

Securing Routing Protocols and Access to Nortel Routers

GSEC 1.4B Option 1

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Abstract

The need for running a routing protocol between a trusted router and an untrusted router on an untrusted network is becoming more common, so the need to secure the trusted router from inadvertently or maliciously receiving routes is required. This paper will describe how to securely receive routes via RIP, OSPF and BGP on a Nortel BayRS router from another device on a network that is not trusted. Nortel Routers have had a heavy configuration reliance on SNMP and access reliance on telnet. The importance of SNMP with BayRS and remote login reliance on telnet will be explained.

History of Nortel Networks Router Configuration

Nortel Networks routers, specifically the BayRS line of routers has historically had a heavy reliance on SNMP. The BayRS line of routers includes BLN, BCN, ASN, Passport, and AN routers. Site Manager is a Graphic User Interface that was designed to make configuring of these routers easier. Their biggest competitor, Cisco has a command line user interface for Cisco IOS. The idea was that the GUI would make configuring a router simple. A Site Manager user connects to the router using SNMP and configures the router by clicking on interfaces and protocols within the GUI to apply to the router. Site Manager sends SNMP MIB updates to the router to correspond to the information entered in the GUI.

The recommended configuration steps were to boot the router with a factory default config that has no interfaces or protocols configured. At the console prompt, run the provided batch script file (usually called INSTALL.BAT). This script runs through several questions in order to configure IP and then SNMP connectivity to the workstation that is running Site Manager. Once that connectivity is established, then the rest of the router is configured through Site Manager.

Site Manager vs. BCC

Site Manager was developed to make router configuration and management easier by using a GUI. BCC (Bay Command Console) was developed by Nortel (at the time the company name was Bay Networks) to provide their customer base with command line configuration tool. Because Cisco IOS dominates the router market, many customers demanded a similar configuration interface to

Nortel Routers. Both Site Manager and BCC will lock the router while actively configuring the router, so both cannot be used at the same time. For ease of description, this document will show router configurations using BCC only.

BCC at BayRS version 13.01 became a standard feature of the router code. There are still several configuration options that aren't available in BCC and you must use Site Manager to configure. Some of the lower end routers will have trouble running bcc because it requires 16meg total memory and 2meg free. An important feature of BCC is that the 'show config' command doesn't display default configuration options. BCC will only display settings that are not the default value for an object.

Site Manager has extensive help for each configuration option. Almost every window has a 'help' button to describe the configuration options and the affects of those options. BCC has a BCC help file, but it has little information compared to Site Manager. Several items can be configured in BCC, but are less cryptic to configure using Site Manager.

Below is an example of the SNMP section of the batch file run to configure the router. Notice at the question "Do you want to configure SNMP?"

SNMP Community Management Menu

Setting up SNMP community management is optional.

It allows you to limit control of this router to a single Site Manager workstation at a given IP address. The default is to allow any Site Manager from any workstation to manage and to configure the router.

Note: You can later configure this using Site Manager.

Do you wish to set SNMP community management? (y/n)[n]:

The default answer is no, but notice that this does not mean that SNMP configuration is being skipped. SNMP is configured as the default community Public with a community manager IP address of 0.0.0.0 (which implies any IP address can manager the router through SNMP). Below is the SNMP configured from the above Install.bat script.

```
snmp
  community label public
  access read-write
  manager address 0.0.0.0
  back
back
back
```

At this point, if you start Site Manager from the PC you would connect using the default read-write community “public” and be able to start using Configuration Manager to configure the router. This can be done to verify connectivity, but the SNMP default community of public should be removed and replaced with a unique community name for read-write access and, if needed, a second community added for read-only access for traps.

In the example below read-write community **sEcr!tRW** has one manager (192.168.169.1). This would be a Site Manager workstation and is the only address that can change a router setting via an SNMP set command. This manager will not receive any SNMP traps from the router. The read-only community **sEcr!tRO** has two managers. Manager 192.168.169.2 is configured to receive generic traps. Generic traps are defined as warm-start, cold-start, and authentication traps that are specifically configured.¹ Manager 192.168.169.3 is configured to receive specific traps. Those are the traps configured as SNMP trap entities and trap events. This example is configured to send traps on entities ip, ospf, and bgp when a fault or warning occurs for the protocol. If an ip interface goes down, a bounce in an OSPF neighbor, or a bounce in a BGP peer occurs, then a warning message is created and an SNMP trap is sent to this manager. The trap event configured below is for entity MIB with a code of ‘5’. A ‘5’ is the code for a MIB change. So any time any MIB has been changed, either by Site Manager, BCC or CLI, a trap will be sent to the community manager

```
snmp
community label sEcr!tRW
  access read-write
  manager address 192.168.169.1
  traps none
back
community label sEcr!tRO
  manager address 192.168.169.2
  traps generic
  manager address 192.168.169.3
  traps specific
back
trap-entity entity ospf slot 1
  fault-log on
  warning-log on
back
trap-entity entity bgp4 slot 1
  fault-log on
  warning-log on
back
trap-entity entity ip slot 1
  fault-log on
  warning-log on
```

¹ definition of generic comes from Site Manager ‘help’ button

back
trap-event entity mib event 5
back

SNMP Vulnerability

SNMP has been used to manage network devices since the 1980s without too much concern with the overall vulnerability of the protocol until CERT released a wide-ranging vulnerability advisory for the protocol on February 12, 2002. Titled "Multiple Vulnerabilities in Many Implementations of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)". This advisory was initiated by the Oulu University Secure Programming Group (OUSPG) that is based on results from the PROTOS project. PROTOS is the Security Testing of Protocol Implementations. OUSPG states about PROTOS, "The goal is to support proactive elimination of faults with information security implications. Awareness in these issues is promoted. Methods are developed to support customer driven evaluation and acceptance testing of implementations. Improving the security robustness of product is attempted through supporting the development process".² What the PROTOS group did was come up with an extensive testing procedure to look for vulnerabilities in multiple vendors' implementation of SNMP. OUSPG picked SNMP because the protocol a mature protocol that is widely used by numerous vendors³.

In their conclusion for the vulnerability testing of SNMP, the OUSPG states, "The initial results from the c06-snmpv1 tests indicate that implementation errors plague several SNMP products. None from the sample of twelve implementations survived the test-material. This is most alarming since SNMPv1 is widely used in critical parts of network infrastructure.

Since the test-material can discover only a fraction of potential implementation errors, it is likely that we have simply touched the tip of the iceberg. We hope that a wide adoption of this test-suite will raise the overall quality of SNMP products and will help implementers to fix also those vulnerabilities not directly addressed by it."⁴ This conclusion is a strong alert to the vulnerabilities found.

Before announcing their report to the public, OUSPG contacted the vendors, to alert them of this vulnerability and allow them time to release a code version that would correct the vulnerabilities their products have with SNMP. OUSPG then worked with CERT to send out a public advisory on the vulnerabilities found (<http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-2002-03.html>) and Nortel has it's own response to the CERT advisory as well as a Best Practice Strategy document (<http://www.nortelnetworks.com/corporate/technology/snmpv1.html>). The best

² www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/protos/ March 19,2003

³ The Simple Times www.simple-times.org December 2002

⁴ www.ee.oulu.fi/research/ouspg/protos/ March 19,2003

practice document is recommending that SNMP enabled devices not be placed in parts of the network available to the public or untrusted parties.⁵

A company called SimpleSoft developed an SNMP Vulnerability Probe in response to the CERT advisory called SimpleSleuth. A Demo can be downloaded from their site at www.snmp-test.com/SimpleSleuth.html. They'll ask for an e-mail address and other information and send you a key to your e-mail address that is based on the machine id that the demo will be loaded. When running the vulnerability tests against a Nortel BayRS router version 15.3.0.8, it passed every test. The router log was filled with the attempted denial of service attacks. A sample of these logs is listed below.

```
# 60: 04/23/2003 05:51:23.186 TRACE SLOT 1 SNMP Code: 8
Agent received unauthorized request from 10.12.132.70 in community public%$%$%$%$%$%$.
```

```
# 61: 04/23/2003 05:51:23.198 TRACE SLOT 1 SNMP Code: 8
Agent received unauthorized request from 10.12.132.70 in community public%n%s%x%n%s.
```

```
# 62: 04/23/2003 05:51:23.203 TRACE SLOT 1 SNMP Code: 8
Agent received unauthorized request from 10.12.132.70 in community %$public%$public.
```

```
# 63: 04/23/2003 05:51:23.211 TRACE SLOT 1 SNMP Code: 8
Agent received unauthorized request from 10.12.132.70 in community .%$public.%$publ.
```

```
# 64: 04/23/2003 05:51:23.221 TRACE SLOT 1 SNMP Code: 8
Agent received unauthorized request from 10.12.132.70 in community %n%s%xpublic%n%s.
```

The most common vulnerability with SNMP involves the default configuration. Vendors often use community name of PUBLIC in default configurations. This community name is well known and should be changed using the same naming convention used for user passwords. Keeping these community names would be similar to keeping root or admin enabled with no password. SNMPv1 only checks community name and manager IP to allow read-write access.

SNMPv1, SNMPv2, SNMPv3

SNMPv1 was first standardized in 1988 and has been the network management tool of choice ever since. The problem with SNMPv1 is that it had no security. No authentication of who is requesting the information and no encryption is provided. Functionally, it lacks any mechanism to have one request retrieve multiple sets of data. The only way to retrieve a table is to continually do a 'getNext' until the end of table. Nortel's Site Manager uses SNMPv1 to get and set MIB objects

There is a difference of opinion on how much security SNMPv2 provides. But, SNMPv2 was all about differences of opinions. These differences were the

⁵ <http://www.nortelnetworks.com/corporate/technology/snmpv1.html> February 12, 2002

reason that several subsets evolved (SNMPv2u, SNMPv2* and SNMPv2c). The 'getbulk' command is introduced in SNMPv2. The benefit of getbulk is one request can return a bulk of data. The downside is trying to control receiving too much data from the getbulk command.

SNMPv3 added plenty to the security of the protocol. The protocol adds authentication between the SNMP manager and the SNMP agent to guarantee the integrity of the message. The SNMP messages can be encrypted to add privacy. Agent access control policies can limit a principle to only certain portions of its data. The concept of a principle is defined by William Stallings in The Internet Protocol Journal as "an individual acting in a particular role, a set of individuals, with each acting in a particular role; an application or set of applications; or combinations thereof"⁶

Remote Logins To Nortel Routers

Nortel BayRS routers do not currently have SSH Secure Shell functionality. This functionality has been added to other Nortel product lines like the VPN aggregator Shasta BSN. Because the only remote login option is telnet, a best practice approach should be taken towards telnetting into the router. The path from the source device to the Nortel router should be a trusted network. Source devices on an untrusted network should SSH Secure Shell to a device that does have a path on a trusted network. The telnet from that device to the Nortel router can then be considered using a best practice approach.

Nortel BayRS routers have two logins that are associated with the router. 'Manager' for read/write access and 'User' for read-only access. These logins and their passwords are not part of the router config. The passwords are kept in NVRAM. The login names are part of the system bootstrap so therefore they cannot be removed. Just like root on a Unix box or administrator on an NT machine, it would be beneficial to disable these accounts. Under **access** in BCC there is a parameter **user-manager-lock** that can be enabled to lock these two login names. Certainly, care should be taken to ensure that other login methods exist before disabling these accounts.

A reliable way to configure other login access is through Radius authentication. This would allow the username and password an employee uses on the network to also be used to login to the router. The radius server controls limiting the users access to a router. Below is a sample config to enable radius authentication that is connecting to a radius server 10.12.132.9

```
radius
radius-client slot 1 address 192.168.100.1
  accounting enabled
  authentication enabled
```

⁶ http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/759/ipj_3.pdf December 1998

```
back
radius-server address 10.12.32.5
  authentication-server-type primary
  primary-server-secret sEcr!tAuth
back
back
```

Dynamic Routing Between Companies

Intercompany private VPNs (Virtual Private Networks) are on the rise. Whether it's the financial sector, healthcare, or just independent companies exchanging data, the need to share routes between companies is becoming common. The need for redundancy has increased the need for dynamic routing protocols on untrusted networks. With that need, comes the need to control what dynamic routes enter a network. In a Telecommunication Reports for KMB Video Journal, Paul A. Crotty, group president – New York and Connecticut for Verizon Communications, Inc. states “The events of Sept. 11 will prompt a number of changes in the telecom industry. You’re not going to see the concentration of assets in hubs. There will be more redundancy, more resiliency in the network”⁷.

Securing Rip on an Untrusted Network

RIP (Routing Information Protocol) is a metric routing protocol. Routes are sent in IP multicast packet 224.0.0.9 to every device on the network over a fixed interval (default 30 seconds) or when the network topology changes. Even in a switched environment, every device on the network will receive these packets. Nortel Routers configured for RIP will listen for multicast packets sent from other devices and by default, add the route into the routing table.

Referring to Diagram 1, Device A needs to send and receive Rip2 routes. Device A wants to dynamically receive routes 192.168.150.0/24, 192.168.151.64/30 and 192.168.151.128/25 from device B on an untrusted network Z. By default the Nortel Router will accept any route packet that has a source address from network Z and destination 224.0.0.9. The next hop of the route will be the source address of the packet.

⁷ www.kmbvideojournal.com/tcreport.htm June 17,2002




DIAGRAM 1

The following is the default RIP2 configuration on a Nortel Router

```

rip/192.168.1.1# info
authentication {}
authentication-type none
broadcast-timer 30
def-cost 0
default-listen disabled
default-supply disabled
frsvc disabled
holddown-timer 90
listen enabled
mode poisoned
rip1-comp disabled
state enabled
supply enabled
timeout-timer 90
triggered-updates disabled
ttl 1
version rip2

```


Unknown device C can easily add routes to Device A's routing table. Below is an example routing table of device A before RIP is enabled on Network Z. All of the RIP routes are coming from trusted network Y.

```
show ip routes                                     Apr 29, 2003
02:57:12 [GMT]
```

Network/Mask AS	Proto	Age	Slot	Cost	NextHop Address
10.10.10.0/30	RIP	2	1	7	192.168.100.2
10.60.8.248/30	RIP	38	1	2	192.168.1.250
10.100.163.0/30	RIP	2	1	7	192.168.100.2
10.133.11.101/32	RIP	2	1	7	192.168.100.2
10.133.11.103/32	RIP	2	1	7	192.168.100.2
10.133.11.105/32	RIP	2	1	7	192.168.100.2
172.1.1.0/30	RIP	2	1	7	192.168.100.2
192.168.1.0/24	Direct	336	1	0	192.168.1.1
192.168.100.0/24	Direct	336	1	0	192.168.100.1
192.168.166.0/24	RIP	2	1	7	192.168.100.2
192.168.169.0/24	RIP	2	1	7	192.168.100.2

Total Networks on Slot 1 = 11

Below is the routing table with RIP2 enabled with default the parameters. Notice that we do successfully receive the routes expected from device B (in green). Also notice that we are receiving routes from device C and extra routes we didn't want from device B (in red). The route 192.168.166.0/24 received from device C is preferred over the same route received from the trusted network because it has a lower RIP metric.

```
show ip routes                                     Apr 29, 2003
03:12:17 [GMT]
```

Network/Mask Address AS	Proto	Age	Slot	Cost	NextHop
10.10.10.0/30	RIP	16	1	7	192.168.100.2
10.12.132.0/24	RIP	1	1	2	192.168.1.2
10.60.8.248/30	RIP	22	1	2	192.168.1.250
10.100.163.0/30	RIP	16	1	7	192.168.100.2
10.133.11.101/32	RIP	16	1	7	192.168.100.2
10.133.11.103/32	RIP	16	1	7	192.168.100.2
10.133.11.105/32	RIP	16	1	7	192.168.100.2
172.1.1.0/30	RIP	16	1	7	192.168.100.2
172.16.0.0/16	RIP	1	1	2	192.168.1.2
192.0.0.0/8	RIP	1	1	2	192.168.1.2
192.168.1.0/24	Direct	1242	1	0	192.168.1.1
192.168.100.0/24	Direct	1242	1	0	192.168.100.1
192.168.100.4/30	RIP	1	1	2	192.168.1.2
192.168.150.0/24	RIP	1	1	2	192.168.1.2
192.168.151.64/30	RIP	1	1	2	192.168.1.2

192.168.151.128/25	RIP	1	1	2	192.168.1.2
192.168.166.0/24	RIP	23	1	2	192.168.1.250
192.168.169.0/24	RIP	17	1	7	192.168.100.2

Total Networks on Slot 1 = 18

Device C's action may or may not be malicious. Device C may just be misconfigured with RIP. RIP authentication can help prevent an inadvertent RIP announcement affecting your router. By configuring authentication type "simple password", the Nortel router will only accept routes with matching authentication. The following is how to configure simple password authentication.

```

rip/192.168.1.1# info
authentication sEcr!tAuth
authentication-type simple-password
broadcast-timer 30
def-cost 0
default-listen disabled
default-supply disabled
frsvc disabled
holddown-timer 90
listen enabled
mode poisoned
rip1-comp disabled
state enabled
supply enabled
timeout-timer 90
triggered-updates disabled
ttl 1
version rip2

```

This prevents the router from accepting routes from a device that doesn't match the authentication password 'sEcr!tAuth' and the Nortel router will log the following entry. The router could also be setup to send an SNMP trap on this event.

```

# 4: 04/28/2003 04:58:07.369 WARNING SLOT 1 IP Code: 74
RIP Authentication failed for source 192.168.1.250 on interface 192.168.1.1
Security enabled, received Address Family Identifier 2 Authentication Type 0

```

Rip Authentication would help in identifying misconfigured devices, but isn't much help is someone wants to maliciously send your router RIP updates. The following simple WinDump from a Windows based machine will capture RIP packets sent on a network. WinDump is the tcpdump program for the Windows platform. The authentication password is in clear text and would be simple to duplicate.

```

C:>windump dst 224.0.0.9
22:12:24.373104 IP 192.168.1.1.520 > 224.0.0.9.520: RIPv2-resp [items 3]: [password
sEcr!tAuth] {24.207.233.110/255.255.255.255}(1)[rip]
22:12:24.786147 IP VENUS.137 > 224.0.0.9.137: udp 50
22:12:26.285805 IP VENUS.137 > 224.0.0.9.137: udp 50

```

```

22:12:27.785745 IP VENUS.137 > 224.0.0.9.137: udp 50
22:12:54.372999 IP 192.168.1.1.520 > 224.0.0.9.520: RIPv2-resp [items 3]: [password
sEcr!tauth] {24.207.233.110/255.255.255.255}(1)[!rip]
22:13:24.372872 IP 192.168.1.1.520 > 224.0.0.9.520: RIPv2-resp [items 3]: [password
sEcr!tauth] {24.207.233.110/255.255.255.255}(1)[!rip]

```

Two RIP Route Accept Policies on the Nortel router will both prevent routes from device C and limit the routes from device B. The policy with the higher precedence is applied first. The first policy 'accept networks' accepts network 192.168.150.0/24 exact match and 192.168.151.0/24 range of networks from device 192.168.1.2. The accept policy 'drop-all' has an action of ignore from rip interface 192.168.1.1, so it will ignore all other RIP routes from this interface.

```

rip
  accept polname drop-all
    action ignore
    precedence 5
  match
    rip-interface address 192.168.1.1
  back
back
  modify
back
back
  accept polname accept-networks
    precedence 10
  match
    network address 192.168.150.0 mask 255.255.255.0 match exact
  back
    network address 192.168.151.0 mask 255.255.255.0 match range
  back
    rip-gateway address 192.168.1.2
  back
back
  modify
back
back
back

```

The following routing table shows that we are only receiving the routes expected from the device expected.

```

show ip routes
03:51:56 [GMT]
Apr 29, 2003

```

Network/Mask	Proto	Age	Slot	Cost	NextHop	Address
AS						
10.10.10.0/30	RIP	15	1	7	192.168.100.2	
10.100.163.0/30	RIP	15	1	7	192.168.100.2	
10.133.11.101/32	RIP	15	1	7	192.168.100.2	
10.133.11.103/32	RIP	15	1	7	192.168.100.2	
10.133.11.105/32	RIP	15	1	7	192.168.100.2	

172.1.1.0/30	RIP	15	1	7	192.168.100.2
192.168.1.0/24	Direct	3620	1	0	192.168.1.1
192.168.100.0/24	Direct	3620	1	0	192.168.100.1
192.168.150.0/24	RIP	23	1	2	192.168.1.2
192.168.151.64/30	RIP	23	1	2	192.168.1.2
192.168.151.128/25	RIP	23	1	2	192.168.1.2
192.168.166.0/24	RIP	15	1	7	192.168.100.2
192.168.169.0/24	RIP	15	1	7	192.168.100.2

Total Networks on Slot 1 = 13

Securing OSPF on an UnTrusted Network

Unlike RIP, OSPF (Open Shortest Path First) is a link state routing protocol. So, Instead of metric routing updates on regular intervals, LSA (Link State Updates) are sent as changes occur in the network. Because of this structure, networks internal to OSPF cannot be easily filtered from the database. Networks that are imported into OSPF from another routing protocol can be filtered. So, selecting OSPF as the protocol requires a little trust in the neighbor router because the OSPF database information will be shared between routers.

Nortel routers have an OSPF type as broadcast in the default configuration. This is the simplest configuration and allows easy configuration of the router. This will allow any device on the same IP network to become OSPF adjacent as long as it has the same OSPF area, hello interval, dead interval, OSPF type and a unique OSPF router ID. The default configuration is as follows:

```
ospf/192.168.1.1# info
area 0.0.0.0
authentication {}
type broadcast
priority 1
transit-delay 1
retransmission-interval 5
hello-interval 10
dead-interval 40
poll-interval 120
metric 1
mtu 1
mtu-mismatch-detect enabled
state enabled
```

Using windump, the parameters needed to configure a device can easily be disseminated by capturing OSPF hello packets.

```
C:>windump -vv dst 224.0.0.5
17:28:19.032561 IP (tos 0xc0, ttl 1, id 215, len 64) 192.168.1.1 > OSPF-ALL.MCAST.NET:
OSPFv2-hello 44: backbone E mask 255.255.255.0 int 10 pri 1 dead 40 dr 192.168.1.1
```

```

17:28:29.032503 IP (tos 0xc0, ttl 1, id 216, len 64) 192.168.1.1 > OSPF-ALL.MCAST.NET:
OSPFv2-hello 44: backbone E mask 255.255.255.0 int 10 pri 1 dead 40 dr 192.168.1.1
17:28:39.032478 IP (tos 0xc0, ttl 1, id 217, len 64) 192.168.1.1 > OSPF-ALL.MCAST.NET:
OSPFv2-hello 44: backbone E mask 255.255.255.0 int 10 pri 1 dead 40 dr 192.168.1.1
17:28:49.032438 IP (tos 0xc0, ttl 1, id 218, len 64) 192.168.1.1 > OSPF-ALL.MCAST.NET:
OSPFv2-hello 44: backbone E mask 255.255.255.0 int 10 pri 1 dead 40 dr 192.168.1.1

```

Using Diagram 1 as a reference, and having Nortel router A wanting to run OSPF with router B, we can see that device C can affect the routing table just as when RIP2 was run with no route policies. Below is the OSPF neighbor and IP routing table. In green are the routes we expect from neighbor 192.168.1.2 and in red are unwanted routes from neighbor 192.168.1.2 and 192.168.1.250.

OSPF Dynamic Neighbors

IP Interface	Router ID	Neighbor IP Address	State	Type
192.168.1.1	192.168.1.2	192.168.1.2	full	Dynamic
192.168.1.1	192.168.1.250	192.168.1.250	full	Dynamic

```

show ip routes
04:52:46 [GMT]

```

Apr 28, 2003

Network/Mask AS	Proto	Age	Slot	Cost	NextHop Address
0.0.0.0/0	OSPF	2	1	10002	192.168.1.250
10.10.10.0/30	RIP	7	1	7	192.168.100.2
10.12.132.0/24	OSPF	47	1	1	192.168.1.2
10.60.8.248/30	OSPF	52	1	10001	192.168.1.250
10.100.163.0/30	RIP	7	1	7	192.168.100.2
10.133.11.101/32	RIP	7	1	7	192.168.100.2
10.133.11.103/32	RIP	7	1	7	192.168.100.2
10.133.11.105/32	RIP	7	1	7	192.168.100.2
172.1.1.0/30	RIP	7	1	7	192.168.100.2
172.16.0.0/16	OSPF	47	1	2	192.168.1.2
192.0.0.0/8	OSPF	47	1	2	192.168.1.2
192.168.1.0/24	Direct	250663	1	0	192.168.1.1
192.168.100.0/24	Direct	5229	1	0	192.168.100.1
192.168.100.4/30	OSPF	47	1	1	192.168.1.2
192.168.150.0/24	OSPF	47	1	2	192.168.1.2
192.168.151.64/30	OSPF	47	1	2	192.168.1.2
192.168.151.128/25	OSPF	48	1	2	192.168.1.2
192.168.166.0/24	OSPF	48	1	2	192.168.1.2
192.168.169.0/24	RIP	8	1	7	192.168.100.2

Total Networks on Slot 1 = 19

To only receive routes from device B, the Nortel router will need traffic filters. The traffic filters will accept protocol 89 packets (OSPF is IP protocol 89) from device 192.168.1.2 and then drop all other IP protocol 89 packets. The below filter templates and traffic filters will accomplish this.

```

filter-template template-name ospf-neighbor
  match
    protocol 89
    source-network range 192.168.1.2
  back
back
actions
back
back
filter-template template-name no-ospf-all
  match
    protocol 89
  back
  actions
    action drop
  back
back

traffic-filter filter-name one-neighbor
  precedence 1
  template-name ospf-neighbor
back
traffic-filter filter-name no-other-neighbor
  precedence 2
  template-name no-ospf-all
back

```

To prevent device B's OSPF external routes from getting into device A's OSPF database, an OSPF accept policy to only accept 192.168.150.0/24 exact network and 192.168.151.0/24 range of networks is needed.

```

accept polname acceptexternal
  precedence 10
  match
    network address 192.168.150.0 mask 255.255.255.0 match exact
  back
  network address 192.168.151.0 mask 255.255.255.0 match range
  back
back
modify
back
back
accept polname dontaccept
  action ignore
  precedence 5
  match
    network address 0.0.0.0 mask 0.0.0.0 match range
  back
back
modify
back

```

The combination of traffic filters and OSPF route policy will produce the following routing table. Notice that an extra network 192.168.100.4/30 was not filtered from the routing table event though the route policy doesn't list this network. Device B is running OSPF on this network, so the network becomes an OSPF internal route and can't be filtered by an OSPF accept policy.

```
show ip routes
09:11:32 [GMT]
```

Apr 29, 2003

Network/Mask AS	Proto	Age	Slot	Cost	NextHop	Address
10.10.10.0/30	RIP	10	1	7	192.168.100.2	
10.100.163.0/30	RIP	10	1	7	192.168.100.2	
10.133.11.101/32	RIP	10	1	7	192.168.100.2	
10.133.11.103/32	RIP	10	1	7	192.168.100.2	
10.133.11.105/32	RIP	10	1	7	192.168.100.2	
172.1.1.0/30	RIP	10	1	7	192.168.100.2	
192.168.1.0/24	Direct	1822	1	0	192.168.1.1	
192.168.100.0/30	Direct	13390	1	0	192.168.100.1	
192.168.100.4/30	OSPF	789	1	2	192.168.1.2	
192.168.150.0/24	OSPF	789	1	3	192.168.1.2	
192.168.151.64/30	OSPF	789	1	3	192.168.1.2	
192.168.151.128/25	OSPF	789	1	3	192.168.1.2	
192.168.166.0/24	RIP	10	1	7	192.168.100.2	
192.168.169.0/24	RIP	10	1	7	192.168.100.2	

Total Networks on Slot 1 = 14

Securing BGP on an Untrusted Network

In a Nortel Router, the limitation of routes sent and received is inherent in the configuration. The configuration must explicitly state which routes will be accepted from a BGP peer and there are no known vulnerabilities to this design. All attempts to circumvent with device C were not successful. Referring to diagram 1, the Nortel Router (A), would be configured to accept the routes 192.168.150/24, 192.168.151.64/30 and 192.168.151.128/25 with the following BGP configuration and BGP accept policy.

```
bgp router-id 192.168.1.1
  igp-interaction {ospf rip}
  local-as 64621
  peer local 192.168.1.1 remote 192.168.1.2 as 64600
  back
  accept polname accept-networks
    action accept
    precedence 5
    preference 5
  match
    as asnumber 64600
  back
  network address 192.168.150.0 mask 255.255.255.0 match exact
```

```

back
network address 192.168.151.0 mask 255.255.255.0 match range
back
back
back
modify
back

```

This would produce the following routing table.

```

show ip routes
18:52:38 [GMT]

```

May 01, 2003

Network/Mask	Proto	Age	Slot	Cost	NextHop	Address
AS						
10.10.10.0/30	RIP	5	1	7	192.168.100.2	
192.168.1.0/24	Direct	92	1	0	192.168.1.1	
10.100.163.0/30	RIP	5	1	7	192.168.100.2	
10.133.11.101/32	RIP	5	1	7	192.168.100.2	
10.133.11.103/32	RIP	5	1	7	192.168.100.2	
10.133.11.105/32	RIP	5	1	7	192.168.100.2	
172.1.1.0/30	RIP	5	1	7	192.168.100.2	
192.168.100.0/30	Direct	71	1	0	192.168.100.1	
192.168.150.0/24	BGP-4	20	1	122888	192.168.1.2	
64600						
192.168.151.64/30	BGP-4	20	1	122888	192.168.1.2	
64600						
192.168.151.128/25	BGP-4	20	1	122888	192.168.1.2	
64600						
192.168.166.0/24	RIP	5	1	7	192.168.100.2	
192.168.169.0/24	RIP	5	1	7	192.168.100.2	

Total Networks on Slot 1 = 14

SUMMARY

Configuring a Nortel BayRS router to allow a Site Manager workstation to send SNMP set commands opens up the router to SNMP vulnerabilities. Nortel BayRS routers currently only have telnet (not ssh) capabilities for remote login. Using a Best Practice strategy, the path used for telnet should be a trusted path and BCC should be preferred for all dynamic configurations.

When receiving routes from an untrusted source, RIP2 or BGP give more ability to limit the vulnerability to your network, so therefore limit your risk. Because OSPF forms a link state adjacency to the other router, the database must be shared. Since RIP2 and BGP are distance vector protocols, the routes received are easier to filter. This document explained how to filter incoming routes on these three protocols.

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