

# The Right to Stay Put, Revisited: Gentrification and Resistance to Displacement in New York City

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**Summary.** Displacement has been at the centre of heated analytical and political debates over gentrification and urban change for almost 40 years. A new generation of quantitative research has provided new evidence of the limited (and sometimes counter-intuitive) extent of displacement, supporting broader theoretical and political arguments favouring mixed-income redevelopment and other forms of gentrification. This paper offers a critical challenge to this interpretation, drawing on evidence from a mixed-methods study of gentrification and displacement in New York City. Quantitative analysis of the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey indicates that displacement is a limited yet crucial indicator of the deepening class polarisation of urban housing markets; moreover, the main buffers against gentrification-induced displacement of the poor (public housing and rent regulation) are precisely those kinds of market interventions that are being challenged by advocates of gentrification and dismantled by policy-makers. Qualitative analysis based on interviews with community organisers and residents documents the continued political salience of displacement and reveals an increasingly sophisticated and creative array of methods used to resist displacement in a policy climate emphasising selective deregulation and market-oriented social policy.

On 23 December 1985, Neil Smith was in bed paging through the *New York Times* when he came to the paper's most prominent and pricey advertising space, the bottom right quarter of the Opinion Page. On this day, the Real Estate Board of New York, Inc., had purchased the spot for an essay appearing under a question set in large, bold type: "Is Gentrification a Dirty Word?" The essay offered a spirited defence of a process in which "neighborhoods and lives blossom", while admitting that

The greatest fears inspired by gentrification, of course, are that low-income residents and low-margin retailers will be displaced by more affluent residents and more profitable businesses (reprinted in Smith, 1996, p. 31).

The Board's plea on behalf of the villainised gentry was, of course, shot through with contradictions—for instance, citing studies showing "that residential rent regulations gave apartment dwellers substantial

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protection against displacement” while neglecting to mention the long-standing industry campaign to liberate ‘free’ market forces by destroying things like rent regulation. But what Smith found most astonishing about the Board’s advert was its very existence

How did it come about that the very powerful Real Estate Board of New York, Inc.—the professional lobby for the city’s largest real estate developers, a kind of chamber of commerce for promoting real estate interests—found itself in such a defensive position that it had to take out an advertisement in the *Times* for the purpose of trying to redefine one of its major pre-occupations? (Smith, 1996, p. 30).

Almost 20 years later, we found ourselves in downtown Minneapolis for a one-day symposium attended by several hundred delegates from non-profit housing service organisations from across the US. Sponsored by the Congressionally chartered Neighbourhood Reinvestment Corporation, the event was held to discuss ways to ‘manage’ the effects of a decade of turbulent inner-city transformation—under the catchy title “When Gentrification Comes Knocking: Navigating Social Dynamics in Changing Neighbourhoods” (Neighborhood Reinvestment Corporation, 2005). But on the morning of the symposium, hundreds of delegates opened their hotel room doors to find copies of *USA Today*, with the national section carrying a bold headline: “Studies: Gentrification a boost for everyone” (Hampson, 2005). The article showcased the surprising findings of several recent studies (Freeman, 2005; Freeman and Braconi, 2002a, 2002b, 2004; Vigdor, 2002) suggesting that gentrification does not, after all, cause very much displacement of low-income urban residents. The article devoted prominent coverage to several econometric studies of specialised housing and income datasets, including two studies by Lance Freeman, an Assistant Professor of Urban Planning at Columbia University who happened to be at the Minneapolis symposium. Freeman instantly became one of the celebrities of the event and played a key

role in discussions of the consequences of gentrification and how to reconcile interpretations of ‘official’ statistics and other quantitative evidence, as opposed to the voices of residents, community activists and similar kinds of qualitative evidence. Meanwhile, debates at the Minneapolis symposium were echoed electronically when the *USA Today* piece made its way across several listservs, attracting commentary by (among others) prominent urban theorists Herbert Gans and Peter Marcuse, as well as the more neo-traditional neo-liberal urbanist John Norquist (President of the Congress for the New Urbanism and former Milwaukee Mayor). Freeman, an exceedingly careful and rigorous analyst, also circulated a clarification of several issues that had been distorted or ignored in the *USA Today* coverage.

Displacement, always a central axis of academic, policy and popular concerns over gentrification, is back on the agenda (Freeman and Braconi, 2004; Atkinson, 2004; Slater *et al.*, 2004; Marcuse, 2005). In this paper, we report on a mixed-methods study of gentrification, displacement and low-income renters’ survival strategies in New York City between the early 1990s and 2003. We begin from the premise that one answer to Smith’s poignant question involves *resistance*: the powerful Real Estate Board felt compelled to defend its interests in the face of militant mobilisation drawing inspiration from the legal and political principles established in Chester Hartman’s famous essay “The Right to Stay Put” (Hartman, 1984/2002; see also Mitchell, 2003; Imbrosio, 2004). After 20 years of intense gentrification and sweeping public policy changes, many of the people who would mobilise to resist displacement have themselves been displaced. And more than two generations after Ruth Glass’s original term was imported from London’s Covent Garden into the American lexicon, the urban trade balance swings back a bit, with Freeman and Braconi’s New York work informing debates on the UK’s ‘urban renaissance’. Indeed, a central theme in much of the UK scholarship on ‘regeneration’ policy is that displacement constitutes a critical litmus

test: redevelopment, renewal, revitalisation, regeneration and reinvestment are good, but these are understood to be different from *gentrification*, which involves direct, conflict-ridden displacement. Although this distinction was thoroughly debated (and generally rejected) many years ago (Marcuse, 1986, 2005; Smith and Williams, 1986; Smith, 1996), it returned as a prominent theme in many of the papers presented at the September 2002 conference, “Upward Neighbourhood Trajectories: Gentrification in a New Century” at the University of Glasgow.<sup>1</sup> The distinction also influences Rowland Atkinson’s (2004) comprehensive review of the international English-language evidence on gentrification in relation to the UK ‘urban renaissance’ and it figures prominently in Chris Hamnett’s analysis of London, where he is concerned that Atkinson’s research “misleadingly conflates displacement with replacement” (Hamnett, 2003, p. 182). Secular replacement and class transformation, Hamnett concludes, take place “largely as a result of long-term industrial and occupational change, not of gentrification *per se*” (Hamnett, 2003, p. 182).

The new evidence on gentrification and displacement provided by Freeman, Braconi and Vigdor, therefore, has enormous implications—and it has rapidly jumped out of the obscure scholarly cloister to influence policy debates that have been ripped out of context from New York City and the US. The new evidence on displacement is being used to dismiss concerns about a wide range of market-oriented urban policies of privatisation, home-ownership, ‘social mix’ and dispersal strategies designed to break up the concentrated poverty that has been taken as the shorthand explanation for all that ails the disinvested inner city (Crump, 2002; Merrifield, 2002; Fraser *et al.*, 2003). If displacement is not a problem, many are saying, then regeneration (or whatever else the process is called) is fine too. Perhaps it will even give some poor people the benefits of a middle-class neighbourhood without requiring them to move to a middle-class community (Byrne, 2003; Duany, 2001).

In this paper, we take Freeman and Braconi’s (2004, 2002a, 2002b) research as a starting-point for our analysis of gentrification, displacement and resident survival strategies in an increasingly competitive housing market. We hypothesise that national and regional housing market dynamics create a variety of displacement pressures at the city-wide level and that these pressures are expressed in complex mixtures of direct and indirect displacement as well as succession and replacement—all intersecting in locally contingent ways at the neighbourhood scale. Understanding the full implications of displacement processes, therefore, requires that we examine variations among the case study neighbourhoods examined by Freeman and Braconi.

We undertook a mixed-method evaluation of displacement in New York City to draw on the partial and selective strengths of: extensive, quantitative measurement of secondary datasets; and, intensive, qualitative understanding of the multifaceted experiences of residents, community organisers and other individuals living and working in gentrifying neighbourhoods. First, we modify the econometric methods used by Freeman and Braconi, and we present an alternative view of displacement from the same dataset they used (the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey, conducted every three years in order to implement the City’s rent regulation statutes). We hypothesise that displacement pressures worsened as the economy boomed and housing markets tightened in the late 1990s; we also hypothesise that, as gentrification intensified, displaced renters regardless of whether they were directly forced out of gentrifying neighbourhoods or moved for other reasons, have been forced to look farther away from the cores of housing market competition to find available affordable units. Secondly, we undertook a series of field investigations and interviews to understand the context for the quantitative results and to gain insight into the ways that individuals, organisers and neighbourhoods understand and resist displacement pressures. We conducted 33 field interviews with

community residents, community organisation staff and staff at city-wide agencies in the seven gentrifying sub-borough areas included in Freeman and Braconi's quantitative analysis to understand better the individual displacement stories and the neighbourhood context for gentrification. Finally, the interviews provided a wealth of information about how low-income residents remain in gentrifying neighbourhoods, a critical point raised by both Freeman and Braconi (2004) and Vigdor (2002).

The rest of this paper is organised as follows. In the next section, we provide a concise review of the role of displacement in the gentrification literature and we summarise the new stream of quantitative research led by Freeman, Braconi and Vigdor. We then present our own quantitative analysis and evaluate our hypotheses on the extent and neighbourhood location of displacement pressures. We next turn to the qualitative evidence, which offers a nuanced view of gentrification and displacement from the ground up. We consider the views of residents and community activists working in gentrifying neighbourhoods, the new places that displacees are moving to and the web of public and private mechanisms that provide limited protections for those trying to resist displacement. Finally, we offer a conclusion that recognises the limited empirical reach of displacement, but emphasises its continued theoretical significance and its enormous consequences for individual families and neighbourhoods.

### **A Generation of Debate on Gentrification and Displacement**

Gentrification is directly related to how cities experience economic transformation and policy interventions. The urban disinvestment produced by economic change and federal urban policy along with the individual desire for the suburban dream laid the groundwork for gentrification's appearance. The renewed position of cities in the global economy has fuelled gentrification's expansion. We do not consider residential displacement as a litmus test for gentrification. Neighbourhoods,

especially those with considerable disinvestment and *de facto* forms of housing abandonment, could experience waves of gentrification for decades without extensive displacement. When we consider the negative impacts of gentrification, we can think not only of residents who are immediately displaced by gentrification processes but also of the impact of the restructuring of urban space on the ability of low-income residents to move into neighbourhoods that once provided ample supplies of affordable living arrangements.

Since gentrification came to attention in the 1960s, researchers and policy-makers have sought to resolve the sharp dividing line between equitable reinvestment and polarising displacement. LeGates and Hartman frame the issue

In the optimistic view, gentrification will not cause social conflict and will produce neighbourhoods which are an exciting mix of different races, classes and lifestyle groups living together. The HUD *Displacement Report* takes the position that revitalization offers a 'unique opportunity' for integration (US Department of Housing and Urban Development 1979). A more pessimistic view holds that gentrification will force low-income minority groups out of desirable inner-city neighbourhoods to less desirable areas, thus reducing their quality of life and diffusing and defusing their political power (LeGates and Hartman, 1986, p. 194).

These questions are again at the forefront of policy debates 25 years later, although the context has changed. Forty years of experience with gentrification suggests its powerful ability to revitalise communities. And in a neo-liberal policy context, gentrification appears to many as an ideal solution to long-term urban decay. The state, which in the past had been hesitant to encourage gentrification processes, has since taken a much more aggressive role by acting as a catalyst to encourage gentrification (Smith, 2002; Hackworth and Smith, 2001). In the UK, regeneration policy blurs the line between

urban redevelopment and gentrification. As Atkinson notes

Increasing demolition, affordable housing problems, housing market failure and a design-led approach to promote 'liveability' and recapturing middle-class households appear as strategies linked to renewal but also to gentrification (Atkinson, 2004, p. 107).

Residential displacement is one of the primary dangers cited by those concerned about the exclusionary effects of market- as well as state-driven gentrification. Residents may be displaced as a result of housing demolition, ownership conversion of rental units, increased housing costs (rent, taxes), landlord harassment and evictions. Those who avoid these direct displacement pressures may benefit from neighbourhood improvements but may suffer as critical community networks and culture are displaced (Freeman and Braconi, 2004, 2002a, 2002b; Atkinson, 2000; Marcuse, 1986). Increased housing expenses associated with gentrification displace current residents as well as those who might have moved there in the future. Neighbourhoods become off-limits, forcing lower-income residents to look to lower-cost neighbourhoods for housing, producing what Marcuse (1986) calls exclusionary displacement.

Even though some cities experienced an in-migration of higher-income households in the 1970s, cities were perceived as following a downward trajectory as population decline and disinvestment continued (Beauregard, 1993). This tempered concern about residential displacement and provided an incentive for the state to encourage gentrification. If private investment was pouring into cities, then the government could withdraw public resources. But if private revitalisation was moving so swiftly that it was dislocating low-income residents, then the state could intervene by addressing the displacement issues. HUD weighed these questions in the 1970s and concluded that neither gentrification nor the displacement it produced was of sufficient scale to warrant concern (Nelson,

1988; US Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1979).

HUD's inaction stemmed in part from an inability to quantify the problem. Measuring how gentrification affects low-income residents is methodologically challenging and estimating the scope and scale of displacement and exploring what happens to people who are displaced have proved somewhat elusive. In short, it is difficult to find people who have been displaced, particularly if those people are poor. Atkinson (2000, p. 163) likens it to "measuring the invisible". By definition, displaced residents have disappeared from the very places where researchers or census-takers go to look for them.

Despite the challenges, researchers have used a variety of methods and datasets since the 1970s to make inferences about the extent of displacement. Past research has estimated the total number of people displaced nationally (Newman and Owen, 1982; LeGates and Hartman, 1986) and within particular cities (Marcuse, 1986; Schill and Nathan, 1983; Grier and Grier, 1980), has traced where people have gone and has measured how gentrification impacts displacees. These studies focused on refining methodologies in order to quantify the problem accurately. Few questioned whether gentrification produced displacement.

After the initial interest in quantifying the negative impacts of gentrification, research through much of the 1990s turned to explaining gentrification's causes and processes. Interest in displacement re-emerged towards the end of the 1990s as a new gentrification wave once again pushed these questions to the forefront. Using a longitudinal dataset, Atkinson (2000) documented substantial residential displacement in London and found that 78 per cent of the displaced were in unskilled occupations. Research in the US has produced decidedly different findings. Contrary to past research that accepted that displacement was part of the gentrification process and merely sought to estimate the impact, Freeman and Braconi (2004, 2002, 2002b) and Vigdor (2002) questioned whether low-income residents are indeed displaced and whether



gentrification hurts the poor. Both of these studies assert that the literature on gentrification has failed to quantify accurately the negative impacts of gentrification. In their view, questions about how gentrification affects low-income residents remain in the absence of strong evidence.

Freeman and Braconi (2004, 2002, 2002b) used the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (NYCHVS), conducted by the US Bureau of the Census about every three years, to measure the number of people displaced during the 1990s, to calculate displacement rates and to measure whether low-income people in gentrifying areas are more mobile than those in non-gentrifying areas. The first part of their analysis is focused on measuring residential displacement. For their most recent study period, they found that 37 766 renters were displaced between 1996 and 1999, which equates to 5.47 per cent of all moves by renters. In the second part of their analysis, Freeman and Braconi sought to determine whether low-income residents were more likely to move out of seven sub-borough areas of New York City that they classified as gentrifying—Central Harlem, Morningside Heights, Lower East Side, Chelsea, Williamsburg, Fort Greene and Park Slope—than out of non-gentrified neighbourhoods.<sup>2</sup> They found that disadvantaged households in gentrifying areas were less likely to move away than similar households in non-gentrifying areas. Echoing many of the themes emphasised by Sumka (1980), Freeman and Braconi conclude that gentrification does not cause the displacement of low-income households. Instead

the primary mechanism seems to be normal housing succession; when rental units become vacant in gentrifying neighbourhoods, they are more likely to be leased by middle-income households. Only indirectly, by gradually shrinking the pool of low-rent housing, does the reurbanisation of the middle class appear to harm the interests of the poor (Freeman and Braconi, 2002a, p. 4).

These findings are provocative but they also raise many questions. First, can we understand displacement if we measure it only as a snapshot in time? The areas of the city selected by Freeman and Braconi cover much of Manhattan below 96th Street and brownstone Brooklyn. We might expect that few low-income residents were left in these areas after 1990 and those who remained stayed through some combination of regulatory protection and individual sacrifice or creativity. Measuring displacement in the heart of gentrified neighbourhoods in the late 1990s creates considerable selection bias: after two generations of intense gentrification, any low- and moderate-income renters who have managed to avoid displacement are likely to be those people who have found ways to adapt and survive in an increasingly competitive housing market. This is a fascinating and important finding, but it does not mean that displacement is not a problem. Secondly, Freeman and Braconi's control group (moves from non-gentrifying neighbourhoods) includes residents of some of the poorest areas of the city including all of the Bronx and parts of Brooklyn and Queens with high poverty rates. We might expect that these residents move more frequently than those in other areas of the city, producing an artificially high standard to use as a comparison for displacement rates from gentrifying neighbourhoods.<sup>3</sup> Peter Marcuse (2005) emphasises the critical importance of the comparison group, as well as the interpretation of mobility as entirely voluntary:

Do they not move because there are no feasible alternatives available for them to move to, in a tight housing market? ... Do they have a 'lower propensity to move' because they are finally getting decent neighbourhood services? (an odd phrase, incidentally, quantitatively considered: judging just by statistics, prison inmates have a 'low propensity to move') (Marcuse, 2005).

Thirdly, the sub-borough areas constituting their study areas are quite expansive; each includes several distinct neighbourhoods,

each with its own trajectory of class transformation, housing market pressures and demographic trends. Tabulating displacement rates by sub-borough area (an unfortunate limitation of the dataset) ignores the fine-grained context and contingency of gentrification (Beauregard, 1986).

We find Freeman and Braconi's work provocative on the basis of its methodological innovations; moreover, we applaud their call for research on the adaptive strategies that low-income renters use if they wish to 'stay put' in gentrifying neighbourhoods that are becoming ever more expensive and competitive. But we dispute the widespread perceptions that displacement is not a problem and that Freeman and Braconi have finally provided the definitive verdict on the costs and benefits of gentrification.

### Measuring and Modelling Displacement

Our empirical analysis begins with a quantitative evaluation of displacement in New York City and its changes over the past decade. As did Freeman and Braconi (2004, 2002a, 2002b), we rely on the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey (US Bureau of the Census, 2003), which provides information on a longitudinal sample of approximately 18 000 housing units every 3 years. The sample frame is augmented to account for additions and alterations to the housing stock. Households in occupied units are asked a wide range of questions pertaining to demographic characteristics, employment, housing conditions and mobility. One question asks residents who recently moved into the unit to choose the primary reason (from a list of more than 30 options) for their relocation. Freeman and Braconi (2004, 2002b) examined renter households and defined as displaced those who chose any of three reasons: wanted a less expensive residence or had difficulty paying rent; moved because of landlord harassment; or, were displaced by private action (such as condo conversions, landlords taking over units for their own living space, etc.). Freeman and Braconi emphasise the many limitations of this measure: it may

overestimate displacement by including households who voluntarily move in search of cheaper living arrangements, but it underestimates the problem by ignoring those who leave the city, fall into homelessness, or double-up with friends or relatives. Freeman and Braconi also provide a rationale for excluding evictions from the definition of displacement.<sup>4</sup>

We analysed the last five surveys—1991, 1993, 1996, 1999 and 2002—to identify all current renters who moved into their units since the previous survey.<sup>5</sup> We excluded those who moved from another unit in the same building, as well as those moving from anywhere outside the city: thus our analysis is centred on the dynamics of local, intraurban mobility and sets aside the question of how gentrification is affected by newcomers to the city and those forced to leave it. The Census Bureau revised the NYCHVS sample frame several times, altering the corresponding weights for individual observations. Surveys from different years, therefore, are not strictly comparable and thus we must exercise extreme caution when evaluating small changes or differences over time.<sup>6</sup> Nevertheless, the results provide a rare and valuable glimpse into the phenomenon (Table 1).

### *The Extent of Displacement*

Overall, our criteria yield estimates of displacement from New York City neighbourhoods ranging between 25 023 and 46 606 households for each of the time-periods covered by the separate surveys. This translates to an annual estimate between 8341 in the 1991–93 period and a high of 11 651 per year between 1999 and 2002 (Table 1). Put another way, the displacement rate fluctuated between 6.2 and 9.9 per cent of all local moves among renter households in the City (Table 1). The vast majority of these households were forced to move by cost considerations; landlord harassment and displacement by private action are rarely cited as primary reasons for moving and these factors show no sign of worsening over

**Table 1.** Displacement rates in New York City, 1989–2002

	1989–91	1991–93	1993–96	1996–99	1999–2002
Number of displacees <sup>a</sup>	31 091	25 023	31 113	43 067	46 606
Number of movers	381 257	264 712	500 260	485 807	471 988
Displacement rate	8.15	9.45	6.22	8.87	9.87
<i>Percentage of households moving because</i>					
Wanted less expensive residence/had difficulty paying rent or mortgage	5.46	7.91	5.64	6.85	8.29
Harassment by landlord	1.35	0.54	0.36	0.70	0.45
Displaced by private action (other than eviction)	1.35	1.01	0.78	1.31	1.14
<i>Percentage moving for other displacement-related reasons</i>					
Evicted	0.87	0.63	0.65	0.76	0.62
Displaced by urban renewal, highway construction, or other public activity	0.10	0.07	0.22	0.22	0.13

<sup>a</sup>Includes only moves for reasons of housing expense, landlord harassment, and displacement by private action.

Data source: US Bureau of the Census (2003).

time. Cost drives the overall trend, with fluctuations in unemployment, income and rental inflation combining to force households into various relocation or adjustment strategies. These constraints appear to have grown particularly severe in the recession of the early 1990s and to have moderated during the hesitant recovery between 1993 and 1996. The acceleration of economic growth in the late 1990s may have boosted employment and income, but it also seems to have unleashed greater housing cost pressures before the sudden uncertainties in the months after 11 September 2001. Displacement rates reached nearly a tenth of all movers between 1999 and 2002.

Our *numerical* estimates of displacement are somewhat lower than Freeman and Braconi's (2002a) figures (which fluctuate slightly below 10 000 households per year), possibly because we excluded renters moving between different units in the same building. Our *rate* estimates are substantially higher (6.2–9.9 per cent versus their range of 5.1–7.1 per cent), because our denominator does not include renters who moved from outside New York City. A valid analytical case can be made for either measure, but it is possible with these data to expand the geographical scope of only part of the fraction. Those in

the numerator—displaced households—disappear from view if they leave the city. If we then define the denominator to include renters arriving from elsewhere, the measure captures only half of the city's role in regional, national and global migration circuits. An expanded denominator would include the city's role as a mecca for elite professionals coming from other global cities, as well as young American Midwesterners responding to what the real estate editor of *New York Magazine* dubs the "Friends effect", thanks to NBC's decade-long prime-time "infomercial for New York" (Pi Roma, 2003). (Now brokers speak of the "Sex in the City effect", for the HBO series that lives on through reruns.) And although it might be possible to capture the effects of low-wage immigrants and refugees willing to double- or triple-up in a single housing unit to afford the rent, our analysis like Freeman and Braconi's (2004, 2002a, 2002b), relies on the *householder's* response to the displacement question. Since the NYCHVS asks only about the move of the 'reference person', it does not identify persons who were displaced from a previous home and who now live with a householder who was not displaced, or who has lived in the same unit for a number of years; in other



words, the single most logical strategy that can be used by a victim of displacement (doubling-up with relatives or friends) immediately renders the family invisible from official estimates of displacement. And unfortunately, we lose sight of anyone who leaves the city. Understanding the displacement rate among these movers would be essential for an accurate quantitative measure of the effects of gentrification (see Frey, 1996; Hempstead, 2002; Ley, 2002).

Regardless of these differences, the analysis confirms that, although displacement affects a very small minority of households, it cannot be dismissed as insignificant. Ten thousand displacees a year should not be ignored, even in a city of 8 million. Moreover, the recent history of American public policy provides ample illustrations of extremely limited empirical evidence (often in the form of widely repeated anecdotes about one or a few *individuals*) justifying major investment and policy changes.<sup>7</sup> Citing low figures to support an argument that displacement is not a problem does have a certain comforting quantitative certainty; but the logic takes us perilously close to a tyranny of the statistical majority in which we would dismiss so many other signs of inequality on the same grounds: racial profiling, illegal employer retaliation against union organisers, employment discrimination, homelessness, racially disparate exposure to environmental toxins, biases in arrests, sentencing and incarceration, personal bankruptcy, loss of health insurance and so on. These phenomena vary widely in terms of their individual and social costs—and, viewed separately, each may victimise only a tiny proportion of the population. But they are not separate: they constitute various facets of the aggressive reassertion of class privilege that has come with the imposition of market principles in so many areas of social life. Displacement is the leading edge of the central dilemma of American property—the use values of neighbourhood and home, versus the exchange values of real estate as a vehicle for capital accumulation. Additionally, our estimates are constrained by the fact that households can choose only

one reason from a long list of alternative explanations of mobility. The measure ignores a variety of scenarios in which displacement pressures are embedded in the social and economic complexity of everyday urban life.<sup>8, 9</sup>

Looking beyond the aggregate displacement rate, the effects of gentrification are dynamic and vary widely with context. First, displacement appears to fluctuate substantially over time in the context of rhythms of housing market competition. Although the temporal cycle of the NYCHVS is a bit coarse, it is possible to stratify results by the year in which each renter household moved into their current unit (Table 2).<sup>10</sup> This tabulation reveals quite pronounced spikes in the displacement rate in 1992, 1996 and 2001. Secondly, displacement varies widely with *neighbourhood* context. The NYCHVS identifies the ‘sub-borough area’ for each sampled housing unit, an area roughly equivalent to the community district level. Sub-borough areas, unfortunately, are coarse aggregations of several different neighbourhoods, each with fine-grained variations in social character, housing stock and histories of community change. Nevertheless, mapping displacement rates at this level does give us some limited information on where displacees are going. (Another limitation of the survey is that we

**Table 2.** Displacement rates by year of occupancy


Year renter moved into current unit	Percentage displaced from previous residence
1989	8.3
1990	8.6
1991	7.8
1992	9.3
1993	6.9
1994	6.9
1995	5.4
1996	8.2
1997	8.1
1998	8.6
1999	9.4
2000	8.0
2001	11.6
2002	9.0

*Data source:* US Bureau of the Census (2003).


have even less detailed information on where renters were displaced *from*.)

Overall, neighbourhood context does seem to matter (Figure 1). Between 1989 and 2002, more than 15 per cent of all renters moving into the Williamsburg/Greenpoint neighbourhood in Brooklyn were displaced from their previous homes. At the other extreme, displacement affected only 3.7 per cent of arrivals in the Flatlands/Canarsie section of Brooklyn around Jamaica Bay. Yet these effects have shifted considerably over time. Between 1989 and 1993, displaced

arrivals comprised between a tenth and a fifth of movers into the Manhattan neighbourhoods of the Lower East Side, Chelsea, Clinton, Midtown and the Upper West Side, and a broad swathe of Brooklyn and Queens from Williamsburg to Ozone Park and Howard Beach (Figure 2). The pattern cannot be clearly linked to localised gentrification pressures and, indeed, we see surprisingly low displacement rates for Harlem and other parts of northern Manhattan during this period. But a decade later the pattern is quite different, with shifting flows of displaced renters in



**Figure 1.** Renters displaced from previous residence, by sub-borough area, 1989–2002.




**Figure 2.** Renters displaced from previous residence, by sub-borough area, 1989–93.

various parts of central Brooklyn and all the way up to Co-op City in the north-east quadrant of the Bronx (Figure 3). Not surprisingly, more fine-grained stratification of the data reveals even greater contextual variations, although at the expense of smaller sample sizes. Between 2000 and 2002, more than a third of renters moving into Bushwick were displaced, as were a quarter of those moving into Brooklyn Heights/Fort Greene and Brownsville/Ocean Hill. Among households in poverty, displacement rates are highest among those

moving into Stuyvesant Town (50 per cent) and Co-op City (40 per cent).

#### *A Model of Displacement*

We hypothesise that urban and metropolitan housing market dynamics create a variety of displacement pressures at the city-wide level and that these pressures are expressed in varied combinations at the neighbourhood scale. The clearest way of testing this hypothesis is to determine if all of the variation in the maps of displacement rates can be explained in terms



**Figure 3.** Renters displaced from previous residence, by sub-borough area, 1999–2002.

of characteristics of the renters. Consider a model to distinguish displacees from other renters who recently moved into their homes

$$\ln \left[ \frac{P_{Displaced}}{1 - P_{Displaced}} \right] = \beta_0 + \beta_D \mathbf{D}' + \beta_R \mathbf{R}' + \beta_I \mathbf{I} + \varepsilon \quad (1)$$

where,  $\mathbf{D}'$  is a vector of demographic, human-capital and labour market characteristics;  $\mathbf{R}'$  is coded for householders of different racial and ethnic identities; and  $\mathbf{I}$  measures household income.<sup>11</sup> This approach yields a baseline view of socioeconomic characteristics associated with displacement. We can then test to determine if the housing regulatory status of

the unit where the renter now lives ( $\mathbf{HR}'$ ) differs for displacees and other movers, and we can estimate another specification which adds a set of housing quality and housing cost measures ( $\mathbf{HQ}'$ ).

$$\ln \left[ \frac{P_{Displaced}}{1 - P_{Displaced}} \right] = \beta_0 + \beta_D \mathbf{D}' + \beta_R \mathbf{R}' + \beta_I \mathbf{I} + \beta_{HR} \mathbf{HR}' + \beta_{HQ} \mathbf{HQ}' + \varepsilon \quad (2)$$

Finally, we can add variables to measure changes over time and contrasts among the different sub-borough areas across the city. Unless the dynamics of gentrification and displacement have changed significantly over

the past decade and across neighbourhoods, adding this final set of variables will yield no significant coefficient estimates or improvements in model fit.

We defined a standard menu of variables to operationalise the socioeconomic and housing circumstances described above. Many of our measures follow those of Freeman and Braconi (2004, 2002a, 2002b), but we added controls for missing and unexpected values. We adjusted income and rent for inflation (using the regional CPI to convert all values into 2002 dollars) and defined codes for income and rent intervals. We also created exclusive categories for poverty and the income ranges (since poverty-level incomes depend on family composition).<sup>12</sup> Reference categories for the variables are not explicitly defined in Table 3, but most of these are readily inferred from the omitted categories for each group of measures.<sup>13</sup> We estimated a sequence of logit models to evaluate the effects of different sets of predictors and the stability of various coefficient estimates. The models were weighted with the corresponding NYCHVS household weights, using a normalisation procedure so that the sum of the weights equals the number of observations.<sup>14</sup>

### Model Results

Consider first the baseline model (Table 3, Model 1). Although the likelihood ratio chi-squared implies a statistically significant improvement over a coin toss, the model is not much better than that. Barely more than half the observations are correctly classified and few of the coefficient estimates attain statistical significance. Indeed, many of the significant estimates are unexpected: for instance, Black, Hispanic and Asian renters are less likely to have been displaced than similarly situated non-Hispanic Whites. Displacement appears slightly more likely among the foreign-born, female-headed households, those in poverty and those in older age-groups. This socioeconomic profile bears at least some resemblance to the kind of renter discussed in many New York City

debates over gentrification and displacement. Legislation introduced in the New York state legislature a few years ago, for example, proposed a trial programme to offer tax abatements to landlords to close part of the gap between rising market rents and what they currently get from long-term tenants. This was an attempt to prevent landlords “from evicting long-term, elderly, disabled, or otherwise vulnerable tenants” (Kilgannon, 2003). The proposal was devised by the Fifth Avenue Committee and press coverage in early 2003 profiled Rose Quiles, a 72-year-old woman who had suffered four strokes, barely met the rent obligation with her Social Security cheque and had lived for 20 years on the top floor of a four-storey Brooklyn walk-up that was not covered by state rent regulations (Kilgannon, 2003). Nevertheless, our baseline regression model provides only the most limited, qualified evidence on the socioeconomic profile of displaced renters. The weak predictive power of the model implies that socioeconomic characteristics predict only a small amount of variation between displacees and other movers; put another way, displacement seems to affect a small fraction of movers from a fairly wide range of socioeconomic groups. Nevertheless, some of these effects are surprising: racial and ethnic minorities, for instance, are significantly less likely to report displacement from their previous place of residence, after accounting for age, income and other controls.<sup>15</sup>

Adding sequential batches of variables to the models still produces mixed results (Table 3, Model 2). With the exception of public housing, rent regulation has no significant effect on displacement after accounting for all other factors in the model. Recall, however, that we have no information on the regulatory status of the *previous* unit from which households may have been displaced; the results simply mean that displacees are no more and no less likely to wind up in a stabilised unit after they are forced to leave their previous home. Housing cost and housing quality measures do seem to matter somewhat, significantly boosting model fit and yielding several robust coefficient



**Table 3.** Logistic regression models of displacement, 1989–2002

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coefficient estimate	$e^{\beta}$	Coefficient estimate	$e^{\beta}$	Coefficient estimate	$e^{\beta}$
Intercept	−2.214***		−2.285***		−2.266***	
Age younger than 25	−0.342**	0.71	−0.317*	0.73	−0.370**	0.69
Age 25–34	−0.263*	0.77	−0.242	0.79	−0.281*	0.76
Age 35–45	−0.203	0.82	−0.181	0.83	−0.212	0.81
Age 45–54	−0.003	1.00	0.018	1.02	−0.020	0.98
Age 55–64	0.100	1.11	0.114	1.12	0.102	1.11
Age unreported	−0.406	0.67	−0.395	0.67	−0.528	0.59
High school graduate	−0.060	0.94	−0.054	0.95	−0.027	0.97
Some college	0.105	1.11	0.112	1.12	0.147	1.16
College, associate, or professional degree	−0.100	0.91	−0.100	0.91	−0.050	0.95
Education unreported	−0.320	0.73	−0.302	0.74	−0.173	0.84
Worked last week	−0.082	0.92	−0.078	0.92	−0.072	0.93
Employment last week unreported	−0.004	1.00	0.002	1.00	0.147	1.16
Married-couple household	−0.083	0.92	−0.075	0.93	−0.078	0.92
Children under 18 in household	−0.194**	0.82	−0.191**	0.83	−0.218**	0.80
Female-headed household	0.146*	1.16	0.143	1.15	0.136	1.15
Household type unknown	0.749	2.11	0.761	2.14	0.753	2.12
Non-Hispanic Black	−0.315***	0.73	−0.323***	0.72	−0.418***	0.66
Hispanic	−0.226**	0.80	−0.241**	0.79	−0.313***	0.73
Asian	−0.240*	0.79	−0.238*	0.79	−0.281**	0.75
Other (includes multiracial)	−0.629	0.53	−0.627	0.53	−0.707*	0.49
Race unreported	−10.363	0.00	−10.369	0.00	−10.434	0.00
Foreign-born	0.231***	1.26	0.234***	1.26	0.221***	1.25
Born in Puerto Rico	0.043	1.04	0.035	1.04	0.029	1.03
Householder birthplace unreported	−0.701	0.50	−0.705	0.49	−0.473	0.62
Household in poverty	0.296*	1.34	0.270	1.31	0.127	1.14
Income less than \$10 000	−0.370	0.69	−0.414	0.66	−0.547	0.58
Income \$10 000–19 999	0.158	1.17	0.146	1.16	0.027	1.03
Income \$20 000–29 999	0.160	1.17	0.150	1.16	0.039	1.04
Income \$30 000–39 999	0.174	1.19	0.170	1.19	0.073	1.08
Income \$40 000–59 999	0.269	1.31	0.268	1.31	0.178	1.19
Income \$60 000–99 999	0.168	1.18	0.170	1.19	0.082	1.08
Household income not reported	0.304	1.35	0.307	1.36	0.203	1.22
Rent controlled or pre-1947 stabilised			0.094	1.10	0.012	1.01
Rent post-1947 stabilised			0.067	1.07	0.029	1.03
Public housing or HUD-regulated			0.228*	1.26	0.001	1.00
Other regulated housing			0.018	1.02	−0.055	0.95
In Rem housing			−0.426	0.65	−0.651	0.52

*(Table continued)*

Table 3. *Continued*

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3	
	Coefficient estimate	$e^{\beta}$	Coefficient estimate	$e^{\beta}$	Coefficient estimate	$e^{\beta}$
Monthly gross rent less than \$300					0.663**	1.94
Rent \$300–\$499					0.541**	1.72
Rent \$500–749					0.395*	1.48
Rent \$750–999					0.349	1.42
Rent \$1 000–1 499					0.373*	1.45
Rent \$1 500–1 999					0.303	1.35
Rent unreported					0.485	1.62
One maintenance deficiency					0.239***	1.27
Maintenance deficiencies 2–4					0.217**	1.24
Five or more deficiencies					–0.135	0.87
Maintenance deficiencies unreported					–0.066	0.94
Overcrowded (1.25–1.50 persons per room)					–0.024	0.98
Seriously overcrowded (1.50 or more)					0.257**	1.29
Persons per room not calculated					–9.914	0.00
Rates neighbourhood excellent					–0.373**	0.69
Rates neighbourhood good					–0.357***	0.70
Rates neighbourhood fair					–0.179	0.84
Rating unreported					–0.669	0.51
Likelihood ratio $\chi^2$	77.0***		82.2***		120.7***	
$\chi^2$ vs Model 1			5.2		43.7***	
$\chi^2$ vs Model 2					38.5***	
Percentage correctly classified	56.4		56.9		58.7	
Number of observations	12 258		12 258		12 258	

\*Significant at  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$ .

Data source: US Bureau of the Census (2003).

estimates (Table 3, Model 3). Not surprisingly, those living in lower-cost units are more likely to have been displaced compared with those able to afford high-rent apartments. Renters living in sub-standard units or in seriously overcrowded homes are more likely to have been displaced; those who are highly satisfied with the housing stock in their neighbourhood are less likely to have been displaced.

### Contextual Effects

Although the models thus far offer predictive lacklustre power, they do provide an effective control for those socioeconomic and housing characteristics that are associated with displacement. Thus, adding variables to capture the role of context—variations over time and across different parts of the city—should have no effect if displacement is just a matter of a few imperfections in the

housing market forcing a small number of households to move out. Conversely, statistically significant model improvements would confirm changes in the displacement process and the importance of variations across the city's many housing sub-markets. We add three simple contextual measures: the borough from which the household moved; the borough of the current residence; and, the year of the HVS panel. At this point, we also calculated standardised logit coefficients to put all of the measures on the same scale: these coefficients tell us which variables are most important in explaining the overall pattern of differences between displacees and other movers.<sup>16</sup>

The expanded model results emphasise the importance of context, even when it is measured with the crude indicators adopted here (Table 4). Not surprisingly, renters moving from the Bronx, Brooklyn and Queens are less likely to have been displaced compared with similar movers leaving Manhattan. Viewed another way, renters moving into Brooklyn and Queens are much more likely to have been displaced than otherwise identical renters moving into Manhattan. The odds that a new renter is a displacee are two and one half times higher in Brooklyn than in Manhattan, even after accounting for all demographic and housing circumstances. Geographical variations, even measured at a very crude scale, post the largest standardised coefficients for the entire model, meaning that they contribute the most to understanding the distinguishing features of displaced movers. There is also some evidence, although it is far from conclusive, that displacement has changed over time in ways that cannot be explained in terms of the characteristics of renters, homes and different parts of the city. Compared with the 1991 sample, recently moved renters surveyed in the 1996 panel were less likely to have been displaced (note the odds ratio of 0.76), while the situation worsened in subsequent years (to the 2002 odds ratio of 1.29).<sup>17</sup>

But context is clearly much more localised than the broad variations among boroughs. For renters' current residence, the NYCHVS

allows us to identify the sub-borough location of the unit. Adding these measures and estimating separate models over time allows us to test a crucial hypothesis: that the accumulated pressures of gentrification and housing market competition have forced displaced renters to look farther afield for affordable homes. The voluminous output from these sub-borough models is not presented here, but several key findings deserve mention. First, measuring context in this way greatly boosts overall model fit. On one measure, the percentage correctly classified, jumps to a bit over 71 per cent for the 1993 and 2002 models, and to the 74–76 per cent range for the other models. Secondly, the coefficient estimates point to shifting combinations of processes driving displacement over time. The pooled models imply that, after we account for income and other factors, displacement is less likely among Blacks, Hispanics and Asians (Table 4). The stratified models, however, indicate that this effect has been inconsistent over time: racial differences are insignificant except for 1993 (where Hispanics and Asians are less likely among displacees) and 1999 (for Blacks and Hispanics). There are similar shifts in the effects for several other predictors (for instance, the clearest link between displacement and poverty or low-income status appears in 1999 and is much weaker in other years).

But a third finding stands out as most relevant to our hypothesis. Even after accounting for all other factors in the models, renters in some sub-borough areas are more likely to have been displaced from their previous homes. Figures 4 and 5 display odds ratios for sub-boroughs, comparing each with the reference category of Lower Manhattan (defined here as the four zones south of Central Park). In 1991, displacement effects were most likely among renters in Co-op City (in the northern Bronx), Williamsburg and Bay Ridge; no other parts of the city were different from lower Manhattan after accounting for the characteristics of renters and housing units. But as the 1990s proceeded, displacement effects appear in more and more parts of Brooklyn and even

**Table 4.** Expanded displacement models

	Coefficient estimate	$e^{\beta}$	Standardised coefficient
Intercept	-2.3575***		
Age younger than 25	-0.3938**	0.67	-12.0
Age 25-34	-0.2767*	0.76	-12.7
Age 35-45	-0.2225	0.80	-9.2
Age 45-54	-0.0276	0.97	-0.9
Age 55-64	0.1138	1.12	2.6
Age unreported	-0.5443	0.58	-2.1
High school graduate	-0.0298	0.97	-1.3
Some college	0.1355	1.15	5.1
College, associate, or professional degree	-0.0793	0.92	-3.7
Education unreported	-0.1455	0.86	-0.9
Worked last week	-0.092	0.91	-4.3
Employment last week unreported	0.1647	1.18	1.0
Married-couple household	-0.0738	0.93	-3.4
Children under 18 in household	-0.1976**	0.82	-9.3
Female-headed household	0.1531*	1.17	7.8
Household type unknown	0.8219	2.27	2.6
Non-Hispanic Black	-0.4035***	0.67	-16.2
Hispanic	-0.2442**	0.78	-10.6
Asian	-0.2887**	0.75	-8.1
Other (includes multiracial)	-0.6596	0.52	-6.0
Race unreported	-11.287	0.00	-25.0
Foreign-born	0.165**	1.18	8.5
Born in Puerto Rico	0.0668	1.07	1.6
Householder birthplace unreported	-0.516	0.60	-4.6
Household in poverty	0.137	1.15	6.0
Income less than \$10 000	-0.5017	0.61	-3.6
Income \$10 000-19 999	0.0206	1.02	0.6
Income \$20 000-29 999	0.0553	1.06	1.9
Income \$30 000-39 999	0.0513	1.05	1.7
Income \$40 000-59 999	0.1737	1.19	6.7
Income \$60 000-99 999	0.0699	1.07	2.5
Household income not reported	0.2581	1.29	4.4
Rent controlled or pre-1947 stabilised	0.0901	1.09	4.4
Rent post-1947 stabilised	0.0655	1.07	2.0
Public housing or HUD-regulated	0.0302	1.03	0.8
Other regulated housing	0.00848	1.01	0.1
In Rem housing	-0.5058	0.60	-8.6
Monthly gross rent less than \$300	0.6225**	1.86	15.9
Rent \$300-\$499	0.5148*	1.67	14.3
Rent \$500-\$749	0.3888	1.48	18.2
Rent \$750-\$999	0.2847	1.33	14.2
Rent \$1 000-\$1 499	0.3176	1.37	13.8
Rent \$1 500-\$1 999	0.2281	1.26	5.1
Rent unreported	0.4793	1.61	4.4
One maintenance deficiency	0.236***	1.27	10.2
Maintenance deficiencies 2-4	0.2299***	1.26	10.4
Five or more deficiencies	-0.1024	0.90	-2.1
Maintenance deficiencies unreported	-0.0566	0.94	-1.5

*(Table continued)*

Table 4. *Continued*

	Coefficient estimate	$e^{\beta}$	Standardised coefficient
Overcrowded (1.25–1.50 persons per room)	–0.0326	0.97	–0.7
Seriously overcrowded (1.50 or more)	0.2384*	1.27	6.1
Persons per room not calculated	–10.516	0.00	–9.1
Rates neighbourhood excellent	–0.3317**	0.72	–10.7
Rates neighbourhood good	–0.3496**	0.70	–16.0
Rates neighbourhood fair	–0.1781	0.84	–7.5
Rating unreported	–0.686	0.50	–7.4
Previous residence in the Bronx	–0.51***	0.60	–17.6
Previous residence in Brooklyn	–0.7756***	0.46	–30.4
Previous residence in Queens	–0.268*	0.76	–10.7
Previous residence in Staten Island	–0.4228	0.66	–7.6
Current residence in the Bronx	0.0774	1.08	3.1
Current residence in Brooklyn	0.9116***	2.49	52.8
Current residence in Queens	0.4342***	1.54	20.3
Current residence in Staten Island	0.1573	1.17	3.1
1993 HVS	0.1342	1.14	5.4
1996 HVS	–0.2689**	0.76	–10.7
1999 HVS	0.1258	1.13	5.3
2002 HVS	0.2563**	1.29	10.8
Likelihood ratio $\chi^2$	226.3***		
Percentage correctly classified	62.4		
Number of observations	12 258		

\*Significant at  $p < 0.10$ ; \*\*  $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\*  $p < 0.01$ .

Data source: US Bureau of the Census (2003).


Queens. By 1999, broad sections of Brooklyn and Queens serve as destinations for displacees. The 2002 panel seems to suggest a slight return to the spatial patterns of earlier years, with strong displacement effects in the Mott Haven, Hunts Point and Throgs Neck/Co-op City sections of the Bronx. But the effects are even stronger among renters moving into areas all the way from Fort Greene to Flatbush in Brooklyn.

Overall, the quantitative analysis provides an essential overview of the magnitude of displacement across the city and changes in the process over the past 15 years. Direct displacement is involved in a relatively small proportion of moves within the city, but it cannot be dismissed or ignored: displacement affects 6–10 per cent of all rental moves within the city each year. For those displaced renters who are able to find new

accommodations in the city, and who are not forced to double-up, our multivariate models suggest that they are looking farther afield in the outer boroughs to find affordable arrangements. As gentrification swept with renewed intensity across Manhattan through the 1990s, renters forced to seek homes elsewhere moved farther into Brooklyn and increasingly into Queens and the Bronx.

Nevertheless, many poor renters do find ways of staying in gentrifying areas. In the seven neighbourhoods examined by Freeman and Braconi, there are still nearly 54 000 renter households in poverty (Table 5). Replacement and displacement both seem to be underway: the number of poor renters in these communities has fallen by 30 per cent since the recession of the early 1990s and rent burdens have risen considerably: by 2002, more than three-quarters of poor






**Figure 4.** Neighbourhood destinations for displaced renters, 1991, 1993 and 1996. *Notes:* Statistically significant odds ratios ( $p < 0.10$ ) from logistic regression displacement models. Medium-grey sub-borough areas have odds ratios between 2.3 and 3.9. Black sub-borough areas have odds ratios from 4.0 to 7.0.

households in these areas were paying more than the standard 30 per cent of income affordability threshold; half were devoting two-thirds of their income to rent. And yet the unique patchwork of city, state and federal programmes that are woven together in New York City offer some measure of protection. Only 1 out of 15 poor renters living in gentrifying neighbourhoods is able to do so in the unregulated rental market (the ‘other rental’ category in Table 6). Public housing

and early-20th-century rent stabilisation are critically important. This is the key paradox that explains the dangers in any casual reading of Freeman and Braconi’s research. Just as the growth-machine class attacked rent regulation in the 1980s even while citing those same regulations to dismiss concerns about displacement (Smith, 1996), too many observers have seized the *USA Today* headline verdict on Freeman and Braconi’s evidence—“Studies: gentrification a boost for



**Figure 5.** Neighbourhood destinations for displaced renters, 1999 and 2002. *Notes:* Statistically significant odds ratios ( $p < 0.10$ ) from logistic regression displacement models. Medium-grey sub-borough areas have odds ratios between 2.3 and 3.9. Black sub-borough areas have odds ratios from 4.0 to 7.0. The cross-hatched area (Morningside Heights/Hamilton Heights) has an odds ratio of 0.18.

everyone”—while ignoring the more subtle point that:

Ironically, two of the most maligned housing policies, rent regulation and public housing, may have a certain logic in the context of gentrification . . . rent regulation reduces housing turnover among disadvantaged renters. . . . Public housing, often criticized for anchoring the poor to declining neighbourhoods, may also have the advantage of anchoring them to gentrifying neighbourhoods (Freeman and Braconi, 2004, pp. 50–51).

It is deeply troubling that public regulation of the market helps to mitigate displacement pressures and that this fact is then used to justify deregulation and privatisation, because, we are told, gentrification is a boost for everyone.

Ultimately, the quantitative analysis has its limits. Although the NYCHVS is one of the best datasets on urban housing market changes, it is ill-suited for an analysis of the full social complexity of individual and family circumstances. Renters who cannot compete in the city’s red-hot real estate market and who leave for New Jersey (or

elsewhere) disappear from view. Displaced individuals and families who are forced to double-up cannot be identified. And the structure of the survey (allowing only one choice on the question for the householder’s reason for moving) terribly simplifies the circumstances of renters who were pushed out of their homes in the midst of other crises, such as unexpected bills that made it more difficult to meet the rent, job loss, or a divorce. Ultimately, then, our quantitative glimpse of housing market conditions across the city from 1989 to 2002 provides only a partial view of the processes of gentrification and displacement, and confirms that we need to consider the nuanced, qualitative experience of individuals struggling to remain in their homes in dynamic, gentrifying neighbourhoods.

### **Displacement: A View from the Neighbourhoods**

In the second part of our study, we conducted field research in neighbourhoods within the seven sub-borough areas identified by Freeman and Braconi as gentrifying (Fort Greene, Greenpoint/Williamsburg and Park Slope in Brooklyn and the Lower East Side,

**Table 5.** Rent burden of poverty households in gentrifying neighbourhoods

	Monthly gross rent as percentage of household income				
	1991	1993	1996	1999	2002
Top decile	101+	101+	101+	101+	101+
Top quarter	89.4	101+	101+	101+	101+
Median	55.5	56.8	62.7	66.2	65
Bottom quarter	32.3	34.7	34.1	37.8	37.2
Bottom tenth	26.6	26.9	26.9	27.4	27.4
Total number of renters in poverty in gentrifying neighbourhoods	65 562	77 990	71 499	62 306	53 885

*Note:* Rent-to-income ratios are topcoded at 101 per cent or more.

Chelsea/Clinton, Central Harlem and Morningside Heights in Manhattan). We sought to assess the catalysts for physical, demographic, political and economic change, organisational dynamics and the roles of private and public groups and leaders, neighbourhood activism, interventions to ensure that disadvantaged groups could remain in the neighbourhoods and the effect of neighbourhood changes on different disadvantaged groups. We were particularly interested in the trajectories of neighbourhood change over time from the 1970s onwards, which groups have been displaced and or are threatened with displacement, what happens to those who are displaced and public or private assistance and decisions that enable low-income residents to remain in gentrifying neighbourhoods.

Before entering the field, we conducted a literature review to understand the histories of change in the study neighbourhoods. We walked through each neighbourhood and conducted in-depth field interviews with 33 respondents in those neighbourhoods. The interviews did not seek to provide objective or statistically representative estimates of the magnitude or scale of displacement. Rather, the interviews were intended to shed light on the qualitative aspects of trends identified in secondary datasets and on the perspectives of individuals and groups living through neighbourhood changes. Interviews were conducted as narrative conversations. Interviewees were not treated simply as research subjects; rather, researchers and interviewees were understood as “equal participant(s) in the interaction” (Fontana and Frey, 2000,

**Table 6.** Rent regulation and poverty households in gentrifying neighbourhoods

	Percentage of poor renters living in specified housing type				
	1991	1993	1996	1999	2002
Public housing	28.8	26.1	29.9	30.1	28.9
Article 4 or 5 building	0.24	0.40	0.90	0.51	0.78
HUD-regulated	3.87	5.85	8.00	7.66	6.58
Stabilised, pre-1947	40.1	38.6	37.6	41.4	38.2
Stabilised, post-1947	2.52	3.03	2.1	2.71	6.02
Other rental	7.18	8.05	6.47	6.72	6.34
Mitchell-Lama rental	2.14	3.42	3.68	3.03	5.9
Controlled	6.28	7.21	6.03	4.52	3.73
In Rem	8.91	7.32	5.33	3.38	3.56
Total	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
Total number of units	65 562	77 990	71 499	62 306	53 885

p. 664; Seidman, 1991). Questions focused on describing the gentrification process, neighbourhood change and its impact on low-income residents.

To identify interviewees, we drafted a preliminary list of neighbourhood and city-wide contacts identified through Internet searches, a literature review and personal contacts to start our 'snowball' sample (Marshall and Rossman, 1999). We sought out community residents, community organisers and staff at local community-based organisations, people who come in contact with those most threatened with displacement, to understand the pressures, situations, contexts and what happens to those who are displaced. In many cases, the community resident, organiser and staff person at a local CBO was the same person. New York's political culture of tenant activism has produced many local leaders who staff the city's non-profit community organisations, often as housing organisers. These respondents, who often live in the neighbourhoods in which they work and benefit from dense family and community networks and an intimate knowledge of their communities, offer an on-the-ground look at gentrification processes and effects.

We present the findings from the field research in two parts. In the first part, we discuss the displacement pressures on residents. In the second part, we discuss the public and private interventions that enable low-income residents to remain in gentrifying neighbourhoods.

### *Neighbourhood Gentrification in the 1990s*

Interviewees from all seven study neighbourhoods described dramatic changes in their communities from the mid 1990s onwards as a tremendous surge of gentrification increased displacement pressures. Even though many of these neighbourhoods experienced some form of gentrification during earlier economic booms in the 1970s and 1980s, the transformations brought about by what Hackworth and Smith (2001) labelled post-recession gentrification or the gentrification wave that occurred in the late 1990s, were different in scale and

scope. Interviewees describe an influx of new residents, gentrification processes that expanded further into not yet fully gentrified parts of the neighbourhoods, dramatic demographic changes, housing revitalisation and new construction, and commercial corridor revitalisation.

The changes in Lower Park Slope are fairly typical of the changes occurring in many of the study neighbourhoods. Lower Park Slope, home to a mixture of residents including older Italian families, Latinos and long-time and more recent White residents, experienced a massive influx of gentrification that transformed 5th Avenue, a major commercial corridor, and drove up housing prices. Residents appreciate many of the changes, but fear that the changes ultimately will displace them. A Latina former resident who became a community organiser after she was displaced from the neighbourhood described her experience

In 1999 my landlord doubled the rent in the apartment but we didn't understand why . . . My rent went from \$750 to \$1200. So he almost doubled it. There were five other families in the building, one from Ecuador, one from Columbia . . . worked in factories all of their lives, lived there for about 28 years; we were there for 8 years . . . My apartment was taken over by a couple and their cat. So that's what he wanted. He always said he wanted to put trees on the block. It faced a factory, which he owned. It was part of Park Slope but not very residential, more like a commercial block. He put trees on it, fixed the gates and then sends everybody a letter saying the rent doubled. It wasn't that he wanted to make it nice for us. That's where gentrification affects people. He was making it look better and fixing it up but he was doing it with a mission to put in luxury condos for other people (interview, 2003).

Like Lower Park Slope, the northern part of Brooklyn's Fort Greene neighbourhood has been rapidly gentrifying since the mid 1990s, pricing out many lower-income

residents who had remained there despite the earlier rounds of gentrification during the 1970s and 1980s. Myrtle Avenue, known locally as ‘Murder Avenue’ because of the crack cocaine issues in the 1980s, became the site of rapid gentrification in the late 1990s and early 2000s, which transformed it from a disinvested corridor to a neighbourhood asset with fashionable restaurants, dry cleaners and an ice cream shop. The transformation brought with it higher rental prices for the units above the commercial properties and helped to set off a rapid transformation of the housing stock just north of Myrtle which had until recently been one of the few remaining affordable areas.

Central Harlem received an influx of middle-class residents throughout the 1970s and 1980s but the changes during the late 1990s and early 2000s are different. Harlem’s residents report a solid flow of SUVs (sports utility vehicles) of people driving through the neighbourhood scouting for homes. One resident described the housing demand: “People are coming up while you’re on the street asking who owns the building. It’s a daily thing”. The neighbourhood also appeals to renters seeking liveable space with manageable commutes. In less than 15 minutes, residents are whisked to midtown on a 2 or A train; in 30 minutes, they can reach jobs on Wall Street. A 20-minute cab ride gets you to LaGuardia Airport and every highway intersects with Harlem. Rents for floor-through apartments in brownstones are capturing \$1 700 a month.

Many residents of gentrifying neighbourhoods like Park Slope, Fort Greene and Harlem view gentrification and the transformations it brings as a mixed blessing. A Harlem resident describes the changes on 125th Street in Central Harlem. “People love Starbucks. People who would buy 50-cent coffee now go in there and buy one for \$3.00”. But residents fear that their new shopping venues come with a high price tag and may help to spur the revitalisation that will ultimately displace them. One resident

explained that he liked the new stores but feared displacement:

I don’t want to have to take a train to go to the Magic Johnson theatre. I live on 126th. I should be able to walk to there and when I’m done, walk back.

Longtime residents are frustrated that after years of fighting to improve their neighbourhoods during periods of severe disinvestment, now that the neighbourhoods are improving, these residents will not be able to stay. A resident of the Lower East Side explained mixed feelings about gentrification:

I’ve never had a problem with it. I’ve welcomed it. But we feel a little bit cheated. We were here when no one wanted to be here. Landlords were selling buildings for \$10 000 to 12 000. Now that it’s gotten better, we want to be here too. We don’t want to wind up moving. It is so unfair . . . We made it better for our community and ourselves. We are here because we had nowhere else to go (interview, 2003).

This resident’s explanation highlights the irony faced by many lower-income residents. For decades, community residents of inner-city neighbourhoods built organisations and fought to revitalise their communities. Now that these communities are improving, they find it increasingly difficult to remain. In the next section, we discuss displacement pressures on low-income residents.

### *Gentrification and Low-income Residents*

The rapid gentrification put tremendous pressure on low-income residents. Community leaders, residents and advocates revealed that displacement from the mid 1990s onwards was a tremendous problem for many population sub-groups including the poor and working class, elderly and immigrants. While it is certainly difficult to understand what happens to residents as they move, residents and community leaders report that residents often double- or triple-up with family and friends, become homeless or move into the city shelter system, or move



out of the city. None of these mobility dynamics is captured in the NYCHVS dataset, suggesting that it underestimates displacement by a significant but unmeasurable amount.

According to neighbourhood informants, many displacees are moving out of the city to upstate New York, New Jersey and Long Island. Community residents and organisers in Fort Greene and Harlem described a reverse great migration with many residents returning to communities of origin in the South. A resident explains where displacees go:

A lot of people go to the South, some to upstate New York, Schenectady; Albany historically has been very cheap and also Poughkeepsie is cheap and Orange County. A lot of people are going to where they had property, to their families in Atlanta, the Carolinas (interview, 2003).

Some groups, including seniors, find it particularly difficult to remain in the gentrifying city when housing prices increase while their incomes do not. An organiser from Brooklyn explains:

Most of the displacement is the result of landlords tripling rents who know that a senior's income doesn't go up. It stays the same. You know she can't pay you \$1500 especially when she's lived there with you for years. They have to move in with their kids; they can't go to senior housing because there aren't any—they are booked and the waiting-lists are really long. Often they go live with family or kids which is hard because they are so independent (interview, 2003).

In neighbourhoods throughout Central and Northern Brooklyn, we heard about elderly women occupying apartments for decades while paying less than market rate rent. As gentrification transformed their neighbourhoods, pressure to raise their rents increased. Landlords of rent-regulated buildings that offer below-market rents to senior citizens can receive a tax abatement called SCRIE, the Senior Citizen Rent Increase Exemption, but unregulated buildings provide little

protection from the increases. There are few alternatives within the city since most senior buildings are full, with long waiting-lists. Elderly women frequently double-up or move in with family outside the city.

New immigrants face similar issues including accepting poor housing quality, overcrowding, or they leave the city to find housing. A community organiser describes the displacement choices of the people he works with:

People we just worked with went back to Mexico. They were evicted from two unregulated places. They ran out of money and went back. Some people move to Bushwick; other people are moving in with family members. A lot of times you just don't know what happens . . . Quite a few of the tenants I've worked with who have been evicted, the Latino population, generally have family in the neighbourhood. One part of the generation lives in regulated housing; another lives in unregulated. They will get evicted and move in with family members who have protection from eviction (interview, 2003).

For those with no alternative, there is the city's shelter system. Community organisers described their frustration when efforts to find affordable housing for tenants failed and tenants turned to the shelter system. In 2003, community leaders in a Williamsburg non-profit referred people to the shelter system for the first time since their organisation's founding in the 1970s. The number of people in New York City's shelter system suggests the severity of the city's current housing affordability crisis. In July 2003, more than 38 000 people, including 8249 families and more than 16 500 children, used the New York City shelter system, far exceeding the last peak of 28 737 reached in March 1987 (Supportive Housing Network of New York, 2003).

These interview reports are of course anecdotal. It is difficult to know with certainty whether they represent isolated incidents or widespread trends. But these findings appear in interviews with sufficient consistency and frequency to provide important evidence

augmenting and filling in important gaps in our quantitative analysis.

### **How Low-income Residents Stay in Gentrifying Neighbourhoods**

Freeman and Braconi (2004; 2002a, 2002b) found that low-income residents in gentrifying neighbourhoods had lower mobility rates than similar residents in non-gentrifying areas. This seems counter-intuitive but raises important and unexplored questions about how low-income residents stay in gentrifying neighbourhoods. Certainly not all residents are displaced, but what enables them to stay? We address this question in the next section.

#### *Public Interventions*

Of the myriad forms of assistance available, interviewees identified the city's rent regulations as the single most important form of public intervention. In 2002, 49 per cent of housing units in New York City were rent-stabilised, 3 per cent were rent-controlled and another 17 per cent were regulated by some other form of regulation, leaving 32 per cent unregulated (Previti and Schill, 2003). Changes to rent regulation legislation over the past 10 years, however, have reduced the regulated housing stock by about 105 000 units city-wide, suggesting that the role of this important safeguard has diminished over time (Chen, 2003).

Interviewees identified problems affecting the regulated stock in gentrifying neighbourhoods. Landlords illegally charge excessive rents for stabilised units, send tenants threatening notices to leave the regulated stock, stop providing services and threaten to look at immigration papers. The Rent Regulation Act of 1997 allows landlords to increase the rent of regulated apartments by between 18 and 20 per cent upon vacancy. When the rent reaches \$2000, landlords can remove the unit from the regulated housing stock. In a market with soaring market rents, and the ability to reach a rent level that enables them to decontrol units, landlords have an obvious incentive to increase rents to reach the

luxury decontrol cap. In Clinton, the area in Manhattan in the west 50s, landlords are reportedly using a variety of illegal tactics to capture higher rents. In one scheme, landlords rotate tenants in rent-stabilised buildings to capture the rent increase, pushing the units more quickly towards \$2,000 so that they can decontrol and capture windfall profits in what one community leader describes as "the most intensely gentrified neighbourhood, right west of Midtown" (interview with community leader, 2003). For their part, tenants reportedly choose not to challenge landlords to improve housing quality or charge legal rents in rent-stabilised buildings because they are afraid that landlords will harass them. An organiser explained:

They are happy that they have some sort of apartment even though the landlord is overcharging under rent stabilisation. In this one building, it was pretty clear that everyone in the building was overpaying at \$1700. They were being overcharged but in their mentality, to have a \$1700 apartment in Manhattan was great and they did not want to make waves (interview, 2003).

In Brooklyn, the story is similar.

The only tenants we have now who are in danger are in rent-stabilised apartments. The landlord has been harassing them for a long time to try to get them out. Landlord tries to increase the rent to \$2000 or beyond and deregulate (interview with a community organiser, 2003).

Staff at the Pratt Area Community Council (PACC), a CDC, related the story of a tenant in a rent-stabilised apartment whose landlord constantly files frivolous cases with city and state agencies as a form of harassment (interview with a community organiser, 2003). Community organisation staff members report a sharp increase in the number of residents seeking help to cope with landlords who file personal holdover evictions, and suggest that the process is being abused to remove tenants illegally.<sup>18</sup> Tenants in designated SROs (single room occupancy units) are also facing displacement pressures even

though they have eviction protection. Since 1983, landlords are required to get a certificate of no harassment before removing tenants in certified SROs. Technically, landlords cannot convert units without the consent letter, but community leaders report that landlords remove tenants by buying them out, converting the units illegally, or cutting off services with the intention of wearing the tenants down until they leave. A neighbourhood organiser in Fort Greene described one situation: "We worked with an SRO building . . . the landlord cut off heat and hot water. Now it's boarded up" (interview, 2003).

Interviewees listed assisted housing as the next most used support. Thousands of residents live in housing with some form of public subsidy, including federal public housing, housing vouchers and Section 8, or New York State's Mitchell-Lama programme. Public housing offers considerable protection against displacement for 181 000 households. Vouchers provide another critical form of support but are threatened by proposed federal cutbacks. Another 20 000 people with HIV/AIDS receive rental assistance from the city's Human Resources Administration (Supportive Housing Network of New York, 2003). Even with these supports, the supply of affordable housing is inadequate to meet needs.

Currently 224 000 households are on the waiting-list for Section 8 rental vouchers . . .

A typical family now spends eight years on the waiting-list for an apartment in one of the city's public housing developments (Rose *et al.*, 2004, p. 12).

Some of these programmes, like the federal Section 8 programme and the state Mitchell-Lama programme, are time-delimited, enabling owners to opt out of the programme at the end of their contracts and many of these contracts are due to expire within the next 10 years, threatening thousands of affordable housing units (DeFillipis, 2003). Some neighbourhoods have high concentrations of Section 8 housing and could expect a severe loss in affordable units in the next few years. The Lower East Side could lose more than

half of its 3064 project based Section 8 units by 2006 under rules currently in effect. Harlem could lose 77 per cent of its nearly 3900 units by 2009 (HUD Section 8 Database). Community leaders and residents are working aggressively, especially on the Lower East Side, to ensure that landlords renew contracts, but this is time- and energy-intensive and produces contracts that last for only a few years at a time, forcing tenants to do battle constantly to save their homes.

Some low-income residents benefit from the city's voluntary 80/20 inclusionary zoning programme, but community groups argue that, given the city's recent upzoning of many neighbourhoods and the expected high production rates in the private housing market, the programme should be mandatory. Upzoning enables landowners to capture windfall profits; the city should capture some of this back in the form of affordable housing units for the benefit of the entire city. Mandating inclusionary zoning in developing neighbourhoods could produce units for low-income residents, rather than simply assuming that units will trickle down by increasing supply. This is particularly an issue as the number of low-income units decreases. The waiting-lists for these programmes suggest the extent of outstanding need. Community organisation and industrial organisation leaders also argue that some zoning changes in formerly industrial areas that allow for mixed zoning including residential facilitates gentrification by allowing residential conversions which negatively impact local jobs and affordable housing (Curran, 2004; interviews, 2003).

Public interventions enable many low-income residents to remain in gentrifying neighbourhoods but they are not the only interventions. We turn next to private strategies including community organisation production and organising, the decisions of individual landlords and resident decisions.

### *Private Strategies*

For many low-income residents, staying in gentrifying neighbourhoods means accepting

poor housing quality, coping with high housing cost burdens and/or sharing housing with other residents. A community leader explained the choices in Brooklyn:

If a unit is unregulated, there is no eviction protection; there are no controls of the rent. If you can't pay it, you just leave. If you move away from the brownstone area of Fort Greene and move closer to Bed Stuy, the tenants in the unregulated housing will be families pooling their resources, Mexican immigrant families with terrible housing conditions and overcrowding. One of the ways people cope is to crowd it out. You either accept sub-standard housing or pool your resources (interview, 2003).

Housing quality and affordability become a trade-off; residents fear that complaining about housing quality will result in displacement. An organiser explained that some low-income tenants in Fort Greene "are paying below market rate, but they are in really hazardous conditions" (interview, 2003). Some displacees, especially single parents, the elderly, immigrants and younger families, remain in the city by doubling up with family or friends. Overcrowding is a particularly serious problem in poor immigrant communities. Poles and Latinos in Williamsburg, Africans and Latinos in Harlem, Chinese on the Lower East Side and an array of immigrants in Brooklyn often live in severely overcrowded conditions merely to pay the rent.

While many low-income residents are forced to live in sub-standard housing to find affordable rents, many other low-income residents live in good-quality private rental housing and pay below market rents. Interviewees throughout many of the study communities described an informal housing market in which landlords know the tenants, in many cases for decades, and charge rent that the tenants can afford. A community leader explains how this works:

Landlords are not always maximising their income. Many things affect the decisions of landlords. There are members of the community, there are thousands and

thousands of disabled people and older people, for example, who pay far below the market rate and have been for a long time because the landlord knows them and has a relationship with them. He makes this illogical decision and that's why the old lady comes in and has been paying \$600 for the last decade. There are community values that mediate the market. Not 100 per cent but in many cases, there is a community consensus that we shouldn't evict the disabled, single person; this mediates the pressure to raise the rents. As the market rate goes up and up, that consensus breaks down. One older woman was paying \$500, the market was paying \$800. The landlord knew she couldn't pay it and it wasn't worth it to raise the rent; he didn't really need the money. By 2002, market rate was up to \$1100. It's one thing to lose \$300 a month, another thing to lose \$600 a month (interview 2003).

The informal housing market provides housing to many otherwise vulnerable residents but it is highly unstable. These are tenuous relationships that end as landlords pass away or sell their buildings. And gentrification itself has been chipping away at the informal housing market as landlords realise the extent of their lost income and raise rents accordingly.

Home-ownership is often viewed as a protection against gentrification but, as housing values increase, rising property taxes often make home-ownership impossible, especially for the elderly and other residents on fixed incomes. Since 1981, New York City's property tax structure has benefited residents who own and live in one to three family buildings. Property taxes can increase only 6 per cent a year or 20 per cent over 5 years and properties are taxed only at 8 per cent of their assessed value (Collins and Werkstell, 2003). A tax benefit created to keep home-owners in Queens and Staten Island from leaving the city now ironically provides protection to home-owners who would otherwise be displaced by rising property taxes. This no doubt provides a benefit for some low-income

households, but few such households in New York are home-owners. Interestingly, the tax structure may benefit moderate-income households who bought homes in neighbourhoods as they were gentrifying.

Community organisations play an important role in ensuring the availability of affordable housing through their organising and housing production efforts. Even though many of New York's housing units are regulated, thousands of units are not regulated and there is an important geography to the regulation. Since fewer units in Brooklyn's inner-ring brownstone neighbourhoods are regulated, community organisers have sought strategies to stem the effects of displacement. Lower Park Slope's Fifth Avenue Committee (FAC) launched an anti-displacement campaign to transform neighbourhood political culture and challenge landlords who displace residents through excessive rent increases (Slater, 2004).

Groups throughout Central and Northern Brooklyn adopted FAC's strategy. In 2001, the Pratt Area Community Council (PACC) created Brooklyn Community Action to build leadership among people who might be faced with displacement. Their initial efforts quickly expanded into Displacement Watch, a programme that "holds weekly meetings for tenants, negotiates with landlords and organises letter-writing campaigns, prayer vigils and demonstrations" (Jackson, 2002). The anti-displacement campaigns and organising efforts are designed to pressure landlords into reducing rents. A community leader explains an action:

The first case we took was for a tenant who lived on Myrtle above a popular restaurant. She had a Section 8 voucher, lived there over a decade, had a kid and was very active in the neighbourhood. A new landlord took over and served 30-day eviction notices to her and another family in the building. Through a clergy campaign and threatening boycott of his store, we got her a two-year lease. This was relatively pretty easy. The other family in the building did not work with us. She ended up going

into the shelter system with her son. The landlord did not call off that eviction proceeding (interview with a community leader, 2003).

Hartman and Robinson (2003) note that organisations in other parts of the country have adopted similar strategies. They describe these as

useful quivers in the antidisplacement armamentarium, and even when evictions are ultimately still carried out, they serve to dramatically publicise housing problems and injustices, stressing the property rights vs. housing rights theme (Hartman and Robinson, 2003, p. 484).

The effect of these campaigns is uncertain. It is hard to say whether a new neighbourhood norm is created in Park Slope or whether landlords are altering their behaviour beyond individual cases.

In addition to organising, the city's community development corporations and other non-profit housing developers have produced thousands of units of affordable housing. The additional production has certainly helped to relieve the need for housing but some, including those running neighbourhood non-profits, point out the limitations. First, organisations acknowledge that these efforts are a drop in the bucket compared with the housing need. Secondly, support for higher-end housing and the need for affordable home-ownership opportunities in many neighbourhoods shift the agenda of the bigger organisations to producing affordable home-ownership, leaving few organisations producing housing for very low-income residents. The housing market boom has also made it more difficult for community organisations to purchase property for development. In the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, groups could easily find property and often acquired it for free or for a small cost from the city. The city's Third Party Transfer programme allowed the city to transfer ownership of buildings with unpaid property taxes at risk of abandonment to other entities. Community organisations used to acquire buildings through this programme but now find themselves competing with private developers.



As Freeman and Braconi suggest, many low-income families stay in gentrifying neighbourhoods, but the interventions that enable them to do so all have serious limitations. Publicly assisted programmes are losing support and the informal private market is crumbling. Inclusionary zoning holds the most potential to capture some of the advantage of the booming real estate market.

## Conclusion

For at least a generation, proponents of gentrification have argued that the process involves little or no displacement—and that, in any case, its benefits for cities far outweigh the costs imposed on a few unfortunate poor households (Sumka, 1980). In recent years, some proponents have gone even further to argue that the process is inherently good, even for its victims. The new urbanist architect Andres Duany cries out in the pages of the *American Enterprise Magazine* with “Three cheers for gentrification”, contending that it “rebalances” concentrated poverty while offering the improved tax-base, “rub-off work ethic” and political power of the middle class: “It is the rising tide that lifts all boats” (Duany, 2001, p. 37). Georgetown Law Professor J. Peter Byrne does not shout quite as loudly in his “Two cheers for gentrification”, but he still contends that “gentrification is good on balance for the poor and ethnic minorities” (Byrne, 2003, p. 406). In an era of aggressive, state-driven privatised deregulation marked by intense rivalry among cities trying to gentrify themselves (Smith, 2002), the defiant cries on behalf of the poor, hated gentrifiers are at once ironic, amusing and politically effective. Moreover, gentrification proponents have carefully selected from the evidence provided by Freeman, Braconi and Vigdor—ignoring their careful qualifications and warnings. Freeman and Braconi (2004, p. 51) caution that “Even though gentrification may provide benefits to disadvantaged populations, it may also create adverse effects that public policies should seek to mitigate”; and Vigdor (2002, p. 171) is careful to

emphasise the enormous difficulties in answering “the question of whether gentrification harms the poor”. Yet these caveats and nuances are usually lost in the press coverage of the research: “Gentrification: a boost for everyone” (Hampson, 2005).

Underestimating displacement involves high costs for theoretical understanding of neighbourhood change and even higher tolls for poor and working-class residents and the tattered policies in place to give them some protection. Those who are forced to leave gentrifying neighbourhoods are torn from rich local social networks of information and cooperation (the ‘social capital’ much beloved by policy-makers); they are thrown into an ever more competitive housing market shaped by increasingly difficult trade-offs between affordability, overcrowding and commuting accessibility to jobs and services. All of the pressures of gentrification are deeply enmeshed with broader inequalities of class, race and ethnicity, and gender (Atkinson, 2002; Curran, 2004; Rose, 1984; Smith, 1996).

We found that between 8300 and 11 600 households per year were displaced in New York City between 1989 and 2002, slightly lower than the total number identified in earlier estimates (Freeman and Braconi 2002a). However, our displacement rates are slightly higher, reaching between 6.6 and 9.9 per cent of all local moves among renter households. We expect that both figures underestimate actual displacement, perhaps substantially, because the NYCHVS does not include displaced households that left New York City, doubled up with other households, became homeless, or entered the shelter system—all of which were identified as widespread practices in the field interviews. The dataset also misses households displaced by earlier rounds of gentrification and those that will not gain access to the now-gentrified neighbourhoods in the future.

We concur with Freeman and Braconi’s finding that not all low-income residents are displaced by gentrification. The historically specific web of housing supports that developed in New York City from the 1920s to



the 1970s has played a key role in mediating the effects of current rounds of gentrification. If they were not already displaced in the massive housing market changes of the 1970s and 1980s, some low-income renters in gentrifying neighbourhoods of New York are protected, to a greater degree than residents in many other cities, from some of the direct displacement pressures that have accelerated in recent years. The pressures on land markets in these global cities are particularly intense. But for those cities where previous generations saw the creation of a few regulatory mechanisms, the current environment is mixed, precarious and set for dramatic change. As affordable housing protections are dismantled in the current wave of neo-liberal policy-making, we are likely to see the end-game of gentrification as the last remaining barriers to complete neighbourhood transformation are torn down.

For decades, New York has sought to attract new middle-class residents and federal priorities echo these strategies. But the recent gentrification wave has fundamentally altered the development context in many formerly disinvested neighbourhoods. Focused on market-based solutions, the neo-liberal state and even some community-based developers, have neglected the housing needs of poorer residents. Inclusionary zoning, housing preservation and new construction can complement the market rate and high-end affordable housing development and rehabilitation well underway in these neighbourhoods. Community organisations, residents and organisers are strenuously working to ensure that affordable housing exists, but the urgency of the need has yet to reach policy-makers at city, state or federal levels.

US cities are at a critical turning-point and New York City, as a global city with a long history of gentrification, is facing these issues earlier than many other places. It is an instructive case that suggests the benefits of housing protections for low-income residents in gentrifying communities and the potential pitfalls of weakening these supports. The

goal of home-ownership and revitalisation of mixed income/mixed race neighbourhoods will not produce the beneficial changes policy-makers seek if protections for low-income residents are not also included. Community actors and policy-makers have argued that gentrification is necessary to revitalise low-income neighbourhoods. But the context for redevelopment has changed. Gentrification is not a minor phenomenon that affects a few communities; it is evidence of vast urban restructuring. The recent wave of gentrification washed through the city with a speed and a force that few, if any, predicted. Low-income residents who manage to resist displacement may enjoy a few benefits from the changes brought by gentrification, but these bittersweet fruits are quickly rotting as the supports for low-income renters are steadily dismantled.

## Notes

1. Many of the papers presented at the September 2002 conference were published in the November 2003 issue of *Urban Studies*, while several others appear in *The New Urban Colonialism* (Atkinson and Bridge, 2005).
2. The NYCHVS uses sub-borough areas, which are similar to Community Districts. Sub-borough areas are quite large and include a number of neighbourhoods with different political cultures, physical and locational characteristics and populations.
3. Hartman and Robinson (2003, p. 467) cite evidence on the higher mobility rates of lower-income renters.
4. Freeman and Braconi's displacement estimates are presented in a table in their article in *The Urban Prospect* (2002a, p. 2), and their definitions are described at length in a longer, preliminary version of their 2003 *JAPA* article that was kindly provided by Lance Freeman (Freeman and Braconi, 2002b). They exclude evictions from the definition of displacement because, they suggest, the processes associated with evictions are theoretically and practically distinct from the processes driving gentrification-induced displacement. In particular, Freeman and Braconi note that the vast majority of eviction notices are filed against tenants who fail to pay rent and that

most of these court filings do not result in actual evictions:

We have not included evictions in our estimate of displacement because both anecdote and logic suggest that non-payment evictions are more often due to household financial crises than to incremental rent increases, even if relatively large. Short of an abrupt shock to income or to non-housing household expenditures, a rational renter would not remain in an unaffordable dwelling unit until the point where a non-payment eviction order is executed (Freeman and Braconi, 2002a, pp. 10–11).

To maintain comparability, our analysis follows Freeman and Braconi in excluding evictions from the displacement estimates; yet it is crucial to recognise the substantial implications of this decision. Freeman and Braconi cite a total of 23 830 evictions in 1999—compared with a total estimate of 37 766 movers who were displaced over a 4-year period (1996–99) according to their more limited set of criteria. As Hartman and Robinson (2003, p. 463) emphasise, tenants threatened with eviction face a long and complicated legal process and they “may move out and give up the battle at many different stages”. As a consequence, even the few official data sources on evictions that do exist may understate the full extent of forced evictions. This is particularly important in cases where renters are facing a variety of individual and household difficulties at the time when a landlord initiates the action, either through friendly pressures, various forms of harassment or formal legal process. Renters may or may not cite ‘eviction’ as the single most important reason for their previous move when asked in the NYCHVS if, for example, they were subtly pressured by a landlord at the time that they were going through a divorce and having increasing difficulty paying a rent that had increased steadily over the previous few years.

5. We used a three-year time window for 1991 and 1993, and a four-year window in the case of the other surveys. This maximises coverage of householders who moved between 1989 and 2002, but it does introduce the possibility of some double-counting: our dataset might, for instance, include a renter who moved into a unit in 1993 and responded to both the 1993 and 1996 NYCHVS questionnaires. Our dataset,

which combines the multiple waves of the NYCHVS, cannot therefore be used to obtain unbiased estimates of overall mobility rates. But there is no reason for any systematic relationship between this possible double-counting and the incidence of displacement, so our analysis should not be affected.

6. The Census Bureau has reweighted the microdata files when new information from the decennial Census counts have become available. The Bureau produced a matched version of the 1991, 1993, 1996 and 1999 files permitting comparable analyses of certain trends in the existing housing stock for these years. But the 2002 survey (as well as the 2005 survey now underway) is weighted according to the 2000 Census count and thus cannot be taken as strictly comparable with the earlier sample factors.
7. The clearest illustrations in the US include welfare reform, in which Ronald Reagan’s apocryphal (and ideologically powerful) story about a ‘welfare queen’ driving a Cadillac animated Congressional debates in the 1980s and resurfaced in social-scientific guise in the underclass literatures of the 1990s; the transformation of public housing, in which underfunding and severe deterioration of a small subset of a small fraction of the nation’s small stock of affordable government-owned housing was used to justify sweeping changes emphasising deconcentration and market-oriented vouchers for housing ‘choice’; and the selective use of measures of extremely rare (but high-impact) events, most notably violent crime and terrorism, to justify increased expenditures on policing, surveillance and ‘security’—and to legitimate ever deeper cuts in investments for social welfare.
8. Consider the hypothetical case of two young people living separately with their families in Hell’s Kitchen in the late 1990s, as the area began to witness significant reinvestment and rental inflation. If these people wish to move into a new place together, they may not even think of looking nearby in their suddenly popular, suddenly unaffordable neighbourhood. If they manage to find a run-down apartment on a subway line in Bushwick and they are asked in the NYCHVS why they left their previous residence, the one designated as the ‘householder’ will almost certainly choose ‘newly married’ or ‘wanted to establish separate household’. But as we will see from the qualitative results later in this study, these partners were unable to establish their new

household in their gentrifying neighbourhood and would certainly have strong feelings about gentrification and displacement, even if they did not meet the strict criteria used here.

9. It is also important to re-emphasise that displaced households 'disappear' from the data if they double up or leave the city. If gentrification-induced displacement follows the pattern of eviction, this bias is likely to be substantial. The number of NYCHVS renter households reporting eviction from their prior residence is only about a tenth of the figure of actual evictions reported by the Rent Guidelines Board (2000, p. 56).
10. This stratification is vulnerable to the possibility of double-counting described in note 5 and so the number of households is not shown. Since there is no reason to expect this replication to be more or less common among displacees, the *rates* should be immune to bias.
11. We considered alternative modelling approaches (such as probit analysis), and ultimately settled on the logit framework as the most intuitive and appropriate. Logistic regression makes the assumption that the underlying response variable is qualitative (directly relevant for our needs), while probit analysis assumes an underlying quantitative response corresponding to the cumulative normal distribution function (Pampel, 2000). Both approaches yield similar results in terms of coefficient direction and significance, but logit results are more readily interpreted.
12. This means that our low-income, non-poverty categories are comprised of students, single-person households and others with limited resources who would nevertheless not be classified as poor by the Census Bureau.
13. For example, the reference category for age is persons over age 65; for education, less than a high school diploma or G.E.D.; and for employment status, did not work last week. For the rent regulation variables, the reference category is private, unregulated market rentals: public housing and HUD-regulated units include those owned and managed by the New York City Housing Authority and units in buildings receiving subsidies that require HUD to regulate rents in the building. The HUD lists used by Census Bureau staff to code the NYCHVS are organised by building rather than housing unit, so they do not identify units where renters receive Section 8 certificates or vouchers unless the entire building is federally subsidised; see US Bureau of the Census, 1999). For the race and ethnicity of the householder, those choosing multiple responses on the 2002 survey constitute only 0.65 per cent of the weighted population estimate of renters moving since the previous survey; these householders are included in the category for 'other' race.
14. The *weighting* procedure is necessary to adjust for the fact that some populations are represented better than others in the survey sample; the *normalisation* procedure is necessary because simply weighting the regression will artificially inflate the statistical significance of coefficient estimates.
15. The unexpected racial and ethnic contrasts in displacement, coupled with the lack of consistent income variations, present some intriguing possibilities. A generation of immigration and suburbanisation has transformed many facets of New York City's housing and neighbourhoods, and thus it is entirely possible that we must reconsider longstanding assumptions regarding the disparate impacts of displacement. Yet definitive conclusions are problematic because of the invisibility of displaced renters who leave the city: all of the model coefficients for race/ethnicity and income are subject to bias if those leaving the city are different from displacees who manage to find alternative apartments in New York. Obviously, the NYCHVS cannot be used to test for or control these biases. But there is a general consensus that out-migration cannot be ignored: the city is a key national source for retirement migrants (who tend to be middle- or higher-income Whites) and the long-running 'balkanisation' debate implies that immigration accelerates the departure of unskilled native-born workers (Frey, 1996). The precise mixture of these class and racial/ethnic variations remains unclear; but Ley's (2002) recent analysis of Canadian and Australian evidence points to the importance of housing market pressures more than job competition and there are other signs corroborating the notion that some displacees may be leaving the city. Stack's (1996) ethnographic work reveals that strengthened migration streams of African Americans out of northern industrial cities have been important factors in a number of poor rural counties in the South. In an analysis of New York City in the 1980s, Hempstead (2001, 2002) found little evidence that immigration-induced labour market competition drove unskilled native-born workers out of New York; but she did find that native-born Blacks and Whites are

equally likely to move out of the metropolitan area—a stark contrast to the predominance of Whites in intracity and city-to-suburb moves (Hempstead, 2001). And in a rare examination of the relationship between migration and changes in household structure, Salvo *et al.* (1990) drew on PUMS data for the 1.5 million persons in households who lived outside New York City in 1980 and who had at least one household member who migrated from the city since 1975; among their findings were distinctive patterns among native-born African Americans and Puerto-Ricans “indicative of return migration into existing married-couple households” (Salvo *et al.*, 1990, p. 316).

16. The standardised coefficients are calculated as

$$100 \times [(e^{\beta_i \sigma_i}) - 1]$$

where,  $\beta_i$  is the coefficient estimate for predictor variable  $i$ ;  $\sigma_i$  is the standard deviation of variable  $i$ , and  $e$  is the base of the natural logs.

17. These findings are not conclusive and must be regarded with caution because of changes in the Census Bureau’s weighting procedures for different HVS samples. Pooling these samples and coding dummies for the years introduces a risk that the coefficient will measure two things that cannot be separated: the phenomenon of interest (in this case, systemic changes over time); and, changes in the sample design and weighting schemes between different HVS panels. This risk depends on whether changes in the sample frame had different effects on the coverage of displacees versus other renters. Stratifying the models for separate HVS panels, as done here, eliminates this risk entirely and thus provides a safer way to evaluate changes over time.
18. Landlords can file personal holdover evictions to occupy rent-stabilised units for their own use or for use by a family member.

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