Shaming the Corporation:

Globalization, Reputation, and the Dynamics of Anti-Corporate Movements

Tim Bartley
Indiana University

Curtis Child
Indiana University

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Abstract

Corporations have become common targets of activism, but social movement research has barely begun to unpack the dynamics of anti-corporate campaigning. To address this gap, we theorize how particular companies get constituted as social movement targets and examine this process using a unique longitudinal, firm-level dataset on the apparel and footwear industry and its intersection with the anti-sweatshop movement of the 1990s. Firms on the leading edge of globalization are found to have an increased likelihood of becoming targets of "naming and shaming" campaigns. Yet the likelihood of becoming a target also depends on how "shamable" a company is based on its position and reputation in an organizational field. Characteristics that are usually treated as assets for business—such as a strong public image, a good reputation within the business community, and positive market performance—are found to attract social movement pressure. The analysis provides systematic evidence of how large, branded consumer products firms became arguably the central site of struggle over globalization and labor rights at the turn of the 21st century.

Contemporary social movements routinely take aim at corporations. From environmental, animal rights, and public health campaigns attacking McDonalds, to attempts to attach the sweatshop stigma to Nike, to conservative Christian boycotts of "gay friendly" companies like Disney, activists have repeatedly put corporations in the political spotlight. In the process, they have reinvigorated debates about the responsibilities of corporations within and across borders. Influenced by the rise of retail-driven commodity chains (Gereffi 1994), the growth of "political consumerist" market segments (Micheletti 2003), an "eclipse of the state" ideology (Seidman 2007), and the growing sphere of transnational corporations' influence, the strategy of "naming and shaming" the corporation is now common in many social movement fields (Bandy and Smith 2005; Baron 2003; Carmin and Balser 2002; Crossley 2002; King, Lenox and Barnett 2002; King and Soule 2007; Manheim 2001; O'Rourke 2005; Raeburn 2004; Rodríguez-Garavito 2005; Schurman 2004; Spar and LaMure 2003).

Although corporations are frequent social movement targets, not all companies are equally at risk, even when a wide swath of firms or an entire industry is "guilty" of the practices activists are challenging. Why do some companies become prominent targets of anti-corporate campaigns, while others largely "fly under the radar?" This process of turning particular organizations into focal points of social movement pressure—which we call the "constitution of targets"—has implications for movement trajectories, patterns of public attention, and the institutional environments of firms. Although it has received little systematic attention to date, it is ripe for sociological analysis. Occasionally, major catastrophes immediately and obviously thrust particular companies into the spotlight—as with Union Carbide after the Bhopal disaster or Exxon after the Valdez oil spill. More commonly, however, the problems that animate social movements are systemic and hidden, such that no responsible actor automatically comes to the fore. We argue that publicly linking particular actors to systemic problems is an important part of what social movements do. Movements matter not only because they influence public policy (Burstein and Linton 2002), generate new organizational forms (Rao, Morrill and Zald 2000), or forge civil society networks (Diani and McAdam 2003), but also because they force particular kinds of actors into the spotlight and make them focal points for the redress of grievances and the enforcement of rights. Traditionally, governments have been the sites of such claims-making, but as Davis and Zald (2005) note, corporations now appear similar to polities, "subject to challenges both from within (by the 'citizens' who work for them) and from without (by activists and consumers)" (p.347).

We examine the constitution of corporate targets in the anti-sweatshop movement of the 1990s—a site of intense corporate campaigning, a model for activism elsewhere, and a case for which detailed data on social movement campaigns is available. Sociologists have built a rich case study literature on anti-sweatshop campaigns (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Bartley 2005; Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000; Brooks 2007; Collins 2003; Esbenshade 2004; Rodríguez-Garavito 2005; Seidman 2007), but the insights of these studies have not yet been integrated into the mainstream of social movement theory and research. Furthermore, because the case studies typically focus on a small number of companies that *have* become targets, they are unable to assess whether particular factors differentiate targets from non-targets across an entire industry.[1]

Labor rights and anti-sweatshop groups targeted a number of apparel and footwear manufacturers and retailers over conditions in their supply chains during the 1990s, but not all firms were targeted equally. Nike faced such intense pressure that its CEO admitted that the company "has become synonymous with slave wages, forced overtime and arbitrary abuse" (qtd. in Cushman 1998), but some of its competitors largely escaped this fate. While activists branded the Gap with the sweatshop stigma, peers like Abercrombie and Fitch were left virtually untouched. Phillips Van Heusen was repeatedly pressured to improve conditions in its factories, while a competitor like Haggar was not. To explain the conditions under which particular firms are likely to become targets of activist campaigns, we utilize longitudinal, firm-level data on the apparel and footwear industry from 1993-2000. This dataset includes firms that were not targeted, as well as smaller campaigns that are typically neglected in the case study literature. In this way, we seek to expand upon case study and anecdotal treatments of anti-corporate campaigning (e.g., Klein 1999; Spar and LaMure 2003) and take heed of Schurman's (2004) call for research to "identify more precisely which sorts of industry characteristics matter most for social movements . . . and to what extent generalizations can be made" (p.263).

Examining corporations as targets of activism helps to fill a conspicuous gap in the literature on social movements. Social movement theory has shifted from a traditional focus on domestic political mobilization to cross-national comparisons (McAdam, McCarthy and Zald 1996; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001) and examination of transnational activism (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Tarrow 2005). But even as the literature has evolved with changes in activism, it has remained remarkably state-centered. The assumption of states as focal points is built into McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly's (2001) very definition of "contentious politics" as collective struggles in which "at least one *government* is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party of the claims" (p.5, emphasis added). Similarly, Keck and Sikkink's oft-cited "boomerang effect" in transnational politics describes a situation in which blocked access to a national government leads activists to appeal to *different governments* or *intergovernmental* organizations.[2] The tendency to assume the state and overlook other targets may reflect not only the state-centeredness of much social movement theory (Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; Polletta and

Jasper 2001) but also the traditional marginalization of labor movements—which have targeted firms for centuries—from the mainstream of social movement research.[3] This sidelining of labor issues is beginning to change, as movement scholars expand their scope and as unions adopt aggressive organizing strategies that some have dubbed “social movement unionism” (Clawson 2003; Lopez 2004; Voss and Fantasia 2004; Voss and Sherman 2000).

In the popular discourse, anti-corporate movements have not so much been overlooked as they have been treated as essentially automatic responses to economic globalization. This argument comes both from both free-market enthusiasts, who equate anti-sweatshop hysteria with protectionist interests of American unions (e.g., Bhagwati 2004; Friedman 2005) and from movement sympathizers on the left, who treat protest as popular resistance to rising global corporate power (e.g., Brecher, Costello and Smith 2000). While our findings support the idea that anti-sweatshop activism is rooted in part in the globalization of production, we seek to move away from images of an *automatic* backlash to instead problematize and investigate the linkages between large-scale reconfigurations of production and the spotlighting of particular kinds of actors (i.e., big, “branded” corporations) more than others (e.g., governments) as linchpins in the configuration (and by implication, the reconfiguration) of the neoliberal globalization project.

CORPORATIONS AS POLITIES: PUTTING CAMPAIGNS IN CONTEXT

Even at earlier points in time, social movements have frequently targeted corporations, from the anti-chain store protests of the Progressive era to the anti-apartheid movement of the early 1980s (Ingram and Rao 2004; Keck and Sikkink 1998). Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor’s (2004) analysis of movements from 1968 to 1975 shows that almost half of protest activity was directed at targets other than the state, including firms, universities, and public opinion. Similarly, Walker et al. (2008) identify earlier waves of corporate targeting, and Luders (2006) shows how boycotts and other protest directed at firms fueled the civil rights movement. Nearly 30 years ago, Vogel (1978) observed that reformers were now "lobbying the corporation as well as the government" (p. 3) and highlighted the leadership of civil rights groups and religiously-based shareholder activists in this arena. Unions have waged strikes and demonstrations for years, and since the 1980s, have been at the forefront of multi-pronged "corporate campaigns" that supplement strikes and worker organizing by building pressure through the media, shareholders, and community organizations—a tactical innovation Manheim (2001) traces to the New Left.

Still, it was during the 1990s that the anti-corporate campaign became especially central to the repertoire of contention in many social movement fields. Many environmentalists came to devote most of their energies to targeting companies (e.g. Burger King, The Home Depot), while others engaged in "partnerships" with firms seeking protection from more aggressive efforts (e.g. Environmental Defense and McDonalds) (Bartley 2007; Hendry 2006; Lenox and Eesley 2006; Sasser 2003). Conservative groups also campaigned against particular corporations, such as AT&T for supporting Planned Parenthood (Himmelstein 1997) and Disney and American Airlines for offering benefits to same-sex partners (Duncan and Lock 2001). Every one of the twenty largest American corporations (in 2007) faced some type of social movement pressure in the previous decade, often from *multiple* movements. Wal-Mart, for instance, not only became a major target of labor rights protests, but has faced pressure from Native American activists over the building of stores on burial grounds, campaigns by animal rights groups over animal testing, pressure from women's rights groups over refusal to carry the "morning after" pill, and protests from *both* "family values" and civil liberties groups over sales and censorship of media products, to give just a few examples. Chevron has faced protests focused not only on global warming and coastal drilling, but also on oil spills and violence in Nigeria, the wars in Iraq, prison labor in California, and planned construction projects in Chad, Cameroon, and Ecuador. Activists have confronted Citigroup over controversial coal, natural gas, oil, and forest investments in Peru, Papua New Guinea, Colombia, and Thailand, and over its executives' membership in the men-only Augusta National Country Club. Hewlett Packard's interactions with activists have ranged from anti-toxins campaigns to anti-gay rights pressures (from conservative Christian groups) to consumer privacy concerns.[4]

Labor rights advocates ratcheted the domestic "corporate campaigns" of the 1980s up to the global level in the 1990s, with unions, religious organizations, and human rights groups mobilizing around sweatshops and cross-border solidarity. While this model of labor rights campaigning has diffused to agriculture (e.g., tomato farmworkers targeting Taco Bell), consumer electronics (e.g., exposés of sweatshops for Apple iPods), and other industries, it gained traction primarily in the apparel and footwear industry. Companies certainly took note of this pressure, worrying about the "sweatshop stigma" (Bobbin 1997) and searching for ways of "muzzling the offshore watchdogs" (Rolnick 1997). Between 1993 and 2000, industry attention was nearly as often focused on social movements as on governments. Out of nearly 1500 articles related to the politics of labor in the two leading trade journals (*Bobbin* and *Women's Wear Daily*), 28% mentioned social movement activity, while 31% mentioned government intervention. As Figure 1 shows, movement activity in the apparel industry peaked in 1997, and over time an increasing number of firms found themselves at the center of controversy, charged with complicitity in underpayment, abuse, or intimidation of production workers, often employed by contractors or subcontractors in the U.S. or abroad. While industry actors often attributed problems to a few "bad apples," sociologists have argued persuasively that labor rights violations are systemic and rooted in the structure of production in highly competitive, labor-intensive industries (Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000). Apparel production has long been a "low road" industry, prone to "sweating" its workforce (Piore 1997). Declining unionization and increasing globalization have exacerbated that tendency and broken down previous social compacts (Esbenshade 2004).

[FIGURE 1 HERE]

Several unions, labor rights, and human rights groups led the charge to make a clear link in the public consciousness between particular firms and the dark side of neoliberal globalization. The Union of Needletrades, Industrial, and Textile Employees (UNITE) was the most frequent sponsor, forging coalitions of religious, community, and human rights groups to target Guess, Leslie Fay, and others over labor relations in their domestic factories and to pressure companies like Phillips Van Heusen and Liz Claiborne to support (or at least not repress) nascent union movements in foreign factories.[5] The champion of the global anti-corporate campaign was the National Labor Committee, a small New York-based group that exposed harassment, child labor, and unsafe conditions in factories in El Salvador, China, and Bangladesh producing for the Gap, Wal-Mart, Disney, and others. Armed with a camera and a keen ability to generate media attention, the NLC "shamed the apparel industry into taking stock of its labor practices" (Krupat 1997), most memorably in exposing Honduran and American sweatshops producing Kathie Lee Gifford's line of clothing.[6] Either UNITE or the NLC had some role in most anti-sweatshop campaigns, but others also played important roles, including Global Exchange, Sweatshop Watch, United Students Against Sweatshops, and a variety of religious, immigrant, and workers' organizations.

THEORIZING THE TARGETS

Much social movement research has assumed the targets of activism—that is, taken the state as the obvious locus of protest. The recognition of a wider array of venues and evolving social movement strategies calls for additional theoretical development. To develop hypotheses about the constitution of corporate targets, we draw on several bodies of knowledge—including case-based insights into the anti-sweatshop movement or other anti-corporate campaigns (e.g., Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Klein 1999; Vogel 2005), pioneering attempts to extend the logic of political opportunity structures to theorize "industry/economic opportunity structures" in social movement research (Luders 2006; Schurman 2004), and more general theories of organizational behavior. We suggest two broad classes of hypotheses: One roots anti-sweatshop targeting in struggles over the globalization of production. The other considers how exogenous opportunities and contextual factors shape the venues in which mobilization occurs—suggesting, in this case, that the opportunities for targeting corporations may be rooted in a firm's position and reputation in an organizational field.

Production Practices and the Politics of Globalization

Many observers argue that anti-sweatshop campaigns arise from collective grievances rooted in globalization and industry restructuring. Supply chains for apparel and footwear globalized dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s, with the total volume of apparel and textile imports to the U.S. nearly tripling between 1989 and 2000 (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, Office of Textiles and Apparel).[7] This shift spurred concerns about the decline of U.S. manufacturing and a possible "race to the bottom" in international labor conditions (Bair and Gereffi 2003; Chan and Ross 2003). Not all firms participated equally in this trend, however. Some quickly came to rely almost exclusively on products manufactured by contractors in Southeast Asia, Latin

America, and the Caribbean, while others were slower to shift away from manufacturing facilities in the U.S.

One might expect this difference to shape which firms become social movement targets, for several reasons. First, labor rights groups may want to *punish* the leading globalizers as a way to contest the migration of production to locations with low wages, weak unions, and lax enforcement of labor law. By some accounts—including those preferred by neoclassical economists—attacking firms for sweatshops could be a way for organized labor or other domestic constituencies to counteract cost advantages of global sourcing and protect domestic industries (Basu 1999; Bhagwati 2004). Second, firms dependent on global supply chains may simply face a higher likelihood of being linked to exploitative practices, given extensive poverty, cutthroat competition, and weak or non-existent regulation in the countries where their production is occurring (Bonacich et al. 1994). This does not mean that exploitation translates directly into mobilization, nor that harsh practices are absent in domestic manufacturing, only that globalization increases the risk of companies being linked to exploitation. Third, firms reliant on global production may face a risk of getting pulled into domestic political struggles in the countries where their production is occurring, as Armbruster-Sandoval (2005) found in case studies of struggles in Latin American factories. By all these accounts, one would expect that

> *H1: Firms on the leading edge of the globalization of the industry are more likely than others to become targets of activism.*

It is also possible that anti-sweatshop resistance is rooted not in globalization, per se, but in job losses in the U.S., regardless of whether these result from capital mobility, technological change, or changing consumer tastes. Research on restructuring in the U.S. apparel industry illustrates dramatic changes both in the organization of production and in the number of

American workers employed in this sector (Mittelhauser 1997; Taplin 1995). Intimations or actions to shut down factories or otherwise reduce employment in the U.S. may constitute serious and concentrated economic threats, which have been shown to spur reactive social movement mobilization in some contexts (McVeigh 1999; Van Dyke and Soule 2002). If job losses are driving anti-corporate movements, then

H2: Downsizing of the workforce should increase the likelihood of a firm becoming a target of activism.

Both of these hypotheses identify collective grievances that may lie behind anti-corporate movements. Although simple grievance arguments are often suspect for their reductionist assumptions about the process of mobilization (as are arguments that fully ignore grievances), if cast in probabilistic and operationalizable terms, they are useful for building a fully sociological account of the constitution of targets. We assume, echoing early statements of resource mobilization theory (McCarthy and Zald 1977), that the world contains a large number of grievances around which mobilization could occur. But these grievances are not distributed evenly. The hypotheses above suggest that measurable features of production practices shape companies' proximity to major social dislocations and collective grievances and thus their likelihood of being implicated in social movement campaigns.[8]

Opportunities and the Double-Edged Sword of Market Status

Prior research has shown how cross-national differences in political opportunities shaped anti-nuclear activists' choice of venue (Campbell 2005; Kitschelt 1986), how political opportunities shaped the level of mobilization of old age movements across U.S. states in the 1930s (Amenta and Zylan 1991), and how city-level opportunities affected which American cities experienced protests in the late 1960s (Eisinger 1973). We argue, following the lead of

Schurman (2004) and Luders (2006), that one can also identify features of firms and industries that shape the opportunities for mobilization.

Perhaps the central insight of the emerging literature on anti-corporate campaigns is that firms' attempts to make their brands meaningful, build reputations, and otherwise distinguish themselves from competitors provide new openings for social movements (King, Lenox and Barnett 2002; Klein 1999; Schurman 2004; Spar and LaMure 2003). Put another way, the strategy of "naming and shaming" corporations is made possible by firms becoming "shamable"—that is, developing a deep interest in their image, reputation, and social standing. Theorists of shaming as social control have argued that shaming requires not only an investment in reputation—that is, a reliance on external judgments—but also an attentive audience (Benedict 1946; Braithwaite 1989; Creighton 1990; Skeel 2001).[9] This basic insight suggests that the chances of being shamed are linked to recognition and the application of status markers by actors in a firm's organizational field. The organizational field concept draws attention to the variety of actors—consumers, business partners, regulators, consultants, and others—that interact with and evaluate a focal firm on a regular basis (DiMaggio and Powell 1991; Scott 1994).

Positive recognition in an organizational field is usually treated as an asset for businesses. Business scholars have often touted the economic benefits of investing in "reputational capital" (Fombrun 1996; Fombrun and Shanley 1990; Roberts and Dowling 2002). On the other hand, corporate critics have started to highlight the unintended consequences of firms' attempts to expand their reputation and brand image. Naomi Klein's popular book, *No Logo*, for instance, treats corporate image as a site of struggle, arguing that "the more ambitious a company has been in branding the cultural landscape, . . . the more likely it is to have generated a silent battalion of critics waiting to pounce. Moreover, the branding formula leaves corporations wide open to the most obvious tactic in the activist arsenal: bringing a brand's production secrets crashing into its marketing image" (Klein 1999).

Several types of reputational investments could potentially serve to attract social movement pressure. The first has to do with consumers, since as Luders (2006) demonstrates, businesses are differentially sensitive to consumer pressure, and these differences shape where activism is directed. One of the great advertising trends of the 1990s was the rise of "branding," a marketing strategy that attempts to go beyond traditional notions of brand loyalty (i.e., a brand as a sign of quality) to imbue corporate names and images with meaning (i.e., a brand as a part of some larger mythology). A VP of marketing for Starbucks explains the strategy:

> Nike, for example, is leveraging a deep emotional connection that people have with sports and fitness. With Starbucks, we see how coffee has woven itself into the fabric of people's lives, and that's our opportunity for emotional leverage. . . . A great brand raises the bar—it adds a greater sense of purpose to the experience, whether it's the challenge to do your best in sports and fitness or the affirmation that the cup of coffee you're drinking really matters. (qtd. in Klein 1999:21)

Firms that have invested in major branding campaigns may make better social movement targets, since activists can play off a company's fame and public image to build awareness of their cause among consumers. Activists may expect these sorts of firms to be responsive to external pressures in order to protect their reputational investments. Conversely, activists are unlikely to wage campaigns against obscure companies, around which it would be much harder to generate consumer awareness (Lenox and Eesley 2006). By this logic,

> *H3: Companies that have engaged in especially large or innovative marketing campaigns are more likely to become targets of activism.*

Consumers are not the only relevant audience, however. Organizational and economic sociologists have shown that firms can be concerned with their standing and legitimacy in a way that is relatively distant from the demands of end consumers. As Fombrun and Shanley (1990) put it, "just as firms compete for consumers, so also do they vie for reputational status" (p.234). Firms are attentive not just to consumers, then but also to peers and field-level evaluators—professionals, consultants, investment analysts, and others (Edelman, Uggen and Erlanger 1999; Sutton et al. 1994; Zuckerman 1999). A firm's reputation in the business community can be a highly valued asset, although also one that can quickly be tarnished by scandal. Strategic and "in the know" social movement actors may seek to exploit this source of vulnerability, targeting recognized industry leaders in order to leverage reputational investments into concessions to the campaign, generate a buzz within the business world, or send a message to firms further down the status hierarchy. By this logic,

H4: Firms that have been recognized for a positive reputation in the business community are more likely to become targets of activism.

In addition to firms' consumer-oriented and business-oriented reputational capital, opportunities for shaming the corporation may be shaped by firms' prior commitments to social causes. Corporate claims to be "socially responsible" or "virtuous" may be sources of vulnerability, since they facilitate charges of hypocrisy and open up opportunities for being "hoisted on your own petard" (Himmelstein 1997; Klein 1999; Vogel 2005). The more that corporations have publicly linked themselves to social causes, the better activists will be able to follow Alinsky's (1971) recommendation to make targets "live up to their own book of rules" (p.128). For example, Vogel (2005) notes that "Ford has found itself targeted by activists because its CEO had promised to create a more environmentally responsible automobile company; its competitors, who made no such commitment, have been subject to much less scrutiny" (p.54).[10] Firms' linkages to social causes may be based on particular actions—such as the creation of organizational vehicles for philanthropy—or on a combination of factors that congeal into an external judgment that the firm is "socially responsible." In either case, corporate linkages to social causes may produce opportunities for social movements to highlight contradictions between image and practice. If so, then,

H5a: Commitment to philanthropic activities should raise the likelihood of firms becoming targets of activism.

H5b: Recognition as a "socially responsible" firm should raise the likelihood of firms becoming targets of activism.

Opportunities for targeting firms may also vary with more "objective" standards of corporate status—that is, their performance in the market. Since social movements typically have fewer resources than their targets, they may seek to maximize their impact by hitching their wagon to the strongest firms in an industry. Furthermore, firms with high profit margins may be expected to have more "slack" resources to direct to the problems activists are highlighting (Cyert and March 1992 [1963]; Eesley and Lenox 2006). Conversely, firms with low profit margins or those teetering on the brink of insolvency may be less attractive to activists who are trying to get companies to redress some injustice in the supply chain. For firms, these dynamics could translate into a "liability of success," such that

H6: Firms' market performance will be positively related to their chance of becoming targets of activism.

Of course, factors like reputation, performance, and even globalization may be linked to some degree to the size of the firm, making this an important control variable. (We discuss additional controls in a later section.) Previous research has suggested that size itself may shape the likelihood of firms becoming targets (Hendry 2006; Lenox and Eesley 2006; Rehbein, Waddock and Graves 2004). If activists seek to maximize the impact of their campaigns, then they may simply target the largest, most consequential actors in the market, regardless of their reputation or performance. We therefore expect that

H7: The larger a firm is, the greater its likelihood of becoming a target of activism.

DATA AND METHODS

Our analysis focuses on nearly 150 large, U.S.-based firms in the apparel, textile, and footwear industries, including relevant retailers (i.e., specialty apparel retailers, department stores, and discount retailers that sell apparel). To develop our sample, we used Standard & Poor's Compustat North America Industrial Annual File to generate a list of firms with the appropriate Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes and a minimum of $300 million in either total assets or total sales at any point between 1993 and 2000.[11] Existing research on the anti-sweatshop movement suggests that for "naming and shaming" strategies to even be viable, some basic threshold of size must be reached, making the numerous small apparel contracting shops poor choices for inclusion in an analysis such as ours.[12] As an additional step in identifying the appropriate risk set, we used companies' annual reports to confirm their relevance to apparel, textile, or footwear production.[13]

To measure whether firms were targeted in anti-sweatshop campaigns, we developed a comprehensive database of labor-related movement activity in this industry from 1993 to 2000.[14] While social movement researchers often rely on newspaper reports (especially the *New York Times*) in order to count instances of social movement activity (Earl et al. 2004; Oliver and Maney 2000), we utilized more specialized sources of information to develop a rich dataset on campaigns in one particular sector. We draw on a unique source of data on the apparel industry—the detailed coverage of industry politics provided by the two leading trade journals—*Bobbin* and *Women's Wear Daily* (*WWD*). As the industry's daily newspaper, *WWD* provided especially detailed coverage of social movement activity in and around the industry.[15] We collected 1,467 trade journal articles broadly related to the politics of labor and coded them to generate a record of movement activity targeting particular firms. Social movement activity was operationally defined as any attempt to force change in the labor practices of the industry (or its firms) led by advocacy groups based outside companies, trade associations, or government. In practice, this included protests and demonstrations at stores, leafleting and other non-confrontational demonstrations, union solidarity pickets, and human rights lawsuits.[16] This diversity of activity reflects the multi-faceted character of anti-sweatshop campaigns, which often link organizing efforts at the point of production to broader human rights or social justice concerns, involve coalitions of sponsoring groups, and mobilize multiple forms of pressure on firms. To avoid conflating anti-corporate campaigns with fully localized labor relations, we excluded from our purview cases that were solely about union negotiations in the U.S. and involved only labor unions as sponsors (e.g., a strike by domestic textile workers seeking a new contract). To supplement the trade journal data, we consulted the leading secondary sources on the anti-sweatshop movement for additional and confirmatory information on companies implicated in campaigns (Armbruster-Sandoval 2005; Bonacich and Appelbaum 2000; Louie 2001; Manheim 2001; Ross 1997).[17]

Table 1 shows a summary of companies that were most commonly targeted between 1993 and 2000, as well as some of the companies that were not targeted at all. Overall, 24% of the companies in our sample were targets of social movement activity at some point, and 60% of those were targeted in multiple years. At the upper end of the distribution, companies like Nike, Wal-Mart, The Gap, and Phillips Van Heusen were the targets of activist scrutiny every or nearly every year between 1993 and 2000.

[TABLE 1 HERE]

To explain variation in the rate and frequency with which firms became social movement targets, we utilize (unbalanced) panel models with a binary dependent variable—a yearly indicator of whether a company was a target of social movement activity.[18] We estimated the models using Stata's "xtgee" command, with a logit specification (making it equivalent to a population-averaged logistic regression procedure), using semi-robust standard errors clustered by company to adjust for a lack of independence between the yearly observations for each company. We report complete case analyses and use supplemental models to provide assurance that missing data are not biasing our estimates.

To control for changes over historical time in the underlying rate of firm targeting, we include dummy variables for each year. Substantive knowledge of the case leads us to expect surges in campaigning in two years in particular—1995, when a shocking "slave shop" was uncovered in El Monte, California, and 1999, when allegations over exploitation of immigrant laborers in Saipan led to a series of lawsuits charging corporate complicity. There might also be patterns of temporal dependence that are not merely about underlying shifts over historical time. One possibility is that being a target of activist attention is a "sticky" phenomenon, such that being targeted in the past raises the likelihood of being targeted again. We model this possibility explicitly, using a dummy variable to indicate whether a firm has been targeted in the past. As a further test of temporal dependence, we ran supplemental models using the procedure developed by Beck, Katz, and Turner (1998) to model duration dependence in longitudinal analyses with binary dependent variables.[19] Because these models generate results that are substantively identical to the simpler models described above, we report the simpler models in our tables.

Measurement of independent variables

To assess whether downsizing breeds social movement campaigns (H2), we measure the *percentage change in the company's number of employees* from the previous year, using employment figures from Compustat. Our hypothesis about globalization requires an important but rare measure—namely globalization at the firm level. Social scientists routinely measure the globalization of national economies (e.g., Brady, Beckfield and Seeleib-Kaiser 2005) or entire industry segments (e.g., Feenstra and Hanson 1996), but scholars have rarely measured firms' use of global production networks. To do so, we compiled and coded information from companies' annual reports, which contain useful information about the location of the companies' or its suppliers'/contractors' manufacturing facilities. Bonacich and Waller (1994) used annual reports to draw several portraits of apparel supply chains but did not measure this systematically across the entire industry. We collected annual reports through the SEC's Edgar database and Thomson Research's database of financial filings. We used a series of inclusive full-text searches to identify potentially relevant sections of the reports, read those sections carefully, and skimmed other sections of the report for additional details. Companies typically reported information on the location of their production to shareholders in the course of discussing their operations, facilities, and/or risk factors (including foreign political and financial risks), and given the enthusiasm for global supply chains in the investment community, often touted their foreign production arrangements proudly or, on the other side, sought to justify their reliance on domestic production.

We used this information to code companies' production profile as one of three types: *Leading globalized producers* (H1) are manufacturers or specialty retailers that reported having at least half of their production (by volume or dollar value) occurring in foreign (non-U.S.) factories in 1993 or 1994 (or, in the case of companies that did not exist in those years, in the first year for which Compustat data is available).[20] This includes production done in company-owned facilities or contract factories. *Primarily domestic producers* are those manufacturers or specialty retailers with at least half of their production occurring within the U.S. in 1993 or 1994, again either through owned facilities or contracting relationships (and with the same conditions regarding "private label" products and late entry as above). We treat this group as the reference category in the analyses. Our third category is for *general retailers*—that is, department stores and discount retailers like Wal-Mart, Sears, May Department Stores, and others—that contract out for "private label" apparel or footwear production but also sell non-apparel items. Although these firms often provided insufficient information about production in their annual reports (presumably due to the breadth of their operations), prior research portrays them as driving forces in the globalization of apparel production (Abernathy et al. 1999; Cheng and Gereffi 1994). Writing in 1994, Cheng and Gereffi called these general retailers "a major factor in determining the organization of overseas production" (p. 78) and showed that most American department stores and discounters relied heavily on purchasing offices in Asia.[21] For this reason, we expect this group to face an increased likelihood of being targeted by activists. Companies were assigned to the "generalist retailer" category if they are in SIC 53 (General merchandise stores) and their annual reports indicate a responsibility for the production of "private label" apparel, textiles, or footwear. These three categories provide a reasonable way of capturing differences in firms' production profiles with respect to globalization, given the paucity of preexisting measures. Appendix A provides examples of these production profiles and the bases on which we have assigned companies to categories.

To measure companies' *involvement in major advertising and branding campaigns* (H3), we use a dummy variable representing whether a company had been listed in *Advertising Age* magazine's annual list (1991-2000) of "100 Leading National Advertisers" or its annual "Marketing 100" list (1992-2000), which highlights especially innovative "branding" campaigns. The first is a ranking by total advertising expenditures. The second results from the magazine's attempt to find "current brand success stories" each year and profile their creators (Edwards 2005). Together, these lists identify companies with the largest absolute stake in maintaining a brand identity among consumers.[22] The measure captures firms that are often cited as being on the leading edge of the "branding" trend, such as The Gap, Nike, Tommy Hilfiger, and Polo Ralph Lauren, among others (Klein 1999). The measure is time-varying, and once a company is listed, we consider it as having an investment in advertising/branding from that point onward.

Recognition for a *positive reputation in the business community* (H4) is similarly measured with a time-varying dummy variable for being listed (or having been listed) in *Fortune* magazine's annual lists of the "Top 100 Most Admired Companies" (1991-2000) with a score above the mean for its industry segment. The *Fortune* reputation rankings are based on a survey in which "more than 8,000 senior executives, outside directors, and financial analysts" rate companies on attributes like "quality of management," "quality of products or services," "wise use of corporate assets," and others.[23] This measure helps to differentiate firms that are well-regarded in industry circles, like Liz Claiborne, VF, and Target, from their much maligned counterparts like Fruit of the Loom and Kmart. These rankings have been used by business scholars to assess the economic impact of reputational investment (Fombrun and Shanley 1990;

McGuire, Sundgren and Schneeweis 1988; Roberts and Dowling 2002). Our purpose is to use the *Fortune* lists to measure which companies have been publicly lauded by business leaders, on the assumption that this public recognition (regardless of its merit) could get turned into a point of leverage by social movement groups.[24]

A *commitment to philanthropic activities* (H5a) is measured by the existence of a corporate foundation (yes=1, no=0), based on an extensive search of the Foundation Center's *Foundation Directory*, using the print edition for earlier years and the online database to check for later-emerging foundations. The apparel industry includes a number of firms with philanthropic foundations, such as the Stride Rite Foundation, Reebok Foundation, Levi Strauss Foundation, and others. We measure *external recognition for social responsibility* (H5b) with a dummy variable for being listed in the Domini 400 Social Index, a socially responsible investment index in existence since 1990 that consists of companies judged to have "positive social and environmental records" by KLD Research and Analytics (formerly Kinder, Lydenberg, and Domini Co.), a leading socially responsible investment firm. While some have questioned how deeply such rankings measure social responsibility, for our purpose, the importance of this measure is that it *publicly constructs* firms as socially responsible, thus providing a potential point of leverage for activists.[25]

To measure *financial performance* (H6) we calculated return on assets (ROA), a simple and widely used measure defined as net income divided by total assets in a given year (both from Compustat). We adjusted all dollar amounts for inflation using the Consumer Price Index and, where applicable, used "restated" income and asset figures available through Compustat. We measure *firm size* as the natural log of the firm's total assets in a given year (from Compustat), following established practice (e.g., Mizruchi, Stearns and Marquis 2006). We have also run additional models using sales instead of assets, which generates substantively identical results.

As a control variable intended to pick up other aspects of labor relations at the firm level, we measure *unionization*. Specifically, we gathered information on unionization of the company's U.S. workforce from corporate annual reports and supplemented this with data from the Bureau of National Affairs' yearly *Source Books on Collective Bargaining and Employee Relations* (1993-1998). We use a dummy variable to represent whether a non-trivial amount (more than 2%) of the company's workforce in the U.S. was unionized in 1993 or 1994.[26]

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

We start by illustrating some simple bivariate relationships, ignoring temporal dynamics and control variables. Table 2 provides *prima facie* support for H1 on globalization by showing that the leading globalizers in the industry—that is, globalized manufacturers and specialty retailers, as well as general retailers—faced higher likelihoods of being implicated in the 1990s wave of anti-sweatshop activism than did firms with more of their production occurring in the U.S. Table 3 provides an initial glimpse at how *reputation* might create opportunities for "naming and shaming" firms. It shows that the companies that were at some point recognized for major or innovative advertising or "branding" campaigns were also more likely than others to be the targets of anti-sweatshop activism.

[TABLES 2 AND 3 HERE]

To better assess whether these associations are meaningful and to further explain patterns of anti-corporate activism, we turn to multivariate, longitudinal models in Table 4. Model 1 focuses on firms' linkages to globalization and downsizing, along with controls for firm size and time trends.[27] This model shows that manufacturers and specialty retailers with a heavy reliance on global production faced more than six times the odds of being implicated in a social movement campaign than did companies with largely domestic production (the reference category). Consistent with H1, this provides evidence that globalization—at the firm level, not merely as a broad macro-social change—structures anti-corporate campaigning. Controlling for size, general retailers (discounters and department stores) did not face significantly greater odds than others of being targeted.[28] We find no effect of downsizing on the likelihood of firms becoming targets. Contrary to H2, job losses in the U.S. did not drive the constitution of corporate targets in any direct sense.

[TABLE 4 HERE]

The positive and statistically significant effect of firm size is consistent with our expectation that, even in this sample of fairly large firms, larger firms are more likely to become targets. Several of the yearly dummy variables are also statistically significant, representing surges in the underlying rate of anti-corporate campaigning in the "sweatshop crisis" years of 1995 and (especially) 1999, as well as 1996 and 1997. The positive but non-significant coefficient for being targeted in the past suggests that there is not an overwhelming amount of inertia in the constitution of social movement targets. Neither does the existence of a union among the company's American employees have any straightforward impact on the likelihood of becoming implicated in anti-sweatshop campaigns.

Model 2 introduces factors expected to shape the opportunities for "naming and shaming" the corporation. Consistent with H3, we find that companies involved in major advertising or branding campaigns face nearly 2.4 times the odds of becoming social movement targets than others do, controlling for size, globalization, and several other factors. Similarly, net of these other factors, companies that have received accolades for their reputation in the business community face more than twice the odds of becoming social movement targets than others do. This supports H4 and the idea that social movements seek to leverage firms' standing in the business community—not merely their standing among end-consumers—in order to press for social change. Financial performance (return on assets) also shapes the likelihood of becoming a social movement target, with more financially successful firms facing a higher chance of becoming implicated in anti-sweatshop campaigns. Consistent with H6, firms in this industry seem to face a "liability of success" in that greater profitability attracts social movement pressure.

Overall, the effects of consumer-oriented reputation, business-oriented reputation, and financial performance support our argument that opportunities for "shaming the corporation" are rooted in companies' positions in a multi-faceted and status-oriented organizational field. On the other hand, being listed on the Domini 400 index or having a corporate foundation do not significantly affect the likelihood of becoming a target. Thus, we find no evidence that commitment to philanthropic causes or investor recognition of "socially responsible" firms—at least in these measurable forms—shape the general pattern of anti-corporate campaigning, contrary to H5a and H5b. All other effects in model 2 are substantively identical to those in model 1, with leading globalizers and larger firms facing higher odds than others of becoming social movement targets, controlling for the reputational effects discussed above. The time trend also retains the same pattern as before.

Since the "targeted in the past" variable is not significant in either of these models, we drop this variable for Model 3 and thus make the analysis applicable to the full range of years (1993-2000) in which social movement pressure is measured. All of the previous findings remain essentially the same: Leading globalizers face 5.4 times higher odds of becoming implicated in anti-sweatshop campaigns than companies that were less aggressive in adopting global production systems. Firms recognized for major advertising or branding campaigns are more than twice as likely as others to become targets, and firms lauded for their reputation in the business community face nearly 2.9 times higher odds than others of becoming targets. Financial performance also remains a significant predictor of social movement pressure. According to this final model, a shift from one standard deviation below the mean level of financial performance to one standard deviation above the mean is associated with 34 percent greater odds of becoming a target of activism.[29] Size also matters, since controlling for time trends and the factors discussed above, a one standard deviation increase in log assets increases the odds of becoming a social movement target by a factor of 2.6.[30]

These findings are based on complete case analyses and do not include 19 companies for which no data for the globalization/production profile variable could be obtained. To ensure that the exclusion of these companies was not driving our results, we performed supplemental analyses, using several different methods of imputing this data, all of which generated substantively identical results to those reported in the tables.[31] We also ran supplemental models with imputed values for a small amount of missing data on downsizing, and again our substantive findings were unaltered.[32]

Further analyses (results available upon request) show that our key findings are robust to minor alterations in the modeling and measurement strategy.[33] Most importantly, to ensure that the effects of reputation—in the form of advertising/branding and/or recognition in the business community—are not somehow a function of differences in firm size not sufficiently captured by our control for log assets, we used sales (in both logged and total forms) as alternative measures of size. We obtained substantively identical results, including positive and statistically significant effects for consumer-oriented and business-oriented reputation. The same result occurs if we restrict our analysis to a subsample of only the very largest firms in the industry (the 50 largest, by sales, in 2000).[34] The globalization effect is also robust to the alterations discussed above, indicating that this variable is not simply picking up differences between smaller (but potentially more heavily capitalized) domestic firms and larger transnational corporations. Teasing out the precise processes behind the globalization effect with the available data is a more difficult endeavor, however. In one set of supplemental models, we attempted to discern whether a *shift* toward foreign sourcing, regardless of the baseline level of globalization, increases the likelihood of anti-corporate mobilization. Although we were unable to pinpoint the precise timing of such shifts and had to drop additional companies due to missing data, a simple indicator of which firms experienced such a shift at some point during our period of analysis was positively and significantly associated with being a social movement target, as was the original globalization measure. We return in the conclusion to a consideration of the various mechanisms by which the use of global production networks may translate into social movement pressure, using case-based research to shed further light on our findings.

CONCLUSION

The constitution of social movement targets—that is, the linking of systemic problems to particular actors to which grievances can be pressed—is an important but under-analyzed social process. While there is obviously some contingency in the development of social movement strategies, our research shows that it is possible to identify structural conditions that lead activism toward particular corporations and away from others. Analyzing labor rights and anti-sweatshop activism in the 1990s using panel models of nearly 150 large firms, we have found that the pattern of anti-corporate campaigning is shaped by both struggles over globalization and opportunities for strategic leverage. Firms' differential degree of linkage to global production systems partially explains why some firms are more likely to be targeted than others. Yet the "naming and shaming" strategy is not merely a reflection of globalization; it is also shaped by firms' standing *vis-à-vis* image and status hierarchies. Having major investments in promoting an image among consumers, being recognized for a good reputation in the business community, and doing well financially all raise the likelihood of becoming a social movement target, net of firm size and linkages to globalization.

Our findings speak to the nature of the "naming and shaming" strategy, which has become an important part of the activist repertoire far beyond transnational labor rights campaigns. In the apparel industry, companies like Genesco, Salant, Cato Corp., and Charming Shoppes—all of which escaped sweatshop scrutiny, even though three of the four were leading globalizers—are clearly not well-suited for naming and shaming campaigns, especially in comparison with firms with a major investment in their public reputation, such as Nike or the Gap. Nevertheless, the importance of corporate reputation as a susceptibility factor may puzzle observers that assume social movement campaigns are simple and spontaneous reflections of specific injustices. While potentially lacking the sort of strategic capacity to generate large-scale successes (Ganz 2000), contemporary social movement organizations have become quite sophisticated in their ability to identify points of vulnerability among potential targets—and are often embedded enough in industries and knowledgeable enough about field-level status orderings to use this information stategically. Manheim (2001) shows that in many cases, activist groups engage in sophisticated research on the vulnerabilities of potential targets, guided by a growing number of manuals for anti-corporate research and a cadre of experts in this work. (See also Juravich and Bronfenbrenner (1999).) Information about firms' reputations may even become tacit knowledge among well-positioned social movement actors, who, as one participant in this field put it, “have some great information” about the industries they are targeting (author’s interview with a corporate accountability advocate, 3/16/04).[35] Although our methodological approach cannot discern the specific strategic maneuvers that underlie “naming and shaming” campaigns, it is at least consistent with evidence from more detailed case studies. Additional research could productively investigate whether similar patterns exist in other sectors or whether the intersection of corporations and social movements is heavily context-dependent.

Our finding that the globalization of production shapes anti-corporate campaigning is consistent with the claims of neoclassical economists and their popular interlocutors, who have authoritatively framed labor rights struggles as a form of protectionist backlash to free trade (Basu 1999; Bhagwati 2004; Friedman 2005). Yet as one digs deeper, simple protectionist effects become harder to identify. Clearly, the crudest image of displaced American workers leading the charge to contest sweatshops is not supported (given the lack of an effect of U.S. job losses on the pattern of targeting). Going further, as one delves into the case studies, several different pathways from the globalization of supply chains to anti-corporate campaigns become apparent, not all of which fit easily within the protectionist frame. Case studies by Armbruster-Sandoval (2005), Seidman (2007), and Rodríguez-Garavito (2005) show how anti-sweatshop campaigns targeting American companies (e.g., Kohl’s, Phillips Van Heusen) can emerge out of labor struggles *at the point of production in other countries*, especially in Central American sites with long histories of class-based politics and international solidarity networks.[36] Here, the process of U.S. based companies becoming targets is rooted in part in their adoption of global production models—consistent with our general finding about globalization—but it is driven more by local struggles and labor internationalism than by protectionism in the U.S.

As an alternative to neoclassical theories of protectionist backlash, we view our findings on globalization through the lens of Polanyi's (1944) "double movement" of capitalism. Whereas neoclassical economists posit a tension between domestic and international production, Polanyi highlighted a tension between the application of a pure market logic and the inherent embeddedness of markets in communities and social institutions. As the marketization of social life intensifies, it generates disruption and resistance—thus the "double movement" language—and this occurs *across multiple sites*. By this account, firms' adoption of global production models can be expected to intensify competition both within and outside the U.S.—and both of these streams may potentially feed into the sort of labor rights campaigns captured in our data.

Big, branded firms have become the locus of struggle over global labor rights at the turn of the 21st century. The long term consequences of this for activism, labor, and global inequality are not yet entirely clear. While some have heralded the power of anti-corporate campaigns to generate unprecedented concessions from firms (Spar and LaMure 2003), others have worried that this strategy detracts from proven ways of institutionalizing labor rights and expanding citizenship at the domestic level (Seidman 2007). At the very least, paying close attention to the contours of anti-corporate social movement pressure helps to cast some recent organizational and institutional innovations in a different light. The rise of anti-sweatshop activism that we have analyzed was followed by a wave of "corporate social responsibility" (CSR) discourse, and many of the firms that were thrust into the limelight by sweatshop scandals have since developed codes of conduct and social auditing systems for their supply chains. A few—like Nike, Reebok, and the Gap—are now recognized as leaders in the burgeoning CSR field.[37] From a distance, these organizational innovations may appear to reflect the goodwill of executives, the diffusion of a managerial script about accountability, or the rise of norms of "ethical sourcing" in the business community. Our study serves as a reminder that these innovations arose in the midst of highly charged struggles between corporations and their critics, which mobilized attention to these issues, identified some firms as “sinners” (thus setting them on a path toward constructions of redemption), and set other dynamics into motion.

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NOTES

[1] For a study that focuses on target selection in environmental movements, see Lenox and Eesley (2006). For a formal economic model of this process, see Baron and Diermeier (2007).

[2] For attempts to extend this model to firms and labor issues, see Klein (1999) and Armbruster Sandoval (2005).

[3] Poletta and Jasper (2001) include the "focus on the state as target of action" as one of the limiting factors of political process theory (p.283) and call for attention to collective identity as an alternative approach. While we agree that political process scholars have largely ignored non-state targets, our analysis shows that a focus on the institutional contexts and opportunities for mobilization can be productively adapted to movements that target firms.

[4] These examples were generated by an extensive search of press sources regarding movement pressure and boycotts of the 20 largest firms in the 2007 Fortune 500.

[5] UNITE resulted from a mid-1990s merger of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union and the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union.

[6] Interestingly, the NLC was initially formed in the 1980s by labor activists concerned with U.S. foreign policy in Central American and the AFL-CIO's support of anti-communist projects. It initially focused on government subsidies for "exporting our jobs" to countries with repressive political regimes. By the mid-1990s, the NLC had mastered the art of shaming the corporation and had largely abandoned its earlier emphasis on government policy. See Krupat (1997).

[7] According to OTEXA data, total imports went from 12.144 billion SME (square meter equivalent) in 1989 to 32.864 billion SME in 2000, an increase by a factor of 2.7.

[8] While some might assume that one could identify which factories were "actually sweatshops" and which companies were using them, this assumption ignores several basic facts about this industry and the global economy more generally: First, to the extent that labor exploitation is a structural, systemic problem, concentrating on identifying a few "bad actors" is likely to be counterproductive. Furthermore, information about labor conditions in the thousands of garment and footwear factories around the world is simply not something that is available, either to activists building campaigns or to scholars studying them. Nor are the relationships between contract factories and manufacturers/retailers transparent or stable over time. Most importantly, when information about sweatshop conditions does emerge, it is typically *the result* of social movement activity, not a precursor to it.

[9] For this reason, scholars have traditionally assumed that shaming is only effective in small-scale, tight-knit communities.

[10] Going further, Klein (1999) suggests that some companies are "singled out because the politics they have associated themselves with, which have made them rich—feminism, ecology, inner-city empowerment—were not just random pieces of effective ad copy that their brand managers

found laying around. They are complex, essential social ideas, for which many people have spent lifetimes fighting" (p.361).

[11] To qualify for our sample, companies must be listed in Compustat during our period of analysis, issue annual reports for shareholders, and have one of the following as their primary SIC code: textiles (SIC 22, except those pertaining to rugs/carpets or yarn/thread), apparel manufacturing (SIC 23), footwear and accessories (SIC 302 codes pertaining to rubber footwear, SIC 31 codes pertaining to leather footwear, gloves, or handbags), wholesale apparel or footwear (SIC 513), general/mass retailers (SIC 53), apparel retailers (SIC 56), or catalog and mail order houses (SIC 5961). We accessed the Compustat data through Wharton Research Data Services (wrds.wharton.upenn.edu).

[12] Although there is no *a priori* basis for setting the threshold for potential targets, we were guided in setting our criteria through substantive knowledge of the case (see AUTHOR REFS), a process of fitting our criteria to data on the actual targets of campaigns, and the common practice in sociological research on business and politics to focus on large firms (e.g., Fligstein 1985; Mizruchi, Stearns, and Marquis 2006; Zorn 2004).

[13] We excluded several catalog and mail order companies that sold no apparel or footwear. Retailers were included only if there was evidence that they were responsible for the production of some "private label" apparel, textiles, or footwear—a common practice which was present for all but ten retailers (with the exceptions being firms like Ross Stores, Just for Feet, Home Shopping Network, etc.). We excluded several firms that were categorized in these SICs but which further research (using the companies' annual reports) revealed to have only tangential connections to apparel, textiles, or footwear during the period of our analysis (e.g. Big Lots, Claire's Stores, Samsonite luggage, and a company specializing in sports-related collectibles). We *included* one conglomerate firm (Sara Lee), which is a major player in the apparel industry (maker of Hanes, Playtex, and other brands) but is categorized in a different SIC.

[14] Although there are scattered examples of anti-sweatshop campaigns prior to 1993, the vast majority of cases identified in the existing literature occur in the mid- to late-1990s, and analysts typically treat this period as the defining moment of this wave of activism.

[15] One might wonder if the trade journals are heavily biased toward the very largest firms and most visible social movement organizations. Several factors limit this possibility. First, because our sources are specialized and have a narrow topical focus, the problem of numerous potential news elements competing for space, as highlighted by Oliver and Maney (2000), should be minimized, especially in comparison with the newspaper data commonly used by social movement researchers. Second, our data did reveal instances of campaigns targeting firms that were not among the very largest in the sample (e.g., Hills Stores, Gymboree) and led by smaller, lower-profile sponsors (e.g. Research Center for Feminist Action, Frontlash (an early student labor support group), Asian Pacific American Legal Center). This demonstrates that the trade journals covered a broader array of political activity than just the high profile campaigns that made it into mainstream media sources, the public consciousness, and even the scholarly

literature on sweatshops. In general, the trade journal data allows for a far more detailed look at anti-sweatshop campaigns throughout the industry than is available through any other source.

[16] Inter-coder reliability tests (based on a random sample of articles coded by four different coders) demonstrated a high rate of agreement (an average rate of agreement of 95%) on the measurement of anti-corporate campaigns. Where disagreements arose, we used these to isolate ambiguous cases and investigate them further.

[17] The primary utility of the secondary sources was to report that a campaign was ongoing over a series of years (e.g. 1996-1998) whereas the trade journals may have neglected to report on the "middle" years of a campaign (e.g., reporting protests in 1996 and 1998). Manheim's (2001) database of anti-corporate campaigns, published in the book's appendix, proved especially useful in this regard. In general, the secondary sources overwhelmingly confirmed what had been found in the trade journal data—listing only one corporate target that was absent from the trade journals. Yet the trade journal data was much more detailed than the secondary sources, and revealed a large number of corporate targets that would have been overlooked if one relied only on the secondary sources. Our assumption is that if a company was not mentioned as a target in the trade journal articles *or* mentioned in the secondary literature on the anti-sweatshop movement, then it was not a target of movement activity during this period.

[18] The panels are unbalanced because some firms came into or went out of existence during our period (1993-2000), although most firms remained throughout. We used Compustat's coverage to identify those that entered or exited the risk set.

[19] This procedure amounts to using a set of dummy variables to represents the number of years a particular unit (here, a company) has been at risk of experiencing the outcome (here, being targeted). Once a company becomes a target, it is reset back to the original value. In this fashion, the model controls for the possibility that the likelihood of becoming a social movement target depends on the amount of time the company has "survived" as a non-target. We generated these dummy variables using the BTSCS Stata routine provided by Tucker (1999). Results available upon request.

[20] The line between "manufacturers" like Liz Claiborne and specialty retailers like The Gap is increasingly blurry, since both sets of firms have become little more than "brands" that outsource most of their production. For specialty retailers, our measure is based on "private label" apparel, textiles, or footwear—that is, products that are made especially for, and to the specifications of, that particular retailer.

[21] Cheng and Gereffi (1994) identified several patterns of sourcing by these types of retailers, *all* of which relied heavily on foreign production: "Department stores that emphasize 'private label' (i.e., store brand) products as well as national brands will source from the most established Third World exporters (the East Asian newly industrializing countries [NICs]), while the mass merchandisers who sell lower-priced store brands buy primarily from a third tier of medium- to low-cost, mid-quality exporters (Brazil, Mexico, low-end producers in the NICs, plus the People's Republic of China and the ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations] countries

of Thailand, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Indonesia. Large-volume discount stores that sell the most inexpensive products import from an outer ring of low-cost suppliers of standardized goods (China, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Mauritius, the Dominican Republic, Gautemala, and others)." (pp. 65-66).

[22] In other analyses, we have tried to use *total advertising expenditures* (from Compustat) as a measure of companies' investments in this arena. However, exceptionally large amounts of missing data and questions about its lack of correspondence with other sources (i.e., figures published by *Advertising Age*) make this an inferior measure for the main analyses. Eesley and Lenox (2006) used advertising expenses in their analyses but were forced to substitute the mean for many observations due to missing data.

[23] The Fortune reputation ranking is released early in the year (in a Feb. issue) and is based on a survey done prior to that date. Therefore, the rankings published in Feb. of one year are taken as measures of activities the prior year (i.e. the list published in 1994 refers to 1993, etc.).

[24] For an account of the consecration of standouts as a social process, see Allen and Parsons (2006).

[25] Notably, while the KLD rankings did not initially consider labor rights issues, they added a measure of "labor rights concern" in 1998—which, though too late for the purposes of our analyses, supports the notion that KLD's evaluations could have provided a point of leverage for activists. Interestingly, separate analyses show that KLD's "labor rights concern" ratings are well-predicted by *earlier* patterns of social movement pressure, lending additional credence to our contention that social movement campaigns serve to publicly link particular companies to sweatshop concerns.

[26] In a few cases where 1993 or 1994 data on unionization was not available, we used information from a later year, such as 1995 or 1996. If, after extensive searches of these sources, no evidence of union presence could be found, we treated the company as non-unionized. Because this assumption is subject to question, we ran additional analyses with the assumption reversed, which generated substantively identical results.

[27] The control for "targeted in the past" uses up our data on campaigns in 1993, making models 1 and 2 relevant to understanding targeting from 1994-2000, with 1994 as the reference year.

[28] This is somewhat surprising, given general retailers' role in globalizing apparel and footwear production and prior research portraying department stores as key sites of social movement pressure during the civil rights movement (Luders 2006). We suspect that the rise of "branding" has to some degree diminished earlier differences in the attractiveness of department stores *vis-à-vis* other firms as social movement targets.

[29] This estimate is based on exponentiating the product of the raw coefficient of 1.161 (corresponding to an odds ratio of 3.193) and the standard deviation of .1344, which indicates

that a one standard deviation change in financial performance translates into 17% greater odds of becoming a target [e^(1.161*.1344)=1.169].

[30] e^(.6565 * 1.448) = 2.587

[31] In these supplemental analyses (available upon request), we used three different methods to impute missing values for the "leading globalizer" variable—(1) mean substitution, (2) random assignment with the 0-1 proportion matching the non-missing cases, and (3) predicted values from a logistic regression of the globalization variable on firm size, with predicted probabilities being rounded to 0 or 1, following several different decision rules. Regardless of the procedure, the effects remain substantively unchanged. We also ran models that simply dropped the production profile variable and replaced it with sectoral dummies (textile, retail, other), which generates substantively identical findings, with the exception of minor changes in the statistical significance of firm size ($p<.055$) and "targeted in the past."

[32] We imputed these values using predicted values from a regression of % change in employment on market performance and a dummy variable for textile manufacturers, using Stata's "impute" command. All of the results, with the exception of the market performance variable itself, remain unaltered.

[33] Using the Beck et al. (1998) duration dummies instead of "targeted in the past" or reversing our assumption about unionization has no impact on our substantive findings.

[34] The one exception is that in the analysis of the top 50 firms, the effect of financial performance, while positive, is not quite statistically significant ($p<.056$). However, this variable is positive and significant in all of our other model specifications.

[35] This individual described the "insider" information held by environmental groups in the following way: "I don't play the stock market, but I play the stock market, like, imaginarily. And it's like, you know, for months I've been making imaginary fortunes off of mad cow disease because I read about it months beforehand—enviros saying, 'mad cow's everywhere'—and it's two months later until it comes up [publicly]."

[36] Although our data do not allow it, we suspect that a more detailed measurement of globalization would show that firms with significant operations in countries with both strong working class political traditions and histories of international solidarity (as in the Central American peace and sanctuary movements of the 1980s, for instance) would face an especially high likelihood of becoming targets.

[37] KLD Research and Analytics recently included these three among a small group of companies recognized for labor rights *strengths* (a new measure) in 2004-2005.

Table 1. Summary of social movement targets in the apparel, textile, and footwear industries, 1993-2000

Most targeted companies	*Years targeted*	*Selected non-targeted companies*
Nike	8	American Eagle Outfitters
Phillips-Van Heusen	8	Authentic Fitness (Speedo)
Wal-Mart	7	The Buckle
The Gap	7	Broadway Stores
JC Penney	7	Charming Shoppes
Kmart	7	Children's Place Retail Stores
Federated Dept. Stores	6	Columbia Sportswear
Guess	4	Converse
May Dept. Stores	4	Costco
Target	4	Haggar
Liz Claiborne	4	Hartmarx
Nordstrom	4	Lands End
Sears	4	Mens Wearhouse
Spiegel (Eddie Bauer)	4	Nautica
Levi Strauss	3	Oxford Industries
Kellwood	2	Quiksilver
VF Corp.	2	Russell Corp.
Donna Karan	2	Sara Lee (Hanes, Champion)
J. Crew	2	Starter Corp.
Kohl's	2	Stride Rite
Montgomery Ward	2	Timberland
Neiman Marcus	2	Tropical Sportswear Intl
Talbots	2	Vans Inc.
Tommy Hilfiger	2	Westpoint Stevens

Table 2. Production profiles and the likelihood of being implicated in an anti-sweatshop campaign

Ever targeted?	Globalized producer	General retailer	Domestic producer	total
Yes	38.9%	28.9%	10%	39
No	61.1%	71.1%	90%	110
total	54	45	50	149

χ^2=11.5 p<.01

Table 3. Corporate reputation and the likelihood of being implicated in an anti-sweatshop campaign

	Recognized for advertising or "branding" initiatives?		
Ever targeted?	Yes	No	total
Yes	64.9%	13.4%	39
No	35.1%	86.6%	110
total	37	112	149

χ^2=38.1 p<.001

Table 4. Yearly panel models of the likelihood of large U.S. apparel, footwear, and textile firms being implicated in labor rights campaigns, 1993-2000

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Leading globalized producer………….…...	6.364*	5.692*	5.401*
	(2.27)	(1.93)	(1.97)
General retailer..…………………….………	1.478	1.827	2.313
	(0.52)	(0.73)	(1.02)
% change in employment (t-1 to t) …………	1.001	1.000	0.999
	(0.52)	(0.16)	(-0.32)
Major/innovative advertiser…………………		2.370*	2.153*
		(2.00)	(1.67)
Reputation in business community………….		2.176*	2.889*
		(1.79)	(2.20)
Corporate foundation……………………….		1.466	1.064
		(0.86)	(0.11)
Domini 400 listing (t-1)…….........................		0.789	1.103
		(-0.54)	(0.21)
Financial performance (t-1)..........................		3.303**	3.193**
		(2.66)	(2.77)
Size (ln(assets)) (t-1)……….…....................	3.023***	2.094**	1.928**
	(4.83)	(2.70)	(2.53)
Unionized in U.S……………………….….	1.384	1.305	1.438
	(0.76)	(0.57)	(0.72)
Targeted in the past………………………….	1.154	1.215	
	(0.31)	(0.42)	
1994…………………………………….....			1.479
			(0.83)
1995…………………………….....................	2.617*	2.637*	3.925**
	(2.11)	(2.20)	(2.92)
1996…………………………….....................	2.784*	2.929*	4.365**
	(2.12)	(2.30)	(3.21)
1997…………………………….....................	3.024*	3.010*	4.530**
	(2.17)	(2.22)	(3.17)
1998…………………………….....................	1.255	1.194	1.827
	(0.52)	(0.43)	(1.42)
1999…………………………….....................	4.381**	4.229**	6.474***
	(2.86)	(2.91)	(4.26)
2000…………………………….....................	1.047	0.878	1.399
	(0.073)	(-0.20)	(0.58)
Number of firms	142	142	144
Number of firm-years	778	778	888

Note: Coefficients reported as odds ratios, t-statistics in parentheses.
* $p<.05$ ** $p< .01$ *** $p<.001$ (one-tailed tests, except for unionization and years)

Figure 1. The rise of labor rights activism in the apparel, textile, and footwear industries, 1993-2000



Source: Coding of all articles on the politics of labor in the two leading trade journals, *Bobbin* and *Women's Wear Daily*. See methods section for details.

Appendix A: Examples of production profiles and supporting evidence

Company	*Supporting evidence*
Leading globalized producers	
Reebok	“Virtually all of the Company's products are produced by independent manufacturers, almost all of which are outside the United States, except that some of the Company's apparel and some of the component parts used in the Company's footwear are sourced in the United States.” (1993 Annual Report)
Phillips-Van Heusen	“Approximately 35% of the wholesale apparel products are manufactured in the Company's facilities in the United States, Puerto Rico and the Caribbean Basin. The remaining products are sourced through contractors throughout the world, but primarily in the Far East.” (1993 Annual Report)
Gap Inc.	"During fiscal 1994, approximately 30% of the Company's merchandise was produced domestically while the remaining 70% was imported from overseas vendors.” (1994 Annual Report)
Leslie Fay Companies	“For 1993, products representing approximately 72% of sales were produced abroad and imported into the United States, principally from Hong Kong, China, Taiwan, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines, Hungary, India, and the Caribbean basin.” (1993 Annual Report)
Crystal Brands	“The Company's apparel products are manufactured principally by independent contractors. Twenty-two percent of these products are produced in the United States and 78% are produced in foreign countries, principally located in the Far East. The Company operates a Hong Kong sourcing office to coordinate apparel sourcing in Asia.” (1993 Annual Report)
Jones Apparel Group	“During 1994, approximately 42% of the Company’s products were manufactured in the United States and Mexico and 58% in Asia and, to a lesser extent, other parts of the world.”
Primarily domestic producers	
Oshkosh B’Gosh	“In 1993, approximately 79% of the Company products were manufactured in the United States using American-made textiles” (1993 Annual Report).
Hartmarx Corp.	“As a vertically integrated manufacturer and marketer, the Company is responsible for the designing, manufacturing and sourcing of its apparel. Substantially all of its men's tailored clothing [which accounts for roughly 2/3 of total sales] is manufactured in its own factories, all of which are located in the United States. The Company utilizes domestic and foreign contract manufacturers to produce its remaining products, principally men's and women's sportswear, in accordance with Company specifications and production schedules.” (1993 Annual Report)
Lands’ End Inc.	As part of its "direct merchant" philosophy, Lands' End deals directly with its suppliers and seeks to avoid intermediaries. All goods are produced by independent manufacturers, except for most of our soft luggage which is manufactured at the company's own facilities. Approximately 75 percent of the merchandise purchased in fiscal 1995 (including materials for soft

	luggage) was sourced domestically. The balance of products was sourced offshore, mostly in Hong Kong, Asia, China and Portugal." (1994 Annual Report)
Russell Corp.	"The Company's principal manufacturing facilities are located in and around Alexander City, Alabama. It also operates 31 additional plants in other communities in Alabama, Florida, Georgia, North Carolina and Virginia. Warehousing and shipping is conducted in Alexander City, Dothan and Montgomery, Alabama; Marianna and Miami, Florida; Mt. Airy, North Carolina; Columbus, Georgia; Chicago, Illinois; Sparks, Nevada; and Palisades Park, New Jersey." (1993 Annual Report)
Quiksilver Inc.	"The Company hires independent contractors located primarily in southern California to manufacture its clothing and accessories. During fiscal 1993, the Company increased its offshore production to approximately 21% of its clothing and accessories produced. The Company does not intend to further expand these import programs significantly." (1994 Annual Report)

Appendix B: Univariate Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Dependent Variable: Targeted	0.122	0.327	0	1
Leading globalized producer	0.359	0.480	0	1
General retailer	0.291	0.454	0	1
% change in employment (t-1 to t)	10.185	46.217	-99.09	1017.05
Major/innovative advertiser	0.220	0.414	0	1
Rep. in business community	0.222	0.416	0	1
Corporate foundation	0.351	0.478	0	1
Domini 400 listing (t-1)	0.217	0.413	0	1
Financial performance (t-1)	0.051	0.134	-0.89	2.44
Size (ln(assets)) (t-1)	6.606	1.448	2.85	11.72
Unionized in U.S.	0.339	0.474	0	1
Targeted in the past	0.172	0.378	0	1
1994	0.127	0.333	0	1
1995	0.124	0.330	0	1
1996	0.127	0.333	0	1
1997	0.130	0.336	0	1
1998	0.126	0.332	0	1
1999	0.123	0.328	0	1
2000	0.123	0.328	0	1

Note: N = 888 firm-years. "Targeted in the past" is measured for 778 firm-years.

Appendix C: Pairwise Correlations for Independent Variables

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
1. Leading globalized producer	1										
2. General retailer	-0.48	1									
3. % change in employment	0.08	-0.06	1								
4. Major/innovative advertiser	0.09	0.16	-0.05	1							
5. Rep. in business community	-0.09	0.04	-0.07	0.38	1						
6. Corporate foundation	-0.01	0.10	-0.09	0.34	0.25	1					
7. Domini 400 listing	-0.01	0.08	-0.07	0.49	0.49	0.29	1				
8. Financial performance	0.14	-0.10	0.17	0.08	0.02	0.03	0.08	1			
9. Size (ln(assets))	-0.16	0.40	-0.14	0.57	0.63	0.41	0.52	-0.05	1		
10. Unionized in U.S.	0.05	-0.16	-0.10	0.02	0.08	0.17	-0.04	-0.05	0.05	1	
11. Targeted in the past	0.09	0.13	-0.03	0.49	0.44	0.27	0.35	0.03	0.52	0.03	1