


# **Real-time evaluation of the response to the Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010**

**Mission: 9-23 February 2010**

## **Mission Report**



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**4 April 2010**

**Evaluation funded by the French Ministry of Defence's Strategic Affairs Directorate**



## **Acknowledgements**

The Groupe URD evaluation team would like to thank the Strategic Affairs Directorate (DAS) who made this real-time evaluation in Haiti possible.

We would also like to thank the people in Paris, New York and Haiti, who accepted to meet us and share with us their experiences and the lessons learned from this disaster.

We are particularly grateful to all the Haitians who, despite the tragic events that they had so recently gone through, always received us with warmth and kindness and showed genuine interest in this original exercise.

The evaluation team would also like to thank the institutions that were invited to take part in the steering committee:

### **The French Ministry of Defence**

Army High Command

*Le Centre de planification et de conduite des opérations de l'état-major des armées (CPCO)*

*Le Centre interarmées de doctrine et d'entraînement des forces (CICDE)*

### **The French Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs**

*La Direction de la prospective du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères*

*La Mission interministérielle pour la reconstruction d'Haïti*

*Le Centre de crise (CDC)*

The French Embassy in Port-au-Prince

### **The French Ministry of the Interior**

*La Direction de la prospective du Ministère de l'Intérieur*

*La Centre opérationnel de gestion des crises (COGIC)*

## **The evaluation team**

The evaluation team was made up of François Grünewald, General and Scientific Director of Groupe URD, senior evaluator and expert in disaster management, humanitarian action, CIMIC and the Haitian context, and Blanche Renaudin, an Agronomist who specialises in environmental issues.

The DAS wanted François Grünewald to be involved in this evaluation because of his recognised expertise in evaluating humanitarian action and crisis contexts. He was responsible for the evaluation of French aid to countries affected by the tsunami of 26 December 2004 and the evaluation of the coordination of the international response to the hurricanes in Haiti in 2008.

**The opinions, findings, and conclusions expressed in this report are those of the authors, and not necessarily those of the French Ministry of Defence**

## Map of Haiti



**List of acronyms**

ACF	<i>Action Contre la Faim</i>
CAMEP	<i>Centrale Autonome Métropolitaine d'Eau Potable</i>
CAP	Consolidated Appeals Process
CC CM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
CDGRD	<i>Comité Départemental de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres</i> (Haitian Departmental Civil Protection Committee)
CERF	Central Emergency Relief Fund
CNGRD	<i>Comité National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres</i> (Haitian National Civil Protection Committee)
CNSA	<i>Coordination Nationale de la Sécurité Alimentaire</i> (Haitian Food Security Coordination body)
CRS	Catholic Relief Services
DINEPA	<i>Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement</i>
DPC	<i>Direction de la Protection Civile</i>
DPKO	Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DSNCRP	<i>Document de Stratégie Nationale de Croissance et de Réduction de la Pauvreté</i>
EC	European Commission
ECHO	European Commission Humanitarian Aid Office
ETC	Emergency Telecommunications
FAO	United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation
FEWS NET	Famine Early Warning System Network
GBV	Gender-based violence
HI	Handicap International
IASC	Inter-Agency Standing Committee
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross and Red Crescent
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross
INEE	Inter-agency Network for Education in Emergencies
IOM	International Organisation for Migration
MARNDR	<i>Ministère de l'Agriculture des Ressources Naturelles et du Développement Rural</i>
MAST	<i>Ministère des Affaires Sociales et du Travail</i>
MDM	<i>Médecins du Monde</i>
MICT	<i>Ministère de l'Intérieur et des Collectivités Territoriales</i>
MINUSTAH	<i>Mission des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation en Haïti</i>
MINUSTAH/HDCS	Humanitarian Development Coordination Section of the MINUSTAH
MINUSTAH/ HR	Human Rights Section of the MINUSTAH
MSF	<i>Médecins Sans Frontières</i>
MSPP	<i>Ministère de la Santé publique et de la Population</i>
MTPTC	<i>Ministère des Travaux Publics Transports et Communications</i>
NFI	Non-food item
NGO	Non-governmental organisation
OAS	Organisation of American States
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OFDA	The Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance
OHCHR	Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
PNH	<i>Police Nationale d'Haïti</i> (Haitian National Police)

SNEP	<i>Service National d'Eau Potable</i>
SNGRD	<i>Système National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres</i>
UN	United Nations
UNCT	United Nations Country Team
UNDAC	United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination team
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Fund
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme
WHO/ PAHO	World Health Organisation / Pan-American Health Organisation

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## INTRODUCTION

It is very rare for the first months of a response to a disaster to be evaluated. Though military forces and civil protection units gather feedback regularly (RETEX), evaluators often arrive much later, when those who were in place in the initial hours and weeks have been replaced and the return to normality has changed the perceptions and lessons from the initial phase.

For a long time now, Groupe URD has tried to promote evaluations of the emergency relief phase. The work it carried out following hurricane Mitch in 1998-99 and after the events in Kosovo, Afghanistan and the tsunami showed the importance of this type of exercise. The United Nations refer to this approach as “Real-time evaluation” (RTE). The difficulty of mobilising the necessary means and staff for this kind of operation means that RTE teams often arrive several months after the event.

For several months now, Groupe URD has been conducting research funded by the French Ministry of Defence’s Strategic Affairs Directorate on the theme of “unintentional risks” (natural, technological and health disasters) in the thirty years ahead. It was during the presentation of the mid-term report of this research project to the Inter-institutional Steering Committee (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Defence, Ministry of the Interior, specialist research centres, etc.), which took place only a few days after the earthquake, that François Grünwald was asked to carry out an RTE of the response to the Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010 in addition to this ongoing research project.

The objectives of the RTE were:

1. To review, in as factual and neutral a way as possible, the national and international actors and bodies involved in the response to the crisis.
2. To evaluate the level of **coherence between needs and the emergency relief provided**. The evaluation included critical analysis of the relevance of the emergency relief delivered by civilian and military actors in relation to the needs of the affected population and the specific constraints of this operational context. The conclusions of this analysis will guide future decisions with regard to preparation and planning of French actors’ response to crises at the national level and in relation to multilateral issues.
3. To speak to beneficiaries and to try to understand **how they perceive the response, how they judge the quality of the aid provided and the aid agencies, and how they perceive the future**.
4. To analyse the response in terms of defence and security and identify lessons learned and know-how needed via the activities of the MINUSTAH, the US military deployment and overlapping external military interventions.

After the evaluation mission, the institutional management of the crisis between 12 January 2010, when the disaster took place, and the beginning of March 2010 will be analysed. This analysis will focus on aid mechanisms from France and other major countries as well as multinational organisations (OCHA, the MINUSTAH, the European Union, international and regional organisations, etc.).

Lastly, the conclusions of the RTE will focus on coordination between different emergency relief mechanisms and estimated needs in terms of planning.

The evaluation focuses on the following points:

- the constraints involved in the response;
- the initial situation and needs assessment;
- the sequence of events involved in the response to the earthquake;
- the impact of international relief on security.

These highlight improvements which need to be made to the inter-ministerial mechanism which is currently being put in place and recommendations are made for way of improving the way the response to crises is planned by the state.

The report is organised as follows:

- Chapter 1: The methodology used
- Chapter 2: The characteristics of the context
- Chapter 3: The characteristics of the disaster and the constraints involved
- Chapter 4: The response during the first days (search and rescue phase)
- Chapter 5: The classic humanitarian aid phase
- Chapter 6: An analysis of future risks
- Chapter 7: General recommendations

A number of more strategic points are made in conclusion.

The report is followed by a number of annexes:

- N°1: a map of risks
- N°2: the mission schedule
- N°3: the list of people met
- N°4: the list of the main documents consulted
- N°5: the main points to emerge from the Angers symposium on military engineering and crises
- N°6: The principles of Good Humanitarian Donorship



## 1. METHODOLOGY

The mission was validated on 27 January 2010 during a meeting at the DAS and included a number of phases:

### 1.1. Preparation phase

The preparation phase included:

- an initial literature review carried out with the support of Groupe URD's resource centre;
- initial exchanges with the different organisations involved in the French response (Civil Protection, the Ministry of the Interior's COGIC, the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs' Centre de Crise, the French Embassy in New York, the French Embassy in Haiti, the inter-ministerial coordination team led by ambassador Pierre Duquesne and Sophie Jouineau of the DAS, etc.);
- initial exchanges with the UN organisations involved: OCHA (Geneva and New York), DPKO (New York);
- initial exchanges with different French civil society stakeholders including the Fondation de France, NGOs and regional authorities;
- monitoring the situation (data collection);
- establishing the itinerary of the Groupe URD team;
- initial exchanges with European institutions, including DG ECHO and the Spanish Presidency of the EU;
- a meeting of the Steering Committee which took place at the DAS on 8 February 2010.

An inception report was produced at the end of the preparation phase which was presented to the Steering Committee on 8 February 2010. This meeting was an opportunity to present the contacts that Groupe URD had already established to prepare the mission in Haiti and to specify the results of the evaluation which focused on the following points:

- The way constraints were taken into account in the response to the crisis. Was the aid delivered technically appropriate and adapted to the conditions in Haiti in general and in Port-au-Prince in particular? Were national actors (state and civil society) able to appropriate the aid?
- The initial situation and needs analysis. Was the aid delivered appropriate in terms of priorities and sector-based choices?
- The chronology of the response;
- The impact of international relief on security.

The provisional timetable of the mission was finalised.

### 1.2. Field mission (from 9 to 23 February 2010)

The field mission had two parts:

- A visit to New York to meet the French UN delegation and UN stakeholders involved in the response to the Haitian crisis (DPKO, OCHA);
- The actual field mission in Haiti.

In order to achieve optimal effectiveness in the field, the evaluation team was logistically autonomous and went to Port-au-Prince using the Santo Domingo road in a hired car. The mission letter from the DAS facilitated Groupe URD's visit.

The evaluation team tried to meet as many stakeholders as possible: Haitian authorities, remaining Search and Rescue units, (essentially French organisations as all the others had left at the end of January), United Nations' agencies, including the MINUSTAH and the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, NGOs and donors. Several meetings took place at the French Embassy, with, for example, Ambassador Le Bret and his team and the head of the French Civil Protection forces.

Lastly, and perhaps most important of all, the evaluation team tried to meet Haitian people to try to understand their feelings about the situation and the aid that was being delivered. Numerous IDP sites were visited in the centre of Port-au-Prince and in surrounding neighbourhoods such as Gressier and Léogâne.

### 1.3. Activities after the field mission

These involved:

- collecting essential complementary information (from the *centre opérationnel de gestion interministérielle des crises* -COGIC, the French army "état-major" and the UNDAC);
- a further review of literature;
- making initial presentations of findings (two sessions);
- writing the mission report.

Some difficulty was encountered in obtaining a situation report from the *Centre de Planification et de Conduite des Opérations* (CPCO) to complement our information.

A draft version of this document was sent to the Steering Committee whose remarks, criticism and suggestions were incorporated into this final version.

## 2. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONTEXT

### 2.1. A rich history

The Republic of Haiti, which covers a third of the island of Hispaniola, has had a turbulent history which has had a significant effect on governance and development and which explains in part the current situation.

- **1492: Discovery of the island of Hispaniola by Christopher Columbus.** The massacre of the native population begins;
- **1500s: Large scale importation of African slaves** to replace the massacred natives.
- **1697 :** The island is shared between France and Spain along lines which correspond more or less to the current states of Haiti and Santo Domingo;
- **1700s:** The French part of the island prospers through the production of coffee and sugar cane.
- **1791: Revolt by the slaves and "petits blancs" (poor whites) led by Toussaint Louverture.**
- **1795:** A treaty is signed handing the Spanish part of Hispaniola over to France.
- **1804: Independence of Haiti, the first ever “black” republic.**
- **22/12/1804:** Jean-Jacques Dessalines proclaims himself Emperor of Haiti, but very quickly there is conflict between the North, loyal to the Empire and the secessionist and Republican South.
- **1820:** Re-unification of Haiti by Jean-Pierre Boyer.
- **1843:** Revolt by the black community which leads to the fall of President Boyer.
- **1850-1910:** dictatorships and poverty until the restoration of the Republic by N. Geffard.
- **1914-1934: US occupation.**
- **1937:** 10000 to 20000 Haitians massacred in Santo Domingo to “whiten” the population.
- **1957-1987: dictatorship of the Duvalliers.** Reign of terror of the *Tontons Macoutes*.
- **1990:** Jean Bertrand Aristide is elected President of the Republic with nearly 70% of the votes.
- **1991:** Military coup by General Cedras. President Aristide exiled to the United States.
- **1994: American military presence allows President Aristide to return and complete his term in office.**
- **1995:** René Préval is elected President.
- **2001: After a very tense election campaign, J.B. Aristide is re-elected President.**
- **2004:** Violence by armed groups causes a new political crisis. An Action Plan by the CARICOM which promotes the sharing of power between President Aristide and the opposition is rejected. In March, the intervention of a UN-mandated multinational force leads to the exile of J.B. Aristide. Boniface Alexandre is named interim President. In June, following resolution 1529, the UN Security Council authorises the immediate deployment of an interim multinational force for a period of three months. Security Council Resolution 1542 authorises the deployment of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) to replace the interim force, for a period of six months.
- **2006: René Préval is re-elected as President in February** followed by a period of relative calm.
- **2008:** the island is hit by a series of devastating hurricanes, with significant damage in the town of Gonaïves
- **2009:** Tension within the government leads to the departure of Prime Minister Pierre-Louis who is replaced by Jean-Max Bellerive.

It is important to note that the debt of independence (Haiti more or less had to buy its independence) remains a difficult issue with regard to relations between Haiti and France and that there was great disappointment in France when President Aristide's presidency became very authoritarian.

Haiti is the poorest country in the Caribbean and is one of the lowest countries on the Human Development Index. The concept of socio-natural disasters, which is commonly used in Latin and Central America, corresponds precisely to a country like this with its eroded mountains and its pauperised population which is extremely dependent on aid and money from the Diaspora.

The weakness of the state, which is the result of the country's turbulent history and the recent years of political instability, has made Haiti very vulnerable to external shocks and natural disasters are particularly destructive there. The difficulties encountered in managing natural disasters are one of the consequences of this vulnerability. The number of victims was much lower when a cyclone recently hit Cuba compared to when the same cyclone hit Haiti (several hundreds), even though it had already reduced in intensity (having changed from a cyclone to a tropical storm).

Since 2005, major progress has been made thanks to efforts to improve governance (at national and regional levels) and to restore the rule of law and reform the security forces (support/training of the Haitian police – the only force with a legitimate mandate to use force in a country where there is no army).

This improvement is one of the effects of the presence of the MINUSTAH, a UN integrated mission, which, through its civil component, does a great deal of capacity building work with regional authorities (town halls, etc.). In addition, a major effort has been made in terms of capacity building with regard to anticipation and response to natural disasters, and particularly hurricanes and tropical storms which have repeatedly hit since 2004.

It should be pointed out that the population has an ambivalent attitude towards the MINUSTAH. The problems which certain troops have encountered in communicating with the population have sometimes made dialogue difficult.

#### Key figures related to the MINUSTAH

##### **Countries who supply troops to the MINUSTAH:**

Argentina (557), Bolivia (208), Brazil (1280), Canada (5), Chile (509), Ecuador (67), USA (6), France (2), Guatemala (116), India (1), Jordan (634), South Korea (1), Nepal (1078), Paraguay (31), Peru (209), Philippines (157), Sri Lanka (959) and Uruguay (1136).

##### **Countries who supply police officers:**

Argentina, Bangladesh, Benin, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Egypt, El Salvador, Spain, USA, France, Grenada, Guinea, India, Jamaica, Jordan, Madagascar, Mali, Nepal, Niger, Nigeria, Pakistan, the Philippines, the Central African Republic, Romania, Rwanda, Russia, Senegal, Serbia, Sri Lanka, Chad, Togo, Turkey, Uruguay, Yemen

## 2.2. Frequent disasters

Due to the frequency of natural disasters, a national institution, the *Système National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres* (SNGRD) was set up in 1999. A permanent secretariat coordinates the activities of 26 governmental and non-governmental organisations involved in natural disaster preparedness and response activities. The Minister of the Interior is in charge of policies via the *Comité National de Gestion des Risques et des Désastres* (CNGRD). The *Direction Générale de la Protection Civile* (DPC) is theoretically present at the national, provincial and communal levels and is responsible for the coordination of operations. In an emergency, the *Centre d'Opérations d'Urgence* (COU), which brings together the members of the permanent secretariat of the SNGRD and the DPC, is responsible for organising and coordinating the response to a natural disaster.

The response to the last natural disasters showed both the dynamism of the DPC and the limits of its operational capacity. National coordination is often complicated by conflicting political allegiances, particularly at the communal level. Though certain members of the administration are loyal to national bodies, others are loyal to local mayors and their networks. In addition, aid has been highly politicised in Haiti with officials managing humanitarian aid in their own interest (for example, during electoral campaigns) or even embezzling it<sup>1</sup>.

At a strategic level within the SNGRD, the Haitian government has set up the *Groupe d'Appui de la Coopération Internationale* (GACI), which brings together UN agencies, the MINUSTAH, international development agencies, donors and international NGOs. Its role is to coordinate international actors regarding preparedness activities and during the response, to mobilise funds and to organise technical cooperation.

In an emergency, international organisations are theoretically supposed to regularly take part in meetings, share information, take part in multi-sector evaluations, integrate their response into the government's action plan and produce a final report on their activities.

Within the aid system, the local version of the IASC, the *Comité Permanent Inter-organisations* (CPIO), is in charge of coordination between international organisations in Haiti. Considerable effort has been made since 2004 to strengthen preparedness and response capacity. The current tragedy has taken place in a context where the most frequent problems obscure the most serious problems. Though Haiti experienced earthquakes which destroyed Cap-Haïtien in 1840 and Port-au-Prince in 1700, these tragedies of the past only had a marginal influence on the national strategy for managing risks (see the map of risks in annex n°1). It should be noted that the DPC has been producing contingency plans for a number of years, but these focus more on what is probable (cyclones, floods, mudslides) and less on what is possible (earthquakes). Efforts were being made on this issue, with the development of communication tools for the general public on the risk of earthquakes. The first of these tools were ready to be launched when the earthquake struck.

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<sup>1</sup> According to interviews with representatives of the government and NGO national staff and documents from the Clusters.

### 3. THE HAITI EARTHQUAKE OF 12 JANUARY 2010

#### 3.1. An exceptional event

The earthquake which struck Haiti on 12 January had a certain number of specific characteristics:

- **Its force:** Though only of magnitude 7 on the Richter scale, the location of the earthquake's epicentre meant that it hit the urban settlements on the southern peninsula of the country with great force, from the centre of the bay of Gonaïves (Gressier, Léogane, Carrefour) to Jacmel on the other side of the mountain, areas with numerous known faultlines.




*Impact of the Haiti earthquake of 12 January 2010 (source Reliefweb.org)*

- **The timing of the earthquake** is also important. At 16.53 a lot of people were still at work or were just leaving and children were still at school. If the earthquake had taken place at night the number of victims would no doubt have been much higher. The earthquake took place when a number of important meetings were taking place at MINUSTAH headquarters, which explains why so many MINUSTAH top level staff were killed. Night fell very quickly afterwards, leaving the city agonising in the dark. When the earthquake struck it was the middle of the night in Europe, which created some mobilisation problems. Fortunately, most specialised units have 24-hour monitoring.
- **The number of victims and people affected by the disaster.** The number of people affected by the earthquake was very high. According to the *Direction Nationale de la Protection Civile* (DNPC), more than 217000 people were killed and over 300000 people were injured, with a very high number of serious and very serious cases. 1.23 million people were left homeless in Port-au-Prince and more than 500000 displaced people fled the capital. The disaster was as deadly as the tsunami of December 2004, but concentrated in one area alone.
- **Port-au-Prince, the capital and strategic nerve centre of the country is severely damaged.** National command centres were completely destroyed. Even though the government itself did

not lose any of its ministers, a large part of the Presidential palace was destroyed and the ministerial quarter was raised to the ground. Human loss in the administration was high. Many civil servants spent the first days trying to find their friends and families and tending to their wounds.

- **The total lack of anti-seismic strategies in the building codes**, whether public or private, meant that buildings which were not designed to resist earthquakes were severely damaged. Basic rules concerning wall ties and concrete reinforcement in areas affected by earthquakes were hardly ever respected.



Port-au-Prince before the earthquake (Groupe URD, 2009)

More flexible buildings like the old traditional buildings on stilts or many of the houses in the shanty towns, which are made of very light-weight materials, suffered much less than the buildings made of concrete.

- **The UN mission (MINUSTAH) lost its leaders** and those who survived, from the top to the bottom of the hierarchy, were left in a state of shock, which partially paralysed its activity. The human loss was considerable: 101 employees lost their lives, among which were the Special Representative and the Head of Mission, 7 other top civilian staff, 36 military staff and 7 UN police officers.

### 3.2. Constraints involved in managing the crisis

**State institutions seriously hit:** Haitians and many international actors felt that the Haitian government's leadership was very poor. It was clearly very badly affected by the earthquake and the weakened state in which it found itself reduced its speed of reaction and limited its ability to take charge of operations. In interviews, many Haitians repeated the same phrase: "the president is in shock". This state of shock, which lasted a long time in certain sectors, led to disaffection within the population and increased the suspicion felt by the population with regard to the authorities. The political repercussions of this situation should be analysed in detail.



**The MINUSTAH lost its leader, the UN Secretary General Special Representative and many of its managers:** The fact that top staff of the MINUSTAH were among the victims of the earthquake was disastrous. The UN Secretary-General quickly nominated a replacement for his missing Special Representative, which no doubt saved the reputation of the MINUSTAH. The new SRSR, Edmond Mullet, had been head of the mission from June 2006 to August 2007 which meant that he had credibility and was immediately operational. However, the MINUSTAH did not immediately cooperate with humanitarian actors. On the contrary, it felt that its political and security-based mandate did not allow it to do so, which created tension and difficulties, for example, with the UNDAC. Very quickly, the UN Security Council met on 18 January to listen to the Secretary-General who had just returned from a first visit to Haiti. On 19 January, the Council unanimously adopted Resolution 1908, increasing the authorised number of soldiers and police officers in the MINUSTAH by 2000 and 1500 respectively and, at the request of the Secretary-General, it gave the MINUSTAH a more humanitarian role<sup>2</sup>. The authorised number of MINUSTAH personnel was thus increased to over 12500.



The Hôtel Christopher, MINUSTAH headquarters, after the earthquake.

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<sup>2</sup> Letter sent by the UN Secretary-General to his Special Representative, Edmond Mullet on 22 January.



As is typical in this kind of disaster, a certain number of constraints which were not properly taken into account led to problems. As a consequence, aid was blocked and operations were not coordinated.

**Very rapidly, there were major communication problems:** As often happens in disaster contexts of this kind, telecommunications networks were affected in the region and between the region and the rest of the world. Communication problems were significant due to the fact that the nerve centre of the country, its capital, had been hit. Skype and internet nevertheless continued to work intermittently after the mobile phone system had stopped working. For example, the MINUSTAH quickly had to switch to its High Frequency network to contact its different offices in the country, because the cell phone network had broken down. During the first days, information only really circulated via CNN.

**Airport:** Though the airstrip was not affected by the earthquake and could continue to be used by large carriers, the airport was not easily accessible except for pilots capable of landing without the support of the control tower, which was no longer operational. Aircraft, volunteers and money rapidly arrived, leading to the typical phase when the airport is blocked. The 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division of the US army quickly took control of the airport, launching a large-scale military operation to evacuate thousands of US citizens and prepare the arrival of reinforcements. Though the decisions made by the Americans regarding priorities irritated numerous observers, everyone in Haiti agreed that the fact that they took control of the airspace around Port-au-Prince was essential to limit disorder and prevent accidents which would have had disastrous repercussions. If an aeroplane had crashed onto the tarmac or the MINUSTAH camp next to the airport, the whole aid dynamic would have been threatened. This localised, rapid and planned action allowed the aid to be regulated to some extent. But the fact that authorisation to land was much more restricted for non-American, civilian planes, carrying medical supplies for example (MSF lost two days as they were forced to go via Santo Domingo), clearly shows that the US army's needs took priority over flights in connection with the emergency response.

**Logistical issues:** Though certain USAR teams, UN agencies and NGOs had what they needed in their "deployment kits" to be autonomous, this was not the case for everyone. Many teams had difficulty finding means of transport. Many cars had been destroyed or blocked in the city by the debris of collapsed buildings. For example, the roof of the garage of the French Embassy collapsed destroying the majority of the Embassy's fleet of vehicles. Fuel was very hard to come by during the first days.

**Initial problems with the MINUSTAH:** The MINUSTAH did not make its logistics resources available to the humanitarian community for several days as it did not want to take responsibility for activities outside the DPKO mandate. It was not until 19 January and the new directions given by the Security Council for the following 6 months that the situation improved. It was only from that point that UNDAC was able to use MINUSTAH helicopters to carry out reconnaissance outside Port-au-Prince, on the coast towards Léogane and Gressier and on the other side of the mountains towards Jacmel.

**Use of ports:** The state of the port of Port-au-Prince and the damage done to it following the earthquake meant that it was difficult to use for aid logistics. The port of Carrefour suffered a small oil slick, but the majority of fuel stocks remained untouched, which proved to be crucial to restart activities (rapid re-opening of petrol stations). The military ships which were deployed to transport aid (for example, by the United States and by France with the “Sirocco”) were not immediately able to gain access to the quays. The use of light ships with amphibious qualities (like the Francis Garnier) made it possible to unload goods rapidly on beaches, bringing, amongst other things, vehicles which were in desperately short supply during the first days. Repairing the ports was crucially important to allow food aid to arrive.

**Access to the affected areas:** There appear to have been considerable problems in gaining access to the affected neighbourhoods, particularly due to the urban characteristics of Port-au-Prince (densely populated mountainsides leading to small coastal plains). Even before the earthquake, urban development made it difficult to gain access to different areas (narrowness of many streets in Port-au-Prince and their characteristics due to the fact that they are situated on a hillside). Only a few main roads were rapidly accessible: part of Delmas, the roads on the coastal plain leading to the Presidential palace and the administrative neighbourhood, where the French Embassy is situated. The build-up of debris, the corpses (at least during the first days) and the numerous victims who stayed outdoors to protect themselves from after-shocks made it difficult to get around. For the majority of victims, the first aid that they received came from neighbours and friends.



Delmas road, which was rapidly cleared (photo URD, 2010)

**Security:** In this country, which experienced periods of turbulence<sup>3</sup> between 2000 and 2004 due to the actions of armed groups acting on behalf of political actors, there were major concerns about security during the first weeks of the response to the earthquake. It is important to remember that Haiti was confronted with serious food and political crises in April 2008. The riots in Port-au-Prince brought a very strong reaction by the MINUSTAH, certain units of which fired rubber bullets. Whereas a new government was formed, the WFP supplied emergency food aid to calm the situation, but the political mechanisms behind this situation have yet to be identified. Concern that the gangs of Cité Soleil would revive their activities was accentuated by the escape of prisoners from the central prison which was destroyed by the earthquake. A form of security-based paranoia began to appear as it had in 2004-2005. UNDAC staff had to gain the permission of UNDSS<sup>4</sup> and have access to a military escort to travel around Haiti from the MINUSTAH logistics base near the airport. This seriously reduced UNDAC's rapid deployment capacity, even though the head of UNDAC managed to do miracles to improve the mobility of USAR staff. The French Civil Protection units operated with light protection from military police units and were therefore relatively mobile.

<sup>3</sup> Including kidnappings and demands for ransoms

<sup>4</sup> United Nations Department for Security and Safety. UNDSS is the United Nations institution which manages the security of United Nations staff and facilities in the field.

Map showing areas of destruction in Port-au-Prince (source SRTIT)





## 4. THE FIRST PHASE: SEARCH AND RESCUE

### 4.1. Very rapid extreme emergency response

#### **The local reaction:**

In shock following the earthquake, the local population tried to save what they could during the night and took shelter. Neighbours, friends and family members helped each other, saving thousands of Haitians who were trapped under light debris or were injured.



Searching through the rubble (photo Groupe URD, 2010)

The evaluation team gathered numerous witness accounts of this collective solidarity, which also highlighted problems encountered due to the following factors:

- Night fell soon after the earthquake struck and the absence of electricity made the situation particularly difficult.
- The absence of rescue equipment made it difficult to free people trapped under the rubble.
- The extremely harrowing experience of dealing with hundreds of injured people and people trapped under the rubble calling out for help and for whom it was impossible to take action due to the lack of appropriate equipment even several days after the disaster.
- Managing corpses was made complicated by the religious context, where voodoo is a very sensitive issue.

The NGOs already present in Haiti, the ICRC and OCHA rapidly began to take action, carrying out situation analyses and launching emergency relief operations. During the night, MSF teams using motorbikes managed to re-open two hospitals, where the operating theatres were more or less intact: Cité Soleil and Martissant. The staff of different NGOs and agencies based in the provinces were transferred to the capital to help with the relief efforts.

The Haitian Civil Protection forces were immediately put into action despite the fact that their headquarters in Port-au-Prince had been badly damaged. Luckily, part of the operational team had been in the provinces and was not affected. They returned to Port-au-Prince during the night, having been contacted by mobile phone and then by HF radio (when the telephone system stopped working). Of course, they were not properly equipped to deal with a disaster of this size. Furthermore, the only Search and Rescue team which has some equipment is based in Port-de-Paix which is at the opposite end of the country.

### **International mobilisation of Civil Protection units**

The United Nations Disaster, Assessment and Coordination agency (UNDAC)<sup>5</sup> was active very quickly. The alarm was raised at the UNDAC centre in Geneva at 23.05, very soon after the event, taking into account the time difference. A global alert was sent out and at midnight UNDAC mobilised its Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) teams<sup>6</sup>. The Virtual OSOCC was then activated to gather and coordinate offers of services, taking into account the rules in application developed as part of the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group procedures.

At 00.22 on 13 January, the Icelandic team ICE-SAR indicated that it was preparing its deployment. At 08.45, the EU-PCT, activated by the Monitoring and Information Centre (MIC)<sup>7</sup>, announced that it would be providing support to UNDAC. The UNDAC coordination team arrived in Port-au-Prince less than 24 hours after the earthquake on the B-FAST European Civil Protection flight. It was able to meet with the DHPC quite quickly, though it did not have any means or decision-making capacity, due to the fact that communication lines with the Ministry of the Interior were down.

The objective was to set up a system to organise USAR teams, identify needs and allocate tasks as quickly as possible. The setting up of the tasking system, the Reception and Dispatch Center and the centre for coordinating operations was immediate (INSARAG measures), but logistically complex due to the weak initial support provided by the MINUSTAH. Very quickly, major problems with regard to logistics and communication made operations difficult. Support for the UNDAC team (logistics, communication, cartography, etc.) began to arrive on 16 January. While the UNDAC system was being set up, USAR teams and health personnel began to arrive from all around the world. Over 1900 international first-aid workers, including several teams with dogs (175 dogs in total) were deployed in around fifty USAR teams, France having sent more than 1100 people in total, including 250 first-aid workers. More than 130 people were pulled out from the rubble alive thanks to the energy deployed and the money invested. This figure is both a record compared to other similar disasters and tragically low compared to how lethal the event was overall (more than 215000 deaths). Many people were treated by the USAR first-aid workers in the destroyed buildings, then evacuated to emergency medical units or what remained of Port-au-Prince's health system. Greater effectiveness would have been possible if more helicopters had been available.

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<sup>5</sup> UNDAC is the United Nations body which coordinates initial activities in post-disaster situations, including search and rescue operations and is answerable to the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, OCHA. UNDAC is in charge of activating the Virtual OSOCC and developing and promoting the International Search and Rescue Advisory Group (INSARAG) Guidelines, which allow the teams deployed in the area to be coordinated.

<sup>6</sup> Search and Rescue teams which specialize in post-disaster operations in urban contexts.

<sup>7</sup> The MIC is a 24H communication tool which is used to identify and communicate requests for civil protection aid to the relevant structures in each Member State.

The Dominican Republic reacted very quickly by sending USAR personnel and medical teams the day after the earthquake took place. It provided significant medical and logistical support at the border to treat the injured and contribute to the relief effort<sup>8</sup>. In the 24 hours following the disaster, due to their geographical proximity (units based in the « Antilles zone »), the United States and France were able to send units (the US Disaster Assessment and Response Team left Washington on the 13th), closely followed by the Canadians. There was significant engagement by other countries in the region such as Argentina, Chile and Peru, including those with troops in the MINUSTAH and by regional authorities (CEPAL). These were joined by contingents of Military and Civil Protection forces (Israel, China, etc.).

These teams frequently gave priority to finding people from their own countries. This explains why many USAR teams were concentrated around the main hotels of Port-au-Prince, where many foreigners had been staying. Certain Civil Protection teams came to find their compatriots and left immediately afterwards. However, most did all they could to also provide aid to the Haitian population, but even in these cases, priority was still given to compatriots. This shows the importance of the “neutrality” of the UNDAC system, which is able to allocate tasks on the basis of identified needs and damage assessment.

#### 4.2. France’s response

France reacted rapidly in terms of Civil Protection, providing assistance to French people affected by the crisis and providing humanitarian assistance. This was made possible by several factors:

- The French Embassy and Ambassador Le Bret reacted very quickly, immediately activating the *Centre de Crise*, with its dual functions (helping expatriates in difficult situations linked to crises and humanitarian action) and organised the response on the spot;
- With regard to the actions of the French Consulate, departures from Port-au-Prince and reception in Fort de France or even directly in Paris to provide French expatriates affected by the earthquake with medical and psychological care, was made easier by sending consular staff to Haiti. It should be noted that all the Ministry of Defence’s aircrafts from Port-au-Prince to Fort de France were made available for all the French and European people who wanted to be repatriated;
- With regard to humanitarian action, the CDC very quickly sent an initial reconnaissance team into the area and provided, for several weeks, the services of both an experienced manager to provide the ambassador with support in « logistics and prioritisation » and a young manager for relations with NGOs, Clusters and United Nations agencies;
- The proximity of French units in the Antilles: the first international relief team to reach Haiti came from the French Antilles and arrived in the late afternoon on 13 January, following delays caused by the transferral of freight from a large carrier to medium carriers. The fact that men and equipment were already in the area (the presence of an airborne disaster operations detachment, DICA, in the Antilles) was a significant asset;

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<sup>8</sup> In view of the historical relations between the two countries, this aid was a very positive political gesture.

- The rapid mobilisation of the COGIC in Paris. Three *Détachements d'Intervention Catastrophes Aéromobiles* (DICA) were deployed (see precise timeline described below): DICA Antilles, DICA Brignole, DICA Guyane and a command unit was rapidly installed in the French Embassy buildings. These Search and Rescue units were accompanied by medical staff who were responsible for administering first aid.

The fact that Civil Protection units had already conducted operations in Haiti in recent years, including in 2008 during the hurricanes which struck Gonaïves, made the work easier. The search and rescue phase, which began on 13 January and which was carried out by 250 Civil Protection agents, ended officially on 22 January following the decision of the Haitian government. The last Civil Protection unit nevertheless stayed until the beginning of February to try to find the bodies of the last missing French citizens. The French Search and Rescue teams worked on around twenty sites and rescued 16 survivors from the rubble.

### **The Civil Protection assets deployed**

The *Élément de Sécurité Civile Rapide d'Intervention Médicale* (ESCRIM<sup>9</sup>) was sent as early as 14 January (decision taken on the 13th), but only arrived in Haiti on the 16th due to the congestion at the airport. Its ability to function autonomously and deal with quite a wide range of disaster surgery problems was extremely important in the Haitian context.



Meanwhile, 4 Health units were deployed (teams of 30 people each with a doctor, a nurse, a first-aid worker and some equipment) whose mission it was to provide support to Haitian hospitals (Canapé Vert, Sacré Cœur, Dikini). By 14 February, the ESCRIM had performed 203 major operations.

In all, the medical staff deployed were able to carry out 17000 consultations, 2550 hospitalisations and 1300 surgical operations between 13 January and 22

February, the date of the ESCRIM's withdrawal.

Two "Water treatment" units were deployed, the second of which arrived on the 16th on the same plane as the ESCRIM, to bring water to residents and French personnel at the Ambassador's residence, which had been transformed into a displaced person's camp (providing shelter to over 300 people, including families of survivors, journalists, humanitarians, etc.), to health structures and to the population. Two "water" units were also deployed, the second of which was from Guyana. In all, 60 people were deployed for water treatment activities.

<sup>9</sup> Complete field hospital for rapid intervention in disaster contexts.





Water distribution kiosks before the earthquake  
(Groupe URD, 2006)

The Civil Protection bodies did not have information about access to water in Port-au-Prince, including its physical characteristics (boring and springs rather than ponds and rivers) and the way it is managed. A privatised management system has been in place for a long time. Boring and distribution by tanker are done by private businesses. Certain neighbourhood water points are managed by committees which implement a collection system linked to CAMEP, the national organisation in charge of water in Port-au-Prince. Access to this information would have been useful regarding the choice of equipment.

The command structure supporting the Ambassador was strengthened quite quickly by separating decision-making and operational levels: the strategic level with the DOS and the tactical level with COS. Reinforcements continued to arrive from 18 January in the form of a logistics unit and equipment to help to unload supplies at the airport. Finally, a “natural risks” unit arrived on 21 January when the Haitian authorities called off the “Search and Rescue” phase.

The DICAs began to disengage from 21 January. A unit of 300 men stayed behind to search for the bodies of the last missing French expatriates (it was not possible to recuperate 3 bodies due to extremely risky search contexts) and a few more people were found alive in the rubble.

It should be noted that France’s direct involvement in UNDAC was weak despite the fact that Haiti is a French-speaking country. And yet the French contingent within the international USAR teams was significant.

There are two basic reasons for this:

- **The political decision to choose Europe.** Though France was more involved in the European Civil Protection system, the fact that the French teams did not know about UNDAC and its different tools (how the Virtual OSOCC functioned and knowledge about the INSARAG standards) was harmful, even with a good level of European coordination. Certain other Member States (Scandinavian countries, Great Britain) are very involved in UNDAC, which is the leader in this area.

- **The choice of priorities.** The leadership of the French Civil Protection units was only able to devote some time and human resources to multilateral coordination mechanisms when it had received reinforcements.



### **Reaction of the Ministry of Defence:**

At the Ministry of Defence, the crisis unit of the CPCO was only activated on 14 January 2010, that is to say, two days after the crisis began and Ambassador Le Bret raised the alarm. This had allowed supplies brought by air from metropolitan France or from the *Forces Armées Antilles* (FAA) to be made available. The Siroco landing craft was also sent to carry out both medical and logistical functions. In addition to sending a team to set up a centre for the organisation and evacuation of expatriates sent by the CPCO, the military health service deployed a surgical team, a reinforced medical team and an aerial transportation medical team. This was part of the military mission based on the ideas of support (to French personnel, in evacuating expatriate citizens and transporting freight) and minimal footprint (only minimal staff and equipment were sent so as not to complicate a local situation that was already restrictive).

### **Difficult coordination between Civil Protection units and armed forces:**

There were difficulties in coordinating the very rapid action of the Civil Protection forces and the procedures of the Ministry of Defence. This had a significant effect on relations between the Civil Protection leadership and the FAA: the level of misunderstanding appears to have been difficult to deal with, being no doubt essentially linked to human problems made worse by institutional competition. Thus, despite the fact that two CPCO officers were sent as reinforcements to Port-au-Prince, coordination problems affected operations and confidence between actors (the impossibility for the Civil Protection units to use the FAA ambulance for Medevacs, etc.). And yet, the existence of a military advisor to the Head of relief operations and the fact that a large number of Civil Protection staff have a military background means that difficulties of this kind should be avoided. The ability of this kind of tension to create problems both internally and operationally should not be under-estimated.

### **The difficulties linked to the presence of the Prime Minister's Special Envoy:**

In a context where time management and professional focus are key to the effectiveness of the response, special envoys who want to interfere in operations despite the fact that they do not have the relevant skills create problems on the ground in the chain of command, which should be headed by the ambassador. According to a number of interviews at the French Embassy in Port-au-Prince, the case of the Prime Minister's Special Envoy was no exception. His presence remains the subject of jokes amongst humanitarians who were met in the field (members of NGOs and French staff working with the United Nations).

### Timeline of operations by different components of the French Armed Forces in the response to the earthquake

	<b>Air lifts<sup>10</sup></b>	<b>Maritime assets</b>	<b>Action on the ground</b>
15/01/2010	2 turnarounds by CASA tactical military transport aircraft and a military A310 Airbus to bring approx. 200 staff (navy-firemen from Marseille, Mobile Accident Units from the Antilles, Civil Protection staff, and military police). On their return trips, these aircraft are available to transport French citizens to the Antilles.	The Francis Garnier landing ship, based in Fort de France, heads for Haiti. On board are around fifty soldiers from the armed forces in the Antilles, engineering equipment, transportation vehicles and humanitarian freight. The Siroco landing craft, which was off the coast of Senegal, received orders to head for Haiti the previous night. It has a medical unit (2 surgical blocks and 50 hospital beds), freight transportation capacity (2000 tonnes) and can carry 2000 passengers. It is also carrying 4 helicopters (2 Puma, 2 Gazelle).	
16/01/2010	CASA tactical military transport aircraft work principally to bring military police, freight, generators, supplies and water. On their return journeys, these aircraft are available to transport French citizens to the Antilles. A C130 tactical aircraft leaves France for the Antilles the next day, where it notably increases the air transportation capacity taking into account the difficulties of landing in Port-au-Prince.	The Francis Garnier landing ship travels to Guadeloupe during the night to complete its load of humanitarian freight and then continues on towards Haiti. It is carrying heavy equipment (3 excavators and 2 mini excavators) and transportation vehicles 'maintenance truck, 2 P4s and a 4x4), a medical team and an ambulance, 700 tents and freight for the Red Cross	
17/01/2010	Four turnarounds by CASA tactical military transport aircraft and two turnarounds by A310 Airbus, principally to transport Civil Protection staff and Mobile Accident Unit staff, military police, freight, generators, supplies and water.		
18/01/2010	Arrival of a second C130 which had left France on 17 January to reinforce the tactical transport capacity. Two turnarounds by tactical transport aircraft with 6 tonnes of freight (food supplies and water).		
19/01/2010	Reinforcement of air transportation capacity with the addition of two Civil Protection Dash 8 aircraft (capacity of 50 passengers or 10 tonnes of freight). Five turnarounds by tactical transport aircraft of Dash 8 aircraft with freight, plus the return of the CASA, which arrives in Haiti. An Air Force A340 leaves France bringing firemen, military police, and army medical staff to work on the Siroco and freight. Three turnarounds of tactical transport and Dash 8 aircraft.	After arriving on 19 January, the Francis Garnier remains anchored in Port-au-Prince, to provide support.	

<sup>10</sup> On trips from Haiti to Fort de France, these aircraft were available to transport French and European citizens to the Antilles.

	The Puma helicopter provides the Embassy with support to evacuate isolated French citizens.		
20/01/ 2010	Five planned turnarounds by transport aircraft (CASA, C130 and Dash 8) with freight.		RSMA and 33rd RIMa units take position in Port-au-Prince, they coordinate their actions with international organisations.
21/01/2010	Five turnarounds by transport aircraft (CASA, C130 and Dash 8) bring around 50 people (Civil protection staff and soldiers) and 16 tonnes of freight and to repatriate more than 100 people to the Antilles. The Puma helicopter provides the Embassy with support to evacuate isolated French citizens in the region of Jacmel towards Port-au-Prince.	The Francis Garnier landing ship remains anchored in support in Port-au-Prince. The Siroco landing craft arrives in Fort-de-France where it takes on complementary equipment (clearing equipment, excavators, FAA vehicles (P4 and trucks), freight (food supplies and water) and humanitarian freight. Once loaded, it immediately sets back off towards Haiti.	RSMA and 33rd RIMa units are in Port-au-Prince. The RSMA takes part in rubble clearing operations around the Embassy and on the Place du Champ de Mars. They take part in operations providing assistance to victims (putting tents up). The army medical teams, who are due to work in the Siroco landing craft when it arrives, help in the civilian field hospital next to the Embassy.
22-24/01/ 2010	Three planned turnarounds by Dash 8 tactical transport aircraft. On trips from Haiti to Fort de France, these aircraft were available to transport French and European citizens to the Antilles. The Puma helicopter continues to support the Embassy evacuating isolated French citizens.	The Francis Garnier landing ship remains anchored in support in Port-au-Prince. The Siroco landing craft arrives in Port-au-Prince in the middle of the day.	
25/01/2010	Seven planned turnarounds by tactical transport and Dash 8 aircraft.	The Siroco landing craft is anchored in Port-au-Prince and continues to unload vehicles and freight. The Siroco role 2 (2 surgical blocks and 50 beds) is operational.	The army medical teams, who had been helping in the civilian field hospital next to the Embassy, go to the Siroco to set its role 2 in motion (medical support).

#### 4.3. The over-loading of the emergency medical system:

With more than 300000 injured people, among which there was a very large number of seriously and critically injured people, the surgical system became saturated. One of the complex issues which were debated regarding the humanitarian response of the first weeks was the high number of amputations which were carried out. It is important to look at the various factors involved:

**The state of medical infrastructure and staff before the disaster:** the Haitian hospital sector is essentially private and supported to a great extent by religious institutions. Its main focus was classical surgery (minor surgery, obstetrics, appendicitis, etc.) and curative medicine (treatment of acute dengue fever, etc.). Before the earthquake, public health issues were one of the major difficulties which had resulted from lack of investment in the national health system in keeping with the structural adjustment policies of the 90s. It was not prepared to deal with a situation of this seriousness which affected Health sector staff in the same way as the rest of the population. Many health centres had been hit themselves and their personnel were busy looking after their loved ones.

**Management of the health situation in the provinces:** Very quickly there were a large number of injured people in the provinces, such as in the Artibonite. The hospitals of Gonaïves, for example, rapidly became overloaded. Emergency surgery teams arrived from Canada and the USA and helped to take care of the 4000 injured people and the hundreds of serious operations which needed to be carried out (including 40 amputations).

#### **The specific epidemiology of emergency relief medicine in post-earthquake contexts.**

- In contrast to many disasters, including tsunamis, earthquakes kill and seriously injure large numbers of people almost instantaneously: smashed limbs, etc. The number of injured who die depends on the speed with which the rescue teams gain access, the quality of the treatment given (management of “crush syndrome”<sup>11</sup>-see below) and the speed with which victims can be transported to emergency surgery units. In Port-au-Prince, gaining access to the injured and then extricating and evacuating them to medical units was difficult and slow due to the fact that the town is situated on hills and the streets were full of debris.
- The USAR teams on the ground treated many people who then tried to reach medical centres where treatment was being given, but also where there was a certain comfort (water, electricity, the presence of women and men “in white”). Very quickly, the courtyards and areas around these medical centres became saturated with the sick, the injured and their families.
- Medical care and surgery in disaster situations are difficult tasks which involve a “selection” process which is both difficult and essential. Cases found on the ground needed to be treated “on site”, to avoid “crush syndrome” for example, but they then needed to be rapidly evacuated to medical centres where major operations could then take place.

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<sup>11</sup> “Crush syndrome” is the effect of a rapid increase in toxins which happens in limbs which have been blocked or squashed and which are suddenly released.

- Surgery in disaster contexts produces a large number of complex cases which, once released from the operating block, does not mean they can be released quickly from the hospital : wounds which need to be kept open and drained, bandages which need to be changed regularly, infections to keep under control etc. The fact that many injured people arrived in the medical units late, often several days after the catastrophe, caused many infection-related complications which needed to be managed. Very quickly, alongside the congestion in operation blocks, post-operation systems also became overloaded. In the end, it became impossible to manage the need to retreat many injuries, the carrying out of grafts and the treatment of serious infections like gangrene. The “simplest” solution was amputation.
- Medical boats (US Comfort, TDC Siroco and Spanish aircraft carriers) attempted to take some of the weight off the medical centres, but very quickly bottlenecks appeared in terms of transportation and the number of beds available. These bottlenecks were reduced, but not completely eliminated by airlifts to take serious cases from the US Comfort to Miami.
- Difficulties quickly appeared in implementing reference systems for the sick and lightly injured in what remained of the Haitian health system, a system, which we must remember, is to a great extent private and fee-paying.

#### 4.4. Difficulty in managing bodies and forensic pathology

The management of bodies, forensic pathology and funeral practices are among the most difficult factors in a post-disaster situation. There are environmental hygiene issues (including the management of odours), culturally and religiously sensitive issues, the treatment of trauma linked to events which people have experienced and the challenges of forensic pathology.

Before the earthquake around 300 burials were recorded per month in the cemeteries of Port-au-Prince. This figure, which is well below the mortality rate of a city of three million inhabitants, shows how many clandestine burials took place and how many bodies were taken to the person's village of origin.

Very quickly after the earthquake, local people removed the bodies which were accessible from the rubble and lay them along the road or path so that they could be recuperated by their loved ones. All at once, the city and its population found itself confronted with thousands of bodies, scattered all over the place, in various states of mutilation. After several days of inactivity, the morgues began to fill up with bodies even though there was no electricity to keep them cool, or ice to conserve them. Drastic measures were therefore needed. The bodies which had not been reclaimed by their families after three days were buried in collective graves after three days. These bodies were rarely identified and the deaths were rarely recorded. This will no doubt have repercussions in the future in terms of transfer of property, eligibility to receive funds from the Diaspora, but also in terms of the ability of families to mourn their dead properly.

For its part, the ICRC had very quickly imported more than 4000 body bags. Each embassy and mission sent forensic pathologists to identify the bodies of expatriates who had been killed. French forensic pathology staff who were rushed to Haiti and French Consulate staff proceeded with this difficult work.

Though it is clear that the decision to proceed with mass burials was necessary due to the situation, to help the population to recover, it is also clear that in cultures like Haiti, where spirituality and rites (including voodoo) are deeply ingrained, such a decision can also have major psychosocial repercussions.

## 5. THE “CLASSIC HUMANITARIAN ACTION” PHASE

### 5.1. Situation and needs assessments

The implementation of situation and needs assessments was difficult and complex. Though, during the first days, satellite images and new mechanisms for sending information to specialist mapping sites played a fundamental role, this became difficult when the available frequencies quickly became saturated. It was necessary to rapidly carry out field assessments, but there were not enough helicopters. The fact that the MINUSTAH's helicopters were not made available immediately for UNDAC's reconnaissance missions could have been compensated for if the MIC had identified this access constraint early enough and had notified the EU CPT which was being deployed at the time. A European solution could have been implemented.

Several activities were set in motion:

- **Remote assessments:** Several mechanisms were set up as soon as the “Satellite Charter” was activated. On the one hand because of UNOSAT, satellite imagery was immediately available. Teams immediately set about analysing it and carrying out an initial assessment of the damage. A specialist from a French team (CARTong) was immediately mobilised in Geneva at the headquarters of UNOSAT, while the organisation's Anglo-Saxon counterpart, Map-action was part of the reinforcement team sent to Haiti by UNDAC. This was essential to have an initial vision of the scale of damage, to identify and monitor population displacement in Port-au-Prince (monitoring of the setting up of temporary camps) and to use as the basis of the initial Flash Appeal. At this point, GPS and SMS calls made it possible to connect people in precarious and even dangerous situations, with the operational mapping which made it possible to direct the USAR teams.
- **Initial Rapid Assessment (IRA):** This IRA was set up by the Atlanta Center for Disease Control (CDC) at the request of OCHA and was based on a pre-established 15-page questionnaire. It provided a description of the situation at the end of January but was only available from 19 February.
- **The Rapid Interagency Needs Assessment in Haiti (RINAH).** The RINAH was the initiative of 3 NGOs and was supported by the Needs Assessment Task Force (NATF), which answers to the IASC<sup>12</sup>. It took place from 23 January to 6 February but the report was only published later for logistical, security and methodological reasons. The RINAH was based on a 12-page questionnaire which took one person three hours to go through (information recorded on PDA, brought back to the base in Port-au-Prince, then processed in the Atlanta CDC), and which involved more than 23 helicopter flights and 18 teams (a total of 128 people). Though it provides a massive amount of information, it is difficult to interpret and use operationally. Despite the considerable effort made by the RINAH team, this data was already out of date when the report came out. The issue of whether the information that was needed at this stage of rescue operations could have been obtained by other simpler, faster and cheaper means needs to be looked into. The results obtained were a little disappointing in relation to the 3 million US\$ that the RINAH cost.

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<sup>12</sup> IASC: Inter-agency Standing Committee for Humanitarian Action.

- **The evaluations carried out by each organisation:** In order to be able to prepare their operations and produce the detailed project documents that donors demand, NGOs and Red Cross national societies had to carry out ex-ante evaluations which allowed them to establish the key parameters of their future operations. The operational areas often overlapped and the same areas were frequently visited by several agencies.
- **Needs assessments carried out by the Clusters.** This process, which involves coordinating the needs assessments carried out by different organisations and discussing them within the Clusters, is central to the role of the Clusters, as this allows gaps and duplications to be identified.
- **The Post Disaster Needs Assessment (PDNA).** The PDNA is not directly linked to the emergency humanitarian response. In theory, it allows the assessment means of major donors (WB, EU, Inter-American Development Bank), CEPAL, the UN and the national authorities to be pooled. The Haitians have mixed views of previous PDNAs, such as those which followed the hurricanes of 2008, considering that a lot of energy and money was spent for very few results and little in the way of real reconstruction impact. This PDNA nevertheless led to an enormous financial commitment during the meeting of donors organised by the UN in New York on 31 March 2010.

The analysis of this assessment and evaluation process highlights three challenges:

**Time management:** the time factor is a classic problem of ex-ante evaluations due to the fact that contexts are very dynamic. In an acute crisis situation, it is fundamentally important to receive information rapidly even if it is only moderately reliable, rather than to have more precise information too late. When the data gathered in keeping with complex protocols aiming for statistical representativeness is finally processed and analysed, it has often lost part of its relevance and validity due to the speed with which the situation changes. When the report comes out it is often already obsolete.

**Taking into account the diversity of contexts:** One of the issues raised by rapid evaluations of this kind is the quality of analysis of the diversity of contexts. Even though Haiti is small, it has very varied landscapes, micro-economies and risks. The direct and indirect repercussions of the earthquake are very varied. Urban processes are very different between Port-au-Port, Jacmel, Léogane, etc. Many Haitians have left the destroyed cities to take refuge in different types of rural area where life is already very precarious. The Initial Rapid Assessment and the RINAH tried to cover the different zones as much as possible by using helicopters and a large number of Haitian assessors, but they quickly came up against the security management style of UNDSS in a “phase 3” security context<sup>13</sup> and logistical difficulties. It is hoped that the PDNA will give a more complete view of the direct and indirect impacts of the crisis in order to ensure that the most appropriate responses are brought in the right places.

**Going further than a simple needs assessment and carrying out a more holistic assessment:** one of the difficulties encountered is that it is often difficult to avoid the needs assessment dynamic, which is imposed by donors who want to know how to spend their money, in order to carry out a more complete analysis which includes a detailed and dynamic analysis of the situation, and focuses not only on local needs, but also on local capacities, and finally, the gathering of information which allows constraints to be taken into account.

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<sup>13</sup> The United Nations uses a system of phases, on a scale from 1 to 5, which specifies particular types of behaviour. These also correspond to different levels of risk bonus.



**SATELLITE-IDENTIFIED IDP CONCENTRATIONS, ROAD & BRIDGE OBSTACLES IN CENTRAL PORT-AU-PRINCE, HAITI (UPDATE 1)**

Operational Analysis with GeoEye-1 Data Acquired 13 January 2010 and QuickBird data acquired 4 March 2009

This work was done in support of the International Humanitarian Relief effort in Haiti following the earthquake on 12 January 2010. Initial IDP sites, bridges and road obstacles have been identified in GeoEye-1 imagery recorded on 13 January 2010. This is a preliminary analysis. It has not yet been validated in the field. Road and bridge designs have been identified and confirmed. Please send ground feedback to: UNOSAT/UNOSAT

**Legend**

- ▲ Likely Informal IDP Site
- ▲ Bridge & Road Obstacles
- ▲ Possible Contaminated Sites
- Likely Closed by Debris
- Likely Restricted by Debris
- ▲ Likely Informal IDP Site
- ▲ Bridge & Road Obstacles
- ▲ Possible Contaminated Sites
- Likely Closed by Debris
- Likely Restricted by Debris

**Map Scale for A3: 1:20,000**

UTM grid coordinates given in 100m intervals. Resolution: ground lines to 20 meter intervals. Background satellite imagery: QuickBird (2009) and GeoEye-1 (2010).

**Map Data © 2009 Google - Impressed with Google Map Maker**


The location and use of boundaries, geographic names and other data shown here are not intended to be an official UNOSAT map. UNOSAT is a program of the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR), providing satellite imagery and related geographic information, research and analysis to UN member states, UN development agencies and other humanitarian partners.

**UNOSAT**

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Map of Population Movements out of Port-au-Prince on 8 February 2010 (source OCHA)



## 5.2. Coordination by the national authorities

In a natural disaster context, national authorities are in charge of coordinating the response. In the case of the earthquake of 12 January, the implementation of coordination mechanisms was made particularly difficult due to the fact that the Haitian government, which had already been weak before the crisis, found itself in a very difficult situation. The COU, the permanent secretariat of the SNGRD and the DPC were themselves seriously affected. Though no Ministers were killed, many high-ranking civil servants and their families were very badly affected. With civil servants in a state of shock, offices destroyed, no or very little means of communication or transport, and often no electricity, the national administration was confronted with considerable challenges in order to function. The re-allocation of positions of responsibility in certain key units, including the SNGRD, after the earthquake did not make the task any easier.

The government instigated a system of regular meetings with the Prime Minister and the Interior Minister, with daily briefings with Heads of United Nations agencies and the Ambassadors of the main countries involved.

As was the case following the previous disasters in Haiti<sup>14</sup>, but to a greater degree, coordination between international actors (United Nations and international NGOs) and the national authorities and national NGOs was seriously weak for the emergency response. This had created a great deal of frustration in administrative bodies both at the national and regional levels. It appears that a dynamic of the same kind, was in place in the first weeks of the response, but probably even stronger due to the scale of international aid and the implementation of a coordination system at the MINUSTAH's "Log Base" (which took a lot of time and human resources, was conducted in English via internet and was situated in a site which was not easily accessible for Haitians). However, even though it was still weak and regularly faced problems of governance, the Haitian state had made significant progress since the end of the crisis of 2004-2005.

There have already been signs of irritation within the Haitian government, in the form of an increased tendency to drag its feet with certain decisions. And yet, even though the Haitian authorities had been badly hit themselves, they tried to take control of coordination. There is a danger that coordination without the Haitians will either become a source of real tension between the aid system and the government or a process which de-legitimises the Haitian state, which is already seriously weakened, due to the difficulty it has had in bringing a strong public voice to reassure the population.

## 5.3. The UN and the Cluster system

At the request of the new Special Representative of the General Secretary and Head of the MINUSTAH, the Security Council accepted to change the mandate of the MINUSTAH, placing support for the humanitarian response at its centre.

Compared to this quick reaction on the part of the UN at a political level, the response of the UN in terms of its civil humanitarian mechanism raised numerous questions.

On the one hand, on 15 January, OCHA launched a Flash Appeal for funds. Those who wrote the appeal told us that it was principally based on satellite data because UN, national and NGO staff were still in shock three days on and were not in a position to evaluate needs or the situation. Nevertheless, 12 NGOs and 16 UN agencies requested a total of 562 million US\$ to assist more than 3 million Haitians affected by the earthquake.


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<sup>14</sup> See the report of the evaluation carried out by Groupe URD/GPPI in October 2009.

This Flash Appeal was for funds for the first two phases of the response:

- Pursual of the emergency response;
- Beginning of the stabilisation process, when people are no longer directly in danger, with the difficult tasks of providing the millions of Haitians directly and indirectly affected by the disaster with shelter, food and protection.

To begin these operations, the *Central Emergency Response Fund* (CERF) allocated 25 million US\$. At the end of January, 82-90 % of the Flash Appeal was accounted for. Very quickly (18 February), a revised version of the Flash Appeal was drawn up and circulated amongst donors for a sum of 1.4 billion US\$. At the time of writing, 50% of this sum has been covered.



Things appear to have been more complicated in terms of operations. The Humanitarian Coordination system, led by a Humanitarian Coordinator who also has the roles of Resident Coordinator and Deputy Special Representative, was very badly affected by a series of deaths and family tragedies. One sign of the state of shock of the UN system in Haiti after the earthquake is that it took more than three weeks for the first inter-agency strategic coordination meeting to take place (Humanitarian Country Team and the IASC, including UN agencies, the Red Cross movement and NGOs). Reinforcements came much too late as it took more than a month for high-level support for the “Humanitarian Coordinator” to arrive in Port-au-Prince.

The launching of the Cluster system was quite quick, as the Clusters, which were activated in 2008 for the response to the hurricanes, were still active. The agencies already involved quickly took action to review the situation assessments that had been carried out up till then and the means available. Very quickly, these Clusters were submerged by the massive arrival of new NGOs, most of which did not know Haiti well and had non French-speaking personnel. The majority of Cluster meetings then began to be held in English (except for the WASH cluster – see below) and were therefore not very or not at all accessible to the vast majority of Haitians concerned (government, local NGOs,...).



United Nations agencies sent a large number of teams to set up Clusters. For these newly arrived teams, who were without operational means and whose movements were severely limited due to the



high level of insecurity that had been decreed (phase 3 on the United Nations security scale), the logistical base of the MINUSTAH, next to the airport, was a practical place to work as it had internet access, a variety of different meetings took place there except the WASH Cluster which was run by the Direction Nationale de l'Eau Potable et de l'Assainissement – DINEPA and it was a place where almost everyone passed through making it easy to establish contact. However, it was also something of a trap, as it cut people off from the outside.

The PDNA tent at the Log Base

The Clusters were confronted with serious challenges in terms of effectiveness due to the facilities available for meetings: 90 people in a large over-heated tent originally meant for 30 people, where it is almost impossible to hear what is being said, without maps on the walls or enough room to properly record announcements, and where the same messages have to be repeated several times due to the constant flow of new arrivals. It became normal practice to have more and more meetings.



The new arrivals had to live and work in very poor conditions. They had to live in tents in an area with a great deal of dust, which then was flooded, following the first rains of February. They had to wait several hours to have a shower, there were very few toilets available and there was constant noise due to the close proximity of the airport and planes taking off and landing every ten minutes. They had very little chance of talking to local people for linguistic reasons and their movements were limited due to the security measures. For all these reasons, they had difficulty in doing their work.

*The inter-agency meeting tent after the first rains*

The first direct repercussion of the United Nations' security measures was that access to the field was slowed down, both for needs assessments and for action, and security procedures around distributions were reinforced. But had the reality of a security problem and its causes been analysed? With serious shortages and aid slow in arriving, did the decision to establish displaced persons' camps which are practical in terms of logistics but can generate violence rather than providing support to mechanisms to disperse victims to their villages of origin create or reduce violence?

Managing a large-scale response to a natural disaster in a relatively unstable political context where there are security risks requires significant comprehension of the situation. It would appear that in order to manage the perceived risks linked to the context, the UN security system created others. Like the slowness and lack of visibility of governmental action, the tension created by aid that is inappropriate and slow can easily be recuperated for political ends and used to destabilise a situation, as happened in 2004-2005. That is no doubt where the real risk of insecurity lies and not in the re-activation of gangs, which, in the past, have been essentially linked to political agendas. In any case, this is one of the major concerns of the Haitian actors in charge of law and order, as the National Director of the Haitian Police clearly indicated to the evaluation team: "Any error made by the humanitarian sector can become a problem for me..."

The coordination system began to go round in circles and the scale of coordination efforts was oversized in relation to action.

During his visit to Haiti, the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC), Sir John Holmes, was able to see for himself the difficulties which existed. As a result, he sent an internal email to remobilise the UN system. Since then, everyone has been very active due to the effects of this email, which was widely printed in the media and sent shock waves all the way to Geneva.

It was in this difficult context that the United Nations were nevertheless brave enough not to hide from the truth. They faced up to the problems that existed and launched an inter-agency real-time evaluation in connection with the IASC.

#### 5.4. Mobilisation of NGOs and the Red Cross movement

NGOs mobilised themselves very quickly, some of them via their international networks (such as MSF international). DG ECHO very quickly allocated funds to NGOs who had signed the Framework Partnership Agreement.

A certain number of NGOs, like MSF, who were already solidly based in Haiti, were able to react on a large scale. They were able to deploy more than 300 medical staff with essential and very specialised support for the treatment of "crush syndrome" from branches like MSF Belgium.

Development NGO networks also mobilised themselves very quickly in connection with organisations from the Haitian Diaspora. In countries like Canada and the United States, the very large and active Diaspora advocated for aid to be sent.

In France, the *Centre de Crises* of the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs and the Ministry of Defence made places available on planes. The French general public, local authorities and businesses showed great generosity with their donations, though less than they had for the tsunami of 2004. The Fondation de France very quickly set up a fundraising operation for private donations via the mainstream media, raising more than 27 million Euros. This operation, which was seen as being monopolistic by a certain number of large NGOs who were developing their own mechanisms for collecting donations from the public led to the kind of controversy that is so common among French humanitarian NGOs<sup>15</sup>.

The arrival of a great number of particularly American international NGOs and large associations with very varied mandates and experiences (many of which are linked to Baptist churches) made coordination excessively complicated. In the first month, more than 1000 NGOs arrived in Haiti, of which less than 20% had the skills and equipment needed to deal with the challenges of the situation. Two major NGO coordination bodies (Interaction based in the United States and ICVA based in Geneva) tried to establish a number of key principles for NGO coordination.

For its part, the International Red Cross movement's response was massive, including the deployment of FACT teams, the mobilisation of more than 30 national Red Cross societies on the ground and involvement of Emergency Response Units for Water and Health. The activities of Red Cross societies were coordinated by the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC) in keeping with the Seville Agreement<sup>16</sup>.

#### 5.5. The operational response

The population first moved along the main roads of the cities which had been affected, then gathered in open spaces where there was little risk of accidents caused by further tremors. Further tremors did happen after 12 January, each time adding to the population's feeling of vulnerability. Many of these sites remained without help for a long time, and did not see any humanitarians for days, despite the fact that they could see and hear the constant coming and going of aeroplanes to and from the airport.

During the first days, access to water, food and even the most basic shelter was extremely problematic. Because aid was taking so long to arrive and conditions were so difficult, tens of thousands of people followed the government's advice to leave the capital to find refuge in rural areas and small towns which had not been directly affected by the earthquake or where they had family. This large-scale displacement to the countryside and the arrival of problems linked to displaced persons camps in rural areas put enormous pressure on the resources of these areas. The solidarity of the host population led to the using up of stocks - the sharing and eating of agricultural produce which they would otherwise have sold to gain income for their families.

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<sup>15</sup> British, Canadian and Belgian NGOs created joint fund-raising mechanisms (DEC in London, Coalition Humanitaire in Canada, 2020 in Belgium) whereas in countries like Switzerland, an independent fund-raising system, the "Chaîne de Bonheur", played the role of fund-raiser and re-distributor.

<sup>16</sup> Under the Seville Agreement, coordination of Red Cross operations is the responsibility of the ICRC in conflict situations and of the IFRC in natural disaster contexts.

### Water and sanitation:

Access to water has always been a major problem in Port-au-Prince. Water networks are made up of a myriad of little distribution systems, with water fountains and small water treatment stations (various systems exist, such as reverse osmosis systems combined with UV tubes and recently by colloidal silver) and a private system of water supply tankers. These water treatment systems do not allow persistent purification, and therefore there is a high risk of the type of pollution which is usually avoided via chlorination when the water is transferred using trucks, pipes, jerry cans, etc. Though chlorination is safer, water treatment by inverse osmosis is favoured for reasons of taste.

Staff of Haitian institutions like the CAMEP<sup>17</sup> were directly affected by the earthquake, but luckily, the infrastructure and staff of the national body in charge of water, the *Direction Nationale de l'eau potable et de l'assainissement* (DINEPA), were not (the DINEPA is based in the higher parts of Petion Ville, an area that was largely unaffected by the earthquake). The DINEPA took action in the hours following the earthquake to encourage the private sector to take part in the distribution of water, first for free, then via subsidies. The DINEPA began distributing water on 14 January and attempted to harmonise the fees that the private companies were charging humanitarian organisations for “water trucking” activities. Unfortunately, certain NGOs had already negotiated high fees and so these were revised upwards for everyone. Nevertheless, this allowed water distribution to begin.



The first water purification units began to arrive, with a great deal of unsuitable equipment. The DINEPA tried to stop the arrival of a large number of treatment units and to keep only those that were suitable for different types of water points. It sent a certain number of actors to areas outside Port-au-Prince, where the context is different and where classical solutions could be applied. For example, the water purification unit installed by *Pompier Humanitaires* between Gressier and Léogane was much more useful there than in Port-au-Prince. However, the most useful equipment to arrive was the bladders which could easily be installed in the field near water sources with multi-tap distribution ramps.

Distribution of potable water (Groupe URD, 2010)

<sup>17</sup> *Compagnie d'Aménagement et de Maintenance pour l'Eau Potable.*



Past links between French companies like SUEZ and the Haitian water systems were revived with the arrival on the ground of a reserve officer who had previously worked for SUEZ and who was made available to the DINEPA to provide support in repairing the water conveyance network. Relatively quickly, in keeping with the extraordinary resilience of the Haitian people, the little water treatment and bottling plants starting working again. The Léogane network, which had not functioned for years, was restored thanks to the crisis that followed the earthquake.

Luckily, the DINEPA had just received two large pieces of funding. The donors, the Inter-American Development Bank and the Spanish Government, immediately gave their approval that the funds could be used for the response to the earthquake.

The issue of sanitation quickly became problematic. The usual humanitarian response and technical standards are not adapted to urban contexts. The technical solutions that were applied (chemical or emptiable toilets) require the forms of management and logistical backup of the private or municipal sectors rather than the humanitarian sector (a lesson which was already learned after the 2004 tsunami). The mobile toilets which were brought in via private companies also represent considerable maintenance costs: between 40 and 50 US dollars/day. The issue of the evacuation of waste will need to be considered from a global perspective when deciding where to establish sites for displaced persons.



*Toilets on the Champs de Mars (Groupe URD, 2010)*

### **Food distribution and economic security:**

In many areas, the food situation rapidly became critical as access to food had become very difficult. This explains in part the pillaging which took place in the first days. During some of the initial food distributions (of which a significant proportion consisted of Ready to Eat Meals, which often include a cooking kit in the packaging) there was chaos and tension because they were poorly prepared (conducted from the back of trucks). Food drops by helicopter and parachute were disasters (the latter being more in the area around the airport than in Port-au-Prince itself). This tumultuous start to the food aid actions created the feeling that humanitarian action was going to be very difficult to put in place.





The military took a more dominant role as a result and a general food aid distribution system was set up on 16 sites under the control of the MINUSTAH or the US army. The World Food Programme and USAID tried to make their implementing partners carry out their distributions from these sites. Some accepted, but others did not, such as large American NGOs like ADRA, World Vision, CARE and CRS.

*Food aid is distributed under military supervision (Groupe URD, 2010)*

Distributions without a military escort or presence were carried out by a number of NGOs, such as those who were both experienced and were not dependent on US funds or the WFP. These NGOs believe in working in close collaboration with communities and applying a form of social engineering around distributions. It would seem that this approach gives positive results.

The most important issue for debate is that of the potential negative effects of this mass distribution on the local rural economy which normally provides Port-au-Prince with food produce. Though the Haitian people are very resilient, they are also quite dependent on complex solidarity networks which affect access to aid, flows of money from the Diaspora and urban/rural relations. There is always a risk that aid, despite being necessary, will weaken the mechanisms between producers and consumers as well as resilience mechanisms. This risk was regularly cited in interviews. On the other hand, the evaluation team was able to observe this dynamic relation between the cities and the countryside in the form of fresh produce which arrived in the capital. The increase in the price of food, linked to the increase in the price of transportation (fuel) and the reduction in the number of sellers, was significant but not critical and the price of certain products was beginning to go down at the time of the evaluation.



*Street seller in Port-au-Prince (Groupe URD, 2010)*

However, it is very important to watch these areas carefully because social solidarity mechanisms have used up stocks (see survey results). It is also important to keep an eye on market prices as these can be affected by food distribution.

The impact of population displacement towards small towns and rural areas will be an important point to take into account for the response. This displacement was encouraged by the authorities because it helped to unblock Port-au-Prince and reduce the pressure on resources and the risk of unrest. Nevertheless, people often pointed out that stocks had been depleted as a result of this transfer of people towards the countryside. One of the major challenges ahead will be the coordination of action in relation to food and economic security. Before the earthquake, there was a dual food aid coordination system, with one led by the World Food Programme within the ad hoc Cluster, and the other run by USAID for American NGOs and implementing partners. This system of two parallel coordination systems continued to function after 12 January, but the American NGOs were forced to take part in the Food Aid Cluster coordination system. It will be important to keep an eye on the repercussions of this situation.

### **The housing and emergency shelter sector:**

This sector appeared to be the most difficult to get going. More than a month after the tragedy, more than 60% of the displaced persons in and around Port-au-Prince had received no aid, no plastic sheeting or tents and were still in the sun, in makeshift shelters made with sheets, or, at best, with found corrugated iron sheets, but without any genuine protection from the rain which had begun to fall every night.



Several factors contributed to this terrible situation. The first of these was the amount of debate over what to do. It seems that the debates revolved around issues which were not fundamental (are plastic sheets or tents needed?). The global tent market was quickly under pressure. One of the lessons which came out of many operations of this kind is that transitory shelters often become long-term shelters.

### *Makeshift shelters in Gressier*

Hours and hours of coordination meetings took place on this issue. The questions discussed included whether or not to relocate IDP sites, whether to provide plastic sheeting or tents, whether or not to build new houses immediately, where the houses should be built, the type of urban planning which should be applied, land ownership constraints and who owned the land which would be suitable for new IDP sites. It is true that it was necessary to wait for the Haitian government to decide where the displaced persons could be relocated to and what policy it was going to adopt with regard to population movement to rural areas, etc.



Meanwhile, it seems that immediate needs were forgotten about. Plastic sheeting and tents had not been ordered and people were still living in shelters made with sheets suspended between four stakes, while experts were busy writing the third “concept paper” on plans and options for transitional shelters. The OIM, which was initially given the task of coordinating these activities, soon found itself unable to cope, and was replaced as Cluster lead by the IFRC. It will be important to follow how things develop in this area. If the actions carried out are unsuccessful, the socio-political repercussions could be considerable.



It should be noted that one of the points which was beginning to be discussed during the Groupe URD field visit was that of the future of the IDP sites. Past examples of free zones in areas affected by natural disasters in Central America and the Caribbean (Honduras, San Salvador) have often been disastrous. These tax-exempt zones are often areas where labour law is not respected, often, at best, referred to as *maquilas*, and, at worst, as *sweat shops*. For this reason, NGOs are somewhat worried about the two large-scale US programmes, HOPE and HOPE 2.


**Health sector:**

6 days after the earthquake, the WHO had registered 18 hospital units able to provide basic healthcare, thanks to support from NGOs, armed forces (US, France, Canada, Santo Domingo, etc.) and health teams supporting the USAR. After the emergency surgery phase and difficult post-operative care had been dealt with, the medical sector began to focus on the main priorities of this kind of situation:

- The epidemiological monitoring system, which was being implemented before the earthquake with the WHO and the Pan-American Health Organisation (PAHO), was re-activated. It should be noted that very quickly, and for the first time, it was the WHO which announced that the much talked-about large-scale post-disaster epidemic was, in fact, a myth for the most part. However, the setting up of the epidemiological surveillance system is an important issue.
- A return to healthcare fundamentals in refugee, IDP, shanty-town and extreme poverty situations (high density population, heightened risk of contagious diseases being transmitted – tuberculosis, which was already common before the disaster, acute respiratory diseases which will be even more common due to makeshift shelters and the arrival of the rainy season, heightened risk of water-related diseases or transmission vectors – dengue fever, etc.);
- A return to small-scale surgery fundamentals and obstetrics in a context of predominantly private healthcare.

Generally, in Haiti, you have to pay to gain access to healthcare and it is too expensive for many Haitians. Nevertheless, this sector is a large source of jobs. The instigation of free medical aid is crucial, due to the level of extreme poverty, but would threaten the viability of numerous medical centres. How to deal with these two issues is extremely delicate.

## Map of Health sector activities





## 5.6. Civil-Military coordination

The issue of Civil-Military relations in humanitarian action once again came to the fore due to the massive deployment of the US army in the days following the earthquake. The other forces present (France, Spain, Canada, Latin-American countries, etc.) remained much more discreet and focused on temporary logistical support and the providing medical care on ships (including a Spanish aircraft carrier which arrived at the end of January). Counting the 10000 men of the MINUSTAH, more than 30000 soldiers were involved in these operations. The Haitian state itself does not have any armed forces.



This has been a nagging issue in Haiti for a long time due to the international military interventions that took place between 1990 and 2000, (principally involving the US, but also with a French contingent) and the presence of the MINUSTAH and its involvement in humanitarian activities in previous years, depending on the objectives of the Humanitarian and Development Section of the Mission.

### **Objectives of the Humanitarian and Development Section of the MINUSTAH before the earthquake**

- To provide support to the DSRSG/RC/HC, in response to humanitarian and development needs.
- To maintain the MINUSTAH's capacity to respond in the event of disasters by providing the necessary support in terms of communication, logistics and security to the humanitarian community and the government.
- To provide support for disaster preparedness and response through active participation in the Departmental Committee for Risk and Disaster Management (CDGRD) and coordinate the MINUSTAH's response with governmental structures, the United Nations system and other humanitarian actors.
- To take part in joint evaluations in disaster-affected areas to evaluate the damage, identify needs and propose solutions.
- To provide the government with support in establishing and consolidating a Departmental Coordination Mechanism, strengthening the capacity of the MPCE and government civil servants through training on governance, to plan, coordinate and monitor the provision of social services.
- To reinforce strategic planning and management capacity at the national and regional level, via integrated development plans and with a participatory approach: government, civil society, NGOs and international organisations.
- To support local government at the departmental level to take part in strategic discussions and to develop sector-based plans for the department.
- To answer questions concerning humanitarian action from the humanitarian community or sections of the MINUSTAH.
- To advocate for the protection of vulnerable groups who have been marginalised with regard to the distribution of assistance or in terms of the violation of rights.
- To collaborate with OCHA and the government's departmental offices to collect and validate humanitarian information.



During the acute emergency phase and the progressive implementation of a classic humanitarian response, several questions were raised:

- As there is no national army, how were armies arriving to take part in the post-earthquake response supposed to collaborate with the national civil authorities?;
- How were the different armed forces supposed to collaborate with the MINUSTAH's military component?
- And finally, how were they supposed to organise themselves in relation to the civil humanitarian machine (Haitian institutions, UN humanitarian agencies, NGOs, Red Cross movement, etc.)?

Though the principle of using military means for a rapid response in natural disaster contexts where there are large-scale logistical requirements is no longer really questioned as such<sup>18</sup>, any hidden political agendas and issues of perception still need to be analysed. Very quickly, in response to concerns about the risk of mounting insecurity, but also in the context of internal agendas linked to the presence of a large Haitian Diaspora in the United States, the US army deployed a large military presence, with more than 20000 Marines in the areas in a few days. Soon afterwards, they were joined by troops from other countries in the region (Canada and countries from Central American and the Southern Cone) for whom there were also political stakes at play in relation to issues such as Latin-American-Caribbean solidarity or relations with Cuba.

Collaboration between the humanitarian sector and the Police component of the MINUSTAH, set up by UNPol, was easier to manage due to the greater collaboration between UNPol and the Haitian police. The initial mandate, which essentially concerned the professionalization of the Haitian National Police Force and the training of its officers, was re-orientated after the earthquake. The police component of the Mission is now mainly responsible for the security of humanitarian convoys and organises patrols around and within the 425 IDP camps. In addition, UNPol and the Haitian police have increased the number of patrols in areas where there are banks or money transfer institutions as these are the basis of many Haitians' resilience, allowing them to receive money from the Diaspora. UNPol has also carried out patrols in sensitive areas (Cité Soleil, near the airport) where several UN agencies and NGOs carrying out operations have warehouses. Before the earthquake, France contributed to UNPol activities in Haiti with 61 police officers and gendarmes and 2 military officers in the MINUSTAH. France argued strongly in favour of strengthening the European engagement within the MINUSTAH for this essential peacekeeping mission. The European detachment which is due to be deployed in February 2010 will include 73 French gendarmes, which will bring the total number of French police officers and military police deployed to 130.

The involvement of the US armed forces via the Joint Task Force and other US Army mechanisms has been massive in terms of deployment and involvement in humanitarian operations, to such an extent that it has created a certain amount of unease among NGOs. The US army signed an agreement with the MINUSTAH and took part more and more in humanitarian action as an "exit strategy" for security actions. This took place via several mechanisms, the most important of these being the Coordination Support Committee (CSC) in terms of strategy and the changing of the Joint Operations Center (JOC), under OCHA, into the Joint Operations and Tasking Center (JOTC) in order to offer humanitarian agencies logistical and security services.

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<sup>18</sup> For example, as soon as a clear reference is made to the Oslo Guidelines on the use of military assets in natural disaster response. These guidelines clarify the areas in which military and civil defence assets (MCDA) should be used, define the kind of relations armed forces should establish with the state receiving aid (in the form of a set agreement document) and establish rules with regard to the concept of "last resort".

The use of the JOTC has been discussed in OCHA's Civil-military unit. The French army appears to have been totally absent from these discussions even when a CIMIC officer was present. The perception within French CIMIC circles seems to have remained close to what was known, not long ago, as ACM (civilian actions at the service of the army) and they appear not to have got used to the idea of coordination in contexts where bilateral/multilateral coordination can be essential.


#### 5.7. Donor coordination

A certain number of humanitarian donors, such as DG ECHO or USAID's Office for Disaster Assistance (OFDA) were extremely quick to react as they were already present in numbers in Haiti. Very quickly, in the field and in headquarters, inter-donor coordination mechanisms were put into place:

- In the field, daily coordination of the main donors was put in place, involving mainly the consolidated team of DG ECHO (4 people), DFID, USAID and Canada. France is not very strongly involved in this multi-donor coordination. Donor meetings regularly bring together the delegations of different bilateral donors who are present in large numbers in Port-au-Prince. Due to their good connections with NGOs and UN agencies, and their regular presence in Cluster meetings, these donors played a major role in adding greater dynamism to the aid effort, including during the visit of the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs, Sir John Holmes. Also worthy of note was the initiative by Spain, which, in the context of its Presidency of the European Union, sent a team into the field to help coordinate European activities. This created a certain amount of tension due European re-organisation in connection with the Treaty of Lisbon.
- At the headquarters level: multi-donor coordination mechanisms were set in motion and led to a complex process of international conferences. The principle of respecting the Haitian government's sovereignty in implementing humanitarian and reconstruction aid was underlined at the first of these conferences, which took place in Montreal. In the final declaration of the conference, the participants made a commitment to adopting a coordinated, coherent and global approach to respond to the immediate and longer-term needs of the Haitian people. In addition, the participants established a road map for the reconstruction of Haiti which will involve a series of preparatory conferences (NGOs, regional authorities, private sector) leading up to an international conference of donors and partners in March at UN headquarters in March, led by the Haitian government, with support from the key contributors, such as Canada, Brazil, the USA, the EU, Spain and France.
- At the global level, the tool which allows different countries and potential contributors to see what funding has already received is the Financial Tracking Service (FTS), which was set up by OCHA. Organised by country, sector and project, this information on funding gives an idea of the generosity of different countries, and where their interests lie, geographically and in terms of sectors. It also allows funding to be coordinated and duplications to be avoided while increasing the chances that gaps in funding will be filled.
- NGOs also managed to raise significant amounts, either directly or via campaigns like the one run by the Fondation de France. Only the Fondation de France, which raised around 27 million Euros, communicated openly about the level of funds that it was receiving.

### 5.8. The operational timeline

Groupe URD has established a typical timeline for a response to a medium- to large-scale natural disaster, based on numerous evaluations and field studies. The key events of the response are shown in black in the diagram below. The arrows and dates in red show the sequence of events for the response to the Haiti earthquake.



The sequence of events in the Haiti response shows that the system reacted more quickly than in a typical situation. The deployment of the USAR teams, of NGOs and of coordination mechanisms was, in effect, faster. Unfortunately, this does not necessarily mean that the overall response was faster.

We also can see that rehabilitation also comes onto the agenda much earlier, as the result of work that has been done on early recovery, for example. This is a positive development and is the result of numerous recommendations in different evaluations. However, in this case, it would appear that humanitarian needs which had not yet been properly covered were consequently overlooked.


Once again, this response revealed the importance of the links between time (continuum) and space (contiguity) and between the immediate response, what could have been or should have been done before (mitigation, preparedness and risk reduction policies) and what will need to be done. Haiti is a perfect illustration of a subject on which there has been significant progress in terms of ideas, but where these are slow to be applied in practice.

- Lessons learned from other disasters: it is important to think about post-emergency and rehabilitation phases early on.
- Such considerations must be based on real needs on the ground or we can lose sight of the fact that the « humanitarian » phase is far from over.
- How can we improve the way we take into account the Haitians' points of view and provide them with support in the assessment of needs and how they develop? (Technical assistant in the Prime Minister's team, as has already been done on a temporary basis with someone from the French Development Agency, participation in the PDNA, etc.).

## 6. MANAGING FUTURE RISKS AND NEEDS

### 6.1. The risks ahead

There are a certain number of predictable risks in connection with the rainy season, which usually takes place in March/April, but, in fact, began at the beginning of February, and the hurricane season, which begins in June. Various specialists also fear aftershocks of the earthquake in the weeks ahead. How will the population react?



Others are more complex, and are the result of a number of factors such as those which caused a small oil slick in the port of Carrefour.

Will the IDP sites be able to cope? Will the aid sector be capable of anticipating and reacting? Will it show resilience in the face of these risks? Is the humanitarian aid being implemented strengthening or weakening the resilience of the Haitian state, municipal institutions, communities and individuals with regard to these risks?

The table below, which was drawn up during the evaluation mission, describes the particular characteristics of these different risks:

Types of risks	Description	Probability	Level of preparedness
Climatic risks	Management of the rains to come which are going to make people's lives more difficult and increase health risks (those linked to sanitation and those linked to acute respiratory diseases or the increased number of vectors of certain diseases – dengue fever, etc.)	Very high	Low
	Management of the hurricane season which theoretically begins in June and usually ends in November. There are fears that the hurricanes will be violent this year due to perturbations to the El Nino – La Nina system <sup>19</sup> .	High	Medium to high
Geological risks	Management of geological and geomorphological perturbations linked to shearing, the creation of weak points and the risk of solifluction flow.	High	Low
Seismic risks	Management of seismic aftershocks <sup>20</sup> which have continued regularly since the earthquake on 12 January	Uncertain, but perceived to be high	Low
Socio-political risks	Development of insecurity linked to popular discontent which is exploited for political ends	Not insignificant, but should not be exaggerated	Medium (taking into account the MINUSTAH and the presence of armies from different countries)
Technicological risks	Related accident of a technological nature (like the management of the oil slick in Carrefour port)	Uncertain	Low

<sup>19</sup> Meteorological phenomena which affect the Atlantic between the Caribbean and South-East Asia with alternating dry and rainy phases, with the potential for hurricanes depending on the thermal flow within the ocean.

<sup>20</sup> A tremor of 4.4 on the Richter scale was felt at 6.16 am in Port-au-Prince on 26 January.




## 6.2. Predictable developments in terms of needs

In addition to the risks presented above, there are the predictable and known ways in which needs develop in situations like these.

The graph below, established by Groupe URD, presents typical ways in which problems and needs develop in post-disaster contexts. In the case of Haiti, particular importance has been given to the analysis of risks in relation to:

- respiratory diseases: the living conditions in IDP sites and shelters, which are over-crowded and have a high level of socio-economic insecurity, make it very likely that the number of cases of acute respiratory diseases will explode;
- future psycho-social problems: the Haitian population has undergone a major shock and managing the mourning, the pain, the prolonged contact with death and the difficulties involved in dealing with the bodies of loved ones who died could cause problems, the scale of which will only become clear in several months.



Finally, it will be important to provide proper medical, psycho-social and economic assistance for the handicapped. One of the effects of the earthquake has been to cause a large number of physical and psychological injuries (crushed limbs, badly treated gangrene, etc.) The psychological scars which will appear in the future will also be significant. And yet, there is very little capacity to deal with this kind of handicap. What is more, in a country which was already so poor and where unemployment was already so high, work opportunities for such a large number of handicapped people are virtually non-existent.

## 7. RECOMMENDATIONS

### 7.1. The need to be realistic

At a time when budgets are shrinking and the General Review of Public Policies (RGPP) has forced public bodies in France to get by, in the most favourable scenarios, with frozen budgets and the future economic situation is not at all clear, to talk of “prevention”, “preparedness” and “investment” is not very popular. But in the face of the risks ahead, we must repeat President Kennedy’s words when he was defending his education reform: “If you think education is too expensive, try ignorance”.

It is with this in mind, and with realism tempered by a lack of knowledge about the budgetary mechanisms which apply to large public bodies that the following recommendations were drawn up. Some of them are aimed at France; others are aimed at the international system for responding to crises and disasters.

### 7.2. Prioritising preparedness and anticipation

#### **Create a permanent inter-ministerial body:**

The Post-tsunami DIPT/CPT<sup>21</sup> showed the importance of an inter-ministerial mechanism which can make it easier to mobilise resources from the different ministries and share information. Under the aegis of the Prime Minister, a body of this kind, of variable size, which could be activated very quickly and with a genuine coordination role, would have improved the interaction between the Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs (MAEE), the Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence during the acute emergency phase, and, for example, would have allowed the CPCO’s *Cellule de Crise* to be activated more quickly. The essential information for activities, which is available either at the MAEE or with the CPCO’s “geography” section, would no doubt have been given to the COGIC more quickly during the DICA deployment phase. The nomination of Ambassador Pierre Duquesne on 15 January 2010, with a team based at the MAEE but with a mandate to coordinate and supervise French institutional operations for the reconstruction of Haiti, was very quick, but only resolved part of the problem, and not, for example, the problem of information management from one crisis to the next and speed of reaction at the beginning of a crisis.

#### **Strengthen operations in high-risk areas:**

Preparedness is a key issue (training and equipment, the role of geographical positioning) both in high-risk countries and at the regional level. This would be an opportunity to use French “geographical ties” in the world.

#### **Create a « Civil Protection» position in high-risk countries or by region or group of countries:**

This position could be filled by Civil Protection attachés whether or not they are residents in high-risk areas or by defence attachés or humanitarian correspondents if they are trained for such a position. The objectives of the “Civil Protection” position would be to establish networks before crises and to very rapidly advise the ambassador in matters of Civil Protection. As indicated above, several different mechanisms can be used depending on the context. The need for them to collaborate regularly with the defence attachés (again, whether resident or not) or the defence attachés direct involvement in the setting up of the “Civil Protection” position would strengthen the links between the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of the Interior as a key to managing large-scale disaster situations.

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<sup>21</sup> *Délégation interministérielle post-tsunami / Coordination post-tsunami*. These are bodies which were set up in France from the end of January 2005 till the end of 2006 to coordinate the actions of the different French Ministries, and establish overall coherence between state institutions, regional authorities and NGOs. The DIPT/CPT also acted as an interface between the French administration and the main bilateral and multilateral mechanisms involved in the post-tsunami reconstruction.

### 7.3. Developing the right tools to improve the international response

#### **Strengthen the capacity of national institutions**

While aid organisations, including the United Nations, made an effort to strengthen their tools and working conditions, nothing was done to ensure that the capacity of national bodies was strengthened so that they could assume leadership. Announcements about the “role of the Haitian state” remained a dead letter to a great extent despite the fact that the “DINEPA model” showed that, with adequate support, the Haitian institutions could play an essential role. It would have been possible to send detachments of experts to provide support, “offices in a box”, etc. but the absence of a strategic and systemic analysis of post-earthquake capacities led to the current strategy.

#### **Encourage police-based rather than military-based management of insecurity**

It is an error to want to manage insecurity in a context like Haiti by deploying foreign military forces when the real objective should be to implement police mechanisms. Whereas, due to a legitimate concern with their own protection, military forces function on the basis of dissuasion, police forces are generally closer to the population, more capable of conducting investigations, anticipating rising violence and identifying threats and groups or individuals who need to be “contained”. In a disaster context, it is more appropriate to show empathy for the population, to maintain law and order using “soft” methods rather than to use intimidation. This is all the more important in Haiti due to the fact that the series of international military operations which have taken place in the last decade have not necessarily left the population with a very positive image of military forces.

#### **Do not be too hasty in deciding the humanitarian phase is over: continue to closely monitor the needs of the population**

Tropical rain had begun to fall during the mission, showing the extreme vulnerability of the population. A large proportion of the displaced persons and victims in Port-au-Prince, but also in Léogane, Gressier, etc. were still sleeping in shelters made with sheets and rags when the rain began to fall and the situation has only improved very slowly since then.



IDP site in Port-au-Prince (Groupe URD, 2010)

It is important to ensure that funds are still available to reduce this vulnerability and to not jump to the conclusion that the emergency relief phase is over, even though it is useful to plan what comes afterwards.

#### 7.4. Organising France's speed of reaction

##### **Initial assessment (sharing information between Ministries, mobilising experts in a matter of hours)**

In this kind of situation, there is a tendency to prioritise the deployment of staff and equipment rather than to carry out a detailed analysis of the context. Though, on the face of it, this appears appropriate in the context of an earthquake in an urban area, numerous evaluations have shown that, in fact, the lack of initial assessment often leads to the sending of useless or unsuitable equipment which contributes to the congestion and blocking of airports and warehouses at critical points in the response. Not taking into account logistical constraints and local capacities (both Haitian institutions and civil society) leads in the end to important delays and problems of quality. Better initial assessments ensure that the equipment sent will be appropriate and will be able to be used for more in-depth assessments (light vehicles, motorbikes, quad bikes and aircraft) and also ensure that the initial response is appropriate. It appears that the initial assessment, which can be rapid and carried out remotely using satellite imagery, maps and previously identified experts, was not properly done, in reality. It is at this stage of the initial assessment that one of the most fundamental inter-ministerial issues takes place: pooling information and mobilising in-house experts and external networks of expertise.

##### **Accelerate access to fast means of transport**

One constraint which is systematically present when long distance deployments take place is that of rapid access to vectors which make it possible to get the necessary equipment and logistical support. The activation of the Ministry of Defence's *Cellule de Crise* is primordial in this respect to mobilise the military assets needed to support civilian operations. However, this mobilisation is also dependent on political decisions, so it is important to maintain a permanent inter-ministerial mechanism to manage crises.

##### **Improve the coordination between « search and rescue » and « disaster medicine/post-operative care »**

It is important to systematically think about giving the response the right proportion in terms of « search and rescue – disaster medicine and post-operative care » with regard to bottlenecks which are either predictable (initial assessment) or are identified during the first hours of the response (rapid situation assessment). This requires both reflection about the instruments which should be deployed for the response in terms of disaster surgery (ESCRIM, ACA, etc.) and in terms of post-operative care (tents and beds, coordination strategy with the local institutions or those supported by other actors, etc.).

##### **Support NGO operations**

In Haiti, French NGOs often responded to the needs of the population effectively and rapidly, because they were very quickly operational (they were able to use military and civil means of transport, the use of which is coordinated by the MAEE, and they were able to create their own base rather than set up at the Log Base), because of important strategic choices (no escort for distributions but intense preparation for their operations with the communities on the ground). This gave them a good operational capacity which could have been increased if further funds had been available quickly.

##### **Treat the Post Traumatic Stress (PTS) of staff deployed**

Many individuals involved in the first weeks of the response will be affected by these events for the rest of their lives. It is important that they are provided with support, with someone to listen to them, and that they are provided with treatment if cases of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder are detected.

### 7.5. Building and consolidating credibility

#### **Monitor and support the development of the MIC/EU-CPT**

This is the first crisis to have taken place under the new European system (the MIC has passed to ECHO and the nomination of the EU High Representative): it should therefore be monitored in detail to ensure that lessons are properly drawn from it. Following a proposal made by President Jacques Chirac and the recommendations of the Barnier report, France has been promoting the idea of a European Civil Protection force to conduct operations in disaster contexts, but this idea raises numerous questions. Similarly, initiatives like the Red Helmets need to be analysed in detail in order to establish whether or not they have a valid role. The difficulty of implementing the European Defence Policy and the regular problems encountered when creating peacekeeping forces shows that this is a complex issue. There is a need to clarify the extent to which different partners accept collective decisions, the leadership and mobilisation mechanisms involved and their related cost and whether these have a real comparative advantage.

#### **Reinforce France's involvement in and support for UNDAC**

Even though almost a third of the USAR teams deployed were French, there is no mention of the work they carried out in the UNDAC report on the deployment following the earthquake. This obviously raises two questions: what coordination existed between French Civil Protection teams and UNDAC? The evaluation team considers this to have been extremely weak. It is imperative that more French representatives are present in UNDAC and French Civil Protection teams need to be systematically provided with training on UNDAC mechanisms and procedures. Even if Europe is given precedence over the UN, it is still important because most European teams use the UNDAC standards<sup>22</sup>.

#### **Reinforce France's involvement in OCHA (NY and Geneva) and within Bill Clinton's team for the current crisis**

Currently, the involvement of France in OCHA and UN mechanisms is minimal, despite the fact that the UN has had great difficulty in finding enough French-speaking personnel since the beginning of operation «Haiti». It is also important that France becomes involved in the coordination mechanism implemented by the UN Secretary General Special Envoy, former US President, Bill Clinton<sup>23</sup>.

#### **Make sure there are French representatives in OCHA's Civil-Military unit:**

This unit acts as an interface to facilitate relations between civilian and military actors when integrated missions take place or there are a large number of military actors involved in a humanitarian crisis. This has been observed in contexts such as the deployment of EUFOR and MINURCAT in Chad, or in Afghanistan, where OCHA's Civil-Military team acts as an important interface in the dialogue between humanitarian organisations, UNAMA and NATO. In Haiti, it acts as a buffer between humanitarians and the large US army contingent and the MINUSTAH. In this area, as is the case in many others in Haiti, there is a serious shortage of French speakers in the United Nations.

#### **Avoid sending special envoys who do not have any real added value:**

In situations like these, where assets and know-how must be focused, there is no place for anything that weakens authority, wastes time, does not bring anything useful and weakens the credibility of the organisations involved.

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<sup>22</sup> In fact, the first UNDAC teams to go to Port-au-Prince were deployed using European Civil Protection aircraft, such as the B-FAST.

<sup>23</sup> Who is also the Special Envoy of President Obama, and who has raised considerable funds for Haiti via his Foundation.



## New constraints, new tools

### **The key issues of operations in urban contexts<sup>24</sup>**

The earthquake in Haiti once again underlined how complex humanitarian action is in cities, in the acute emergency phase as well as in the stabilisation and reconstruction phases. Humanitarian actors are not used to dealing with the specific characteristics of disasters in cities (population density, management of medical care, logistics and transport, urban forms of violence, relations with the authorities and social structures, methods of economic survival and access to energy, the role of telecommunications, etc.) and this represents a vast area of research to be invested. It is to be noted that the *Angers Ecole du Génie* organised a conference on this subject in 2009 (see annex n°4).

### **New information technology applied to disaster management**

Whereas the famine in Ethiopia in 1985 led to the advent of “showbiz” humanitarian action and the response to the tsunami in 2004 brought in the age of donations made via mobile phones, the Haiti crisis of January 2010 is the crisis of Facebook and Twitter, but also the intensive use of satellite images and SMSs. The range of tools which is being developed (communications satellites and satellite operators like TSF, Eutelsat, Immersat, Iridium; satellites which collect and process images like UNITAR and those run by university centres, etc. and social networks, new SMS tools and “User Generated contents” such as Frontline SMS, USHAIDI and SAHANA) will need to be monitored at the strategic and technological levels.

### **Look into ways of improving local disaster management!**

It is worth noting the considerable cost of deploying international Civil Protection units. The cost of deploying the fifty or so international search and rescue teams needs to be compared to the limited number of people who were saved. Everything that can contribute to improving the local response, even if this requires an initial investment, allows both significant gains in terms of effectiveness and, major savings in the long term. National and local Civil Protection units, prefecture and municipal entities, as well as national Red Cross societies and their numerous volunteers need to be given greater support.

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<sup>24</sup> Groupe URD has published three books on the subject: *Villes en guerre et guerres en villes*, 2004, Karthala; *Après le Tsunami : reconstruire l'habitat en Aceh*, 2010, Karthala; *Villes afghanes : les défis de la reconstruction*, 2010, Karthala.

## CONCLUSION

The mission that Groupe URD was given by the DAS was unusual in that, for the first time, a civilian non-governmental organisation specialised in the evaluation of humanitarian action was asked to critically analyse a complex operation in which the Armed Forces (including the Navy, the Air Force and the Army), Civil Protection units, diplomatic and humanitarian tools (CDC) worked alongside NGOs and UN agencies in a major disaster context. The openness of numerous top level staff at the Ministry of Defence (DAS, EMA), at the Ministry of the Interior (COGIC) and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows that there is real interest in the evaluation process and in inter-ministerial exchange. In proposing and funding this mission, the DAS showed that it was willing to innovate.



The fact that this evaluation is part of a wider study by Groupe URD involving the analysis and mapping of non-intentional risks and the resilience of communities means that it could contribute to reflections in connection with the *French White Paper on defence and national security*. It also confirms that there is a need for a permanent inter-ministerial group responsible for managing crises<sup>25</sup>.

*“There is a fundamental difference between insecurity which is the result of hostile acts and that which is created without malicious intent, such as in natural disaster contexts. However, in both cases the need for anticipation, preparedness and speed of reaction is the same for our fellow citizens. As a result, defence and security strategies have to respond to new problems (...). Responses themselves have to be global, involving all the assets of the state and civil society at every level of mobilisation: national, European and international”.* (French White Paper on defence and national security)

There are also links between this evaluation and various pieces of research and evaluations which Groupe URD has carried out in the past on Civil-Military relations (in theory and in practice, in contexts like Chad and Afghanistan and in integrated mission contexts like DRC), on disaster management (in Central America, in Africa and in Asia) and on coordination mechanisms:

- The Cluster Approach for the United Nations and NGOs.
- Different initiatives by donors (Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative<sup>26</sup>, research on Fragile states in connection with the OECD’s Development Assistance Committee).
- Internal coordination within public institutions to improve LRRD (work carried out for the French Development Agency, the Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation – AECID – and as part of numerous evaluations and strategic analyses for DG ECHO and, more generally, for the European Commission).

The case of Haiti, where diplomatic, defence and civil protection bodies are present as well as United Nations agencies, NGOs, churches, etc., raises several major questions:

<sup>25</sup> This was already pointed out in Groupe URD’s evaluation of French post-tsunami aid.

<sup>26</sup> The GHDI, or the Oslo initiative is a humanitarian donor coordination initiative (36 donors have signed up to date) based on 23 principles.

**How can the comparative advantages and limits of the different components of the response be more effectively taken into account,** at the “launch” phase (how dependent on political decisions), at the planning stage (what information is available at t0, t1, t2, etc.) and in fixing the objectives and the exit and engagement strategies of the different types of actor involved?

**What tools/mechanisms would allow the links between emergency aid and security to be improved in a complex context which requires in-depth « situational intelligence »** if we are to avoid media-orientated actions, which are a trap, or the risk adverse approach, which, contrary to risk management, paralyses action and prevents objectives from being met effectively and in a timely manner.

**What should be done to ensure that the comparative advantages of different actors and improved decision-making processes achieve better speed of reaction** (rapid mobilisation of assets implemented especially to evacuate expatriate citizens and to a certain extent neglecting local people)?

**What needs to be done to improve the anticipation of needs in the long term** in order to improve the gauging of emergency aid with the crucial post-operative and post-emergency stages? Though actors’ roles are clearly different depending on their positioning, their mandate, their capacity and their experience, it is important that exchanges are structured so that the phasing of the different types of operation is harmonious in order to avoid duplications, incoherence and gaps of a strategic, geographical, sector-based or methodological nature.


**How can involvement in existing mechanisms, both at the European and United Nations levels be improved?** It is an error to believe that strategic involvement with existing UN mechanisms like UNDAC and OCHA is possible without actively taking part in them. In view of current DG ECHO approaches and the commitments France has made to the European Consensus on Humanitarian Aid, active engagement in the UN is one of the necessary conditions to successful involvement in Europe.

**What can be done to improve the approach to and support of resilience mechanisms** which exists at the level of the state, the community and the individual and make it easier to anticipate and deal with these tragedies and to recover from them?


At the time of writing this evaluation report, Groupe URD has been chosen, along with its German partner GPPI, to carry out the real-time evaluation for the IASC. This will be an opportunity to monitor how the situation has developed, and to confirm or allay certain concerns.

## **ANNEXES**

Annex n°1: Map of risks







## Annexe n°2: Mission schedule

Mercredi 10/02	Jeudi 11/02	Vendredi 12/02	Samedi 13/02	Dimanche 14/02	Lundi 15/02	Mardi 16/02	Mercredi 17/02	Jeudi 18/02	Vendredi 19/02	Samedi 20/02	Dimanche 21/02
									Réunion au SCAC /ambassade de France	Retour PoP	Retour sur Santo Domingo
							Visite du Président Sarkozy		trajet sur Léogane		
			Organisation de la logistique (location de véhicule, préparation du programme à distance, achats, etc.)	Logistique	DINEPA	Protection Civile Française		ACF	Visites de camps et de sites de distribution	Coordination civilo-militaire	
	Réunions OCHA			trajet de Santo Domingo à Port au Prince	Prise de contact à l'Ambassade de France		Cellule civilo-militaire d'OCHA		Cellule de Crise Leogane	US Army	
Réunion mission Française						Réunion avec l'ambassadeur de France		11h PNH	PAM leogane	Direction de la Sécurité Civile Haitienne	
					FAO / UN HABITAT (shelter cluster)	Interview population déplacée	SRSR	Log Base	WASH Cluster Léogane		
UNICEF							OCHA			MSF	
	UNICEF				UNEP			AFD			
Mission britannique	DPKO				ECHO/ BID	Log base		DINEPA			
					UNDP	Solidarités					
					Office Clinton						
					ICRC	MSF	Réunion avec les ONG /ICVA			Réunion avec les ONG françaises	
				Réunion staff DINEPA							
							MSF				

## Annex n°3: List of people met

People met – Real-time evaluation – DAS		
<b>Preparatory phase Paris</b>		
Général Bazin	DAS	Directeur adjoint
Stéphanie Daniel-Genc	DAS	Chargée de mission, pilote de l'étude
Colonel François Delapresle	DAS	Sous directeur Politique et prospective de Défense
Sophie Jouineau	DAS	Chef du bureau Amérique Latine
Général Eric Waringhem	CICDE	Directeur adjoint
Colonel Randal Zbiennen	CICDE	Chef de projet
Pierre Duquesne	MAEE	Ambassadeur chargé de la coordination pour la reconstruction en Haïti
Geneviève Javaloyes	MAEE	Membre de la Cella Haïti
Bertrand Gallet	Cités Unies France	Directeur général
Jean Philippe Bayon	Région Rhône Alpes	vice président de la en charge des solidarités
Isabelle Lagarde	Grand Lyon	Chargé des solidarités internationales
Martin Spitz	Fondation de France	Chargé des solidarités internationales
Paul Vermande	Collectif Haïti-France	coordinateur
Alain Boinet	Solidarités	Directeur général
<b>Preliminary phase in New York</b>		
French delegation in New York	Emmanuel Lebrun-Damiens	Premier Secrétaire, Droits de l'Hommes
	Benoit Guidée	Premier Secrétaire, Conseil de Sécurité
British delegation in New York	Nick Harvey	Responsable des questions humanitaires
UN /DPKO	David Hallam	Directeur adjoint Amérique Latine
OCHA New York	Hansjurg Struhmeier	Conseiller politique
	David Kristensen	Gestion de l'information /DASH Board
	Heid Kettab	Responsable géographique Haïti
UNICEF New York	William Fellow	Coordinateur du Cluster WASH Global
	Carmen Dolman	Coordinatrice du cluster Nutrition Global
<b>Field visit Haïti</b>		
French Embassy in PoP	Didier Le Bret	Ambassadeur
	Bernard Smolikowski	Chef du SCAC
	Sébastien Bidaud	renforcement du MAEE
	Christophe Renou	Chef de corps de l'unité de sécurité civile n°1
	Daniel Hautemanière	Colonel - chef d'EMZ Rennes
	Docteur Donnadiou	Médecin Sécurité Civile
US Army	Major Brian Donohue	Coordinateur Civ-Mil JTF Haïti
DINEPA	Jean Batiste Guerald	Directeur DINEPA
	Alban Novellon	conseiller technique
	Pierre Yves Rochat	Equipe de coordination
	Roger Montes	Management de l'information
	Ingrid Henrys	Responsable assainissement
DPC	Madame Jean Batiste	Directrice
	Abel Nazaïre	Coordinateur Adjoint des urgences
	Dr Chenet Ulysse	Pool santé à la Celule de Crise de Léogane
DPNH	M. Andrésol	Directeur général

	Colonel Teclide	Inspecteur général
DG ECHO	Damien Berrendorf	Chef de Bureau
	Benoit Artigaux	Renfort siège
	Olivier Cossé	Sécurité alimentaire
UN MINUSTAH	Edmond Mulet	SRSF
CEPALC	Ricardo Zapata Marti	Conseiller régional pour les désastres
OCHA Haiti	Dan Baker	Chef d'OCHA
	Brian Ispell	Unité Civilo Militaire
	Marie Sophie Reck	Unité Civilo Militaire
	James Brown	Unité Civilo Militaire
UNDP	Nigel Fisher	Coordinateur PDNA
	Sue Lautze	PDNA
	Jean Marc Cordaro	Conseiller Relèvement Précoce
	Bruno Marquis	Conseiller Relèvement Précoce
	Pierre Bessugue	Conseiller relèvement précoce
UNEP	Antonio Perera	Responsable pays
	Andrew Morton	Renforcement du HQ
	Bruno Marquis	PNUD
WFP	Christophe	Coordinateur Log
	Rasmus Egdal	Coordinateur base Leogane
FAO	Dick Trenchard	FAO Emergency coordinator
	Francisco del Re	Information manager
UN Habitat	Leon Esteban	Human settlement officer
	Erik Vittreo Christensen	Human settlement officer
UN office of Special Envoy Clinton	John Harding	Conseiller gestion des risques de catastrophe
Inter-American Development Bank	Dominique Malik Bouzerma	Spécialiste Eau Potable et Assainissement
	Gilles Damais	Spécialiste Ressources naturelles
ACF	Pierre Tripon	Chef de mission / pool d'urgence
	Olivier	Chef de mission
ACTED	Sebastien Lambrisshii	Chef de mission
Première Urgence	Marine	Chef de mission AI
AMI	Yves Bourny	Chef de mission AI
MSF Belgique	Stefano Zannini	Chef de mission
	Katherine Derderian	Conseillère du chef de Mission
	Alan Lefevre	Responsable logistique pôle urgence
MSF Suisse	Béatrice Godeffroy	Chef de mission
	Laureen Conway	Conseillère
Solidarités	Bruno Marquez	Chef de mission
	Tanguy Le Rolland	Responsable Eau et Assainissement
Refugee International	Emily Parry	Directrice Pays
	Patrick Duplat	
World Vision	Liz Satow	Directrice Pays
	Madara Hettiarachchi	
CARE	Yves Laurent Regis	Directeur pays
ActionAid		
Coordination des ONG / ICVA	Manisha Thomas	ICVA Genève, en mission à Haïti
ICRC	Ricardo Conti	Chef de délégation

	Giorgio Lunes	Chef de délégation adjoint
<b>Contacted on return from field visit</b>		
Lieutenant de Vaisseau Lotz	EMA/MINDEF	Etudes opérationnelles / RETEX
Colonel Brossard	COGIC	Directeur adjoint, MINICOT
Commandant Perrin	COGIC	Chargé de mission, faisait parti du DICA en Haiti
Claude Hilfiker	OCHA	Responsable à Genève des évaluations
Jesper Lunds	UNDAC	Chef de l'UNDAC à Genève



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## Annexe n°5: Angers Conference

**« La ville, la population et le génie militaire »  
Ecole du Génie Militaire – Angers – 7-8 October 2008**

Le colloque "Villes, population et génie militaire" soulignait les évolutions des contextes opérationnels sur lesquels les militaires du génie ont à intervenir pour assurer la protection des sociétés civiles, particulièrement en milieu urbain. Ces contextes sont plus complexes que ceux auxquels sont habitués les ingénieurs militaires et demandent de nouveaux défis comme l'intégration d'un cadre multi acteurs, multi national, la nécessité d'établir des procédures d'analyse de retours d'expérience de manière à tirer des leçons, des interventions à décider à partir de l'élaboration d'une grille de compréhension des contextes.

De fait, lors de ce colloque, le sujet propre d'intervention en ville ou au plus près des populations n'a pas vraiment été traité dans les différentes présentations qui se sont succédées, sauf dans la présentation des Sapeurs Pompiers de Paris et dans celle du Groupe URD (Béatrice Boyer). Il s'est plus agi de présentations mutuelles entre les différentes armées présentes, sur la place et les rôles actuels de leurs ingénieries au sein de leurs organisations propres, dans l'objectif de procéder à des rapprochements de méthodes.

Pour les différents rôles des génies et interrogations par pays, la France a soulevé un manque de cohérence dans la dualité des organes de décision (ministères de la Défense et MAE). Les USA ont donné un aperçu de la compétence de gestion d'infrastructures civiles déjà acquise sur leur propre territoires, les anglais de leur habitudes d'analyses fines des contextes locaux (ressources humaines, configurations physiques) plutôt orientée vers du renseignement. Les espagnols ont expliqué leur attachement à être efficace dans la lutte anti terroriste et les allemands ont précisé leur position d'ingénieurs purs attachés à des réalisations pérennes au service et des militaires et de la population pour la sortie de crise.

Il a été fait état de l'évolution des contextes d'intervention en termes de nouveaux champs d'action, de nouvelles menaces, non conventionnelles, enfin de la nécessité d'intégrer les spécificités des environnements locaux, contextes culturels, religieux ...urbains. Face aux nouveaux défis et perspectives pour l'ingénierie militaire, il a été posé le principe de trois évolutions nécessaires : 1) admettre le principe de dualité (civil et militaire), 2) opérer des convergences entre ces deux domaines, 3) tirer des leçons (et avancées technologiques) de la société civile pour les militaires.

Les militaires Sapeurs pompiers de Paris ont une vraie expertise d'intervention rapide en milieu urbain complexe tant pour la sécurité des personnes, que la protection des fonctions du Pouvoir de l'Etat (bâtiments administratifs) que pour la préservation d'un Patrimoine exceptionnel. D'une analyse très précise (swot) de leurs capacités d'intervention, ils expriment des besoins comme de renforcements d'outils GIS et expliquent qu'ils seront amenés à intervenir de plus en plus à l'extérieur de la France.

La présentation URD a porté particulièrement sur le cas des villes en Afghanistan, en soulignant la complexité de superposition des crises : conflits, plus processus incontrôlés d'urbanisation qui inhibent les autorités locales urbaines maintenant un manque crucial de services essentiels pour les populations urbaines. Avec le constat de la limitation des interventions pour des actions ponctuelles, quelques pistes ont été présentées en terme d'aide à : déblocage du foncier, planification urbaine, meilleure coordination inter acteurs urbains, enfin renforcement structurel physique (tous réseaux) et décisionnaire (techniques, gouvernance, fiscalités, urbanisme.)



## Annexe n°6: The principles of the Good Humanitarian Donorship Initiative

### PRINCIPLES AND GOOD PRACTICE OF HUMANITARIAN DONORSHIP

*Endorsed in Stockholm on 17 June 2003 by Germany, Australia, Belgium, Canada, the European Commission, Denmark, the United States, Finland, France, Ireland, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Sweden and Switzerland.*

#### Objectives and definition of humanitarian action

1. The objectives of humanitarian action are to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain human dignity during and in the aftermath of man-made crises and natural disasters, as well as to prevent and strengthen preparedness for the occurrence of such situations.
2. Humanitarian action should be guided by the humanitarian principles of *humanity*, meaning the centrality of saving human lives and alleviating suffering wherever it is found; *impartiality*, meaning the implementation of actions solely on the basis of need, without discrimination between or within affected populations; *neutrality*, meaning that humanitarian action must not favour any side in an armed conflict or other dispute where such action is carried out; and *independence*, meaning the autonomy of humanitarian objectives from the political, economic, military or other objectives that any actor may hold with regard to areas where humanitarian action is being implemented.
3. Humanitarian action includes the protection of civilians and those no longer taking part in hostilities, and the provision of food, water and sanitation, shelter, health services and other items of assistance, undertaken for the benefit of affected people and to facilitate the return to normal lives and livelihoods.

#### General principles

4. Respect and promote the implementation of international humanitarian law, refugee law and human rights.
5. While reaffirming the primary responsibility of states for the victims of humanitarian emergencies within their own borders, strive to ensure flexible and timely funding, on the basis of the collective obligation of striving to meet humanitarian needs.
6. Allocate humanitarian funding in proportion to needs and on the basis of needs assessments.
7. Request implementing humanitarian organisations to ensure, to the greatest possible extent, adequate involvement of beneficiaries in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of humanitarian response.
8. Strengthen the capacity of affected countries and local communities to prevent, prepare for, mitigate and respond to humanitarian crises, with the goal of ensuring that governments and local communities are better able to meet their responsibilities and co-ordinate effectively with humanitarian partners.
9. Provide humanitarian assistance in ways that are supportive of recovery and long-term development, striving to ensure support, where appropriate, to the maintenance and return of sustainable livelihoods and transitions from humanitarian relief to recovery and development activities.
10. Support and promote the central and unique role of the United Nations in providing leadership and co-ordination of international humanitarian action, the special role of the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the vital role of the United Nations, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and non-governmental organisations in implementing humanitarian action.

#### Good practices in donor financing, management and accountability

##### (a) Funding

11. Strive to ensure that funding of humanitarian action in new crises does not adversely affect the meeting of needs in ongoing crises.
12. Recognising the necessity of dynamic and flexible response to changing needs in humanitarian crises, strive to ensure predictability and flexibility in funding to United Nations agencies, funds and programmes and to other key humanitarian organisations
13. While stressing the importance of transparent and strategic priority-setting and financial planning by implementing organisations, explore the possibility of reducing, or enhancing the flexibility of, earmarking, and of introducing longer-term funding arrangements.
14. Contribute responsibly, and on the basis of burden-sharing, to United Nations Consolidated Inter-Agency Appeals and to International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement appeals, and actively support the formulation of Common Humanitarian Action Plans (CHAP) as the primary instrument for strategic planning, prioritisation and co-ordination in complex emergencies.

##### (b) Promoting standards and enhancing implementation

15. Request that implementing humanitarian organisations fully adhere to good practice and are committed to promoting accountability, efficiency and effectiveness in implementing humanitarian action.
16. Promote the use of Inter-Agency Standing Committee guidelines and principles on humanitarian activities, the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement and the 1994 Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) in Disaster Relief.
17. Maintain readiness to offer support to the implementation of humanitarian action, including the facilitation of safe humanitarian access.
18. Support mechanisms for contingency planning by humanitarian organisations, including, as appropriate, allocation of funding, to strengthen capacities for response.
19. Affirm the primary position of civilian organisations in implementing humanitarian action, particularly in areas affected by armed conflict. In situations where military capacity and assets are used to support the implementation of humanitarian action, ensure that such use is in conformity with international humanitarian law and humanitarian principles, and recognises the leading role of humanitarian organisations.
20. Support the implementation of the 1994 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets in Disaster Relief and the 2003 Guidelines on the Use of Military and Civil Defence Assets to Support United Nations Humanitarian Activities in Complex Emergencies.

##### (c) Learning and accountability

21. Support learning and accountability initiatives for the effective and efficient implementation of humanitarian action.
22. Encourage regular evaluations of international responses to humanitarian crises, including assessments of donor performance.
23. Ensure a high degree of accuracy, timeliness, and transparency in donor reporting on official humanitarian assistance spending, and encourage the development of standardised formats for such reporting.

Groupe URD:

Groupe URD is a non-profit research, evaluation and training institute. It aims to improve understanding of crisis contexts and the practices of the humanitarian and post-crisis reconstruction sector.

It has carried numerous missions for NGOs, UN agencies, Red Cross movement institutions and donors.

[www.urd.org](http://www.urd.org).