

Brief Announcement: Reconfigurable Byzantine-Fault-Tolerant Atomic Memory*

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Introduction

Quorum systems are valuable tools for building highly available replicated data services. Traditionally, quorum systems assumed that servers fail benignly, i.e., by crashing or omitting some steps. Recently, Reiter and Malkhi extended quorum systems to provide data availability in the presence of arbitrary (Byzantine) faults [3].

One limitation of standard Byzantine fault tolerance techniques, quorum-based or otherwise, is that they assume a fixed set of servers that provide the data service throughout the entire system lifetime. This assumption is problematic, since in a long-lived deployment machines may have to be added and removed from the system.

This paper addresses this limitation by presenting an algorithm for a reconfigurable Byzantine quorum system. Our algorithm ensures atomicity with an asynchronous network despite Byzantine failures of servers, crash failures of clients, and reconfigurations.

Design Overview

Our work builds on existing Byzantine quorum algorithms [3, 4] that provide atomicity in a static system. We are the first to extend these algorithms to support a dynamic membership (Alvisi et al. [1] describe a scheme that allows the failure threshold to change in a Byzantine quorum system, but still considered a fixed replica set).

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Our algorithm can be summarized as follows. We use a logically-centralized reconfigurer (implemented as a Byzantine agreement group [2]) that generates new configurations with associated epoch numbers. We tag all messages with epoch numbers. In each epoch, we execute reads and write as in existing atomic Byzantine quorums [3, 4]. If the client discovers that a server it contacts is in a new epoch, it upgrades its configuration, and restarts the operation in the new epoch. If a server discovers that it is in an old epoch, it upgrades its configuration, stops accepting requests for the old epoch, determines if it became responsible for storing objects, and then performs a state transfer from a quorum of nodes in the old epoch.

Other Contributions

This high-level description hides several interesting aspects of the protocol:

- State transfer requires retaining information about old configurations. We present a new garbage-collection protocol that allows this information to be deleted when it is no longer needed, even in the presence of malicious nodes that may, for instance, pretend that they have not received recent configurations.
- The system relies on limiting the number of failures in a replica group that occur within a window of vulnerability. (Outside this time window, all servers in that group may fail arbitrarily.) We present correctness conditions that determine the size of this window, expressed in terms of the occurrence of certain events.
- We address the issue of slow clients trying to contact old replica groups whose failure threshold has been exceeded.
- We present an analytic performance model, and experimental results from our implementation that validate this model.

References

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