military operations are substitutable foreign policy instruments, all of which can be triggered in response to conflict. Failure to consider policy substitutability can account for the weakness of many empirical findings and failure to better understand conflict management outcomes (see also Most and Starr 1989; Starr 2000).

The problems associated with the failure to recognize policy substitutability are endemic in the conflict management literature. Existing studies examine the policies of military intervention (see Regan 1996), diplomatic approaches (see Mack and Snyder 1957; Ott 1972; Pruitt 1981; Kleiboer 1996; Bercovitch 1998), mediation (Bercovitch et al. 1991; Greig 2001; Regan and Stam 2000), and economic sanctions (see Hufbauer and Schott 1983; Li 1993; Weiss 1999) independently of one another.⁸ Management methods are rarely used in isolation, and yet they are treated as such in a majority of the existing literature. It is unclear how methods of conflict management work together both theoretically and in practice. If the outside party is truly interested in resolving the conflict, it will likely employ different conflict resolution tactics until the conflict is resolved. For example, the United States and European Union used economic sanctions, mediation, and eventually military intervention to help end the bloody conflict that arose during the breakup of Yugoslavia. Citing the eventual bombing of Bosnia as the reason for the end of the conflict ignores the possibility that earlier sanctions and mediation may have paved the way for a successful NATO bombing campaign. I seek to build on the work of authors who holistically evaluate third-party conflict management techniques (Dixon 1996; Regan 2000).

When and How Conflict Management Occurs

Who manages and when? Conflict management is a complex decision process where actors weigh the risks and benefits of various actions. To understand this process, I employ expected utility logic (Bueno de Mesquita 1988; Terris and Maoz 2005). I assume third parties are rational utility maximizers and consider the utility of conflict resolution, the costs of mediating, and the probability of success before choosing a foreign policy. I begin with three actors: actors A and B, who are in a militarized dispute over some issue, and actor I, who is a potential intermediary. I look first at the decision by the disputants A and B to terminate or continue hostilities⁹ and then the choice by potential intermediary I to become involved as a conflict manager.

Conflict Settlement

At any given point in time, A and B can either settle or continue to fight. In order for A to accept an agreement, the expected value of the settlement must

⁸ While examining these different methods of management holistically is an important step to understanding the conflict resolution process, the currently accepted categorizations are admittedly not arbitrary. It is logical to examine these actions separately if seeking to understand the occurrence of multilateral efforts. When examining such efforts from the supply side, however, creating delimited categories poses serious threats to the accumulation of knowledge (Starr 2000).

⁹ As I define a conflict manager as a state whose preference for deescalating the dispute exceeding their preference for one side's victory, third-party choices are linked closely to the disputants' utility for settlement.

be greater than the expected value of continuing to fight. To calculate A's expected value of settling (EU_{ag}^a) requires taking into account the value of the agreement (u_{ag}^a) minus the costs of the agreement (c_{ag}^a).

$$EU_{ag}^a = u_{ag}^a - c_{ag}^a$$

Calculating A's expected value of continued conflict (EU_f^a) takes into account its probability of winning (p_w^a), weighted by the utility of winning (u_w^a), minus the costs it expects to accumulate over the course of the dispute (c_t^a).

$$EU_f^a = p_w^a(u_w^a) - c_t^a$$

The higher the probability of winning, the greater the expected utility of winning; the lower the costs, the greater value there is in continued fighting. A agrees to a settlement (rather than continuing to fight) if and only if the expected utility of an agreement (EU_{ag}^a) outweighs (or equals) the expected utility of continuing to fight (EU_f^a).

$$EU_{ag}^a \geq EU_f^a$$

As will B, with the appropriate changes in subscripts. This is a basic expected utility argument whereby decision makers choose the strategy with the best expected net return when faced with a choice among alternatives (Morrow 1989; Fearon 1994; Werner 1999; Bueno de Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, and Smith 2001).

In the case that the disputants are unable to resolve the conflict themselves, the opportunity for outside actors to assist in establishing an agreement arises. Thus, *whether* management occurs is partially a result of the inability of the disputants to find grounds on which they can agree.

Conflict Management

At each point that the disputants decide to continue fighting rather than settle, a third party (I) has the option to become involved as an intermediary. By becoming involved in a dispute as a conflict manager, the third party has a unique ability to alter the disputants' expected utility. Specifically, the third party weighs the following in deciding if and when they will become involved: the utility of agreement; the costs of involvement; and the probability of successful intervention.

Utility of Agreement

The third party's value for conflict resolution entails the potential intermediary's preference for involvement as a conflict manager, including related political risks and dispute salience (what Most and Starr 1989 term "willingness"). If policy-makers do not place high utility on settling the dispute in question, then it will not gain allocations of the actor's limited resources (Palmer 1990; Powell 1993; Clark 2001).

Cost of Involvement

Managing a conflict is a high-risk endeavor for third parties, and success is not without certain costs. The third party must (i) consider the conditions under which the disputants will settle in order to determine how costly involvement will be and (ii) choose a method of management according to their perception of the disputants' utility for fighting. More intrusive methods, such as economic and diplomatic efforts, impose higher costs on the intervener. The cost of becoming involved will vary depending on the management method the third

party decides to use. The choice of involvement and management strategy are inseparable (Maoz, Kuperman, Terris, and Talmud 2006).

Probability of Successful Conflict Resolution

Finally, third parties also consider the probability that their efforts will be successful before getting involved. The probability of conflict resolution involves both the strategic conditions and the available resources of the intermediary; it provides the context within which the policymaker acts (what Most and Starr 1989 term “opportunity”).

A potential conflict manager would thus calculate its utility for involvement (EU_{ag}^I) as:

$$EU_{ag}^I = u_{ag}^I(p_W^I) - c_X^I$$

Where u_{ag}^I is the utility of dispute resolution for the intermediary, p_W^I is the perceived probability of conflict resolution (or A’s expected utility times B’s expected utility), and c_X^I is the cost of intervening in the conflict. The third party’s utility for involvement is therefore their utility for resolution times the perceived probability of conflict resolution minus the cost of intervention. Management is likely to occur when the third party has a high utility for conflict resolution (u_{ag}^I), when the costs of management (c_X^I) are low, and when the perceived probability of conflict resolution (p_W^I) is high.

The value that a third party has for resolving a conflict entails its preference for involvement as a conflict manager, including related political risks and dispute salience (what Most and Starr 1989 term “willingness”). The third party’s decision calculus hinges on the relationship between the third party and the disputants, or the triad. This relationship has important implications for when conflict management is observed. A third party’s utility has two sources: (i) helping a “friend” resolve a conflict and (ii) influencing the conflict’s outcome or the agreement (Altfeld and Bueno de Mesquita 1979).

The first source of third-party utility is that gained from helping a “friend” resolve a conflict. As conflict management is not costless, third parties must have sufficient interests at stake in the conflict to voluntarily become involved in an already difficult situation (Melin and Svensson 2009; Beardsley 2010). If policymakers do not place high utility on settling the dispute in question, then it will not gain allocations of the actor’s limited resources (Palmer 1990; Powell 1993; Clark 2001). Factors such as alliances, trade, and historic ties between the third party and the disputants can all provide the motivation to act. The strategic interests of the mediator have been shown to impact the decision to manage (Terris and Maoz 2005).

A second source of utility is that of influencing the conflict’s outcome. A third party’s ability to influence the disputants is closely tied to their relationship (Princen 1995; Walter 2002; Rauchhaus 2006; Kydd 2007). Third parties that have political or economic ties to the disputants will have a greater ability to influence these actors at the negotiating table, making an agreement more likely. Third parties will account for such leverage in deciding to offer conflict management, although third-party management has still been shown to occur when such leverage is absent (Beardsley 2009). Both credibility (Terris and Maoz 2005) and bias (Favretto 2005) have been shown to play important roles in the decision to become involved.

Both sources of utility are based on the relationship the third party has with the disputants. These relationships involve alliances, shared borders, or similar political systems. The role of biased relationships in management activities has been a topic of great debate (Rauchhaus 2006; Kydd 2007; Favretto 2009). I

further explore the role bias plays in management by comparing the relative timing of biased and unbiased management efforts. A third party may be considered unbiased for one of two reasons: it may have strong ties to both disputants or it may have ties to neither disputant. I expect that biased third parties should act more quickly than those third parties without a relationship to either disputant since they will have a greater utility for resolution. Third parties without ties to either disputant will not have strong enough interests at stake to risk the costs of management. Bias third parties will also act more quickly due to a higher probability of success, as a third party with strong ties to the disputants will be capable of pressuring the disputants to find a peaceful end to conflict (Savun 2005; Svensson 2007). It is possible to specify how the third party's utility for resolution effects conflict management decisions as:

Hypothesis 1A: *Potential managers will manage more quickly when they have a relationship with one of the disputants.*

Returning to the sources of a third party's utility, helping a "friend" resolve a conflict, and influencing the conflict's outcome, we should expect to see third parties that have ties to both disputants are also quick to act as a conflict manager. Third parties that have ties to both disputants should have a greater utility for resolution than those without ties since they can help two "friends." Such ties should also increase a third party's probability of success, as they should be viewed as trustworthy and therefore be more likely to succeed (Kydd 2005, 2006; Rauchhaus 2006). This logic would make us more likely to see third parties acting as conflict managers when they are considered unbiased in the sense that they have ties to both disputants. I therefore expect that:

Hypothesis 1B: *Potential managers will manage more quickly when they have a relationship with two of the disputants.*

Third parties also consider the probability that their efforts will be successful before getting involved. The probability of conflict resolution involves both the strategic conditions and the available resources of the intermediary; it provides the context within which the policymaker acts (what Most and Starr term "opportunity").

One way by which third parties gauge the probability that their efforts will lead to conflict resolution is in considering the conflict management history. Disputants that have previously exhibited a willingness to work with a manager will likely attract third-party resources once again. That warring parties have worked with a conflict manager in the past, regardless of whether the attempt was successful, indicates to potential managers that both sides see the possibility for a settlement (Greig and Regan 2008). Conflict resolution attempts are not independent, with subsequent efforts at least commencing with more information than was available at the previous one (Greig 2005). A third party might reconsider involvement if there is no history of conflict management or there is a history of unsuccessful conflict management.

Put differently, third parties should manage when they expect their efforts will succeed or when management is easy. Whether third parties get the "easy" or "difficult" cases is debated in the literature, with findings that support both sides of the debate (Terris and Maoz 2005; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006). Thinking of conflicts in terms of "easy" or "difficult" to manage generates somewhat of a false dichotomy, as the ease of resolving a conflict evolves throughout the tenure of the conflict. Clearly, there will be some conflicts that are so easily resolved that the need for a third party never arises since the disputants resolve issues themselves (Gartner and Bercovitch 2006). Thus, in these easy to resolve

cases, the occasion for management never arises. For the cases in which the disputants are unable to resolve the conflict themselves and the conflict is of high enough profile that it attracts outside attention, third parties will be more likely to get involved—merely based on the fact that there is the chance for management to occur. Thus, in one sense, the tough cases are the ones that get outside management. Given that the opportunity for management is present, however, third parties are going to act when they think they can impact the conflict. It is the costly conflicts that they expect to be able to resolve, since these are the ones that are versatile (Terris and Maoz 2005). So, in another sense, it is the easy cases that are managed. Given that third parties are more likely to manage when they expect their efforts to succeed and that previous management efforts help to accumulate information, thereby increasing the probability of success, I expect to find that:

Hypothesis 2: *Disputes with prior efforts at conflict management are more likely to be managed quickly.*

Finally, third parties account for the costs of management before acting. These are directly related to disputant willingness to settle, as disputants that are more willing to settle will require less third-party action, and thereby lower third-party costs, to induce settlement. What third-party actions will be necessary to change the disputants' payoffs? The third party must consider the conditions under which the disputants will accept an agreement, namely, when their expected value of the settlement outweighs that of continuing to fight. I's utility for involvement is therefore their probability of success and utility for a settlement minus the minimum investment required for the disputants to accept the agreement:

$$EU_{ag}^I = u_{ag}^I [\min [u_{ag}^a \geq p_w^a (u_w^a) - c_t^a] - \min [u_{ag}^b \geq p_w^b (u_w^b) - c_t^b]] - c_x^I$$

Thus, much of the variation we observe in the occurrence of third-party conflict management is a function of the disputants' costs and benefits associated with continued conflict, since this determines how "solvable" the conflict is. The cost of conflict management is related to the cost of the conflict to the disputants since less will be required of third parties to raise the cost of conflict such that the disputants prefer settlement to continued conflict (Terris and Maoz 2005). Third parties likely consider their ability to influence the disputants in deciding when to manage a conflict, meaning costly conflicts are more likely to be quickly managed (Young 1967; Regan and Stam 2000; Zartman 2000). A third party is more likely to act quickly in costly conflicts since these are versatile (Terris and Maoz 2005; Greig 2005; Greig and Diehl 2006). When the costs of conflict (c_t), the utility of winning (u_w^a), and the probability of victory (p_w) outweigh the value of agreement (u_{ag}) for one or both disputants, dispute resolution, and therefore management, will be unlikely. Dispute resolution is likely when both A and B have a low value for winning (u_w^a), low probability of victory (p_w), and high costs (c_t).

The third party does not know the disputants' utility for winning and therefore must estimate which management method is necessary to alter the disputant's utility for resolution. Third parties observe wartime behavior that helps them estimate their beliefs about the conflict (Gartner 1997). Third parties will use their lessons from past interactions with disputants to help them decide how to act (Houghton 1996, 2001; Hehir 2006). Potential intermediaries often have knowledge of the nature of the conflict and experiences with the leaders involved that allow them to generate expectations about the actions necessary for effective conflict management. The intermediary then develops a strategy

based on these expectations. Unless the relationship between the third party and disputants is such that it overrides the costs of intervention, a third party will not act. Such third parties will take action only when the expected utility of the agreement exceed the expected costs of implementing the chosen strategy. More costly conflicts will require less from the third party for the disputants' value of settlement to outweigh the value of continuing to fight. Previous research shows that costly conflicts are more likely to be managed (Young 1967; Regan and Stam 2000; Zartman 2000). Therefore:

Hypothesis 3: *The higher the costs of conflict, the more likely a potential manager is to quickly manage the dispute.*

Finally, the expected utility model has implications for the management technique that is employed. The decision to act and which strategy to employ are inseparable (Regan 2000). I classify management efforts as verbal, diplomatic, or economic.¹⁰ Verbal efforts include speeches made by state representatives calling for a ceasefire, negotiations, or troop withdrawal and offers to facilitate negotiations or mediate.¹¹ Diplomatic efforts include mediation, and administrative efforts include good offices and fact finding. Economic efforts formalize intermediary demands by limiting a state's financial interaction with the disputants. Economic sanctions vary from imposing importation duties to a full naval blockade halting imported goods (Hufbauer and Schott 1983; Li 1993; Martin 1993). Whereas economic and diplomatic efforts may entail high third-party costs, verbal efforts are essentially costless and entail little or no commitment, as a state at most risks its rapport with other actors. We can also distinguish verbal and economic efforts, which are unilateral in the sense that they do not require disputant cooperation, from diplomatic efforts, which are multilateral and require disputant involvement.

Since management techniques vary in costs and likelihood of success, we can expect for third parties to employ them differently, depending on the relationship the third party has with the disputants. Those third parties with strong ties to the disputants are more willing to employ more costly methods of management (such as mediation and other diplomatic efforts) early in the conflict, whereas other third parties will either employ a low-cost technique (such as calling for a ceasefire) or wait until the costs of involvement are lower before acting. We should therefore observe high- and low-cost techniques used quickly and moderate techniques used slowly. We can therefore expect to find:

Hypothesis 4: *Potential managers will quickly employ diplomatic and economic management when they have a relationship with one or both of the disputants.*

We can also generate expectations based on variations in the likelihood that each technique will produce an agreement. Costly conflicts will require less third-party action in order for the value of resolution to outweigh the value of continued conflict (Terris and Maoz 2005). As the cost of the conflict rises over time, the disputants are more likely to work with a third party and the third party's efforts are more likely to be effective. This will therefore decrease the

¹⁰ While these mechanisms could each be broken into specific policies, it is not clear that doing so would change our understanding of the third-party decision process. I exclude military efforts because of their limited use and the challenge of separating such efforts from joining a conflict as an additional disputant. For an examination of US decisions to use military, economic, or diplomatic intervention in civil wars, see Regan (2000).

¹¹ Thus, the disputants do not have to accept the third party for management to occur, as rejected offers will be included as verbal interventions. Including verbal offers to manage is crucial, since I am interested in the motivations behind third-party efforts and not whether the disputants deem the third party acceptable.

time until multilateral, diplomatic efforts. Additionally, the probability of successful conflict resolution and utility for an agreement will increasingly outweigh the costs of management over time. Low-cost techniques, such as verbal efforts, will only be effective in the cases that are easily resolved, whereas we can expect efforts that formalize third-party involvement as a mediator to be more effective. We can therefore expect to see an increase in the use of costly management techniques as a conflict continues.

Hypothesis 5: *Diplomatic techniques will be employed more quickly in costly conflicts.*

Finally, we can think of different management techniques as having different probabilities of success depending on the circumstances. Economic sanctions, for example, are unlikely to be used repeatedly if they have not yet affected the conflict. Conversely, diplomatic and verbal efforts can have a cumulative effect. Diplomatic efforts are much more likely to occur when the disputants have a history of working with outside managers, as this multilateral management technique requires the consent and cooperation of the disputants.

Hypothesis 6: *Diplomatic techniques will be employed more quickly when there is a history of management.*

The expected utility model and the hypotheses that follow show that the relationship and characteristics of the third party, along with the characteristics of the conflict, help us understand when management occurs and the types of management that are employed. Thus, if we are going to consider *when* and *how* management occurs, we need to consider the initial dyadic dispute, its management history, and the potential manager. I expect to find that the characteristics that raise a third party's utility for conflict resolution, such as a cooperative relationship with the disputants, will decrease the time to management and diplomatic and economic management techniques. Things that increase the perceived probability of conflict resolution, such as previous conflict management, and things that lower the cost of conflict management, such as costly conflict, will decrease the time to conflict management and the use of diplomatic methods.

Data, Measurement, and Methods

I test the empirical implications from my model with a data set of post-WWII third-party conflict management efforts. The data consist of all *Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes* (Maoz 2005). For each year in which a conflict is ongoing, I construct an observation of each disputant and a potential manager. Of the authors that examine conflict manager identity, few have generated a population of potential managers and therefore cannot speak to the effects of third-party characteristics or its relationship to the disputants without selecting on the dependent variable (for exceptions to this, see Frazier 2006; Greig and Regan 2008; Melin and Svensson 2009). Examining who manages conflicts therefore necessitates establishing a population of potential managers. Analyzing all actors in the international system as possible intermediaries yields a staggering number of observations, making both analysis and collecting accurate information across so many cases extremely difficult. Case selection involves determining which countries have a theoretical chance of acting. I define potential managers as actors that meet at least one of the following criteria according to the Politically Relevant Dyads data (Maoz 1996):

Major or regional powers, which have both the resources and the responsibility to manage conflicts. Regional or major powers are more able to undertake a costly

conflict management effort and more likely to have a stake in the outcome of the conflict.

Geographically contiguous states, which regularly interact with the disputants and will be disproportionately affected by a neighboring conflict (Kathman 2006, Forthcoming). If a state is geographically proximate to a conflict, it is likely to suffer the conflict's effects, such as economic problems, refugees, and the spread of the conflict. Studies have shown links between distance and the occurrence of conflict management (Crescenzi et al. 2005).

Reputational managers, which have exhibited both the willingness and opportunity for conflict management by acting in previous disputes.¹² While many of these states are captured with the preceding criteria, including reputational conflict managers expands the definition to include medium powers that would have otherwise been excluded.

The above criteria offer a method of determining which cases to analyze based on theoretical arguments about likely managers (Beardsley 2005; Greig 2005; Frazier and Dixon 2006).¹³ The process that determines whether actors are in the sample is related to the process that determines whether they manage, exerting both direct effects on the dependent variable and indirect ones on the chance of being selected. Such correlation between case selection and the dependent variable is common (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). While most of the potential managers never manage, over sampling is necessary to avoid case exclusion (which occurs if cases not included in the sample manage a conflict), possibly resulting in measurement error and selection bias (Clark and Regan 2003).

Outcome Variable and Model Specification

I estimate the occurrence of conflict management using competing risk models with Weibull specification (Lunn and McNeil 1995). In a competing risk model, the conflict may experience any of the management types (or "failure" types) in random order.¹⁴ The models are stratified by the different types of management that might occur, which allows the baseline hazard rate to vary by management type. The unit of analysis is the triad-year-management type.¹⁵ For each case, the times until three possible events were recorded: verbal, diplomatic, and economic (Frazier and Dixon 2006). The information on if and when management occurs is from the *Third Party Intervention* data (Frazier and Dixon 2006) and the *International Conflict Management* data (Bercovitch 1999a). All times are measured from the first start day of a *Dyadic Militarized Interstate Dispute* (Maoz 2005). Summary statistics for the variables used in the analysis are shown in Table 1.

¹² Reputational managers have previously managed a conflict (*any* conflict) according to the TPI (Frazier and Dixon 2006) or ICM (Bercovitch 1999b) data.

¹³ While the empirical portion of this analysis focuses on the role of states in conflict management, international organizations also play an important role in conflict management (Hansen et al. 2008; Shannon 2009). I omit IOs because interests and bias likely work differently in international organizations than in states. The exclusion of these actors has implications for the generalizability of the results, which cannot speak to the role that the relationships between actors play when nonstate actors are involved. Additionally, as conflict management and resolution is frequently part of international organizations' mandates, state actors might be less likely to offer conflict management services since they see this as the role of international organizations. State actors therefore have a lower baseline likelihood of offering conflict management than nonstate actors. The theoretical argument of the paper, however, is still applicable to international organizations.

¹⁴ This is also referred to as an unordered failure event of different types. One limitation of the estimation method is that each failure event can only occur once per subject, or once per potential intermediary, conflict year. The likelihood that the same third party uses the same management method in the same conflict year but in a different management attempt, however, is very low.

¹⁵ Because each third party-conflict year appears five times in the data, one for each management types, the N is deceptively large. It is therefore useful to know that there are 40,749 third-party-conflict years.

TABLE 1. Summary Statistics

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Mean</i>	<i>Standard deviation</i>	<i>Minimum</i>	<i>Maximum</i>
Outcome variable				
Time to management	398.25	915.5	0	11,015
Verbal (<i>N</i> = 411)	1022.536	1335.386	0	6667
Diplomatic (<i>N</i> = 649)	1173.91	1697.507	0	11,015
Economic (<i>N</i> = 4152)	518.855	849.568	0	8041
Explanatory variables				
Utility for resolution				
Alliance ties with one disputant	0.141	0.348	0	1
Alliance ties with both disputants	0.005	0.071	0	1
Trade interests with one disputant	0.046	0.208	0	1
Trade interests with both disputants	0.013	0.114	0	1
Democratic ties with one disputant	0.048	0.213	0	1
Democratic ties with both disputants	0.109	0.311	0	1
Geographic ties with one disputant	0.109	0.312	0	1
Geographic ties with both disputants	0.066	0.248	0	1
Colony	0.008	0.087	0	1
Previous dispute with disputant	0.021	0.143	0	1
Probability of success				
Number of previous management efforts	1.632	5.868	0	53
Managed last year	0.001	0.035	0	1
Previous agreement	0.003	0.050	0	1
Previous no agreement	0.006	0.077	0	1
Other third-party agreement	0.001	0.109	0	1
Other third-party no agreement	0.012	0.109	0	1
Cost of management				
Previous dispute	0.837	0.369	0	1
Disputants contiguous	0.284	0.451	0	1
CINC State A	0.104	0.079	0.000	0.364
CINC State B	0.032	0.053	0.000	0.184
Low democracy level	-2.143	7.586	-10	10

(Notes. Statistics for management timing is based on 203,745 triad-year-management types, 150 which were managed verbally, 215 which were managed diplomatically, 33 which were managed economically, and 203,347 which ended without management.)

Explanatory Variables: Measuring the Utility of Management

I hypothesize that states with ties to the disputants will manage more quickly than others. I employ the following variables as measures of the nature of the triadic relationship, which should impact the *timing* of management.

Alliance Ties with One/Both Disputant(s)

The presence of a formal alliance is the most obvious and measurable indicator of a cooperative relationship between states, signaling shared interests between a third party and disputants (Morrow 2000). A third party is more likely to become a conflict manager if it is allied with one or both of the disputants since the commitments of alliances change the incentives for intervention (Morrow 1994; Fearon 1997; Favretto 2005). I employ the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions data (Leeds, Ritter, McLaughlin Mitchell, and Long 2002). The variables are coded 1 if the third party has a defensive or offensive alliance with one or both states and zero otherwise. Alliance ties with neither disputant is the comparison category.

Trade Interests with One/Both Disputant(s)

Just as trade levels affect international conflict by reducing the willingness of both sides to fight (Morrow 1999), trade should increase a third party's utility for conflict resolution. Existing studies show trade increases the probability of conflict management (Crescenzi et al. 2005) but has no impact on US interventions (Regan 2000). I employ a dichotomized version of Barbieri's (1996) international trade data.¹⁶ The variables are coded 1 if the states have above the original data's mean level of trade and zero otherwise. Trade ties to neither disputant is the comparison category.

Democratic Ties with One/Both Disputant(s)

Another source of cooperation is joint democracy, as a strong democratic community has been shown to increase the likelihood of third-party management and the probability that it is successful (Mitchell 2002; Mitchell, Kadera, and Crescenzi 2008). This variable is coded one if the third party and one/both disputant(s) are both mature democracies and scored at least a six based on the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).¹⁷ Democratic ties with neither disputant is the comparison category.

Geographic Ties with One/Both Disputant(s)

Studies have shown links between geopolitical interests and the occurrence of conflict management (Crescenzi et al. 2005; Kathman Forthcoming). This measures whether the distance between third party and disputant capitals are <1,000 miles for one or both states, according to the Gleditsch and Ward (2001). Geographic ties to neither is the comparison category.

Colony

Colonial powers have been shown to be particularly likely to manage conflicts in their colonies (Bercovitch and Schneider 2000). Such states have both a shared history and significant political and economic ties (Greig 2005). This is a dummy variable if the third party has colonial ties to at least one of the disputants, according to Correlates of War contiguity data (The Correlates of War 2 Project).

Previous Dispute with Disputant

Those states that have a history of conflict with one or both disputants should be especially unlikely to offer management. This is a dummy variable coded according to the *Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes* data (Maoz 2005).¹⁸

Explanatory Variables: Measuring Probability of Success

Third parties take account for the probability that their actions will lead to an agreement before getting involved as a manager. Third parties observe the

¹⁶ This variable is the sum of the value of merchandise that State A or B (a disputant) imports from State C (the third party) plus the value that State C imports from State A or B in millions of current US dollars.

¹⁷ I also examine the relationship between previous colonial powers and their colonies as a possible explanation of management decisions. However, colonies are no more likely to receive management than other states, which is in line with previous findings (Greig 2005).

¹⁸ Ideally, *Colony* and *Previous Dispute with Disputant* would be coded similarly to the other relational variables, but the small N for countries with colonial ties or previous disputes with both disputants would make these variables drop out of the model. I therefore account for colonial or dispute-ridden relationships between the third party and one or both disputants.

nature of the conflict and conflict management history, using this information to estimate their probability of launching an effective conflict management effort. Disputants that have previously worked with a manager are more likely to be managed, since this indicates to potential managers that both sides see the possibility for a settlement (Greig and Regan 2008). I employ the following measures of the probability of success.¹⁹

Number of Previous Management Efforts

Whereas the occurrence of previous management signals “important” disputes, the likelihood of success decreases the greater the number of previous attempts. This is a count variable of the number of previous management attempts, according to the TPI (Frazier and Dixon 2006) and ICM (Bercovitch 1999a) data.

Managed Last Year

Coded 1 if the potential manager managed the conflict in the previous year, according to the TPI (Frazier and Dixon 2006) and ICM (Bercovitch 1999a) data.

Previous Agreement/No Agreement

A potential manager that has previously managed the dispute has clear and demonstrated interests in resolving it, as it has already made an investment in doing so. This dummy variable measures whether the third party has managed the dispute before and whether the management created an agreement or not, based on the TPI (Frazier and Dixon 2006) and ICM (Bercovitch 1999a) definitions of success. The comparison category is no management attempt by the potential manager.²⁰

Other Third-party Agreement/No Agreement

A history of third-party-created agreements shows that third parties can impact the conflict. A third party may still act despite that lack of success in other actors’ attempts to manage a conflict, perhaps thinking themselves to be more effective managers. That management has occurred at all signals an “important” dispute, thereby making it more likely that other efforts occur. This variable is coded 1 if another third party has successfully/unsuccessfully managed the dispute before and zero otherwise, based on the TPI (Frazier and Dixon 2006) and ICM (Bercovitch 1999a) definitions of success. The comparison category is no management attempt by another third party.

Explanatory Variables: Measuring the Cost of Management

Much of the existing literature on management occurrence speaks to the role disputant characteristics and conflict stalemates play in whether a conflict is managed (Greig 2005; Gartner and Bercovitch 2006; Svensson 2006; Beardsley 2010). My theoretical argument shows that such characteristics affect the supply of management, or third-party decision process, by affecting the costs of

¹⁹ These measures also help me to approximate whether the effort is likely to be multilateral, or include the cooperation of the disputants.

²⁰ I also tested the role of third-party fatalities as a conflict manager, but this does not significantly impact management occurrence.

management. Costlier conflicts will require less third-party action for the disputant utility for resolution to outweigh its utility for fighting.

Previous Dispute

Reoccurring disputes are extremely costly to the disputants, making the disputants more willing to work with a conflict manager and management therefore less costly. The variable is a dummy coded one if the disputants have been in previous conflicts with each other and zero otherwise, according to the *Dyadic Militarized Interstate Disputes* data (Maoz 2005).

Disputant Contiguity

Disputes between contiguous states have a high potential for escalation (Holsti 1991; Vasquez 1995), which likely makes disputants more willing to work with third parties and management should be less costly (Greig 2005). This is a dummy variable coded 1 if the disputants are directly contiguous, according to the *Correlates of War Contiguity Data* (Stinnett, Tir, Schafer, Diehl, and Gochman 2002).

Third-Party Capabilities

Before a third party can act, it must have the ability to do so. Third parties with greater capabilities have more numerous foreign policies from which to choose (Clark, Nordstrom, and Reed 2008). This is the third party's capabilities, coded according to *CINC* scores (Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).

Low Democracy Level

Much literature suggests that democratic dyads are more willing to work with third parties (Bercovitch et al. 1991; Dixon 1993; Greig 2005). Management should therefore be less costly in these cases. This is the minimum regime score of the disputants, according to the Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002).²¹

Results and Discussion

I employ a competing risk model of conflict management occurrence using Weibull specification. The model is clustered by dispute and stratified by management type. Table 2 presents the results, which provide substantial support for my hypotheses. The first model is a "pooled" single event model, which does not distinguish among the various risks; the remaining three columns give the estimates of the type-specific hazards (the labels correspond to each of the ways by which a conflict can be managed).

A comparison of the pooled risks to the competing risk estimates shows that the two approaches yield different results regarding the impact of a covariate on when conflict management occurs. In most cases, the signs on coefficients are the same in the pooled and submodels; the pooled model does not differentiate among event types and therefore only represents an "average" effect (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004).

I first examine how the utility for resolution effects when conflict management occurs. I argue that third parties with a high utility for conflict resolution, measured in terms of ties to the disputants, should quickly step in to manage a

²¹ I also tested a control for management activities during the Cold War. This was insignificant, which is a finding in line with previous findings (Regan 2000).

TABLE 2. Weibull Competing Risks Model of Conflict Management, 1945–2000

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Pooled</i>	<i>Economic</i>	<i>Diplomatic</i>	<i>Verbal</i>
Utility for resolution	1.0931 (0.1936) ***	1.3281 (0.2101) ***	0.1160 (0.2522)	-0.1427 (0.2514)
Alliance ties with one disputant	0.1163 (0.2338)	-0.0925 (0.2768)	0.8596 (0.5883)	1.5098 (0.7102) **
Alliance ties with both disputants	-0.1467 (0.2486)	-0.4861 (0.2857) *	0.3875 (0.3712)	0.7988 (0.5946)
Trade interests with one disputant	0.2697 (0.2176)	0.4897 (0.2223) **	-0.7172 (0.8087)	-0.3261 (0.9000)
Trade interests with both disputants	0.7563 (0.1618) ***	0.6567 (0.1896) ***	1.4965 (0.2919) ***	0.8421 (0.3051) ***
Democratic ties with one disputant	0.2706 (0.2014)	0.2211 (0.2265)	0.1104 (0.3748)	0.2395 (0.3510)
Democratic ties with both disputants	0.9300 (0.1357) ***	0.9694 (0.1645) ***	1.1347 (0.2180) ***	0.7323 (0.2490) ***
Geographic ties with one disputant	1.6663 (0.1635) ***	1.8452 (0.1897) ***	1.1101 (0.2982) ***	0.7792 (0.3702) **
Geographic ties with both disputants	0.5719 (0.2338) **	0.2182 (0.3356)	1.4213 (0.3615) ***	1.2705 (0.5184) **
Colony	1.3889 (0.0830) ***	1.5453 (0.0892) ***	-0.3005 (0.3842)	-0.0174 (0.4538)
Previous dispute with disputant				
Probability of success	0.0098 (0.0149)	0.0167 (0.0162)	-0.0388 (0.0120) ***	-0.0115 (0.0090)
Number of previous management efforts	0.3140 (0.1490) **	0.3638 (0.1591) **	-0.2151 (0.5834)	-0.5990 (0.9916)
Managed last year	0.5975 (0.2222) ***	-0.8582 (0.4424) *	2.2460 (0.2775) ***	1.0643 (0.4050) ***
Previous agreement	0.3827 (0.1797) **	-0.5617 (0.2471) **	1.9352 (0.3770) ***	2.3008 (0.3301) ***
Previous no agreement	2.2053 (0.3483) ***	-1.0678 (0.6699)	4.0909 (0.4039) ***	4.1009 (0.4955) ***
Other third-party agreement	0.1407 (0.4526)	-1.0109 (0.4507) **	1.6110 (0.6876) **	1.7989 (0.6368) ***
Other third-party no agreement				
Cost of management				
Previous dispute	-0.5130 (0.2299) **	-0.5766 (0.2584) **	-0.5892 (0.4063)	0.7217 (0.5331)
Disputants contiguous	1.0709 (0.1735) ***	1.0859 (0.2012) ***	1.4304 (0.3214) ***	0.3648 (0.3394)
Low democracy level	-0.0301 (0.0117) ***	-0.0307 (0.0128) **	-0.0565 (0.0238) **	0.0080 (0.0223)
Third-party capabilities	6.3979 (0.9774) ***	6.1231 (1.1411) ***	7.6620 (1.4879) ***	8.4803 (1.5279) ***
Log-likelihood	-22680.385	-18187.026	-3555.3548	-2732.386
N	201,946	201,946	201,946	201,946
N (failures)	5212	4152	649	411

(Notes. Clustered by dispute. Efron method for ties. Robust standard error in parentheses; significance tests are one tailed, * $p \leq .05$; ** $p \leq .01$; *** $p \leq .001$.)

dispute. There is interesting variation across the models. In the pooled and verbal models, third parties that have an alliance with both disputants act more quickly than those without alliance ties. Alliance ties to both [one] disputants increase the risk of verbal management by 150%. Conversely, alliance ties to one disputant have an increased risk of employing economic management. This finding indicates that biased third parties, when measured in terms of alliance patterns, take economic actions more quickly than those without alliance ties to the dispute or those with ties to both disputants. Unbiased third parties are more likely to employ diplomatic and verbal management techniques. The results support previous studies showing that alliances affect third-party decisions to mediate (Regan 2000; Crescenzi et al. 2005).

Bias, measured in terms of trade, does not have a strong impact on the timing of third-party management activities except in the model of economic management. Generally, third parties that trade with one or both disputants act as conflict managers neither more slowly nor more quickly than other third parties. The lack of findings for the trade relationship is consistent with previous research (Regan 2000). Trade ties do affect the use of economic management, likely because economic techniques will be more successful in these circumstances. Trade ties to both disputants increase the risk of economic management by 49%, and trade ties to one decrease the probability of management 48%.

Democratic ties have a strong effect on management that is similar across all models. Third parties that are democratic manage disputes more quickly if one of the disputants is a democracy than if neither disputant is a democracy. Democratic ties increase the risk of management by 76%, of economic management by 66%, of diplomatic management by 150%, and of verbal management by 84%. However, democratic ties do not significantly affect the timing of management efforts if both disputants are democracies. This also suggests that biased third parties act as managers more quickly than unbiased ones.

Examining geographic ties provides further support for the role bias has on management timing. Third parties that are geographically proximate to one or both of the disputants are quicker to manage a conflict than those third parties that are not proximate to either state; this effect is significant in predicting the timing of each management technique. In the pooled, economic, and verbal models, I find that third parties act more quickly if they have geographic ties to both states than when they have biased ties. Conversely, in the diplomatic model, the effect of ties to one state is slightly stronger.

Third parties that have colonial ties to one disputant are also timelier in their attempts to manage disputes than those without previous colonial ties. It seems that colonial ties decrease the time to diplomatic and verbal efforts, a finding that is likely due to the existence of communication lines and political ties that remain from colonial times (Greig and Regan 2008).

A previous dispute between the third party and one disputant decreases the time until the occurrence of economic management. This variable is only significant in predicting the time to economic management, likely since economic efforts typically "punish" disputants more than other management types.

I argue that the probability of successful management, measured with conflict management history, also explains when and how management occurs. The greater the number of previous management efforts, the greater the amount of time a conflict goes on before diplomatic efforts are employed. Whether management previously took place appears to have a greater influence on when and how management occurs again than how numerous or recent previous efforts were. Whether the potential manager has managed the conflict before, it will use diplomatic and verbal methods of management more quickly, regardless of whether previous efforts generated an agreement. The same results are true if other third parties have managed the conflict. One potential explanation of

these findings is that conflicts with a history of management are the “important” ones (thus, this finding relates to those on the utility for conflict resolution). Another possibility is that the probability of successful management is higher when the conflict has been managed before. This is because management efforts are not independent of one another, but rather previous efforts generate an increased understanding of the dispute and disputants. However, the opposite is true when examining economic methods: previous involvement increases the time until economic methods of management are employed. This is likely because the effects of previous diplomatic and verbal efforts can accumulate, whereas the same is not necessarily true of economic sanctions.

Finally, I examine the conditions that likely influence the cost of management. I argue that conflicts that are more costly to manage should increase the time until third-party management and the use of diplomatic techniques. The findings on how costs affect management timing are generally similar across management types, albeit with variations in significance. Previous disputes between the disputants, which should signal a costly conflict, increase the time to management in the pooled, economic, and diplomatic models, although this is only significant in the economic model. The results show that disputes are more likely to receive third-party management, specifically diplomatic and economic efforts, quickly if the disputants are contiguous. The finding is likely a product of the tendency of disputes between contiguous states to escalate (Holsti 1991; Vasquez 1995). The potential for escalation likely makes disputants more willing to work with third parties, which is in accordance with my theoretical argument (Greig 2005). More powerful third parties take less time before acting to manage a conflict, as these actors have a greater ability to absorb the costs of acting. This finding holds across all management techniques. The lower the minimum democracy score of the dyad, the more slow a third party is to manage the conflict. If we combine this finding with the above one, we can say that democratic third parties take less time to act when one disputant is democratic but more time to act if the disputing dyad has a high minimum democracy level. These findings are in accordance with previous research, which has found that disputant contiguity (Greig 2005), relative regime score (Greig and Diehl 2006; Terris and Maoz 2005; Dixon 1993, 1994), and third-party capabilities (Clark et al. 2008) impact foreign policy decisions and the occurrence of conflict management.²²

These findings reveal interesting observations about the conflict management decision process. Strong ties between the third party and one disputant lead to the timely use of economic and diplomatic management techniques. These techniques are more costly to employ than verbal efforts, and only those third parties with strong, one-sided relationships are willing to undertake such costs. Biased third parties tend to act more quickly, especially when democratic ties are involved. With an increased history of management, and thereby probability of success, verbal and diplomatic efforts are used more quickly. Finally, I find that third parties are slow to act when management is costly and when the third party has little ability to absorb such costs.

Figure 1 shows the influence the shape parameter (σ) has on the hazard estimates. When σ is 1, the hazard is constant over time or takes the form of a horizontal line. The relative flatness of each method of management (but especially economic management) reflects the estimate for σ is not significantly <1 in the model. Greater time dependence is reflected with the steeper slope in the hazard curve for diplomatic and verbal efforts. The graph suggests that the hazard

²² As robustness check, I run the same model using a Cox specification and generate similar results. I test the proportional hazards assumption based on scaled Schoenfeld residuals, but the global test and several variables violate the proportional hazard assumption, indicating that the hazard rate is not constant over time. Weibull specification is therefore more appropriate.




FIG 1. Estimated Hazards for Verbal, Diplomatic, and Economic Management

(Notes. Figure plots estimated hazards of verbal, diplomatic, and economic management at the mean levels of independent variables.)

of economic increases slightly across the course of a dispute, but economic techniques are only employed in conflicts that last under 10 years. Both verbal and diplomatic efforts decrease slightly as a conflict continues. The longer a conflict goes on, the less likely management is to occur. The relative hazard of each type of management is also of interest, as diplomatic and verbal efforts have a much greater hazard than economic management efforts.

Although the effects outlined in these findings may appear very modest, they are larger in substantive terms. Since hazard probabilities are conditional on survival to that time, the hazard of management is reevaluated for each year that a dispute continues. Hazards will therefore have cumulative effects over the years. Additionally, since the hazards discussed are probabilities for each third-party dispute, one way of calculating the probability that a dispute is managed is to sum the hazard rates for each third party (if we assume third-party management probabilities are independent). What might appear to be small changes in the hazard for a specific third party (especially changes that would impact all third parties, such as those in terms of management history or dispute characteristics) can therefore reflect substantial changes in the likelihood that a conflict is managed from year to year.

Conclusion

There are several explanations of President Roosevelt's decision to finally manage the conflict between Russia and Japan. First, Roosevelt had been carefully monitoring the costs of the conflict to the disputants and acted when they were financially drained and split internally. Thus, the conflict management effort took place once the conflict had largely become intractable and the disputants were looking for resolution. The war weariness of the disputants also helps explain the choice to employ diplomacy, as the disputants were willing to cooperate with Roosevelt. Second, Roosevelt felt US trade interests in China might be jeopardized if the conflict were allowed to continue or if an agreement were made without Roosevelt's involvement. It is clear Roosevelt was aware of the both

the costs and potential benefits of acting as a conflict manager. Fearing possible loss of face should his efforts fail, he waited until the Russo-Japanese War had gone on over a year and a half and caused an estimated 130,000 casualties, thereby minimizing risks (Jukes 2002). The realization of the benefits of successful conflict management is clear, as he is quoted as describing the 1905 treaty as “a mighty good thing for Russia and a mighty good thing for Japan and it’s a mighty good thing for me too!” (Morris 2001).

It is possible to create a systematic explanation for which conflicts receive the interest of outside parties and the variation in the timing and techniques of conflict management activities. Employing expected utility logic, I argue that third-party efforts are the result of policymakers’ utility of obtaining a settlement, the expected costs of involvement, and the probability that their efforts will be successful. This theoretical model allows me to develop hypotheses about the timing of third-party conflict management and the techniques employed. The empirical results provide support for my theoretical argument. One of the most significant and original findings in the analyses is the major role that the nature of the relationship between third parties and the disputants plays on the supply of conflict management. I find that third parties with ties to one of the disputants are more likely to act quickly than third parties with ties to both disputants or those without ties to a disputant. Such biased third parties are quick to offer management services and to employ economic and diplomatic techniques. Direct alliance, democratic, geographic, and colonial ties encourage timely conflict management. This is because direct ties create accountability for a third party and increase its utility for seeing a conflict resolved. These are the first cross-national findings on how the third party’s relationship with the disputants impacts the third party’s decision to intervene in an international conflict. The relationship with disputants is arguably the most important part of a third party’s decision calculus and has thus far remained unexamined in the literature. As most studies of conflict management focus exclusively on the characteristics of the conflict and the disputants, these results suggest we have ignored a significant portion of the conflict management puzzle.

I also find that third parties take into account the conflict management history and cost of the conflict before getting involved. My findings also contribute to the debate on the types of conflicts in which management occurs (Terris and Maoz 2005; Gartner and Bercoitch 2006). While much of this debate surrounds whether managers act in easy or difficult cases, I find that third parties are more likely to supply management when there is a history of management, regardless of whether it was successful or not. These results provide support for the cumulative effect of management efforts, especially in the use of diplomatic management. Additionally, I find support for the argument that third parties choose to manage the conflicts they think they will be able to resolve (Regan and Stam 2000; Young 1967; Zartman 2000).

Future research should further explore the relationship between third parties and disputants and examine how other aspects of this relationship, along with the conflict and conflict management history, impact the occurrence and timing of third-party conflict management efforts. The role domestic politics and public opinion play should also be further explored, as these have been shown to impact US policy decisions (Regan 2000). Another interesting extension of this research would be to examine the implications of the model for the outcomes of third-party conflict management efforts.

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