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The Real Score***

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Population and Poverty: The Real Score*

By

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Population and Poverty: The Real Score

Salus populi suprema lex

Introduction

The public debate on the population issue – long settled in most of the developing world – remains unresolved in the Philippines. We aim in this paper to contribute to the debate, in particular to highlight the role the government must play to face up to this development challenge.

On one extreme, there are those who say that there is no population problem and, hence, that there is nothing the government needs to do about it. On the other, some view population growth as the principal cause of poverty that would justify the government resorting to draconian and coercive measures to deal with the problem (e.g., denial of basic services and subsidies to families with more than two children).

We consider these extreme views and arrive at what we think is a balanced, more reasoned and, hopefully, more widely acceptable position. Our review of the extensive literature and our analysis of relevant empirical data lead us to the following **key messages**:

- Poverty is a complex phenomenon, and many factors are responsible for it. Rapid population growth alone cannot explain poverty. Bad governance, high wealth and income inequality and weak economic growth are the main causes. But rapid population growth and high fertility rates, especially among the poor, do exacerbate poverty and make it harder for the government to address it. The government's target of reducing poverty incidence to 20% or lower by 2010 would not be feasible, given historical growth rates of population and the economy.
- Time and again, Filipino women across all socioeconomic classes have expressed their desire for fewer children. But many, particularly the poor and the less educated among them, have more children than they want and are unable to achieve their desired number of children. Moreover, an overwhelming majority of Filipinos have affirmed the importance of the ability to plan one's family or control one's fertility, and believe that rapid population growth impedes the country's development.
- An unequivocal and coherent national population policy – backed by an adequately funded family planning program that provides accurate information and enables access to methods of contraception of choice – is pro-poor, pro-women, pro-people, and pro-life. Any government that cares about the poor cannot be blind to the fact that many of them have no access to effective family planning services.


- Good population policy and programs are not costly and, based on the results of surveys, are likely to be widely welcomed. But political will and commitment are needed to make them effective.
- The threat of the so-called “demographic winter” (birth dearth, aging, etc.) for the Philippines is greatly exaggerated, and using it as an argument against a sensible population policy is a plain and simple scare tactic.

What macro data show

Population growth in the Philippines declined slowly from 3.0% per annum in the early 1970s to 2.5% in the mid-1980s, then leveling to 2.36% in the 1990s and remaining at this rate today. This pattern of growth deceleration roughly corresponds to the relative waxing and waning of the country’s population program.

The leveling of the Philippines’ population growth decline in the late 1980s through 1990s has resulted in a population size that is larger than the United Nations (UN) medium variant population projections. The UN (1986) projected RP’s population to reach 86 million by 2010; in fact, that size would already likely be reached by 2005.

By comparison, Thailand’s and Indonesia’s population growth rates, which were similar to the Philippines’ in the early 1970s, are down to 1.4% and 1.5%, respectively (Chart 1). Likewise, while Thailand’s poverty incidence is down to 9.8% and Indonesia’s to 18.2%, the Philippines’ poverty incidence remains high at 33% (all official figures reported in ADB 2004)¹.



¹ Poverty incidence is the proportion of the population below a defined poverty line – here, a country’s official poverty line.

These comparisons are instructive in understanding the links between governance, population policy, and poverty. Thailand is arguably the best among the three countries on all three counts, suggesting that good population policy combined with good governance results in rapid economic growth and poverty reduction. Meanwhile, the experience of Indonesia, where governance and corruption ratings are worse than those of the Philippines, suggests that good population policy by itself can contribute to significant poverty reduction. In short, population policy does matter.

Moreover, the contrast between Indonesia and the Philippines shows that even a country with lower literacy and per capita income than the Philippines can reduce fertility rates, which, as is argued below, is very important for poverty reduction. This is so since it is the poor who have the highest fertility and the largest gap between desired and actual fertility.

The Philippines' population growth rate is among the highest in the developing world. It had been widely accepted even in the 1970s-80s that rapid population growth (of 2% or more per annum then prevailing in many developing countries) was more likely to impede than promote economic development (World Bank 1984). This negative effect operates via reduced child care and human capital investment at the family level, lower household sector savings for business and government investments, and constraints on allocative efficiency, innovation and entrepreneurship. Population growth requires capital widening to maintain the amount of capital per worker, and the faster such growth the lesser the chances for capital deepening or raising the amount of capital per worker. Many developing countries have taken these lessons to heart, with positive results, and since have moved on – but not the Philippines.

The Philippines' rapid population growth has a direct bearing on the labor market. It has prolonged the task of significantly reducing unemployment – a problem that is untenably large – and raising productivity. The current pool of unemployed and underemployed exceeds 5 million – a daunting challenge, indeed, for job creation.

A recent study (Mapa and Balisacan 2004) on the population-poverty nexus, using data on 80 developing and developed countries, gives the following results:

- total population growth exerts a negative and significant effect on economic growth (unfavorable saving and capital-shallowing effects);
- at the same time, working-age population growth (implying demographic dividend), life expectancy at birth (a health indicator), openness to trade, and quality of public institutions (denoting good governance) all show positive and significant effects on economic growth.

The study also carries out a simulation exercise – *what if the Philippines had Thailand's population growth trajectory?* – with the following results:

- an increase of 0.77% per annum over 1975-2000 in average income per person or a cumulative increase of 22% in income per capita by 2000 – meaning a GDP per capita in 2000 of \$1,210 instead of the actual \$993 [or \$4,839 instead of \$3,971 in purchasing power parity (PPP) terms];
- basic education cost savings of P128 billion from 1991-2000, and basic health cost savings of P52 billion from 1996 to 2000;
- these cost savings could have been used to improve the quality of education and health services, or to finance agricultural sector investments that – along with lower population growth – could have sharply reduced rural poverty;
- the above estimates are conservative as they don't fully capture the population-economy-poverty interaction effects.

It should be noted, however, that cross-country studies such as the above, which employ regression analysis of cross-country averages, have inherent shortcomings² and show mixed results (see Appendix). Other studies may be cited that show either a positive or no relationship between growth rates of population and per capita income.

We now turn to micro (household) data for a deeper look at the population-poverty link.


What household data reveal

The Philippines' total fertility rate (TFR)³ declined from 6.0 in 1973 to 4.1 in 1993, and more slowly to 3.5 in 2003 (NDHS 2003). By comparison, Thailand's and Indonesia's TFRs, starting at about the same level in the early 1970s as the Philippines', are currently 1.7 and 2.6, respectively (Chart 2).

Again, this is instructive. Contrary to claims that significant fertility declines can happen only in countries at high income levels, Indonesia with lower per capita income and lower literacy rate was, in fact, able to reduce fertility faster than the Philippines. The same can be said of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and India's Kerala state.

² For example, the data are inconsistent as concepts and measurements of poverty, income and income correlates, as well as unmeasured institutions and economic structures, vary across countries.

³ TFR is the number of births a woman would have on average at the end of her reproductive life if she were subject to the currently prevailing age-specific fertility rates throughout her reproductive years (15-49).



There is a close association between poverty incidence and family size, as borne out consistently by data over time. For example, data for 2000 show that poverty incidence rises monotonically from 9.8% for family size of one to 57.3% for family size of 9+ (Table 1). Moreover, poverty incidence declined the slowest for family size 9+, from 59.9% in 1985 to 57.3% in 2000 compared with 19% to 9.8% for family size 1. Further, family size is directly related to the vulnerability to poverty or the likelihood of falling into poverty owing to exogenous shocks, e.g., typhoons and droughts (Reyes 2002).

Table 1: Poverty Incidence by Family Size (%)

Family Size	Poverty Incidence					
	1985	1988	1991	1994	1997	2000
1	19.0	12.8	12.7	14.9	9.8	9.8
2	20.0	18.4	21.8	19.0	14.3	15.7
3	26.6	23.2	22.9	20.7	17.8	18.6
4	36.6	31.6	30.1	25.3	23.7	23.8
5	42.9	38.9	38.3	31.8	30.4	31.1
6	48.8	45.9	46.3	40.8	38.2	40.5
7	55.3	54.0	52.3	47.1	45.3	48.7
8	59.8	57.2	59.2	55.3	50.0	54.9
9 or more	59.9	59.0	60.0	56.6	52.6	57.3
National	44.2	40.2	39.9	35.5	31.8	33.7

Source: Orbeta (2004) based on NSO, Family Income and Expenditure Surveys, 1985-2000.

As expected, mean per capita income, expenditure and savings fall monotonically as family size rises (Table 2). Likewise, mean education spending per student drops from P5,558 for family size 1 to P682 for family size 9+, and average health spending per capita falls from P1,700 to P150 over that family size range (Table 3).

Table 2: Mean per Capita Income, Expenditure and Savings by Family Size, 2002

Family Size	Mean per Capita Income	Mean per Capita Expenditure	Mean per Capita Savings
1	39,658	33,885	5,773
2	25,712	20,858	4,854
3	21,342	18,307	3,035
4	18,429	15,480	2,950
5	15,227	13,159	2,068
6	12,787	11,416	1,371
7	11,147	9,341	1,806
8	9,259	8,168	1,091
9 or more	8,935	7,699	1,236
Total	14,280	12,252	2,028


Source: Orbeta (2004) based on Family Income and Expenditure Surveys, 1985-2000.

Table 3: Mean Education and Health Expenditures by Family Size, 2002

Family Size	Mean Education Expenditure per Student	Mean Health Expenditure per Sick Member	Mean Health Expenditure per Capita
1	5,558	2,437	1,700
2	3,135	1,969	922
3	2,243	2,124	802
4	1,787	1,464	438
5	1,558	1,454	336
6	1,090	1,311	299
7	858	940	206
8	1,081	744	166
9 or more	682	756	150
Total	1,369	1,400	466

Source: Orbeta (2004) based on Family Income and Expenditure Surveys, 1985-2000.

As noted in our earlier paper, “The Deepening Crisis: The Real Score on Deficits and the Public Debt” (August 2004), social sector services besides infrastructure have fallen victim to the fiscal crisis. National government expenditure on social services per capita has fallen sharply in real terms from P2,487 in 1997 to P1,999 in 2004 (Manasan 2004). For education the decline has been from P1,789 to P1,415, and for health from P266 to P141 over the same period. More specifically for education, annual real spending per student in public elementary and secondary schools has dropped precipitously from P8,439 to P6,554, with negative annual average growth rate, over that seven-year interval (Chart 3).



The prevalence of child labor rises, and school attendance falls, with the number of children in the family (Raymundo 2004). Moreover, the odds of a child becoming underweight and stunted are greater if he/she belongs to a household with 5 or more members (FNRI 1998). This partly explains why poverty tends to be transmitted and perpetuated from one generation to the next.

The average TFR masks the wide variance across wealth (asset) groups: 5.9 children for the bottom quintile, 3.5 for the middle quintile, and 2.0 for the top quintile (Table 4). Likewise, wanted fertility declines monotonically from the bottom to the top asset class: 3.8 for the bottom quintile, 2.6 for the middle, and 1.7 for the top. The large gap between actual and unwanted fertility among poor households (2.1 bottom quintile versus 0.9 middle and 0.3 top) suggests that family size adversely impacts on their living standards⁴. As expected, the actual-wanted fertility gaps are also evident by education level and urban/rural location.

Behind this gap is high unmet need for family planning services: 26.7% bottom quintile versus 15% middle and 12.4% top (Table 5). Hence, low contraceptive use or contraceptive prevalence rate (CPR) (any method): 37.4% bottom versus 52.7% middle, and CPR (modern method) of 23.8% versus 35.7% (Table 6). Poor households mostly depend on public sources of modern family planning methods (88% versus 74% among the middle quintile) (Table 7).

⁴ “In the 2003 NDHS, women were asked a series of questions about each child born in the preceding five years and any current pregnancy, to determine whether the pregnancy was wanted then, wanted at a later time, or unwanted...The danger of rationalization is present; an unwanted conception may well have become a cherished child...Respondents are willing to report unwanted conceptions, although some postpartum rationalization probably occurs. The result is probably an underestimate of unwanted fertility” (NSO 2004, p. 100).

Table 4: Actual and Wanted Fertility (Number of Children) by Wealth Quintile, Education, and Urban/Rural Location

	Total Actual Fertility Rate	Total Wanted Fertility Rate	Difference
Wealth quintile			
Lowest	5.9	3.8	2.1
Second	4.6	3.1	1.5
Middle	3.5	2.6	0.9
Fourth	2.8	2.2	0.6
Highest	2.0	1.7	0.3
Women's education			
No education	5.3	4.1	1.2
Elementary	5.0	3.3	1.7
High school	3.5	2.5	1.0
College or higher	2.7	2.2	0.5
Urban/Rural location			
Urban	3.0	2.2	0.8
Rural	4.3	3.0	1.3
Total	3.5	2.5	1.0

Source: National Demographic and Health Survey 2003.

Table 5: Unmet Need for Family Planning Services, 2003 (%)

Unmet Need	Wealth Quintile					Total	Poor-rich ratio
	Lowest	Second	Middle	Fourth	Highest		
Total	26.7	19.6	15.0	13.4	12.4	17.3	2.2
Spacing	10.9	8.6	7.7	6.5	6.1	7.9	1.8
Limiting	15.8	11.0	7.3	6.9	6.2	9.4	2.5

Source: NSO, National Demographic and Health Survey 2003.

Table 6: Contraceptive Prevalence Rates, 2003 (%)

Type of Method	Wealth Quintile					Total	Poor-rich ratio
	Lowest	Second	Middle	Fourth	Highest		
No Method	62.6	51.2	47.3	45.6	49.4	51.1	1.3
Any Method	37.4	48.8	52.7	54.4	50.6	48.9	0.7
Modern	23.8	33.8	35.7	37.9	35.2	33.4	0.7
Traditional	13.6	15.0	17.0	16.5	15.3	15.5	0.9

Source: NSO, National Demographic and Health Survey 2003.

Table 7: Source of Supply of Modern Methods, 2002 (%)

Source	Wealth Quintile					Total
	Poorest	Second	Middle	Fourth	Richest	
Public	88.4	80.2	74.4	61.9	49.2	70.1
Private	10.9	18.0	23.9	36.2	49.7	28.5
Others	0.6	1.4	1.4	1.5	0.8	1.1
Don't know	0.1	0.3	0.3	0.5	0.4	0.3
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source: NSO, Family Planning Survey 2002.

Higher-order pregnancies are more likely to be unwanted and, as would be expected, unwanted pregnancies often result in abortions. Indeed, 70% of unwanted pregnancies are aborted intentionally, accounting for a large part of about 400,000 abortions yearly (estimated in 1994 and must have risen over time, Raymundo 2004).

What people say

The latest survey carried out by Pulse Asia (February 2004) shows that people's views on family planning have not changed much over time since previous surveys.

Virtually all Filipinos nationwide and across the broad regions affirm the importance of the ability to control's one's fertility or plan one's family (Table 8). Moreover, 7 out of 10 Filipinos believe that rapid population growth impedes the country's development, with 13% undecided and 16% disagreeing.

Further, a vast majority (82%) are of the opinion that candidates favoring family planning should be supported rather than rejected in elections.

Table 8: Survey Results on Family Planning, 2004


Location	National	NCR	Luzon	Visayas	Mindanao
% of people who think that ability to control one's fertility or plan one's family is important	97	99	97	97	98
% of people who think that a fast-increasing population hinders the country's development	71	77	72	67	69
% of people who think that candidates who favor family planning should be supported	82	87	81	77	87

Source: Pulse Asia Survey on Family Planning, 2004.

Is the government's poverty goal achievable?

The government aims for a poverty incidence of below 20% in 2010 from about 33% currently. Is this goal achievable? Estimating a simple functional relationship shows that a GDP per capita growth rate of 1% is associated with drop in poverty incidence of 0.95%. This suggests that a poverty incidence of 20% by 2010 would require a GDP per capita growth of at least 3% per annum⁵.

Such economic growth numbers are significantly higher than the Philippines' historical average since the early 1980s and even higher than the more recent average of at most 1.8% from the mid-1990s to the present (Chart 4). This suggests that even for more modest reductions in poverty than the government's objective, it's not realistic to rely on economic growth (already severely constrained by fiscal deficits) while benignly neglecting the population issue.



The government does aim for a population growth rate of 1.9% by 2010. However, this target is simply not feasible with the government's current stance on the population front. To achieve such a target, contraceptive use – now at 49% (any method) – would have to increase by 0.48% yearly and would require a drastic shift in contraceptive method mix from predominantly traditional to predominantly modern, costing P1.25 billion per annum (Perez 2004). The amount is actually just a sliver of the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) or of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF or pork barrel). But will our political leaders spare such precious tiny slice?

⁵ Extending the target year to 2015 (the Millennium Development Goals milestone), to achieve that poverty incidence level would require an annual GDP per capita growth of at least 2%.

Why the need for population policy?

The rationale for an active public policy on population essentially stems from three considerations: (a) externalities, (b) imperfect information, and (c) poverty reduction.

First, externalities refer to costs imposed or benefits conferred on other people outside private contracts and the market place. They are often associated with the environmental effects of economic activities and of population, such as congestion, environmental degradation and resource depletion (“the tragedy of the commons”). But in developing countries like the Philippines which obligate the state to help the poor, population growth also generates externalities of a fiscal character: the greater the number of poor people, the higher the taxes that the non-poor must pay in order to prevent the quality of education, health, infrastructure and basic services from deteriorating. With weak tax administration, high population growth means that poverty will be perpetuated. The children of today’s poor will tend to be the poorer and less educated parents of the future, whose children in turn will be the less educated....etc, etc. Moreover, the additional fiscal costs have deleterious effects on infrastructure and human development.

Second, information about and access to family planning services are inadequate. Low-income or less educated couples are often ill-informed about the health risks to both mothers and children of many and closely-spaced births. And even those who are sufficiently informed about the advantages of family planning may not know how to operationalize the information they have or often do not have access to suitable services. In which case, the government must provide the needed information and access.

Third, the large gap between wanted and actual fertility, the high unmet need for contraception, and the low contraceptive use particularly among the poor constitute cogent justifications for the government’s provision of effective family planning services. Further, there is a compelling case for the provision of free services to the poor. Population policy should be an integral component of a poverty reduction strategy.

From the above, the need for a coherent population policy is obvious. There is, however, the deep-seated opposition to such a policy from some religious groups. The Catholic Church’s official position allows natural family planning (NFP) as the only method in the exercise of responsible parenthood. However, NFP as practiced has not been an effective method for family planning and for slowing the country’s population growth. For many poor and less educated couples, in particular, learning and adopting NFP is too complicated and cumbersome and requires extraordinary discipline. A more humane stance would tolerate the use of modern and more effective methods of family planning, besides NFP, provided they do not result in abortion. “This moral position is also pro-life, in the sense of pro-quality-life. Each life brought into this world deserves to be raised in a dignified, human way that the parents are capable of, according to God’s design, and not left to a ‘bahala-na’ attitude” (Tanseco 2004, p. 16).

Perhaps it is time, therefore, that the Catholic Church hierarchy and other religious groups listened to the people and took a more tolerant and humane position on the need for a state-supported population policy backed by a responsive family planning program. This type of mutual understanding has happened after all in other countries, including many where Catholics predominate. A more tolerant stance on the part of the Church would be in keeping with the Second Vatican Council's teaching that the final arbiter of moral decision is one's informed and responsible conscience.

"The Catholic Church, as is well known, is opposed to contraception, but not to family planning. The Second Vatican Council insists that parents-and parents alone-should decide on the number of children whom they will bring into the world, and that they should do so in view of the good of the family and of the society in which they live ("The Church in the Modern World" No. 50). It also recognizes the right and obligation of individuals to follow their consciences. Thus, it should be possible for responsible elements in the Church and the state, and other religious groups as well, to ignore the extremists on both sides, to end the cold war that has been going on for too long, and to work out a modus vivendi for the good of the Filipino people" (Carroll 2004, p. A15).

Why must population policy be national in scope?

The national government's current approach of leaving the adoption of population policy and implementation of family planning programs to local government units (LGUs) is ill-advised and is doomed to fail. It represents poor governance, to begin with.

In the first place, local government leaders typically wait for signals or directives from the national leadership in terms of policy objectives and instruments. In other words, if national leaders don't care, why should they? Even worse, controlling population growth at the local level is incentive-incompatible with internal revenue allotments, which increase with population size, as well as with politicians' electoral chances. Indeed, there are only a handful of LGU executives who take the population issue seriously.

Second, there are negative spillovers involved, since LGU boundaries are not closed and population is mobile across these boundaries. Thus, a town or province with successful population management, good economic performance, and adequate infrastructure and social services would find itself swamped with migrants from poorly performing towns or provinces. This is a case where success breeds its own failure. Hence, this is another disincentive for local population policy and programs.

Third, population policy cannot be local in scale or scope because varying fiscal resources and technical capabilities among LGUs militate against its success and consistent application.

For these reasons, the national government cannot simply shift this important responsibility to LGUs. It must assume leadership in coming up with an unequivocal and coherent national population policy, backed by adequately funded family planning

programs that provide accurate information and enable easy access to all methods of choice, especially for the poor. Then, it should enjoin all LGUs to implement effective programs in the field.

What are the elements of an effective population policy?

The sources of future population growth and their respective contributions are: unwanted fertility – 16%; desired family size – 19%; and population momentum – 65% (Herrin & Costello 1996). This suggests that the key objectives and instruments of an effective population policy are:

- First is to reduce unwanted fertility (or to meet unmet needs for contraception) through a strong national family planning program, i.e., one that allows a choice among both traditional (“natural”) and modern (“artificial”) methods of contraception. Family planning services, comprising information and contraceptive means, should be made readily available to low-income couples who want such services. Lack of education and low incomes should not be barriers to availing of quality family planning services.
- Second, raising the quality of basic education, reducing infant mortality, fostering women’s empowerment, and increasing employment opportunities for women are desirable goals in themselves. In time, as the empirical evidence suggests, the effect of these changes should contribute to a smaller desired family size and reinforce the downward trend in fertility and population growth, resulting in a virtuous circle.
- Third, women’s empowerment and job opportunities are also likely to result in later childbearing and wider birth spacing that slow population momentum. Slowing population momentum, like the first and second objectives, also requires fully responsive and effective family planning programs⁶.

These measures are mutually reinforcing and, if backed by appropriate policy reforms in the economic and other social sectors, would bring about the best results. Further specific measures to help improve the welfare of the poor include investments in infrastructure and human capital that directly benefit the poor, and good agricultural prices and other food productivity-enhancing programs that are likely to favor poor households. And even if not much can be done about public investments in infrastructure owing to the fiscal constraints, it would help to ease the demand pressure coming from rapid population growth.

What about the prospect of a “demographic winter”?

The prospect of a so-called “demographic winter” – birth dearth, aging, etc. – while occurring in varying degrees in highly advanced countries, is as distant as about 100

⁶ Note that birth spacing is about the only measure that President Arroyo favors; however, without an effective family planning program, even that is meaningless lip service.

years from today for the Philippines. Projections indicate that, if TFR continues to decline by 0.2 children every five years, replacement fertility of 2.1 children per woman would be reached only by 2040 (Concepcion 2004). However, the effects of population momentum would persist for another 60 years before population ceases to grow, by which time the Philippines' total population would be 240 million. For example, Thailand's population, which has reached below-replacement fertility for some time, continues to grow owing to population momentum.

Therefore, much of the talk of a demographic winter is greatly exaggerated and can only be regarded as a plain and simple scare tactic to instill fear in people's minds. It appears to be peddled by people who are simply unaware of population dynamics or, worse, who intend to mislead.

Conclusion

Rapid population growth is a critical national concern. It impedes economic growth, worsens inequality, and exacerbates poverty.

A sound population policy must be part of good governance to promote faster economic growth, lower inequality, and hasten poverty reduction. A national population policy, at the core of which are well-funded family planning programs that provide accurate information and access to all methods of contraception, is pro-poor, pro-women, pro-people, and pro-life.

The responsibility for formulating, financing and implementing a population policy cannot be left entirely to local governments because of spillover effects and incentive incompatibilities. The national government must take the lead.

The country would benefit if Church and State were to arrive at an *entente* on this critical issue – an understanding on the need for a sound national population policy – as has long happened in other countries.

A “demographic winter” is not in the cards – not in the next 100 years, anyway.

Ultimately, the majority of Filipino women across all socioeconomic classes have spoken: they want fewer children. And Filipinos in general have affirmed the importance of addressing the population issue. Good governance requires that the government listen to the people's voice.

Salus populi suprema lex – the welfare of the people is the supreme law.

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APPENDIX

Studies Related to Population-Poverty Links

Studies	Key Findings
Barro, Robert, and Xavier Sala-i-Martin. 1998. <i>Economic growth</i> . New York: McGraw-Hill.	Showed no effect of population growth on economic growth.
Bloom, David, D. Canning, and J. Sevilla. 2003. <i>The Demographic Dividend: A New Perspective on the Economic Consequences of Population Change</i> (Sta. Monica: Rand Corp.).	Concluded that the speed at which population grows reduces capital per worker and leads to lower living standards.
Bloom, David, D. Canning, and P. Malaney. 2000. "Population Dynamics and Economic Growth in Asia" in C. Chu and R. Lee (eds.) <u>Population and Economic Changes in East Asia</u> , a Supplement to <i>Population and Development Review</i> , Vol. 26.	Showed how demographic transition can have an impact on poverty via economic growth, concluding that the demographic structure of East Asia – slower population growth and higher ratio of working-age group – was responsible for about a third of the region's increase in income per head.
Boserup, Ester. 1965. <i>The Conditions for Agricultural Growth</i> (Chicago: Adline).	Concluded from her historical studies of agricultural development in Africa that population growth serves as a stimulus to agricultural intensification and technological improvement.
Clark, Colin. 1969. "The Population Explosion Myth" <i>Bulletin of the Institute of Development Studies</i> . Clark, Colin. 1970. "The Economics of Population Growth and Control: A Comment" <i>Review of Social Economy</i> , 28 (1).	Noted the lack of empirical support for the proposition that population growth impedes economic growth, claiming that the relationship between the growth of population and that of per capita income was positive.
Coale, Ansley, and J. Hoover. 1958. <i>Population and Economic Development in Low Income Countries</i> (Princeton: Princeton University Press).	Using data spanning 50 years, found that rapid population growth has negative effects: capital shallowing, increase in youth dependency, and investment diversion.

Studies	Key Findings
<p>Ram, Rati, and T. Schultz. 1979. "Life Span, Savings, and Productivity," <i>Economic Development and Cultural Change</i>, 27 (3).</p>	<p>Pointed out that the longer life spans that accompany falling death rates and faster population growth in the developing countries increase the incentives for investment in human capital and make labor more productive.</p>
<p>Simon, Julian. 1981. <i>The Ultimate Resource</i> (Princeton: Princeton University Press).</p> <p>Simon, Julian. 1986. <i>Theory of Population and Economic Growth</i> (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).</p>	<p>Noted that a larger population is likely to contain more entrepreneurs and other creators, who can make major contributions to solving the problems of humanity, calling human ingenuity the ultimate source that can overcome any depletion of other resources.</p>
<p>Alhburg, Dennis. 1996. "Population Growth and Poverty" in D. Alhburg et al. (eds.), <i>The Impact of Population Growth on Well-Being in Developing Countries</i>. Springer-Verlag.</p> <p>Lipton, Michael, and M. Ravallion. 1995. "Poverty and Policy" in J. Behrman and T. N. Srinivasan (eds.) <i>Handbook of Development Economics</i>, Vol. 3.</p> <p>Pernia, Ernesto M. 1982. "Micro-level Implications of Population Growth," in A. N. Herrin, V. B. Paqueo, and E. M. Pernia, <i>Essays on the Economics of Fertility, Population Growth, and Public Intervention in a Developing Country</i>, UPSE Discussion Paper 8212.</p>	<p>Shown that bigger households have larger household incomes but lower incomes per capita than smaller households, and that poverty incidence tends to rise with family size.</p>
<p>Balisacan, Arsenio, D. Mapa, and C. Tubianosa. 2004. "The Population-Poverty Nexus: the Philippines in Comparative East Asian Context" Asia Pacific Policy Center.</p>	<p>Traced the path of the effects of population growth to economic growth, and then to poverty. Simulations were performed using the Balisacan-Pernia model and the APSM model to show this path. Results were significant showing that poverty is strongly affected by population growth.</p>
<p>Bloom, David, and J. Williamson. 1998. "Demographic Transition and Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia," <i>World Bank Economic Review</i>, 12 (3).</p>	

Studies	Key Findings
<p>Eastwood, Robert, and M. Lipton. 1999. "Impact of Changes in Human Fertility on Poverty" <i>Journal of Development Studies</i>, 36 (1).</p> <p>Eastwood, Robert, and M. Lipton. 2001. "Demographic Transition and Poverty: Effects via Economic Growth, Distribution and Conversion" in N. Birdsall and S. Sinding (eds.), <i>Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth and Poverty in the Developing World</i> (New York: Oxford University Press).</p> <p>Kelley, Allen, and R. Schmidt. 1995. "Aggregate Population and Economic Growth Correlations: The Rule of the Components of Demographic Change," <i>Demography</i>, 32.</p> <p>Kelley, Allen, and R. Schmidt. 2001. "Economic and Demographic Change: A Synthesis of Models, Findings and Perspectives," in N. Birdsall and S. Sinding (eds.), <i>Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth and Poverty in the Developing World</i> (New York: Oxford University Press).</p>	<p>Showned, using cross-country data, that demographic changes affect substantially the growth in per capita incomes, accounting for one-third of the growth in fast growing East Asian countries and one-half for the slower growing Southeast Asian countries.</p>
<p>de Dios, Emmanuel, et al. 1993. <i>Poverty, Growth and the Fiscal Crisis</i>. PIDS and IDRC.</p>	<p>Identified high population growth as one of the reasons for poverty in the Philippines. Argued that high population growth aggravates poverty as it disproportionately affects the poor who tend to have larger families.</p>
<p>Deolalikar, Anil, and E. M. Pernia. 1993. "Population Growth and Economic Development Revisited with Reference to Asia," Economics and Development Resource Center, Asian Development Bank.</p> <p>Pernia, E. M., and M. G. Quibria. 1999. "Poverty in Developing Countries," in <i>Handbook of Regional and Urban</i></p>	<p>Showned the association between poverty incidence and population growth for a cross section of developing countries. Population growth was lagged to reduce the possibility of reverse causality, namely, higher poverty incidence inducing faster population growth. The statistical relationship implies that a 1% increase in population growth is associated with a</p>

Studies	Key Findings
<i>Economics</i> , Vol. 3. Amsterdam and NY: North Holland, pp. 1865-1934.	subsequent rise in poverty incidence of about 0.83%.
Eastwood, R., and M. Lipton. 1999. "Impact of Changes in Human Fertility on Poverty," <i>Journal of Development Studies</i> , 36 (1).	Showed that high fertility not only retards economic growth but also skews the distribution of income against the poor.
Eastwood, Robert, and M. Lipton. 2001. "Demographic Transition and Poverty: Effects via Economic Growth, Distribution and Conversion" in N. Birdsall and S. Sinding (eds.), <i>Population Matters: Demographic Change, Economic Growth and Poverty in the Developing World</i> (New York: Oxford University Press).	Traced the different channels through which demographic transition can negatively affect poverty. These channels are growth, distribution, and conversion.
Gaiha, Raghav, and A. Deolalikar. 1993. "Persistent, Expected and Innate Poverty: Estimates for Semi-arid Rural South India, 1975-1984," <i>Cambridge Journal of Economics</i> , 18. Penny, D. & M. Singarimbun. 1973. "Population and Poverty in Rural Java: Some Economic Arithmetic from Sriharjo," Mimeograph 41 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell International Agricultural Development).	Found that larger families are not only likely to be poor at any given point in time but that they are also likely to experience chronic poverty.
Herrin, Alejandro N. 1993. "Studies on Consequences of Population Change in Asia: Philippines" <i>Asian Population Studies Series No. 121</i> . New York: Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, United Nations.	Showed that the accumulation of household assets is negatively affected by the number of young children 0-6 and 7-12 years old, corroborating earlier findings (e.g., Mason 1992) that child bearing negatively affects the saving rate.
Orbeta, Aniceto Jr., et al. 1998. "Population-Development-Environment Modeling in the Philippines: A Review," <i>Journal of Philippine Development</i> , 23 (2).	Simulations at the aggregate level using a population and development planning model showed that higher population growth lowers GNP per capita.

Studies	Key Findings
Orbeta, Aniceto Jr. 1992. "Population Growth, Human Capital Expenditures and Economic Growth: A Macroeconometric Analysis," <i>The Philippine Review of Economics and Business</i> , 29 (2).	Showed that while rapid population growth raises human capital expenditures (aggregate expenditures on education and health), the increases are insufficient to maintain per capita levels, implying negative impacts on education and health.
Orbeta, A., and E. M. Pernia. 1999. "Population, Growth, and Economic Development in the Philippines: What has been the Experience and What Must be Done?," Discussion Paper Series No. 99-22. PIDS. Orbeta, A. 2002. "Population and Poverty: A Review of Links, Evidence and Implications for the Philippines," Paper prepared for the 2002 Population National Congress, INNOTECH Building, Diliman, Q.C.	Argued that with the slow growth of employment opportunities in the face of rapid growth of the labor force, the consequent high open unemployment rate, which did not spare even educated workers, and the continued flow of overseas contract workers, real wages have been either stagnant or falling. Also showed that high fertility negatively affects investments in human capital – the main channel through which poverty is transmitted intergenerationally.
Orbeta, A. 2002. "Population and Poverty: A Review of Links, Evidence and Implications for the Philippines" Paper prepared for the 2002 Population National Congress, INNOTECH Building, Diliman, Q.C.	Argued that the view that the poor rationally prefer to have large family sizes is difficult to believe particularly in the Philippine setting, given the data showing that they have higher unwanted fertility, higher unmet need for family planning services, and lower contraceptive prevalence rates.
Reyes, Celia. 2002. "The Poverty Fight: Have We Made an Impact?" PIDS 25 th Anniversary Symposium Series on Perspective Papers.	Showed that rapid population growth contributes to the increase in inequality, and that getting out of poverty becomes harder with larger family size.
Sachs, Jeffrey, S. Radelet, and J. Lee. 1997. "Economic Growth in Asia" in <i>Emerging Asia: Changes and Challenges</i> . (Manila: Asian Development Bank).	Analyzed East Asia's remarkable economic performance for the past three decades and attributed it four factors: substantial potential for "catch-up", favorable geographic and structural characteristics, favorable demographic changes following World War II, and economic policies and strategies conducive to sustained growth.