



The march of modern fascism. A comparison of social dominance orientation and authoritarianism

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Abstract

In the present study, we tried to identify variables that are differently related to social dominance orientation (SDO) and authoritarianism. A strong positive relationship between SDO and authoritarianism was found and both variables showed strong positive correlations with racism. Nevertheless, results support the idea that SDO and authoritarianism refer to different kinds of dispositional prejudice. Authoritarianism, when statistically corrected for SDO, was negatively associated with level of education, moral competence, relativism, and the values hedonism, stimulation and self-direction, whereas positive correlations with age, cultural conservatism, orthodoxy, and the values tradition, conformity and security were registered. In contrast, SDO, when corrected for authoritarianism, was negatively associated with age, second naïveté and the values universalism, benevolence and tradition, whereas economic conservatism, external critique, and the values power, achievement, hedonism and stimulation showed positive relationships. It is argued that SDO represents a more modern kind of prejudice than authoritarianism. © 2002 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.

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1. Introduction

Social dominance orientation (SDO) is considered to be “a general attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers such relations to be equal, versus hierarchical” (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994, p. 742). SDO thus reflects an individual’s tendency to classify social groups along a superiority–inferiority dimension and to

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favour policies that maintain social inequality. Researchers reported strong correlations between SDO and general conservative beliefs, such as ethnic prejudice, political and economic conservatism, and right-wing political party preferences (e.g. Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996; Pratto, Stallworth, & Sidanius, 1997). Also strong correlations between SDO and other variables such as nationalism, patriotism, rejection of noblesse oblige, support of punitive policies and military programs were reported (Pratto, Stallworth, & Conway-Lanz, 1998; Sidanius & Liu, 1992; Sidanius, Liu, Shaw, & Pratto, 1994; for a recent overview, Pratto, 1999).

Previous research has also reported that conservative beliefs, right-wing political preferences, and positive opinions about punitive policies and military programs are similarly related to authoritarianism (e.g. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer, 1996; Peterson, Doty, & Winter, 1993). However, only recently, researchers developed an interest in contrasting authoritarianism with SDO. McFarland (1998, 1999; McFarland & Adelson, 1996) and Altemeyer (1998) conducted a series of studies in which the predictive validity of both measures was compared. Authoritarianism and SDO were found to independently predict conservative beliefs and prejudice. McFarland (1998, 1999; McFarland & Adelson, 1996), Altemeyer (1998) and other authors (e.g. Lippa & Arad, 1999; Pratto et al., 1994; Whitley, 1999) reported a modest relationship between authoritarianism and SDO in American samples. In contrast, Van Hiel and Mervielde (in press) reported substantial correlations ($r_s > 0.40$) between these two constructs in a Western European sample.

The modest correlations generally observed in North American samples between authoritarianism and SDO has been interpreted as evidence of “two kinds of dispositional prejudice”. Authoritarianism-based prejudice is supposed to stem from an acceptance of statements made by respected authority figures that denigrate out-groups, and can be considered as “entailing real repugnance toward targets who are viewed as violating in-group norms and standards” (Lippa & Arad, 1999, p. 488). SDO-based prejudice, on the other hand, is supposed to stem from a need to justify the maintenance of societal status inequalities from which one benefits. It serves an instrumental function and can be considered as “a route to superiority and power in a ‘dog eat dog’ world” (Lippa & Arad, 1999, p. 488). Shortly, authoritarianism can be considered as an *intragroup* phenomenon, whereas SDO is an *intergroup* phenomenon (Altemeyer, 1998; Pratto et al., 1994; Whitley, 1999).

But, SDO and authoritarianism are expected to show some similarities too. That is, the SDO concept has actually been based on authoritarianism and related constructs. First, preferences for hierarchy and the generalization of the dimension superiority–inferiority have always been considered a component of authoritarianism (Adorno et al., 1950; Maslow, 1943). Second, personality characteristics such as coldness, disagreeableness, unsensitiveness, and realism that have been typically used to describe social dominators, clearly refer to Eysenck’s (1954, 1999; Eysenck & Coulter, 1972) toughmindedness dimension and have been repeatedly found to correlate positively with conservative ideology (Wilson, 1973).

The first aim of the present study was to replicate the strong correlations between authoritarianism, SDO, and racism reported by Van Hiel and Mervielde (in press). This result would substantiate their claim that both constructs are far from unrelated in Western Europe. Second, the present study was designed to identify variables that are differently related to both constructs in order to come to a better understanding of the underlying dynamics of these constructs. Among other things, Van Hiel and Mervielde (in press) suggested that SDO and authoritarianism might

be differently related to Schwartz' (1992) value orientations (see also McFarland, 1998, 1999; McFarland & Adelson, 1996), and that religionism might be typical of authoritarianism but not of SDO (see also, Altemeyer, 1998). A third aim was to elaborate the findings of Van Hiel and Mervielde (2001) concerning analogous relationships between SDO and authoritarianism on the one hand and conservatism on the other hand. Here, a distinction between cultural and economic conservatism will be made (see Middendorp, 1978). Finally, we also thought that it might be interesting to examine how SDO and authoritarianism relate to age, level of education and moral competence.

1.1. SDO, authoritarianism and values

Schwartz (1992) developed a comprehensive theory about the content and structure of the value domain, which received support in over 40 countries (Schwartz & Sagiv, 1995). Schwartz (1992) defines a value as a transsituational goal that varies in importance as a guiding principle in one's life. On the basis of theoretical analyses and extensive empirical research, he identified 10 different value types: Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, Self-Direction, Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, and Security (Table 1). According to Schwartz (1992), these value types can be arranged into a two-dimensional circular circumplex structure on the basis of the mutual compatibilities and conflicts between their respective motivational goals (Fig. 1).

Table 1

Definitions of Motivational types of values in terms of their goals and the single values that represent them^a

Power	Social status and prestige, control or dominance over people and resources (social power, authority, wealth, preserving my public image, social recognition)
Achievement	Personal success through demonstrating competence according to social standards (successful, capable, ambitious, influential, intelligent)
Hedonism	Pleasure and sensuous gratification for oneself (pleasure, enjoying life, self-indulgence, sexuality)
Stimulation	Excitement, novelty and challenge in life (daring, a varied life, an exciting life)
Self-Direction	Independent thought and action-choosing, creating, exploring (freedom, independent, choosing own goals, creativity, curious, self-respect)
Universalism	Understanding, appreciation, tolerance and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature (broad-minded, social justice, equality, a world at peace, a world of beauty, unity with nature, protecting the environment, wisdom)
Benevolence	Preservation and enhancement of the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact (helpful, honest, forgiving, loyal, responsible, true friendship, mature love)
Tradition	Respect, commitment and acceptance of the customs and ideas traditional culture or religion provide (humble, devout, respect for tradition, moderate, detachment, accepting my portion in life)
Conformity	Restraint of actions, inclinations, and impulses likely to upset or harm others and violate social expectations or norms (obedient, politeness, honoring parents and elders, self-discipline)
Security	Safety, harmony and stability of society, of relationships and of self (national security, social order, sense of belonging, family security, clean, reciprocation of favors, healthy)

^a From Value priorities and religiosity in four western religions, by S. H. Schwartz and S. Huisman, 1995, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, June, p. 90. Copyright 1995 by the American Sociological Association. Adapted with permission.

Value types that share compatible goals are positively related and emerge adjacent to one another in the two-dimensional representation. Value types that are characterized by conflicting goals are negatively related and are situated opposite to one another. In this way, the value structure can be regarded as composed of four higher order value types that form two bipolar dimensions: openness to change vs. conservation and self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence (Fig. 1).

McFarland (1998, 1999; McFarland & Adelson, 1996; total $n=1082$) reported meaningful differential correlations between SDO and authoritarianism on the one hand and some of Schwartz' (1992) value types on the other hand. In particular, McFarland reported positive relationships between authoritarianism and tradition (mean $r=0.41$), conformity (mean $r=0.30$) and security (mean $r=0.26$), and negative relationships between authoritarianism and power ($r=-0.21$, $n=186$), self-direction (mean $r=-0.21$) and universalism (in some samples only) (mean $r=-0.09$). SDO was not significantly related to tradition (mean $r=-0.06$), conformity (mean $r=-0.09$), security (mean $r=0.03$) and self-direction (mean $r=-0.08$), but showed a somewhat




Fig. 1. Theoretical model of relations between types of values. From Value priorities and religiosity in four western religions, by S. H. Schwartz and S. Huisman, 1995, *Social Psychology Quarterly*, June, p. 91. Copyright 1995 by the American Sociological Association. Adapted with permission.

stronger negative relation with universalism (mean $r = -0.29$), and a positive relation with power ($r = 0.37$, $n = 186$). The value types achievement, hedonism, stimulation and benevolence were not administered by McFarland and colleagues. Therefore, it might be interesting to see if we can replicate and elaborate their findings. We expect authoritarianism to show a slightly negative relationship with the pure self-enhancement value types (power and achievement), a clearly negative relationship with hedonism and the pure openness to change value types (stimulation and self-direction), a slightly negative relationship with the self-transcendence value types (universalism and benevolence), and a clearly positive relationship with the conservation value types (tradition, conformity and security). We expect SDO to show a positive relationship with the pure self-enhancement value types, no relationship with the pure openness to change value types and hedonism, a negative relationship with the self-transcendence value types, and no relationship with the conservation value types.

1.2. SDO, authoritarianism and religiosity

It has repeatedly been asserted that religionism and fundamentalism are typical of ethnocentrism (Wilson & Bagley, 1973) and authoritarianism (Altemeyer, 1996). Altemeyer (1998) and Van Hiel and Mervielde (2001) have argued that religionism is typical of authoritarians, but not of social dominators. This hypothesis is based on the observation that, in some countries, authoritarians prefer traditionalist, religious parties to fascist parties. Moreover, Altemeyer (1998) reported religious fundamentalism to relate positively to authoritarianism (mean $r = 0.74$, $n = 890$), but not to SDO (mean $r = 0.06$). He also reported that authoritarianism is related to “Emphasis placed on religion while growing up” ($r = 0.58$, $n = 116$), “Acceptation of teaching of the home religion” ($r = 0.52$, $n = 117$) and church attendance (mean $r = 0.39$, $n = 1160$), whereas SDO is not ($r = -0.17$, $r = -0.15$ and $r = -0.11$ respectively). Finally, Saucier (2000) reported a positive correlation between self-descriptive terms referring to religiousness and authoritarianism ($r = 0.74$, $n = 303$), but not to SDO ($r = 0.05$). In the present investigation we can proceed one step further, since recent developments in the conceptualization and the measurement of religious attitudes provide a potentially more interesting perspective to investigate the relationship between SDO, authoritarianism and religiosity.

According to Wulff (1991, pp. 633–641), all possible approaches to religion can be summarized in a two-dimensional diagram (Fig. 2). The vertical axis specifies whether the objects of religious interest are granted participation in a transcendent reality (inclusion vs. exclusion of transcendence). The horizontal axis indicates whether the expressions of religion are interpreted literally or symbolically (literal vs. symbolic). These two dimensions define four basic attitudes toward religion. The upper left quadrant represents literal affirmation of the religious realm, a position most clearly embodied by religious fundamentalism. The lower left quadrant represents a disaffirmation of the religious realm, in which the possibility is lost out of sight that this realm could have a symbolic meaning. The lower right quadrant represents a disaffirmation of the religious realm in which a privileged perspective on the true but hidden mundane meaning of religion’s myths and rituals is claimed. The upper right quadrant represents an affirmation, in which one tries to encompass and go beyond all possible reductive interpretations in order to find religion’s symbolical message. In this respect, Wulff (1991, pp. 634–635) speaks of a second naiveté. Building further on this, Hutsebaut and colleagues (Duriez, Hutsebaut, & Fontaine, 2000;

Hutsebaut, 1996) drew up a questionnaire — the Post-Critical Belief scale — that captures four different approaches to Roman Catholic religion: Orthodoxy, External Critique, Relativism and Second Naiveté. According to Duriez et al. (2000), this questionnaire is designed for usage in a context in which subjects are either Roman Catholics or at least have fair knowledge of Roman Catholic doctrines and customs. Multi-dimensional scaling analyses revealed that these approaches map onto Wulff’s scheme (Duriez et al., 2000; Fontaine, Luyten, & Corveleyn, 2000; Luyten, Corveleyn, & Fontaine, 1998). Orthodoxy is located in the upper left quadrant, External Critique is located in the lower left quadrant, Relativism is located in the lower right quadrant, and Second Naiveté is located in the upper right quadrant (Fig. 2).




Fig. 2. Integration of Hutsebaut’s concepts in Wulff’s theoretical model.

1.3. SDO, authoritarianism, cultural conservatism and economic conservatism

Researchers often assumed that both political parties and political attitudes can be positioned on a single left–right (progressive–conservative) dimension (e.g. Lipset, 1960; McClosky, 1958). However, others have argued that the meaning of this dimension varies across nations and over time, and that a single dimension is often insufficient to represent all relevant political polarities in a given society (e.g. Inglehart, 1990; Leeson & Heaven, 1999; Rokeach, 1973). Middendorp (1978) distinguished between a cultural conservatism vs. progressivism dimension considering attitudes in favour of social change and individual rights and freedom, and an economic conservatism vs. progressivism dimension considering the degree of economic equality among people. We expected that economic and cultural conservatism would be differently related to SDO and authoritarianism. In the light of the aforementioned characteristics of both authoritarianism and SDO, we expected that authoritarianism would be positively related to cultural conservatism, whereas SDO would show a clearly positive relation to economic conservatism.

1.4. SDO, authoritarianism, age, level of education and moral competence

According to Lind (2000b), moral competence would have a desirable outcome on moral–democratic competencies. In particular, a high moral competence refers to the internal consistency of a subject’s moral reasoning, even when under pressure to acquiesce to non-moral factors like majority’s opinion, prejudice, abusive authorities, etc. (Lind, 2000a, 2000b). Consequently, we expected that especially authoritarianism would be negatively related to moral competence.

McFarland and colleagues have noted that, whereas many studies do report a negative relationship between authoritarianism and level of education (as well as intelligence and cognitive complexity; McFarland, 1998, 1999), SDO appears to be unrelated to levels of education (McFarland & Adelson, 1996) as well as to cognitive complexity and intelligence (McFarland, 1998, 1999; McFarland & Adelson, 1996). Age too would be negatively related to authoritarianism, but unrelated to SDO (McFarland & Adelson, 1996).

2. Method

2.1. Participants

A total of 350 questionnaires were distributed by undergraduate students who asked their neighbours to participate, in order to obtain a heterogeneous sample. Refusal rates were low (13%). In total we received 303 completed questionnaires. All of these were checked for three kinds of response biases: acquiescence (yeah-saying), denial (no-saying) and avoidance (sticking to the neutral point). No participants needed to be excluded on any of these grounds. All participants were Flemish-speaking and of Belgian nationality. All subjects were either Roman Catholics or at least had fair knowledge of Roman Catholic doctrines and customs. The mean age was 45.08 years (S.D. = 12.52); the sample consisted of 106 (35%) males and 197 (65%) females. Of these participants, 65 (21%) attended university, 122 (40%) obtained a higher education diploma,

94 (31%) obtained a secondary education diploma, and five (2%) obtained a primary school diploma only. The 17 (6%) remaining subjects failed to give an answer to this question.

2.2. Measures

Participants completed Dutch versions of the SDO-scale (Van Hiel & Mervielde, in press; 14 items), Adorno's F-scale (Scheepers, Felling, & Peters, 1991; nine items), Altemeyer's RWA-scale (Meloan, 1991; 10 items), a racism scale (Billiet & De Witte, 1991), and a cultural and an economic conservatism scale (De Witte, 1990; both 12 items).¹ According to Billiet and De Witte (1991), the racism scale is comprised of two conceptually different components: xenophobia and racism. An example of a xenophobia item is "In general, immigrants are not to be trusted". An example of a racism item is "We have to keep our race pure and fight mixture with other races". However, a scree test (Cattell, 1966) clearly pointed to one component only (cf. Duriez, 2001; Duriez & Hutsebaut, 2000; Duriez et al., 2000). The cultural conservatism scale addresses issues like upbringing, work ethic, the position of women in society, abortion, euthanasia, and premarital sex. The economic conservatism scale addresses issues such as the desirable impact of trade unions, level of government interference in economics, and income differences. The items of all these scales were to be rated on a five-point Likert scale (1 = completely opposed, 3 = neutral, 5 = completely in agreement). Estimates of internal consistency (Cronbach's Alpha) were satisfactory for SDO (0.83, $M=2.08$, S.D. = 0.60), F (0.72, $M=2.79$, S.D. = 0.67), RWA (0.74, $M=3.13$, S.D. = 0.62), racism (0.83, $M=1.98$, S.D. = 0.64), cultural conservatism (0.75, $M=2.87$, S.D. = 0.63) and economic conservatism (0.87, $M=2.45$, S.D. = 0.72).

The Dutch translation of Schwartz' value survey consists of 54 values (Schwartz, 1992). Each value was rated in terms of its importance as a guideline in one's life on a nine-point scale, ranging from "opposed to my principles" (-1) over "not important" (0) to "of supreme importance" (7). Estimates of internal consistency (Cronbach's Alpha) were 0.60 for Power ($M=1.99$, S.D. = 0.97), 0.64 for Achievement ($M=3.02$, S.D. = 1.05), 0.74 for Hedonism ($M=2.79$, S.D. = 1.39), 0.71 for Stimulation ($M=1.62$, S.D. = 1.40), 0.70 for Self-Direction ($M=3.78$, S.D. = 1.04), 0.74 for Universalism ($M=4.64$, S.D. = 0.92), 0.60 for Benevolence ($M=5.30$, S.D. = 0.70), 0.65 for Tradition ($M=3.74$, S.D. = 1.06), 0.64 for Conformity ($M=4.36$, S.D. = 1.04), and 0.69 for Security ($M=3.99$, S.D. = 0.97). As in Schwartz and Huisman (1995), a correction of the mean score for each participant was done in order to correct for systematic response sets.

Participants also completed the Post-Critical Belief scale (Duriez et al., 2000; 33 items). Eight items refer to Orthodoxy (e.g. "Bible stories should be taken literally, as they are written"), nine refer to External Critique (e.g. "Faith is a safety net for human fears"), nine refer to Relativism (e.g. "Profane as well as religious ideology give valuable answers to important vital questions"), and seven refer to Second Naiveté (e.g. "Despite the injustices Christianity has caused people, the message of Christ is still valuable"). All items are scored on a seven-point Likert scale (1 = completely

¹ Although Altemeyer (1981, 1988) has tried to show that the RWA scale is psychometrically superior to the F scale, Meloan, Van der Linden and De Witte (1996) and Van Hiel and Mervielde (in press), have shown that both scales are reliable and equally effective in predicting political party preferences, racism, conservatism and various other attitudes. Moreover, notwithstanding the high correlation between both scales ($r=0.65$), the F-scale has some unique aspects. For example, topics like superstition, harshness, projectivity, sexual preoccupation and destructiveness are not included in the RWA scale. Hence, both scales were included in this study.

opposed, 4 = neutral, 7 = completely in agreement). Seven items (2 for External Critique, 1 for Relativism and 4 for Second Naiveté) were excluded from further analysis, because they lowered the internal consistency. Estimates of internal consistency (Cronbach's Alpha) were 0.72 for Orthodoxy ($M = 2.86$, $S.D. = 1.10$), 0.72 for External Critique ($M = 2.13$, $S.D. = 0.93$), 0.65 for Relativism ($M = 4.95$, $S.D. = 1.03$), and 0.68 for Second Naiveté ($M = 5.22$, $S.D. = 0.86$).

The Dutch translation of Lind's Moral Judgment Test (Lind, 1998) was included to provide an index of moral competence. Since this test is used to examine the internal consistency of a subject's moral reasoning, it is obviously useless to check the validity of the test by relying on classical test theory (cf. Rest, 1997). However, this test was recently validated by Duriez and De Marez (2000), according to the prescriptions of Lind (1998), and can be regarded as a fully fledged translation of the original test.

3. Results

In accordance with Van Hiel and Mervielde (in press), we found quite a strong positive correlation between SDO and the authoritarianism scales ($r = 0.37$ and 0.35 , $P_s < 0.0001$, for RWA and

Table 2

Correlations between SDO and authoritarianism on the one hand and racism, value types, religiosity dimensions, cultural and economic conservatism, and moral competence on the other hand^a

	SDO	RWA-scale	F-scale
Racism	0.52*	0.57*	0.52*
Power	0.25*	0.08	0.06
Achievement	0.21**	-0.04	-0.01
Hedonism	0.18**	-0.17**	-0.14***
Stimulation	0.06	-0.26*	-0.13***
Self-Direction	0.04	-0.33*	-0.18**
Universalism	-0.46*	-0.20**	-0.21**
Benevolence	-0.28*	-0.13***	-0.19**
Tradition	-0.13***	0.18**	0.15***
Conformity	0.20**	0.49*	0.39*
Security	0.24*	0.44*	0.31*
Orthodoxy	0.16**	0.43*	0.49*
External Critique	0.24*	0.02	0.12***
Relativism	-0.08	-0.34*	-0.29*
Second Naiveté	-0.27*	-0.01	-0.08
Cultural Conservatism	0.26*	0.61*	0.59*
Economic Conservatism	0.38*	0.13***	0.01
Moral Competence	-0.13***	-0.32*	-0.31*
Level of Education	0.02	-0.24*	-0.23*
Age	-0.13***	0.24*	0.34*

^a These correlations are corrected for social desirability. For this purpose, a 10-item version of the Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) was administered.

* $P < 0.0001$.

** $P < 0.01$.

*** $P < 0.05$.

the F-scale, respectively). RWA and F were, of course, highly related ($r=0.65$, $P<0.0001$). The correlations between SDO and authoritarianism on the one hand, and racism, value types, religiosity, cultural and economic conservatism, age, level of education and moral competence on the other hand, are presented in Table 2.² Table 3 visualises partial correlations between (1) SDO corrected for authoritarianism and (2) authoritarianism corrected for SDO on the one hand, and racism, value types, religiosity, cultural and economic conservatism, age, level of education and moral competence on the other hand. When statistically corrected for authoritarianism, SDO appeared to be positively related to racism, power, achievement, hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, external critique, economic conservatism and level of education, unrelated to conformity,

Table 3

Partial correlations between the dependent variables and (1) SDO corrected for authoritarianism, and (2) authoritarianism corrected for SDO^a

	SDO	RWA-scale	F-scale
Racism	0.38*	0.46*	0.45*
Power	0.24*	-0.01	-0.03
Achievement	0.24*	-0.10	-0.09
Hedonism	0.27*	-0.26*	-0.22**
Stimulation	0.17**	-0.30*	-0.17**
Self-Direction	0.18**	-0.37*	-0.20**
Universalism	-0.42*	-0.04	-0.06
Benevolence	-0.24*	-0.02	-0.10
Tradition	-0.23*	0.25*	0.21**
Conformity	0.01	0.46*	0.34*
Security	0.09	0.40*	0.25*
Orthodoxy	-0.05	0.40*	0.47*
External Critique	0.24*	-0.08	0.04
Relativism	0.07	-0.34*	-0.28*
Second Naiveté	-0.28*	0.08	0.00
Cultural Conservatism	-0.01	0.57*	0.55*
Economic Conservatism	0.38*	-0.10	-0.02
Moral Competence	0.01	-0.29*	-0.28*
Level of Education	0.13***	-0.26*	-0.24*
Age	-0.28*	0.31*	0.39*

^a These correlations are corrected for social desirability.

* $P<0.0001$.

** $P<0.01$.

*** $P<0.05$.

² The high correlations between authoritarianism and cultural conservatism and between SDO and economic conservatism might have been caused by item overlap. We therefore recomputed these correlations after excluding the overlapping items. For this purpose, one F item, referring to the importance of working hard, and two RWA items, referring respectively to the traditional family and to child rearing practices, were removed because they showed great similarity to some of the cultural conservatism items. Two SDO items, referring to income and social equality, were also removed because they showed great similarity to some of the economic conservatism items. Excluding these items neither substantially altered the correlation between authoritarianism and cultural conservatism ($r=0.58$, $P<0.0001$) and $r=0.56$, $P<0.0001$ for RWA and F, respectively) nor between SDO and economic conservatism ($r=0.35$, $P<0.0001$).

security, orthodoxy, relativism, cultural conservatism and moral competence, and negatively related to universalism, benevolence, tradition, second naiveté and age. When statistically corrected for SDO, both RWA and F appeared to be positively related to racism, tradition, conformity, security, orthodoxy, cultural conservatism and age, unrelated to power, achievement, universalism, benevolence, external critique, second naiveté and economic conservatism, and negatively related to hedonism, stimulation, self-direction, relativism, moral competence and level of education.

In order to further investigate the relationships between the various scales in this study, a Principal Component Analyses (PCA; using a PROMAX rotation) was performed on all scales included in this study. Cattell's scree test (Cattell, 1966) pointed to a two-componential solution.³ This solution accounted for 38% of the total variance. The authoritarianism scales (RWA and F) were the scales with the highest loading on the first bipolar component (Table 4). The SDO scale was the scale with the highest loading on the second bipolar factor (Table 4). Table 4 also shows that cultural conservatism, orthodoxy, conformity, racism, security, age and tradition loaded positively (> 0.35) on the first component, whereas relativism, self-direction stimulation, level of education, moral competence and hedonism loaded negatively (< -0.35) on this component.

Table 4
Rotated two-componential pattern of the scales included in this research

	Component 1	Component 2
RWA	0.80 ^a	0.19
F	0.74 ^a	0.21
SDO	0.30	0.66 ^a
Racism	0.55 ^a	0.52 ^a
Power	-0.02	0.51 ^a
Achievement	-0.13	0.43 ^a
Hedonism	-0.35 ^a	0.53 ^a
Stimulation	-0.46 ^a	0.45 ^a
Self-Direction	-0.47 ^a	0.24
Universalism	-0.14	-0.66 ^a
Benevolence	-0.07	-0.58 ^a
Tradition	0.44 ^a	-0.58 ^a
Conformity	0.66 ^a	-0.11
Security	0.49 ^a	0.28
Orthodoxy	0.69 ^a	-0.11
External Critique	-0.08	0.53 ^a
Relativism	0.13	-0.56 ^a
Second Naiveté	0.03	-0.53 ^a
Cultural Conservatism	0.73 ^a	0.02
Economic Conservatism	0.05	0.35 ^a
Moral Competence	-0.39 ^a	-0.18
Level of Education	-0.39 ^a	0.09
Age	0.49 ^a	-0.37 ^a

^a Loading > 0.35 or loading < -0.35 .

³ The eigenvalues for the first six components, after extraction, were 4.93, 3.89, 1.70, 1.27, 1.21 and 0.98, respectively.

Hedonism, external critique, racism, power, stimulation, achievement and economic conservatism loaded positively (>0.35) on the second component, whereas universalism, benevolence, tradition, second naiveté and age loaded negatively (<-0.35) on this component. These results are largely in line with our correlational analyses, with the exception that SDO does not show substantial positive relationships with self-direction and level of education.

4. Discussion

In accordance with Van Hiel and Mervielde (in press), we found a quite strong positive relationship between SDO and authoritarianism. Also in accordance with Van Hiel and Mervielde (in press), both SDO and authoritarianism were strongly positively related to racism. Although these results suggest great similarity between SDO and authoritarianism (at least in Western Europe), various authors (e.g. Lippa & Arad, 1999; Whitley, 1999) distinguished between authoritarianism-based prejudice that stems from an uncritical acceptance of statements made by respected authority figures that denigrate out-groups, and a dominance-oriented prejudice that is more “sophisticated” in the sense that it is more thought out because it stems from a need to justify the maintenance of societal status inequalities from which one benefits. The existence of two different forms of prejudice becomes apparent when looking at the relation between SDO and authoritarianism, once racism is corrected for ($r=0.10$ for RWA and 0.09 for F, ns). Thus, prejudice is about the only thing SDO and authoritarianism have in common.⁴ This supports the need to distinguish between two forms of prejudice. Both social dominators and authoritarians are likely to be racially prejudiced, but for different reasons.

SDO is negatively related to age, once authoritarianism is corrected for, whereas authoritarianism is characterized by an opposite pattern. Moreover, SDO is unrelated to moral competence and unrelated (or only very weakly positively related) to level of education, once authoritarianism is corrected for, whereas authoritarianism shows a negative relationship with both moral competence and level of education. These results support the thesis that social dominators are not only likely to be racially prejudiced, just like authoritarians, but that their prejudice is also likely to be more sophisticated. High SDO scorers may exhibit a style of thinking which reflects a form of “modern racism” that surfaces in subtle ways when it is safe, socially acceptable, and easy to rationalize (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1997). Thus, although the underlying disease remains the same, the overt symptoms of racism may have changed. The modern fascist is no longer a closed-minded bigot, but an intellectual, who is perfectly able to express his/her world-views in such a way that they not only sound acceptable, but also attractive to the general public. This might have important consequences. The presence of racist attitudes among social dominators is likely to exert more influence on both the output of public policy and the opinions of other people than is the case with the old-fashioned prejudice of authoritarians. This influence of social dominators is not likely to be effectively countered as long as both politicians and media fail to understand that the “fascist personality” is going through quite a few changes. In a similar vein, any effort to boost people’s moral competence is indeed likely to diminish the level of authoritarianism in the population, but is unlikely to diminish the SDO level.

⁴ Statistical correction for racism did not undermine the correlation between RWA and F ($r=0.49$, $P<0.0001$).

SDO is also a more modern form of prejudice than authoritarianism because SDO is no longer related to cultural conservatism, once authoritarianism is corrected for. With regard to economic conservatism, the opposite pattern can be observed: authoritarianism is no longer related to economic conservatism, once SDO is corrected for. These results support the idea of Lippa and Arad (1999) that authoritarianism is related to the preservation of in-group norms, whereas SDO presents a route to superiority and power. It has also been noted that high SDO-scorers actually admit that they *oppose* a more even distribution of wealth (Altemeyer, 1998). These persons are therefore often in favour of privatisation, reduction in social spending, weakening of unions, lower taxes for both businesses and the rich, and less government involvement in the economy.

Finally, SDO is also a more modern form of prejudice than authoritarianism because it is highly secularized. Whereas authoritarianism corrected for SDO is highly positively related to Orthodoxy and negatively related to Relativism, SDO corrected for authoritarianism is positively related to External Critique and negatively to Second Naiveté. These findings suggest that, whereas both stances are characterized by literal thinking about the religious realm, authoritarianism is associated with Wulff's (1991, 1997) inclusion of transcendence, whereas SDO is not. This is clearly in line with Altemeyer's (1998) statement that religionism is typical of authoritarianism but not of SDO, and with Van Hiel and Mervielde (in press), who found that for authoritarians, the traditionalist Christian democrat party is a valid alternative for the rather a-religious fascist party.

The previous findings are also reflected in the value patterns associated with SDO and with authoritarianism. When corrected for SDO, it becomes apparent that authoritarianism can be understood in terms of openness to change vs. conservation. In particular, authoritarianism shows a clearly positive correlation with the conservation value types security, conformity and tradition, and a clearly negative relationship with the openness to change value types stimulation and self-direction, as well as with hedonism. SDO, corrected for authoritarianism, is characterized by a thoroughly different underlying value pattern. SDO shows a positive relationship with the openness to change value type stimulation (and according to some of our analyses also with self-direction), as well as with hedonism, and, though unrelated to the conservation value types conformity and security, it has a negative relationship with tradition. Moreover, SDO is also positively associated with the self-enhancement value types power and achievement, and negatively with the self-transcendence value types universalism and benevolence. These findings not only replicate the studies of McFarland and colleagues (1998, 1999; McFarland & Adelson, 1996) which used North American samples, but also elaborate these results. These results, again, support the idea of Lippa and Arad (1999) that authoritarianism is related to the preservation of in-group norms and tradition, whereas SDO presents a route to superiority and power.

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