

# Emigration, Return and Development in Cape Verde: The Impact of Closing Borders

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## ABSTRACT

**Few countries in the world are more dependent on migration than Cape Verde. A small, barren and isolated place, Cape Verde has survived – and prospered – due to the migration lifeline. However, immigration policies in destination countries have made emigration gradually more difficult since the early 1970s until today. In Cape Verde, emigration is such a key structural feature of the society and economy that falling emigration is a major concern. This article addresses the ways in which the restrictive migration regime is affecting three aspects of the migration–development nexus in Cape Verde: recruitment of migrants, return migration, and remittances. The last of these is analysed within the context of transnational practices more generally. The ‘unmaking’ of the Cape Verdean diaspora is still no more than a future scenario, but the processes that challenge the continuation of diasporic loyalties have already gained momentum. Copyright © 2004 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.**

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## INTRODUCTION

Cape Verde is among the most migration-dependent countries in the world. With a meagre resource base, a small

domestic market and an isolated location, the country is to a large part sustained by its migratory linkages to the wider world. The social and economic dynamics that are common to many emigration countries across the developing world stand out starkly under such circumstances. The history of mass migration from Cape Verde is more than 100 years old, with peaks and troughs in emigration figures. The last quarter of a century has been marked by a gradual but severe tightening of opportunities for emigration, due to the ever more restrictive immigration policies of destination countries. This article addresses some of the changes that the current migration regime inflicts upon the migration–development nexus in Cape Verde.

In their seminal book about the relationship between migration and development, Papademetriou and Martin (1991) identified the three Rs – recruitment, remittances and return – as three fundamental factors for analysing the development impact of labour migration. Recruitment is about who emigrates in the first place, remittances concern their financial transfers, and return relates to the characteristics of return migrants and their subsequent reintegration into their communities of origin. I will structure the analysis with reference to these concepts. In the analysis of remittances, however, I will also address transnational practices more broadly. While remittances might have a more direct impact on development than other practices, it is important to see financial transfers within the context of transnationalism as a totality of material, emotional and symbolic ties between emigrants and their communities of origin (Basch *et al.*, 1994; Vertovec, 1999; Portes, 2001).

The analysis is primarily concerned with the changing dynamics of migration, but from the perspective of development in Cape Verde. I use the concept of development quite loosely to refer

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


Figure 1. Map of Cape Verde and the Cape Verdean diaspora. *Note:* See Table 1 for details on emigrant communities.

to the processes of social change towards improved and sustainable living conditions. The article is based in part on fieldwork in Cape Verde and among Cape Verdeans in the Netherlands. Before going into the processes of recruitment, return and remittances, I will give a brief introduction to Cape Verde and the country's migration history in order to place the changes of the last few decades in a longer historical perspective.

#### A BARREN AND MARGINAL COUNTRY

Cape Verde (Fig. 1) was first populated by European settlers and West African slaves in the late 1400s and remained a Portuguese colony until 1975. Today, the archipelago is inhabited by just under half a million people. Throughout its history Cape Verde has been characterised by a marginal existence. As expressed by the Cape Verdean historian António Carreira (1982: 15), 'everything in these islands combines to impose on man a hard, difficult and wretched way of life'. A series of devastating droughts has resulted in levels of famine mortality that are exceptional in human history (Drèze and Sen, 1989; Patterson, 1988). As late as the 1940s, about a quarter of the total population died in two consecutive famines (Carreira, 1984). The problem of drought has persisted, and there has been a downward trend in rainfall for several decades

(Langworthy and Finan, 1997). The proportion of people living from subsistence agriculture has fallen to less than 20%, and international food aid provides a guarantee against famine. However, the scarcity and instability of rain is still a limiting factor for the country's development, and – importantly – a fundamental factor in people's image of their homeland.

The high cost of transportation, small domestic market and lack of natural resources have been important impediments to developing the economy (Economist Intelligence Unit, 1999). However, the country has fared better than its natural endowments would suggest. While Cape Verde was among the most destitute places in Africa 60 years ago, it is today among the wealthiest. Within sub-Saharan Africa, only the Seychelles and Mauritius have a higher Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme, 2002).

#### A History of Emigration

Cape Verdean emigration is commonly divided into three waves (Carreira, 1983). At the beginning of the twentieth century, Cape Verdean migrants crossed the Atlantic to the United States, along with Southern Europeans. This constituted the first wave. In the 1920s the introduction of immigration quotas in the US led to a reduction of Cape Verdean immigration. A




Figure 2. Cape Verdean net emigration rate, 1910–1994 (five-year moving average). *Source:* Calculated from Biayé 1995 and Carreira 1983. There are no data for the period 1919–26. *Note:* Since the figure shows *net emigration*, negative numbers indicate years when immigrants (mostly return migrants) outnumbered emigrants.

second, smaller wave of emigration occurred in the 1940s, directed to Portugal, West Africa and South America. During the colonial period, there was also an extensive migration of indentured labourers to São Tomé and Príncipe (Carreira, 1983; Ishemo, 1995).

In the 1960s, Cape Verdeans joined the north-bound flows of labour migrants to Western Europe. This constitutes the third wave, culminating around the time of independence in 1975. It is this wave that has resulted in the growth of Cape Verdean emigrant communities in Europe. Portugal has remained an important destination, partly because Portuguese emigration created a demand for unskilled labour in Portugal. Furthermore, independence boosted migration of colonial officials and their families towards Europe, and contributed to the record outflows of the mid-1970s. Large-scale Cape Verdean migration to Northern Europe started with the recruitment of Cape Verdean sailors through the port of Rotterdam. This led to the growth of a large community in the Netherlands, and onward migration to other parts of Northern Europe. In the first half of the 1980s, almost two-thirds of Cape Verdean emigrants were headed for Europe, and in the late 1990s, at least three-quarters did so (SEDES, 1989; Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2002). While the focus in this paper

will be on migration to Europe, many of the same arguments apply to Cape Verdean migration to the US.

Figure 2 shows fluctuations in net emigration, with the three waves clearly visible. The decline of the third wave of Cape Verdean emigration is the result of a gradual tightening of the immigration policies in destination countries. After Cape Verde's independence, the change from Portuguese to Cape Verdean passports meant a drastic reduction in migration opportunities. When talking about the present barriers to migration, Cape Verdeans often contrast it with the time 'when you could emigrate with just a *bilhete de identidade*' (identity card). About the same time as Cape Verdeans lost their free access to Portugal, the changing economic and political climate in northwestern Europe put an end to regular labour migration from the South. While this marked the so-called 'immigration stop', it is important to appreciate that for Europe as a whole the process of reducing immigration opportunities has been a gradual one that has continued until today. For instance, the introduction of new legislation against sham marriages in the Netherlands in 1994, and the end of regularisation of undocumented immigrants in Portugal in late 2001, are both policy changes that have significantly reduced the

opportunities for prospective migrants in Cape Verde.

Taken together, these policy changes over the last quarter of a century have led to the reduction of emigration that is visible in Fig. 2. While the emigration figures have serious weaknesses and should be treated with care, other population data confirm the trends.<sup>1</sup> As the net emigration rate has fallen, the population growth rate has risen dramatically. From the 1970s to the 1990s, the growth rate trebled and reached almost 2.5% per year (Ministério de Coordenação Económica, 1996). Today, Cape Verde is one of seven countries in the world in which the government's view on emigration levels is that they are *too low*.<sup>2</sup>

After a century of emigration, ethnic Cape Verdeans in the diaspora probably outnumber the 460,000 inhabitants on the islands (Table 1). The largest number of Cape Verdean emigrants is found in the US. The high figure is the result of the long history of immigration from Cape Verde, and includes third and fourth generation migrants. The Cape Verdean government and Cape Verdean-American community leaders maintain that the community numbers several hundred thousand people, but less than 80,000 people classified themselves as being of Cape Verdean ancestry in the 2000 US Census (United States Census Bureau, 2001). The number of *Cape Verdean-born* migrants is probably smaller in the US than in Portugal (Carling, 1997).

## Meanings of Migration

In order to understand the dynamics of migration, it is also necessary to address the meaning of migration as a culturally defined concept. This includes a parcel of expectations regarding the nature and consequences of migration. During recent decades, migration has increasingly been analysed as a socially constructed project. By addressing the meanings of migration, it is often possible to make better sense of the more tangible variables traditionally employed in migration studies, including the extent and forms of return migration.

The meaning of emigration (*emigrasão* in Creole) in Cape Verde centres on working abroad, usually with the intention to return (Carling, 2001; Åkesson, 2004). Emigration is generally conceived as an instrumental project aimed at achieving a 'reasonable' standard of living in Cape Verde, something which is difficult with an average Cape Verdean salary. What is seen as reasonable is partly influenced by the wealth that results from remittances. One of my informants summarised the purpose of emigration as 'going to work *there* in order to come back and have a better life *here*' (Carling, 2001). This is related to popular explanations of poverty that focus on characteristics of Cape Verde as a place, especially the lack of rain. While few people make their living from agriculture, the constant drought is frequently referred to as the cause of

Table 1. Estimates of Cape Verdean diaspora populations.

Americas	±270,000	Europe	±150,000	Africa	±90,000
United States <sup>a</sup>	265,000	Portugal	80,000	Angola	45,000
Argentina	5,000	France	25,000	Senegal	25,000
Brazil	3,000	Netherlands	19,000	São Tomé & Príncipe	20,000
Canada	300	Spain	12,000	Guinea-Bissau	2,000
		Italy	10,000	Mozambique	1,000
		Luxembourg	3,000	Gabon	200
		Switzerland	2,400		
		Germany	800		
		Belgium	800		
		Sweden	700		
		Norway	400		

<sup>a</sup>See text for details on the US.

Source: Instituto de Apoio ao Emigrante (1998) with minor revisions based on additional sources. The figures are estimates based on information from Cape Verdean emigrant community leaders and consular staff. There are apparent weaknesses in these figures, both in terms of reliability and validity (see Carling, 1997).

an inescapably hopeless situation, with little hope for social mobility.

If the means to live well are sought elsewhere, Cape Verde is seen as the perfect place to enjoy the fruits of one's work. Being an emigrant on holiday or a settled return migrant is portrayed as uniting the best of two worlds. When the drudgery of everyday life is transformed into recreation and you can simply bypass the difficulties of making a living in Cape Verde, being Cape Verdean becomes a blessing.

## RECRUITMENT

The mechanism by which some people migrate and others remain behind is a crucial factor for the consequences of migration on the development process. During the past decades of emigration from Cape Verde, the dynamics of recruitment have changed at the same time as the flow has contracted. I have chosen to use the term 'recruitment' as suggested by Papademetriou and Martin (1991) but this does not imply that migrants are actively recruited by government or private business.

In explaining migration trends, actual migration should be seen as the combined outcome of *aspiration* and *ability* to emigrate (Carling, 2001, 2002). Migration presupposes both a wish to

migrate and the ability to realise this wish.<sup>3</sup> With Cape Verdean emigration during the past few decades, everything indicates that the number of people wishing to emigrate has remained vastly higher than the relatively small number who succeed in entering Europe or North America. This means that it is necessary to examine how different population groups have different qualifications for the realisation of their migration aspirations, and how these differences change over time. Having said this, changes in people's aspirations to migrate also matter because this affects the composition of the pool of prospective migrants. In this section, I will concentrate on differences with respect to gender and socio-economic status.

## The Changing Gender Balance of Migration

Based on different sources, it is possible to construct a rough time series of the gender balance in emigration from Cape Verde (Fig. 3). Cape Verdean emigration was heavily male-dominated in its early days, with as few as 17% women among registered emigrants in the period 1900–20. The proportion of women rose to almost 40% during the 1960s and 1970s, around the height of the third wave of emigration. The figure suggests that the proportion of women




Figure 3. Estimates of the proportion of women in Cape Verdean emigration flows, 1900–2000. *Note:* Horizontal lines represent estimates for given periods. The thin, slanted lines are interpolations. *Source:* Carreira, 1983 (1900–1972); SEDES, 1989 (1979–1984); Andrade, 1998 (1985–1990); Instituto Nacional de Estatística, 2002 (1995–2000). Figures for the period 1900–1984 are based on registered departures. Figures for 1985–1990 and 1995–2000 are based on Census questions to residents about the emigration of household members during the past five years.



among emigrants peaked at nearly three-quarters in the late 1970s, and then fell to slightly less than half in the late 1990s.

The rising proportion of women among emigrants in the first three-quarters of the century was caused by changes in Cape Verdean society as well as in the international migration order. The very high share of women in the late 1970s and early 1980s was related to the reduction of labour migration and the onset of family reunification. This is the standard explanation for the changing gender balance that is observed in most migration flows to Europe from the guestworker countries of origin. In the case of Cape Verde, however, growth in independent female migration seems to have been more important. Even in the Netherlands, where the growth of the Cape Verdean community was set off by all-male labour migration in the 1960s, the share of women in the subsequent, mainly family-related flows probably stayed below 60%.<sup>4</sup> The marked feminisation of emigration flows must therefore be explained with reference to the emerging opportunities for employment as domestic workers in Europe. Italy has probably attracted the largest number of Cape Verdean domestic workers. Capuchin friars based on the island of São Nicolau functioned as mediators for this migration, which started in the late 1960s and gained pace in the 1970s (Monteiro, 1997; Andall, 1999). Today, there are also many Cape Verdean domestic workers in Spain and Portugal, and smaller numbers in France, Luxembourg and Belgium. The growing demand for domestic workers in Europe was complemented by changes in Cape Verdean society that encouraged female migration. Lifelong unions were increasingly rare, and more women tried to lessen their financial dependence on men by providing for themselves and their children. One way to do this was through emigration.

The family reunification migration depended on the existence of separated families, usually men residing in Europe and wives and children residing in Cape Verde. By the late 1980s, however, most of the male labour migrants had either returned to Cape Verde or brought their families to Europe, and the potential for family reunification was therefore reduced. This led to a decline in the proportion of female migrants. Meanwhile, immigration policies in Southern Europe have also become more restrictive and

made independent female migration more difficult. The migration of female domestic workers to Italy declined markedly in the 1980s (Monteiro, 1997).

By the late 1980s, family *formation* migration was increasingly replacing *reunification* migration as the principal mode of migration from Cape Verde to Northern Europe. This is migration that is based on the formation of a family through marriage. In the Netherlands, for instance, about half of all the adult immigrants from Cape Verde during the 1990s were admitted through family formation. While women are also in the majority among the family-forming migrants, this is a less female-dominated flow than family reunification (Statistics Netherlands, 2003).<sup>5</sup>

Today, it is striking that migration is not a strongly gender-segregated phenomenon in Cape Verde. Men and women do different work abroad and have different social responsibilities towards family in Cape Verde, but they have remarkably similar migration aspirations and emigrate at similar rates (Carling, 2001; Åkesson, 2004). I have heard men complain that migration is now much easier for women, because they have better chances of finding work in an undocumented situation, and better possibilities of regularising their situation through marriage. If independent female migration has grown as a result of an increasing need for independent livelihoods, it is also true that the opportunities for independent migration have enabled women to take more control over their own lives. The ties between children and their mothers are usually much stronger than the ties with their fathers. In some areas, only a minority of women with two or more children have them all by the same father (Ministério de Saúde/FNUAP, 1996). A woman is sometimes forced to pursue new childbearing unions in order to attach herself to a man who can provide for the children she already has (Åkesson, 2004). The large proportion of female-headed households might have resulted partly from male-dominated emigration in the past, but at least in recent decades this has had much more to do with social organisation locally (Finan and Henderson, 1988). In fact, the instability and flexibility of conjugal relations means that there are few couples separated by migration: while 84% of the population have relatives abroad, only 2% say they have a spouse abroad (Instituto de Emprego e Formação Profissional, 2002).

Given the two-way relationships between migration and social change in Cape Verde, it is futile to look for simple effects of changing recruitment patterns. However, it is clear that the long-term development towards more female involvement in migration has been central to finding alternatives to the breadwinner model of the family economy. After a relatively short period of circumstances that led to a very high share of female emigrants, men and women today seem to encounter the obstacles to emigration in very similar ways.

### Social Stratification and Migration

The northbound emigration of the 1960s and 1970s is said to have been quite independent of class.<sup>6</sup> It was not difficult to borrow money to pay for the ticket, even though the annual interest rates ran as high as 100%. Given the prospect of arriving in Europe with two empty hands and starting work the next day, this was not seen as much of a problem. After nearly three decades of tightening immigration policies, money itself is still rarely a decisive obstacle. As one Cape Verdean official working with migration told me, 'Money is not a problem; as long as people get a visa, they will earn, borrow or steal the money; they will get it one way or another'. At the same time, socio-economic resources more broadly are becoming more important.

As with explanations of the shifting gender balance, it is necessary to distinguish between different *modes* of migration (Carling, 2001, 2002). In particular, the changing migration regime has increased the importance of tourist visas in the migration process. During the 1980s and 1990s, a growing share of Cape Verdean migrants entered Europe and North America on tourist visas and overstayed their duration. Many were later able to regularise their situation through marriages or regularisation campaigns, but this is increasingly difficult. In Cape Verde, it is still common for prospective migrants to hold the view that the first challenge is 'getting there' and then they can worry about the paperwork later. While those who succeed have later had their status regularised under the headings of family formation migration or labour migration, it is important to appreciate that a tourist visa was the necessary first step.

The growing importance of tourist visas for subsequent long-term migration has had important implications for migrant recruitment. Immigration authorities in North America and Europe are well aware of the practice of overstaying tourist visas, which is not specific to Cape Verdean migrants. Tourist visas are therefore issued restrictively with the aim of identifying potential overstayers in the application process. This sifting is an extremely important part of international migration regulations.

The Schengen countries, which include all the principal European destinations for Cape Verdean migrants, have common instructions for processing visa applications. The most decisive requirement for prospective emigrants' ability to obtain tourist visas is the so-called 'proof of socio-professional situation' to be submitted with a visa application. This is usually specified as a pay slip or employment contract and a transcript of the applicant's bank account. Such a requirement essentially constitutes a means of sorting applicants by social and economic status, ensuring that only those with a high level of material well-being in Cape Verde are given visas. This is based on a belief that the risk of overstaying is associated with the perceived benefits of emigrating, which depend on the standard of living in Cape Verde. Consular officers I interviewed stressed that visa applications were not assessed on the basis of specific requirements for salary levels or bank accounts, but from the overall impression of a person's financial situation. In particular, stable employment was more important than the actual level of income.

The socio-economic barriers to obtaining a visa are reflected in the Schengen countries' internal instructions for examining visa applications. These instructions describe the basic criteria for examining visa applications as follows:

'The purpose of examining visa applications is to detect those applicants who are seeking to immigrate to [the Schengen Area] and set themselves up there, using grounds such as tourism studies, business or family visits as a pretext. Therefore, it is necessary to be particularly vigilant when dealing with "risk categories", in other words unemployed persons, and those with no regular income, etc.' (Council of the European Union, 2000: 26)

This describes a situation where consular officials must 'detect' the intention of applicants through examining the evidence, and that people with few economic resources are a 'risk category' in the sense that they are likely to have dishonest intentions.

There are, of course, numerous attempts at overcoming the socio-economic barrier to obtaining a visa. Firstly, many applicants submit false employment contracts. Secondly, people fill their bank accounts with borrowed money before the transcripts for their bank accounts are issued. In Cape Verde, these strategies were well-known by consular officials and ordinary people alike. People have also been known to buy false medical certificates to support applications for visas for medical treatment.

In some cases, visa applications are examined only on the basis of the written documentation. In other cases, depending on the country and on the individual case, there is a short interview with a consular officer. The purpose of the interviews is to compare different pieces of information to see if the totality makes sense and documents a 'socio-professional situation' that makes overstaying unlikely.

The consuls I interviewed had different views on the difficulty of identifying potential overstayers. Some of them said that it is 'very easy' to see from the totality of the information submitted in the application whether the person is a likely overstayer. This has important implications for the ability of prospective migrants to emigrate by means of overstaying a tourist visa. What the consuls base their decisions on is primarily an assessment of the applicant's true socio-professional situation, as well as their family circumstances. The ease of making decisions, then, is based on a firm association of certain characteristics with the risk of overstaying. In particular, potential overstayers are identified as those who have an unstable socio-professional situation, whether or not they attempted to give a different impression. Furthermore, the risk of being seen as an overstayer declines with age.

Considering the various avenues for emigration combined, there is little doubt that with the tightening of opportunities for emigration, the poor have been most critically affected. This has important implications for development in a country where a large proportion of households depend on remittances. In this situation, access to the transnational sphere becomes an important

dimension of social stratification, intertwined with socio-economic status. Coming from a poor family reduces the chances of being able to emigrate, and when this is the same for close relatives, it also reduces the chances of receiving remittances.

## RETURN MIGRATION

While there is no reliable statistical base for determining the true extent of return migration, the Cape Verdean case probably confirms the 'rule of thumb' in migration theory that original intentions to return often dwindle with time (Boyle *et al.*, 1998; King, 2000). Nevertheless, return is an important aspect of migration dynamics in two respects. Firstly, actual return takes place on a significant scale even if many emigrants choose to settle permanently abroad. Secondly, the *idea* of return is central to transnational practices such as sending remittances and constructing houses.

The sustained idea of returning to the homeland is often referred to as 'the myth of return' (Guarnizo, 1997). Regardless of whether or not those who emigrate will actually return, it is significant that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the aspiration to emigrate is formulated with intentions to return. Since, as noted above, this idea is important regardless of whether it is realised or not, it is more appropriate to speak of an 'ethos of return' than of a myth or an illusion. In fact, Cape Verdean migration is conceptualised as a template for behaviour that includes return. Studies of Cape Verdeans in the Netherlands, Portugal and Italy confirm that virtually all migrants arrived with the intention of returning, and often keep wishing to do so even after many years in Europe (de França, 1992; Reekers, 1997; Monteiro, 1997; Gomes, 1999).

The question of returning or not, and how this decision is affected by the changing migration regime, will be addressed later. Firstly, however, I will discuss the different forms that return migration has taken during the past couple of decades by focusing on two contrasting groups of returnees who reflect the changes in the migration regime.

### Classic Returnees

The 'classic returnees' are the prototypical migrants of the guestworker era that are still



alive, both in flesh and bone, and as an archetype in people's minds. Passengers arriving in São Vicente's airport are still met by a sign, posted by the recently closed Institute for Assistance to Emigrants (IAPE), that reads 'Mr Emigrant, do you have problems? Contact us!'. This Mr Emigrant is obviously a man, and represents an image of a respectable person whose problems presumably concern getting a car through customs, claiming his pension rights or buying land in Cape Verde. This is in fact a relatively well-defined social category in Cape Verde. A classic returnee often retires in Cape Verde and enjoys the fruits of many years of work abroad, sometimes as much as 25–30 years. Some of these returnees have been able to secure pension rights that guarantee them a regular income. While the monthly sum of money is usually modest by European standards, it usually exceeds typical salaries in Cape Verde. These emigrants are often seen as being in a perfect situation, 'receiving their own money just sitting down' as one of my interviewees put it. Such statements are uttered with respect more than with envy, since these migrants' achievements are very much in line with 'the Cape Verdean dream', if there is such a thing. There are few other realistic strategies for securing such a comfortable standard of living, so having returned to Cape Verde with savings or pension rights after working abroad is the best many young Cape Verdeans can – and do – hope for. As a girl from São Vicente put it to me, 'everybody who sees somebody like that will say that "that one has his life sorted out"; he doesn't have to do anything more; now he can just live'.

The economic success of the classic migrant must be analysed in several stages. In a typical case, the migrant has spent much of his adult life abroad, often more than 30 years. While he is working abroad, he sends remittances to Cape Verde, either to his wife and children, or, if they are with him abroad, to parents or other relatives. He also has a house constructed in Cape Verde and sends money to pay for it being built. The resources his relatives consume find their way into the local economy, as does the money spent on constructing a house. In most cases, he will be entitled to an old-age pension when he reaches a stipulated age (e.g. 65 years). He might await reaching this age before returning, or he might return when he is in his fifties. In the latter case, he enters a financially challenging period.

Known as the period of *pre-reforma*, the years before an old age pension arrives require that consumption be financed through other means. One important source of income is rental housing. It is common for migrants to build a house with more than one apartment, with one for themselves and the others for rent.

Some returnees also have substantial savings when they return, and invest this in a small business such as a bar or a taxi, or in agricultural land. These investments are all highly visible in the local community, require minimal administration or expertise, and lie within the financial capacity of many classic returnees. This can also provide some income during the *pre-reforma* years. When the old-age pension starts arriving, this might then come on top of earnings from rental housing and business. It is important to appreciate that the combined wealth of successful migrants comes partly from abroad and partly from the local economy. When emigration results in savings that in turn give access to physical capital, this leads to internal redistribution favouring return migrants.

For various reasons, some migrants never manage to secure pension rights – or to obtain the pension they are actually entitled to. There is, in other words, an important distinction within this group of return migrants between those who receive a pension in Cape Verde and those who do not. What unites the classic return migrants is that they have spent much of their adult life abroad, they have managed to secure a relatively high standard of living in Cape Verde, and they have usually not re-entered the Cape Verdean wage labour market.

### Empty-handed Returnees

In contrast to the classic returnees, there are the empty-handed returnees, unsuccessful migrants who come back being no better off than when they left. Some of them have spent many years abroad while others have returned quickly. Some of them have returned voluntarily while others have been deported. Despite these variations, they can be grouped together because of their failure to achieve even the most basic objectives of migration.

As mentioned above, emigration is usually conceptualised as an instrumental project for achieving a higher standard of living after

returning to Cape Verde. One is also expected to assist one's family through remittances and gifts upon return. Returning without being better off than at the time of departure, and becoming a burden to one's family upon return, can only be seen as a humiliating experience.

While there are obvious disincentives to returning to Cape Verde without savings, an increasing number of emigrants are forcibly returned against their will. All emigrants who lack the necessary permits for residing in Europe or North America run the risk of being deported. In addition, migrants who are convicted of serious crimes could be expelled after serving a prison term even if they had a residence permit at the time of their conviction.

Cape Verdean authorities registered almost 500 deportees living in Cape Verde in 2002 (Instituto das Comunidades, 2002). The involuntary returnees have become a considerable problem in some islands, and often have great difficulties reintegrating into Cape Verdean society. A rough categorisation of the deportees whose grounds for repatriation are known shows that about 40% have been repatriated due to undocumented residence or possession of false documents. About the same number have been convicted of drug-related crimes, and the final 20% have been convicted of other crimes.<sup>7</sup>

The first wave of repatriation occurred in the mid-1990s and was dominated by migrants from the interior of Santiago who were repatriated from Portugal (Instituto das Comunidades, 2002; Instituto de Apoio ao Emigrante, 1995–1998). These might have returned empty-handed, but have by and large managed to reintegrate. A much more troubling second wave of repatriation is dominated by younger migrants from the US, many of whom were born abroad or left Cape Verde as young children. These migrants are less educated, have usually been deported in relation with crime, and have practically no roots in Cape Verdean society. This often results in either attempts at re-emigration, or drug abuse and delinquency in Cape Verde (Instituto das Comunidades, 2002; Instituto de Apoio ao Emigrante, 1996; Tavares, 1997).

The fact that some people return with substantial savings while others do not is hardly surprising. However, it easily leads to speculation about what went wrong with those who return as poor as they left. Such speculations easily go

in the direction of irresponsibility. If it is a man, people will often say that 'it must have been *vida de paródia*, or spending it with women'. While Cape Verdeans are fond of partying and proud of this tradition, a *vida de paródia* (a life of excessive revelry and squandering of money) is often held up as a contrast to responsibility. If the person has been deported, such suspicions are even more probable, and often focus on drugs. People know that there are severe drug problems among young Cape Verdeans in the US, Portugal and the Netherlands. The fact that many Cape Verdeans have relatives who have lived for many years without papers in Europe or America easily leads people to conclude that deportees must have done something wrong. Those 40% who have been deported due solely to undocumented residence therefore run the risk of being suspected of having caused their own deportation through criminal behaviour. As emigration is getting more and more difficult, returning empty-handed is a greater humiliation than ever. Going abroad is such a coveted opportunity that deportees are easily accused of 'having wasted their chance', whatever the circumstances of their deportation.

### Two Generations of Returnees

The 'classic' and the 'empty-handed' returnees represent two generations of migrants. Figures 4 and 5 show a demographic comparison of the two groups. Statistics on Cape Verdean-born Dutch citizens living in Cape Verde are used as a proxy for the classic returnees. Migration to the Netherlands represents the successful guest-worker migration *par excellence*. Numerous elderly returnees express satisfaction with their experience in their 'second homeland' and many have secured pension rights. The figures exclude those who have never opted for Dutch citizenship. The small number of Dutch citizens born in the 1980s and 1990s are children of migrants with Dutch passports and not returnees themselves. The empty-handed returnees are represented by statistics on the inflow of deportees in the mid-1990s. Age at the time of deportation has been translated to decade of birth, in order to make the two figures comparable.

The first striking feature of the figures is the dominance of men: 83% among the adult Dutch citizens and 90% among the deportees. Secondly,




Figure 5. Age pyramid of deportees to Cape Verde, 1994-1998 (decade of birth, %). Note: Only includes deportees registered by the Cape Verdean Instituto de Apoio ao Emigrante (IAPE). Figures for 1994 only include deportees from Portugal. Source: Unpublished statistics, IAPE.




Figure 4. Age pyramid of Dutch citizens living in Cape Verde, 2002 (decade of birth, %). Note: Only includes persons born in Cape Verde ( $n = 130$ ). Source: Consulaat van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, São Vicente, Cape Verde.

the graphs illustrate the generational aspect of the contrast between the two groups. The Dutch citizens were born in the 1930s to 1950s, while more than half of the deportees were born in the 1960s. Their mean age at the time of deportation was 33 years. Their contrasting experiences are quite obviously linked to the changing migration regime.

### Beyond the Two Extremes

The story of Cape Verdean return migration is more complex than the above contrast suggests. Firstly, there are many 'intermediate' returnees who have not worked abroad for as long as the 'classic returnees', have accumulated less savings and not secured pension rights. However, many have achieved other important objectives, most obviously the construction of one's own house. This could be the necessary base for making ends meet after returning to Cape Verde and working for a local salary. They have, in other words,

perhaps not 'made it' once and for all, but nevertheless enjoy a markedly higher standard of living than those who have never been abroad. My impression is that there are relatively many return migrants in this category. The father of Eloisa, one of my informants, is a case in point. He was already 40 years old and had been employed on Cape Verdean ships for many years when he spent five years working for a foreign shipping company.

'Thanks to those five years, we managed to build our house. Because I think that if he'd stayed here the whole time, with that job he had, we wouldn't have had our house. He went abroad, worked, and we managed to build our house. And he managed to buy his motorbike as well.' (Eloisa)

In fact, a survey of students in secondary school showed that those families where one of the parents had worked abroad had a considerably higher standard of living (Carling, 2001). As

many as 28% of the fathers and 13% of the mothers of the interviewees were return migrants, so this affected a large proportion of the students. The parent's migration experience actually had a stronger positive effect on the material well-being of the household than their level of education. However, very few of the parents had spent more than ten years as emigrants, very few were retired, and very few received pensions from abroad.

Another important group of returnees are the Cape Verdean graduates from foreign universities. These have never been 'emigrants' in the Cape Verdean sense of the word, but their migration is particularly important for Cape Verdean development. Higher education is still in its infancy in Cape Verde, and the country depends heavily on training professionals abroad. Portugal is the most important destination country. Every year, about 40% of the graduates remain in Portugal (Pires, 1997). Those who return often find it difficult to start a professional career. Many are unable to find work that they are qualified for, and those who do are often frustrated by rigid hierarchies that are dominated by people with less formal education but who have acquired a certain standing and are wary of upwardly-mobile university graduates.

Cape Verde has tried to encourage organised return of qualified emigrants in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration. The programme 'Return of Qualified African Nationals' resulted in 52 returns in the period 1996–2000 (International Organization for Migration, 2001). The more recent programme 'Migration for Development in Africa' (MIDA) takes a broader approach to utilising the resources of the diaspora in the development process, with or without permanent return.

### Return and Non-Return

Studies of Cape Verdeans in Europe have identified a number of reasons why migrants postpone the return, often indefinitely, despite their sustained commitment to the idea of returning (de França, 1992; Monteiro, 1997; Reekers, 1997). Many Cape Verdeans in Europe say that they postpone their return because they do not have the necessary amount of savings. In the words of a Cape Verdean in the Netherlands, 'I'd rather die of hunger here than go back to Cape Verde with

nothing' (Reekers, 1997: 69). Among younger people, the dim prospects of finding a job in Cape Verde are an obvious obstacle to return. Some migrants therefore postpone their return until they have reached the age of retirement or worked in Europe long enough to obtain pension rights.

Having a house in Cape Verde is sometimes given as a *precondition* for return. As mentioned earlier, constructing a house is usually the most important objective of migration. Many emigrants monitor the construction of a new house during holidays, or send money to relatives in order to have the house built. The cost of a house can perhaps be seen as a minimum threshold for the achievements necessary in order to return with dignity in the sense of justifying the years of emigration. This can also be related to the typology of return migrants in the way that people chose not to return if this would mean finding themselves in the 'empty-handed' category of returnees. Postponing the return can also mean hoping to be able to be a 'classic' returnee in the future.

Emotional or social ties with the host society also discourage return. This is especially the case when the migrants' children are well integrated and determined to remain in Europe. According to Reekers (1997), some migrants are also afraid of returning if they have not been able to fulfil their families' expectations regarding remittances. If they have not had anything to remit, they are also unlikely to have money to live from after returning to Cape Verde. Being dependent on their families after failing to support them with remittances is an unpleasant scenario that could strongly discourage return. The non-migrants' tendency to accuse empty-handed returnees of having led an irresponsible life could perhaps be strengthened by a feeling of resentment over the amount of remittances received.

It appears, therefore, that many Cape Verdeans who remain in Europe for longer than they had originally envisaged have not actively decided *not* to return. However, they postpone their return until they have hopefully come closer to their objectives. As time passes, the attachment to Cape Verde is likely to fade, while the sense of belonging in the destination country could increase. Somewhat simplistically, one might therefore say that the return-stimulating effect of coming closer to the objectives of migration

could be offset by attachment-related factors that work in the opposite direction.

In the face of a difficult decision to return or not, some emigrants opt for a transnational existence. Spending part of the year in Cape Verde and the rest in Europe makes it possible to retain social benefits and access to health care in Europe, which might be difficult to give up. It also makes it easier to maintain contact with family members living in Europe, especially children who do not have an interest in returning to Cape Verde. Many emigrants see this as the ideal form of retirement. However, it is not for everyone, since it requires having a home in each country and the means to pay for tickets that typically cost upwards of €1000 for a return trip from Europe. The importance of financial barriers to transnationalism is an important corrective to the tenet that transnational practices reflect discrimination in the host society. While discrimination might be a significant motivation for transnational engagement, a high degree of mobility also requires a financial base that is often associated with a high level of socio-economic integration in the host society.

The more restrictive migration regime affects return migration in several ways. Firstly, access to Europe or America is such a scarce resource that those who are there without papers are reluctant to leave. More importantly, the situation of migration pressure in Cape Verde could affect return migration through its influence on the relationship between emigrants and stayers.

The tightening of immigration policies has made potential emigrants ever more dependent on their relatives in Europe for realising their migration aspirations. Whether through family formation or through overstaying a tourist visa, the ability to emigrate depends almost entirely on emigrant relatives, who in this sense are 'gatekeepers' as much as 'bridgeheads' in the migration process (Böcker, 1994). For the prospective migrants in Cape Verde, it can be difficult to understand that it is often extremely difficult, if not impossible, for their relatives in Europe to 'sort out the papers' and pave the way for their migration. For the emigrants, such facilitation can be very demanding. Finding a legally resident spouse for a bogus marriage, paying him or her off, paying bribes for visas and buying plane tickets, are all considerable pressures for people who are struggling to make ends meet in the first

place. This potential clash between the expectations of prospective migrants and the capacity of emigrants to help them can sour the transnational family relationships. This comes in addition to the issue of remittances already mentioned.

If conflicts over remittances and the facilitation of migration come to dominate transnational relationships, emigrants could prefer to give priority to integration into the host society over the maintenance of ties with Cape Verde. This could involve fewer return visits or greater scepticism towards the idea of a definite return.

The pessimistic scenario about the perpetuation of transnational practices and return migration is supported by Åkesson's (2004) finding that people in São Vicente feel that emigrants were more supportive in the past. This could be a sign of 'de-transnationalisation', or it could result from the general trend of increasing individualism. It could also, perhaps, be a symptom of a more wide-ranging nostalgia and glorification of the past.

The classic returnees are closely associated with the wave of migration to Northern Europe in the 1960s and early 1970s. The young men who left in this period reached the age of retirement in the 1980s or 1990s and many of them returned to Cape Verde. To what extent this return migration continues depends partly on the continued migration of young adults, and partly on the development process in Cape Verde. Some returnees express satisfaction with the changes that have enabled them to move to Cape Verde and keep the level of comfort they were used to abroad. Others complain about the rising level of crime and the inefficiencies of the government. The balance between such factors will be more important to emigrants who are better integrated abroad and consider return if it is desirable, rather than seeing it as a predestined trajectory.

## REMITTANCES

Sending remittances to family members at the place of origin is seen as a fundamental part of the Cape Verdean migration project. Those who leave and 'forget' their relatives are widely frowned upon, while those who provide for their family are praised as exemplary migrants.

Remittances are usually thought of as the money that migrants send to their relatives in



the country of origin while they are working abroad. In addition, some return migrants transfer substantial savings upon their return. Finally, an increasingly important flow consists of pensions received by migrants after returning. In the case of Cape Verdean migration to the Netherlands, old-age pensions and other types of welfare payments account for about a quarter of registered remittances.<sup>8</sup>

Understanding the impact of remittances requires a brief discussion of their place within the Cape Verdean national economy. Export of goods has played a marginal role in Cape Verde since independence. In 2000–01 it accounted for only 12% of the country's income. By comparison, remittances accounted for 22%, and development aid for 8% of national income.<sup>9</sup> While these figures show continued dependence on international transfers, the importance of development aid is considerably smaller than about a decade ago (Bourdet, 2002). Many donors have recently withdrawn from Cape Verde and redirected aid to poorer countries. The relative importance of aid and remittances has also declined because income from goods exports has increased since the mid-1990s.

Nominal remittance inflows have grown tremendously from less than 1 billion CVE in the late 1970s to almost 9 billion in 2001 (Banco de Cabo Verde, 2002). In real terms, the value of remittances was virtually constant through most of the 1980s and then increased by about 50% during the following decade. As a percentage of the GDP, remittances constituted around 25% in the late 1970s, 15% in the early 1990s and 12% in 2000 (Bourdet, 2002). An international comparison based on data from 1995–99 showed that Cape Verde had the fifth highest level of remittances in relation to the GDP and the sixth highest level of per capita remittances in the world (Gammeltoft, 2002).

As always with studies of remittances in the national economy, unregistered remittance flows are the great unknown. In Cape Verde, smaller amounts are often sent in cash by regular mail. Larger sums are brought by migrants themselves on holiday, or sent with trusted friends and relatives. It is my impression, however, that those emigrants who send regular (usually monthly) remittances to their relatives do so through formal channels. Professional couriers and currency swap arrangements that are widespread

elsewhere are not commonly used in Cape Verde. Nevertheless, data from other countries that are relatively similar in terms of development level and migration experience suggest that up to 40–50% of total remittances could be sent through informal (i.e. non-recorded) channels.<sup>10</sup>

Different sources estimate the proportion of Cape Verdean families receiving remittances to be between a third and two-thirds (World Bank, 1994; Instituto da Condição Feminina, 1996; Instituto de Emprego e Formação Profissional, 2002). The volume of remittances is such that it undoubtedly has a great impact on the distribution of purchasing power. If we assume that half the country's households receive remittances, each household would receive an average of about 10,000 CVE ( $\approx$  US\$100) per month.<sup>11</sup> This is the same as a typical monthly salary for an unskilled worker.

### Remittances and Diaspora Dynamics

Sending remittances is only one of many transnational practices that link Cape Verde with the emigrant communities. In fact, Cape Verdean migration shares many of the characteristics that have been described in the literature on transnationalism during the past decade. The homeland and the diaspora are connected to each other through flows of remittances, telephone calls and goods, through relationships of kinship and friendship, and through the movement of people. Emigrants have also been important to Cape Verdean politics, and are increasingly involved in development projects (SEDES, 1989; Reekers, 1997; Vieira, 1998; Meintel, 2000, 2002; Marques *et al.*, 2001).

The future of remittance flows is intimately connected with the overall dynamics of the Cape Verdean diaspora. One important aspect of this is the inevitable decline of the proportion of first-generation migrants. In the Netherlands, for instance, it is estimated that over the next 15 years, the number of second-generation Cape Verdeans in economically active age groups (15–64) will more than double, while the corresponding number of first-generation migrants will decline by 5% (Bik and van Zundert, 2001). During the past decade, the second generation has come to take a much more active part in the collective organisation of Cape Verdeans.<sup>12</sup> Unlike the first generation, they are almost

exclusively concerned with the situation of Cape Verdeans *within* Dutch society, rather than with Cape Verdean politics or development. In fact, even the activities that actively relate to Cape Verde are seen as means to an end in the Netherlands. When the leading Dutch-Cape Verdean youth organisation organised a project called 'back to our roots', and took a group of the second generation to Cape Verde, it was based on the idea that increased awareness of their origin would strengthen the participants' position within multicultural Dutch society (Reekers and Lopes, 2001). Within the second generation, there is also a growing minority who are committed to 'helping Cape Verde'. This has a collective rather than an individual orientation, where the desire is usually to help vulnerable groups such as street children rather than helping one's family members.

Similar initiatives are increasingly seen among Cape Verdeans in the US, where social gatherings often involve drives for donations to Cape Verdean causes (Meintel, 2002). This can be related to an increased ethnic consciousness and pride among Americans of Cape Verdean origin over the past two decades.

While transnational ties with Cape Verde seem to outlive the first generation, there is no doubt that the nature of the ties will change. It is likely that the magnitude of contact will diminish, even with a strengthening of the Cape Verdean ethnic identity among the second and subsequent generations. It is fully possible to be an ethnically conscious Cape Verdean and interact with Cape Verde on a symbolic level, without having any contact with contemporary Cape Verdean society (cf. Smith, 2002). In line with this, it is likely that the volume of remittances will decline. While many first-generation migrants have siblings or parents in Cape Verde, the second generation's closest relatives are likely to be cousins, aunts and uncles. The weaker kinship ties are associated with a lower likelihood of sending remittances. The fact that remittance flows from Northern Europe have risen despite declining immigration from Cape Verde could be explained by a rising number of return migrant pensioners living in Cape Verde. The demographically induced decline in remittances could therefore take many years to materialise.

The contrast between the long-standing Cape Verdean community in the US and the more

recently established communities in Europe can be used to reflect upon the future of remittance flows. The US has been the largest source of registered remittances for most years since the early 1980s, and now accounts for more than a quarter of total remittances. However, the probable size of the Cape Verdean-American community is such that remittance flows *per capita* are relatively low. If the 'official' estimate of the size of the Cape Verdean-American community (265,000 people) is used as a basis, per capita transfers amounted to 9000 CVE in 2000–01.<sup>13</sup> This is lower than for all the 11 European countries for which data exist. If the denominator is changed to the much smaller population figure from the 2000 US Census (77,000 people of Cape Verdean ancestry), per capita transfers rise to 31,000 CVE. This only surpasses the levels from Portugal and Spain, and is still less than half the levels from Sweden, Switzerland and Italy, and only a tenth of per capita transfers from Germany. While there are many factors that influence the estimated per capita remittances flows, the difference between Europe and the US must be interpreted with reference to the maturity of the American community. If the level of remittances per capita in Europe were to drop to the level of the US, Cape Verde's total remittance income would fall by 25 to 40% (using the high and low estimates of US remittances per capita, respectively). What is not known is whether the large total transfers from the US originate almost entirely from the Cape Verdean-born minority within that group, or whether second and subsequent generations also remit money. Survey data on the children of immigrants from other countries of origin living in New York and San Diego suggest that more than a quarter have sent remittances, and that about half of this group do so several times a year (Kasinitz *et al.*, 2002; Rumbaut, 2002).<sup>14</sup> In the Cape Verdean community in the Netherlands, my impression is that members of the second generation who send remittances on a regular basis are extremely few, if they exist at all.

### The Future of Transnational Transfers

The demographic development of the diaspora will inevitably reduce the potential for remittance income. However, financial transfers from the diaspora could take new forms. Firstly, the

Cape Verdean government is trying to encourage emigrants to invest in Cape Verde, either by setting up businesses or by buying shares in the formerly state-owned companies that are now being privatised. In the ongoing privatisation of the national airline, TACV, 15% of the stocks are reserved for emigrants. While the second and subsequent generations might lack the emotional attachment to Cape Verde that Cape Verdean-born members of the diaspora have, their qualifications for doing business might be higher. In Northern Europe, the vast majority of first-generation Cape Verdean immigrants are unskilled, and many are not even functionally literate. Among the second generation, growing numbers are pursuing higher education, and some specialise in areas such as tourism with the idea of working in Cape Verde (Reekers and Lopes, 2001). While progress has been made in facilitating investment and reducing red tape, many migrants are frustrated with the inefficiencies of the Cape Verdean bureaucracy and lose their interest in investing. The fact that such dissatisfaction is a popular conversation theme makes it a considerable challenge for Cape Verdean authorities to reverse the mood and build up confidence in the local authorities among potential investors. An important positive initiative in this respect is the development of professional websites for various institutions of the government during the past couple of years. Since the mid-1990s, the Internet has been important for strengthening the unity of the diaspora. However, websites based in Cape Verde have been virtually non-existent. The fact that the government is now in the vanguard of promoting Cape Verde's own position in the Cape Verdean cyberspace is important for transnationalism more generally, and for confidence in the government more specifically.

The second form of transfers that might compensate for a fall in remittances is development cooperation organised or initiated by Cape Verdeans in the diaspora. While Cape Verdeans have long organised themselves with reference to specific communities of origin, some of these associations have more recently acquired the necessary level of expertise to fund and direct development projects. This is especially the case with Cape Verdeans in the US and the Netherlands. Some of these initiatives are partly funded by government sources. In addition, bilateral official

development assistance is sometimes channelled towards Cape Verde, even without direct intervention by the migrants. The best examples of this are the recently initiated development cooperation between the local authorities of Rotterdam and Praia, and Luxembourg's substantial aid to Cape Verde (especially to Santo Antão, the home island of most Cape Verdeans in Luxembourg). In fact, Cape Verde is the largest recipient of Luxembourg aid and Cape Verdeans are the largest non-European immigrant group in that country.

The third financial flow that could prove more sustainable than remittances is income from tourists of Cape Verdean origin. Many second-generation Cape Verdeans, who have no close relatives to send remittances to, cherish their holidays in Cape Verde. As mentioned above, the great value placed on holiday-making as an emigrant is a key aspect of the Cape Verdean culture of migration, and one that seems to be transmitted to the second generation. The first generation have traditionally stayed with relatives during their holidays and spent much of their time with family. It is now increasingly common for emigrants on holiday to rent their own housing, either because they do not have close relatives who can board them, or because they value and can afford the comfort of private space. Furthermore, many second-generation migrants are spending their holidays much like any other tourists, going to the beach during the day, eating in restaurants and going to discos at night. While the emigrants constitute a promising market for the Cape Verdean tourist industry, the transition from family visits to commercial tourism also places great demands on the service provided. Firstly, emigrants have long been frustrated with the national airline, which has been troubled by frequent cancellations, excessive overbooking and allegations of nepotism in making reservations on popular flights. International flights during the summer and Christmas holidays are full up to a year in advance, and overbooked domestic flights constitute an additional bottleneck. A second challenge is the quality of tourism services in Cape Verde. Second-generation migrants who have experienced high-quality tourism at a low price in other countries might not feel that the ethnic attachment compensates for the lower value for money they find in Cape Verde.

## CONCLUSION

Migration will undoubtedly continue to be a central factor in Cape Verde's development process, even with a declining emigration flow. Recent changes in migration dynamics and in the relationship between diaspora and homeland constitute both promises and challenges. Firstly, there is a worrying tendency towards increasing social segregation in the recruitment of migrants. Unequal access to the benefits of migration could increase existing inequalities in Cape Verdean society. A second challenge is that returnees are increasingly a social problem as much as a blessing. The rising number of deportees living in Cape Verde makes it more difficult to fight crime and drug abuse, while their presence apparently does little to reduce migration pressure. Thirdly, the future of remittance inflows is threatened by the demographic development of the diaspora, even if this is a long-term process that is yet to materialise in Europe. The challenge for Cape Verde is to facilitate the continued commitment of the diaspora through the transition to new forms of transnational attachment. The rising level of education among Cape Verdean emigrants and the growing ease of communication and travel are factors that hold the promise of valuable contributions in the future.

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## NOTES

- (1) Emigration figures for recent years are based on passenger counts with poorly specified categories of travellers. However, the net emigration rate can also be calculated from population statistics on fertility, mortality and population size. This confirms that the annual net emigration rate was about 9 per thousand in the late 1980s, and 5 per thousand in the early 1990s (Ministério de Coordenação Económica, 1996). See also Andrade (1998) and Biayé (1995, 1996).
- (2) This is a position that Cape Verde shares with Egypt, Jordan, Bangladesh, Thailand, Vietnam and Indonesia (United Nations Population Division, 2002).
- (3) The conviction that migrating is better than staying could be coercive, if staying is life-threatening (as in the case of refugees). Nevertheless, there is a wish to go in the sense that this is the lesser of two evils. Even in such a situation there will be people who lack the ability to realise this wish, and remained trapped in a threatening situation (see Carling, 2001, for a thorough discussion).
- (4) There are no data on immigration flows from Cape Verde before 1983. In this year, only 44% of Cape Verdean nationals immigrating to the Netherlands were women. During the following decade, this proportion averaged 56%. Data on Cape Verdean-born residents in the Netherlands show that about 55% of those who arrived around 1980 and still reside in the Netherlands are women (calculations based on published and unpublished data from Statistics Netherlands).
- (5) The distinction between family reunification and family formation is problematic, both at the conceptual and at the statistical level. The notion of reunification is based on the pre-existence of a family relationship. This is clear-cut in the case of parents and children, but sometimes ambiguous in the case of spouses – especially when formal marriage is not a requirement (as is the case in the Netherlands).
- (6) While this is 'common knowledge' in Cape Verde, it is difficult to find conclusive evidence. The poorest strata of the population probably had limited opportunities for taking part in migration to Europe, and were more likely to be recruited for indentured labour on São Tomé. However, it seems clear that the broad masses of the population were less affected by structural, class-related barriers to migration than during the subsequent decades.
- (7) Data from Instituto de Apoio ao Emigrante about the *inflow* of deportees 1994–1998 and data from Instituto das Comunidades about the *stock* of deportees in 2002 show slightly different distributions of grounds for repatriation. These figures are a rough summary of the two sources combined.
- (8) Refers to the period 1996–2002, calculated on the basis of unpublished statistics from De Sociale Verzekeringsbank.
- (9) These descriptions refer to the credit items in the current account, related to the total credit.
- (10) Surveys from the Philippines, Tonga and Western Samoa, reviewed by Puri and Ritzema (1999).



- (11) Calculated for 1998 on the basis of data from Instituto Nacional de Estatística and Banco de Cabo Verde. The result should be interpreted with caution since the assumption that half the households receive remittances is very rough, and there is no information about the distribution of remittances among remittance-receiving households.
- (12) The categorisation in terms of first and second generation is a simplification of a complex reality, used to contrast those who migrated as adults with those who are either born in Cape Verde or immigrated as children. In fact, a large proportion of the parent generation of the Dutch-born Cape Verdeans were themselves brought to the Netherlands as children. The grandparents of the 'second generation' (defined as the Dutch-born) were therefore the true 'first generation' in that they did not have migrant parents.
- (13) The calculations are based on remittance statistics from Banco de Cabo Verde, using the average of 2000 and 2001.
- (14) The two surveys ( $n = 2593$  and  $n = 1100$ ) covered a number of Asian, Latin American and Caribbean countries of origin and included foreign-born children of immigrants who came to the US before the age of 12. Rumbaut's study from San Diego found that the US-born are in fact more likely to send remittances, but this difference is not significant in regression analysis where other factors (including gender, age, socio-economic situation, and language use) are controlled for.

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