Movement as utopia

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ABSTRACT

Opposition to utopianism on ontological and political grounds has
seemingly relegated it to a potentially dangerous form of antiquated
idealism. This conclusion is based on a restrictive view of utopia as
excessively ordered panoptic discursive constructions. This overlooks
the fact that, from its inception, movement has been central to the
utopian tradition. The power of utopianism indeed resides in its ability
to instantiate the tension between movement and place that has marked
social transformations in the modern era. This tension continues in
contemporary discussions of movement-based social processes, partic-
ularly international migration and related identity formations, such as
open borders transnationalism and cosmopolitanism. Understood as
such, utopia remains an ongoing and powerful, albeit problematic instru-
ment of social and political imagination.

Key words cosmopolitanism, migration, movement, utopia

INTRODUCTION

It is telling, though not entirely surprising, that over the last few years the terms
utopia and utopian have been appearing, in the press, in conjunction with
expressions such as terrorism, Islamic fundamentalism and suicide bombings
(Jacoby, 2005: xi–xii; Levitas, 2003a: 2). By the end of the 20th century, utopia
had come to be reviled as illusory, dangerous and against human nature. For
instance, this radical antithesis between the 'reality' of 'human nature' and
utopia has been dramatically inscribed in narrative dystopias through the

opposition between human sexual desire and the totalitarian attempt to efface it. As Ruth Levitas writes, '[d]esire in the guise of sexual desire is the irrepressible reality which challenges the totalitarian state in all three of the great dystopias, *We*, *Brave New World* and *Nineteen Eighty-Four*' (1990: 185). These critiques of utopia would seem to draw on an ontological incommensurability between what individuals are and what utopian schemes would have them be; individuals, human societies, reality itself embody an excess, which always threatens to overwhelm finely delineated utopian geometries. Violence and terror become the ritualized means through which 'utopian' harmony is produced and reproduced. At best, utopias remain fanciful worlds whose reality is belied by the presence of mere caricatures instead of real individuals, practices and institutions. As Jameson points out with respect to the highly schematized utopias, of which More's is the exemplar: '[t]he whole description is cast in the mode of a kind of anthropological otherness, which never tempts us for one minute to try to imagine ourselves in their place, to project the utopian individual with concrete existential density' (2004: 39). At worst, the need to force 'reality' into what it is not meant to be requires the ceaseless shearing of excess; utopias turn society into human topiary gardens.

Beyond these types of ontological oppositions, there has also been the mobilization of liberal intellectual thought in response to the historical record. Most utopian social and political experiments seemed to have failed dismally, the last of which – state socialism – left half of Europe in tatters (Levitas, 2003a). From the Rousseauist influence on the excesses of the French Revolution to the evils of the 20th-century totalitarianism, utopias, it seems, only generated their social and political opposites. What defines utopia, warned Mannheim (1936) during the Weimar Republic, is not just incongruence with reality, but also hostility to the established social order. In the 1950s, Reinhold Niebuhr (1952) was dismissing utopias as dangerous illusions serving as refuges from history. He and many other mid-century intellectuals had come to the uneasy realization that utopias generated their own dystopias with unfailing regularity. Thus, notwithstanding important differences among liberal intellectuals such as Karl Popper, Isaiah Berlin and Hannah Arendt, all three were resolute in their denunciation of the totalitarian impulse, which they understood to be a sine qua non of utopian aspirations, particularly visible in Stalinism (Jacoby, 2005). Given the end of the cold war and the rise of the war on terror, the semantic contiguity between terrorism and utopia is not merely unsurprising, it is overdetermined.

This overdetermination, however, is structured by a restrictive view of utopia as simply an unrealistic yearning for centrally imposed, systemic social perfection that inevitably descends into despotism. The tension between totalizing utopias and their liberal foes, currently instantiated in the conflict between various strands of politico-religious movements and secular capitalism,[1] continues to obscure a central aspect of the question. Thus, rather than

just a pawn in a simplified clash between cold realism and a dangerously fanciful brand of idealism (see Sibley, 1940 for a classic analysis), utopia can be more broadly linked to the inauguration of a discursive political space that contributed significantly to the constitution of the nation-state as 'an original spatial, social and cultural form' (Wegner, 2002: xvi). Indeed, as Phillip Wegner convincingly demonstrates, utopian imaginary communities provided 'one of the first spaces for working out the "particular shapes and boundaries" of nation-states' (2002: xvi). In virtue of its two constitutive tropes – the ideal city and travel – it also served to crystallize and explore the emerging tension between space and movement.

In Foucault's (1986) schematic summary, medieval space was a hierarchy of clearly defined places, from geographic locales to divine realms. This spatial organization was radically modified by scientific and social transformations, yielding a range of heterotopias: 'other places' of emancipation or repression, freed from previous hierarchies.[2] To the extent that place became untied from its previous sacred mooring, mobility, both social and physical, became more significant. In this way, utopia became available to symbolize the potential associated with the intersection of opening spaces and newly defined places. Moreover, '[i]n a pre-utopian state, the world of signs was understood to be immovably grafted to the world of things and woe betides anyone who attempted to prise them apart' (Scott, 2004: 112). When this previously un-yielding epistemic grid, which had assigned everyone and everything its place, began to give, it allowed the mobilizing of signs for the pursuit and signifi-cation of new objects and places in the world (ibid.: 111).

The goal of this article is to delineate the importance of the notion of movement within the utopian tradition, and to discuss its problematic wide-spread discursive expression in social processes central to the contemporary era: the rise of globally transformative international migration systems and transborder mobility. In order to do so, we first begin by surveying scholarly accounts of the present-day status of utopia. Broadly, there are two identifi-able clusters: one in which the survival of the notion of utopia is understood to require refurbishment and downsizing, and the other in which utopia is judged as presently being either irrelevant or undesirable. In the first, we find a number of attempts to trim utopia's totalitarian ambitions; in the second, claims about utopia's inability to secure a foothold in contemporary politi-cal, social, economic and cultural terrains. Although these contributions raise a variety of insightful points pertaining to the current significance of utopia, they overwhelmingly conceive utopia in terms of the trope of place (i.e. more or less concrete spatializations of social relations), thus having little to say about its other constitutive trope, i.e. movement. As we show below, even those authors who distinguish between spatial and processual utopias (i.e. Harvey [2000] and Buck-Morss [2002]) understand movement in terms of historical change rather than physical movement.

Following this, we move on to track the centrality of the notion of movement in utopian imaginations, and the complex ways in which it becomes intertwined with a variety of mobilities linked to modern processes such as the formation of the nation-state, the development of capitalism, and, more recently, migration and cosmopolitanism. We conclude by suggesting that although scholars are right to point to the contemporary decline in spatial utopias, this, *pace* Bauman (2003), does not signify an exhaustion of utopian discourse itself, but its reconfiguration and radicalization in the form of utopias of itinerancy around its second classical constitutive trope: movement.

UTOPIAN THOUGHT TODAY

In his study of anti-utopianism, Jacoby writes that '[u]topia has lost its ties with alluring visions of harmony and turned into a threat. Conventional and scholarly wisdom associates utopian ideas with violence and dictatorship' (2005: 81). This, however, does not mean that all attempts to rehabilitate utopian projects have been abandoned. Mindful of the ease with which utopian projects can become, or are, associated with ambitious social engineering projects gone seriously, or deadly, wrong, defenders of utopia have attempted to regrade the grounds upon which new utopian projects shall be erected. For instance, Jeffrey Alexander (2001) maintains that the modern conception of utopia as a 'totalizing package' of radical social and institutional change has lost traction in the context of pluralistic and multicultural societies. Utopia, today, needs to be rethought along the lines of 'self-limiting civil utopias'. In other words,

> . . . critical thinking is an 'actually existing' practice of utopia, since every aspiration to greater levels of equality and respect within civil society implies consciousness of a better ordering of identities and relations. Utopia is thus implicit in every particularist group claim that is couched in the languages of inclusion, justice or aspiration. (McLennan, 2005: 11)

Similarly, in *The Third Way*, Anthony Giddens's defense of 'utopian realism' is premised on the need to overcome the classic tensions between the monolithic prescriptions of left and right, which in any case are exhausted in late modernity, to enable the 'reparation' and 'remoralization' of society (Groarke, 2004).

A different strategy is deployed by Jacoby, who introduces a distinction between 'blueprint' and 'iconoclastic' utopianism. The former, which he sees as revolving around the obsessive working-out of every detail, is to be abandoned, while the latter, 'those who dreamt of a superior society but declined to give its precise measurements', is to be embraced (2005: xv; see also Sargent,

2006). David Harvey (2000), in his *Spaces of Hope*, similarly demarcates utopias into two stands, but to a different effect.

As in Jacoby's critique of blueprint utopias, Harvey weighs in against what he calls 'utopias of spatial form', which idealize the punctilious organization of social interaction with the narrative trope of the ideal city, typically small in size (e.g. More's *Utopia*). This utopian figuration, what Bauman describes as an architectural and urbanistic utopian imagination (Bauman, 2003: 14), inscribes in spatial form the panoptic impulse of discipline and control. In this context, historical change and time disappear as variables, often with disastrous consequences. The second strand, 'utopias of process', is articulated around historical dynamics that point towards a resolution of conflict some time in the future; the concrete destination, however, remains vaguely defined (e.g. Hegel's *Spirit*, Marx's *class conflict*).[3] A utopia of process, 'a temporal process devoid of spatial form' (Levitas, 2003b: 140), becomes distorted through the necessity of its spatialization in the same way that a utopia of space becomes twisted through its encounter with social change and process:

> Utopias of spatial form get perverted from their noble objectives by having to compromise with the social processes they are meant to control. We now also see that the materialized utopias of the social process have to negotiate with spatiality and the geography of place and in so doing they also lose their ideal character, producing results which are in many instances exactly the opposite of those intended (e.g. increasing authoritarianism and inequalities rather than greater democracy and equality). (Harvey, 2000: 180)

In consequence, the spaces of hope, for which Harvey argues, must synthesize these separate traditions into more coherent and achievable spatial-temporal utopian visions (Harvey, 2000). Similarly, Erik Olin Wright's *The Real Utopias Project* has attempted 'to focus on specific proposals for the fundamental redesign of basic social institutions rather than on either general, abstract formulations of grand designs or on small reforms of existing practices' (Wright, 2009). To date, discussions have been undertaken in the areas of *Basic Income*, *Secondary Associations and Democratic Governance*, *Models for Market Socialism*, *Redistribution in Advance Capitalism* and *Pensions and Control of Capital Accumulation* (Wright, 2009; see also Wright, 2006).

In a more literary vein, Frederic Jameson associates utopian literature not with the capacity to imagine a more progressive future society, but rather with the failure to escape the constraints of the present in order to do so:

> Its function lies not in helping us to imagine a better future but rather in demonstrating our utter incapacity to imagine such a future – our imprisonment in a non-utopian present without historicity or futurity

– so as to reveal the ideological closure of the system in which we are somehow trapped and confined. (Jameson, 2004: 46)

Thus, '[c]onfrontation with the impossibility of imagining utopia gives us the necessary courage for revolutionary change' (Johnson, 2006: 88); it is only by opening this negative critical space that yet unimaginable, but, hopefully, more progressive futures might be materialized. Tom Moylan, on the other hand, in *Demand the Impossible*, draws attention to the emergence of a new form of utopian figuration, 'a critical utopia', in the works of Samuel Delaney, Ursula Le Guin, Marge Piercy and Joanna Russ. For Moylan, critical utopias do not merely direct a critical lens on existing social arrangements; they also instantiate a self-reflexivity that allows them to carefully evaluate the limits of utopian writing itself (Moylan, 1986). Thus, at the heart of the utopian worlds projected in these novels, we find conflict, dissidence and a strong sense of the contingency of future utopian societies conveyed through fractured authorial voices (Geoghegan, 2003: 152; Levitas, 1990: 172–4). More recently, Moylan has distinguished between dystopian texts that are anti-utopian – i.e. they mobilize fear in order to preserve existing arrangements – and those that stimulate a critical utopian vision: the latter

> . . . magnify, and cognitively challenge the brutal social conditions of the late twentieth century, each develops a particular utopian response not only to the historical situation but also to the self-satisfied anti-utopian refusal to challenge reality. . . . By means of their creative speculation, these hopeful texts help to revive and expand the popular imagination in the name of progressive transformation. (Moylan, 2000: 277)

Thus far, we have considered both the rejection of the utopian tradition resulting from its association with totalitarianism and also the attempts to rethink utopia in order to free it from this fatal designation, what we identified as the first cluster in our introduction. There is, however, another position vis-à-vis utopia, the second cluster, that rests with neither endorsement nor rejection. It goes like this: given contemporary configurations, utopias are unlikely to emerge, or if they do they will have a minimal impact. The most widespread and popular forms of these types of arguments are based on the belief that the very necessity of utopian thinking has been overcome. For Jacques Rancière, this problematic understanding of the superfluity of utopian thought can be summarized as follows: 'We are said to be living through the end of political divisions, of social antagonisms and utopian projects; entering an age of common productive effort and free circulation, of national consensus and international competition' (Rancière, 1995: 3). Moreover, disappointedly he adds: '[i]n a situation where demands of economic competition and geopolitical equilibrium now leave democracies the slenderest of margins for political alternatives, where individual ways of

assessing life refer to broadly consensual values' (ibid.: 59), there is little room for utopian 'castles in the sky'. Below, we take up the notion that it is the constraints of 'reality' that deracinate utopian thinking from our contemporary political landscape. First, however, we review other arguments that are skeptical, or at least extremely cautious, of utopia's current viability.

For Wegner, utopian figurations are closely tied to the imagined cultural, political and social communities spatialized around the nation-state; in the era of globalization and the alleged decline of the nation-state, the fate of utopias is unclear (Wegner, 2002: xvii).[4] Similarly Bauman argues that in 'solid modernity' the 'good life' and 'good society' were inextricably symbolized 'as the population inhabiting a territory plotted and mapped, and then projected upon the physical space, by the wise and benevolent powers of a good state' (2003: 14). Now, however, 'with the nation-state in the double bind of pressures coming simultaneously "from above" and "from below", the bottom [has fallen] off the barrelful of utopian blueprints' (ibid.: 17). More broadly, 'liquid modernity' has transformed our existential experience of both time and place. Our symbolizations of and hence our attachments to place are but mere drawings in the sand ceaselessly erased by the never-ending waves of liquid modernity. Thus, '[t]he "u" of "utopia" bereaved by the "topos", is left homeless and floating, no more hoping to strike its roots, to "re-embed"' (ibid.: 22). The ethos of 'fixity and finality' that characterized 'solid modernity' has given way:

> In the transgressive imagination of liquid modernity the 'place' (whether physical or social) has been replaced by the unending sequence of new beginnings, inconsequentiality of deeds has been substituted for fixity of order, and the desire of a different today has elbowed out concern with a better tomorrow. (Bauman, 2003: 24)

Jacoby locates the source of utopian speculation in imagination. Given the 'relentless barrage of prefabricated "images" from movies and advertising', it is not clear that our ability to imagine can resist this onslaught (2005: viii). For Jameson, the 'weakening of the sense of history and of the imagination of historical difference, which characterizes postmodernity, is, paradoxically, intertwined with the loss of that place beyond all history (or after its end) which we call utopia' of which the contemporary waning of the utopian ideal is a powerful symptom (Jameson, 2004: 36). Krishan Kumar, for whom utopia is more formerly defined as a literary genre (1991a, 1991b), notes that even though literary utopias are still produced today they lack the broad mobilizing force of utopias of yesteryear:

> Former utopias, whether those written by More or Wells, became central reference points for public discussion and debate. They were known and referred to by all educated people. They could set the political agenda

– in the case of Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, they could even give rise
to a major political party. (Kumar, 2003: 73)

He wonders whether 'postmodern culture', as characterized by Jameson and
Harvey, has perhaps undermined the viability of utopian visions (Kumar,
2003: 74).

More damaging still, utopia is thought to have been replaced by political
complacency, or downright cynicism, and mass consumerism. The 'dream-
worlds' of mass utopias, a notion Buck-Morss (2000) borrows from Benjamin,
have long been captured by powerful institutional forces, leaving little space
for collective imaginings. Be they liberal-democratic or socialist, states have
successfully defused the political imaginary of mass utopias by basing their
legitimacy on external or internal enemies: rival nations or classes. In a world
reduced to economic and political competition, utopia is but a distraction, and
a potentially disastrous one. Consuming and producing become collective
moral obligations, in direct opposition to utopian fantasies. All that is left of
utopia, particularly after the last bout of quasi-revolution of the late 1960s in
much of the western world, is a 'nostalgia of rebellion' (Passerini, 2002: 17).

The field of utopian studies, like all knowledge spaces, is fractured by com-
peting definitions of its object of study. Levitas (1990) maps with great care
various attempts to stabilize the field through the production of taxonomies
rooted in form, content and function. In the definitional contest between
narrow and broad definitions of utopia, Levitas has argued convincingly for
the preservation of a more expansive sense. For her, the essential element in
utopia is 'the desire for a better way of being. It involves the imagining of a
state of being in which the problems which actually confront us are removed
or resolved' (1990: 191). Moreover, Levitas also insists that this broader con-
ception of utopia must also conceptually accommodate utopias that are not
customarily associated with progressives or the left, since their exclusion may
explain the fact that the contemporary world appears bereft of utopia. After
all, she notes, the rise of the New Right would seem to have all the trappings
associated with utopian projects (ibid.: 186).[5] Moreover, one should be wary
of the notion that contemporary 'realism' is opposed to utopia. As Jacques
Rancière reminds us, '[r]ealism is neither the lucid refusal of utopia nor the
forgetting of the *telos*. It is just one utopian way of configuring the *telos*, of
recovering the compass of reason within the singularity of the present' (1995:
15). Thus, according to Rancière, 'realism' rather than signifying the other of
utopia is the utopia of the end of utopias.

One of the purposes of the following is to argue this very point: utopia
is still with us, albeit without the clear markers of the past in the form of a
readily identified literature and accompanying ideologies spatialized through
the bricks and mortars of ideal cities and places with their concomitant social
choreographies. Consequently, utopia's centrality and current intensity risk
being considerably underestimated.

Utopia seems to have landed somewhere between the critical assaults of historically informed realism, a range of attempts at salvaging its potential for unleashing social imagination, and a frequently resigned consignment to irrelevance. Our age is marked more than any other by this strong ambivalence toward utopia (Baczko, 1978). But this uneasy position largely obscures an important facet of the trajectory of utopian thought. Rather than, or perhaps in addition to, the historical ideological see-saw of triumph and infamy, death and revival, utopia has undergone a transfiguration. From its origins in narrowly specific fictional narratives ('egocentric celebrations of mono-mania' in the words of Philippopolous-Mihalopoulos, 2001), which mapped out wondrous new places across the newly open spaces of modernity, an important strand of contemporary utopian thinking has been concerned with signifying the transcendence of the encaging places of modernity.

Original utopians used the device of travel to express a complex exploratory intent: the opening of geographical space permitted offshore imaginings of social perfection. Travel would open passages, and therefore help to draw new cartographies of the rapidly expanding physical and social universe. Somewhere in the newly unfolding space there existed places holding the promise of new beginnings. Current utopia, we argue below, has preserved the original kinetic impulse, the necessary movement that brings travelers to new shores, but has also reversed the priority. For many, the defining places of modernity turned out to be mostly restrictive cages of bureaucratized coercion, already hinted at in the near-panoptic cities of early utopias. The opening of space *qua* space[6] – roaming rather than journeying to a new place – is the source of contemporary utopian imaginations, the process rather than the destination. In the dyadic cycle of openness and closure (Philippopolous-Mihalopoulos, 2001: 154), our hegemonic utopias are now chiefly those of free movement and placeless space, 'replacing "roots" with "routes"' (Frello, 2008: 26). It is this transformation of utopia into a processual mode, with an emphasis on movement, that we unpack below, starting with the centrality of movement in early utopian writings and continuing with contemporary instances of utopias of itinerancy conceived in terms of the idealization of universal frictionless movement.

MOVEMENT IN UTOPIA, MOVEMENT AS UTOPIA

Physical movement, in the form of travel, was an integral part of utopian thinking from the earliest works of the tradition. For instance, Marin notes that

> From the time of More's book and for centuries later, utopias tend to
> begin with a travel, a departure and a journey, most of the time by sea,
> most of the time interrupted by a storm, a catastrophe that is the sublime

> way to open a neutral space, one that is absolutely different: a meteoric event, a cosmic accident that eliminates all beacons and markers in order to make the seashore appear at dawn, to welcome the human castaway. (Marin, 1993: 414)

This was partly due to the general context within which utopian writing emerged: as an extension of travel writing, itself a product of the exploratory expansion of European commerce (Hazard, 1961; Zumthor and Peebles, 1994). Hythloday, the mariner who tells the story of the Isle of Utopia in More's classic, was, in the author's own words, not just a traveler, but a philosopher. Utopia was one of the many social and political discoveries he made during his voyages, often in the company of the great discoverer Amerigo Vespucci. Likewise Bacon's Bensalem, in *The New Atlantis*, was discovered during a voyage of exploration, and Candide discovered El Dorado during the most fantastic part of his tragicomic voyage to the Americas. These were projections of the Age of Exploration: somewhere over the horizon existed a society free of the evils of poverty, ignorance and war. Thus, the boat or ship, in the age of exploration, besides being a vessel that facilitated the movement across, and exploration of, an ever-expanding physical world, was also a discursive vehicle with which to move through, and survey, the uncharted horizons of the imagination:

> . . . the boat is a floating piece of space, a place without a place, that exists by itself, that is closed in on itself and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the sea . . . the boat has not only been for our civilization, from the sixteenth century until the present, the great instrument of economic development . . . but has been simultaneously the greatest reserve of the imagination. (Foucault, 1986: 27)[7]

It is important, however, to note that the travel narrative need not, by its very nature, be disruptive. Indeed, as Zumthor and Peebles (1994) show, travel writing was a well-established cultural form in the European Middle Ages; all the same, its intent was to achieve the traveler's 'reintegration into the familiar world from which he set off' (1994: 812). It did not undermine the inelastic medieval spatial and social ordering; instead, it functioned to symbolically appropriate foreign places rather than 'to effect a projection into an expanse' (ibid.: 810). In the words of Marin,

> *The ideology of the travel* implies a departure from a place and a return to the same place. The traveler enriches this place with a large booty of knowledge and experiences by means of which he states, in this coming back to the 'sameness', his own consistency, his identity as a subject. (1993: 415)

Whereas,

The utopian moment and space of the travel, on the contrary, consists in opening up, in this ideological circle, in the tracing out of its route, a *nowhere*, a place without place, a moment out of time, the truth of a fiction, the syncopation of an infinity and paradoxically its limit, its frontier. (1993: 415)

As noted above, it was the unraveling of the social relations, schemas and epistemologies, which had previously immobilized individuals, things and signs in a sacred space, through the development of commerce and scientific cultures that contributed to the advent of utopias. As Crosby (1997) shows, the abandonment of the 'venerable model' – the shift from a universe of qualities to one of quantities (1997: 47) – was equally fueled by advances in mathematics, quantification, cartography and measurement and contributed to the hollowing-out of space. This, in turn, promoted a dramatic reconceptualization of the nature of the universe, of both its heavenly and sublunary dimensions. For Zumthor and Peebles, the emergence of narrative utopias is inseparable from 'the fulfillment of a secular dream of the totalization of space, to which the reality of a just recently discovered New World, would impart a sudden urgency' (Zumthor and Peebles, 1994: 822).

New spatial schemas and mobilities, however, were not just invested with hope for better places in far-off spaces; they also hosted a range of novel dangers, instabilities and concerns. After all, the medieval worldview had 'answered the need for a description of the universe that was clear, complete and appropriately awesome without being stupefying' (Crosby, 1997: 22). Thus, it provided 'structures and processes that a person could live with emotionally as well as comprehend intellectually – for instance, a time and a space of human dimensions' (ibid.). The rift between the old and the new, the passage from previously hermitic to open spaces and temporalities, from the sacred to the profane, also became the source of existential, cultural and political anxiety. Thus,

More than any other message, the sixteenth-century reader perceived in Thomas More the disarray of the generation that had 'discovered' America. Utopia abolished the intolerable reality of this opening onto what seemed to be the void. It closed this space in order to organize it by means of and within the text; or rather, the narrative engenders this space, a space of representation where lived contradictions are evoked and annulled, where nothing from the outside may be admitted any longer, where the vertigo of what remains to be done in a world that has lost all measure is perhaps quelled. (Zumthor and Peebles, 1994: 821)

It is for this very reason that the Marin quotation, cited above, draws attention to Utopia's ability to syncopate and limit infinity, to act as its frontier, in this way making a rapidly dilating universe thinkable, and inhabitable. For

Marin, utopia describes those 'in-between [*entre-deux*] spaces at the beginning of the sixteenth century of the historical contradiction of the Old and New Worlds' (Marin in Wegner, 2002: 34). In the words of Wegner, utopia is found 'spatially between Europe and the Americas . . . and temporally between late feudal society and an emerging capitalist modernity' (2002: 34).

As with space, so it was with movement and its associated newfound mobilities. Thomas Hobbes's work, for instance, can be read as one of the discursive and conceptual sites where this ambiguity towards movement can be found. Much of his work was a reaction to Aristotelian social stability, but also an attempt to understand restlessness, passion and movement. His definition of human purpose and happiness is not one of tranquility and stability, but one of acquisitive mobility (Piotte, 1999: 171).

This ambiguity is also reflected in the development of European capitalism. In brief, the fundamental shift brought about by the Industrial Revolution was centered on the control of the movement of people. On a global scale, most of the regions of the world that had attained some level of commercial development were on a more or less equal economic footing by the mid-1700s. India, China, much of Europe, parts of Africa had all achieved some level of commercial prosperity based on modest Smithian growth and limited trade: increasing productivity based on handicraft and regional specialization (Bagchi, 2004). The joint forces of emergent bourgeois states (post-feudal states supportive of merchant classes in search of new sources of wealth) and industrialization completely changed that social order (Castel, 1995).

Most such European states were, to some degree, bent on three things: displacing farmers to feed emerging industries, controlling the movement of this emerging geographically mobile class within well-defined borders, and encouraging the movement of traders and colonialists. On all three counts, it is first and foremost the movement of people that is at stake, and more specifically the achievement of some balance between allowable (indeed necessary), and restricted (in many cases forbidden), movement.[8] Nothing illustrates this tension between sedentary modernity and kinetic commercialism better than the fate of Gypsies throughout Europe. A highly heterogeneous population characterized mostly by its mode of existence rather than by any ethnocultural traits, Gypsies came to be regarded as the epitome of the greatest threat to population control: vagrancy (Lucassen and Willems, 2003). Equally, it is worth keeping in mind that '[i]n its history of English usage, mobility refers not only to the capacity to be moved but also to the unsettled "mob" of common people who threatened the British landed gentry in the 17th century' (Kaplan, 2006: 396). It is this other foundational tension of modernity that utopia also addresses, originally under the metaphorical guise of the island where the tension is both instantiated and resolved: a place that is distant but delimited, open to travelers but self-contained, fantastical but plausible.

If travel was a central trope of most classic utopian works, and controlled movement a constant concern for emerging European industrial states, from the late 19th century onward, a utopian figuration has developed around a more enduring type of movement. The most obvious manifestation of this is the appearance of migration utopia as the defining metaphor for entire political systems. The USA, for instance, built part of its national mythology on powerfully utopian works, particularly Emma Lazarus' hymnal poem to the 'Mother of the Exiles' and Israel Zangwill's play celebrating the great American crucible that can 'purge and re-create' all those who enter it (*The Melting Pot*, act IV).[9] In addition, or because of this, the USA maintained an open door policy until the First World War (Thomas, 1939: 254). As Scott (2004) has argued, some of the features that made America available as a screen on which to project a quasi-utopian model, and destination, had already been noted by Alexis de Tocqueville in his famed visit. First, as a result of both its distance from the 'old world' and its territorial expanse, 'America's founding fathers had been able, in a sense, to step outside of history and establish a new community in a virtually virgin [*sic*] territory', thus it could be inscribed within the utopian narrative whereby an island erupted from the sea as a bounded world capable of hosting new forms of social organization. Second, 'although America's founding fathers were primarily Anglo-Saxon, the subsequent influx of colonists from all over Europe and the Middle East brought about the "melting pot" situation in which new cocktails of identity and religious belief could be created'. Finally, the transition from 'old' to 'new' social system had been achieved without extreme revolutionary violence (Scott, 2004: 118–19).

Few other western states have gone as far as the United States in this direction but French republicanism, finally triumphant in the 1870s with the rise of the Third Republic, was powerfully influenced by the radical openness of the French Revolution, which marked the high tide of the political integration of political exiles and foreigners (Kristeva, 1988: 230). The rebirth of French republicanism was itself made possible by that great challenge to structured space – the Paris Commune – and its attendant invention, as Kristin Ross (1998) puts it, of a new type of social space, free of bourgeois strictures. This emergent spatial openness was in turn informed by and reflected in some of the radical poetic and literary innovation of the period, particularly Rimbaud's.[10] The renewal of colonialism during the 19th century was likewise influenced by new utopian ideals. Saint-Simonian radical reformism, for instance, informed France's colonial efforts, combining religious, socialist and economic ideals (Jaenen, 2003). On both counts large-scale population movement is central to the emergent and largely imagined social order: as influx of sympathizers or as expatriation of civilizers.

The first age of modern mass migration, and of overlapping 'civilizing' colonialism, spawned these views of movement in a utopian register: new

civilizations would be forged out of old ones, through a global shuffling of humanity. This first utopianization of itinerancy managed to combine powerful racialism and liberalism, across much of the west (see Gerstle, 2001; Noiriel, 2001), but largely ceded the terrain to nationalism as the central political force of the 20th century. Movement abated as the world seemed to settle into the bordered world of firmly emplaced nation-states in the years following the First World War (Thomas, 1939; Torpey, 1999).

FROM MIGRATION TO UTOPIAS OF ITINERANCY

The cataclysmic nature of the Second World War opened the door to a new perspective on movement that would gather momentum during the second half of the century. Freedom of movement *within* particular states, for instance, is one of the rights recognized by the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights.[11] Refugees fleeing oppressive states were also granted the right to flee sovereign states during the same period. Racialized migration policies were increasingly questioned and slowly, but irrevocably, 'de-ethnicized' across the entire West (Joppke, 2005). This combination of forces gave rise to a new age of migration that, according to many observers, in turn yielded entirely new social and political forms (Castles and Miller, 2003; Friedman and Randeira, 2004; Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Koopmans, Statham *et al.*, 2005).

A first, distinctly utopian expression of the possibilities opened by this renewed importance of movement is to be found in discussions of how to (de)regulate global migration. The most clearly expressed instance of this is the ongoing open borders debate (Bauder, 2003; Moses, 2006; Legrain, 2007). Moses (2006: xii) places his detailed argument in favour of free mobility squarely within the utopian tradition, if only because of the 'motivational power of utopian visions'. Not unlike earlier utopias, the prospect of free mobility, or the utopia of itinerancy, mobilizes dominant, if still emergent, systems of ideas. The gist of the open borders argument in effect extends the commitments of liberal nation-states, particularly freedom of movement, to the global level. With the work of Joseph Carens (1987, 2001), the case for open borders became a cogent extension of political liberalism, widely discussed by philosophers, geographers and others.

The case for open borders is partly based on a real evolution of the handling of migration by states. Immigration was one of the last policy instruments to cede to domestic pressures: ethnic selectivity has disappeared in nearly all immigrant receiving states, in many cases only very recently. This has been accompanied by a broad (but uneven) process of de-ethnicization (Joppke, 2005), i.e. the removal of largely baseless lineage-based criteria from all policy areas. It is important to remember, however, that the older model of ethnic migration was not a throwback to pre-modern ascriptive belonging, but a

hypermodern form of classification and organization based on a racialized construction of the nation: 'personalized collectivities and depersonalized individuals' (Joppke, 2005: 229). National emplacement has therefore long been at the core of the statist model of political belonging. As a result, a de-nationalized and de-ethnicized migration system does much more than end blatantly discriminatory selection practices. It opens the possibility of truly global, highly mobile functional specialization and accompanying forms of belonging. If the nation has been the host of the serialized individual expulsed from pre-modern profoundly local forms of belonging (Joppke, 2005: 228), the world is now taking on this role. Thus, in much the same way that the spatial utopias of the 16th century emerged as textual and discursive imaginary spaces in between pre-modern places and the emerging space of the nation (Wegner, 2002; Marin, 1984), contemporary utopias of itinerancy can be understood as underwriting discursive and imaginary regions in between the nation and the deterritorialization associated with globalizing processes.[12] Thus, it is the partial, but 'actually existing', opening of borders that the politico-moral argument extends, in classic utopian fashion, to the fullest extent of its potential. Complete borderlessness is a hoped-for universalization of liberalism, but it is also, and perhaps more importantly, an upgrading and rethinking of the site of political imagination from the national to the global through utopian figuration.[13]

Much in the same way that utopian migratory itinerancy envisages the detachment of individuals from place through the erosion of national borders, it equally emphasizes a new type of postnational citizen equipped with a cosmopolitan subjectivity: 'the subjectivity of the mobile person in the world of traversed spaces' made up of 'the messy configurations of migrant ethnic consciousness, transnational religious revivalism and movements of diasporic hybridity' (James, 2005c: 110). An important discursive site for the imagining of these identities is that of migration narratives, which by the late 20th century had come to dominate a number of cultural areas. For instance, the 'novel of immigration' is widely held to be the most significant type of contemporary English fiction (Parrinder, 2006). It is to our era what travel literature was to the Age of Exploration. No explicit utopian narrative comparable to the works of More or Bacon, or to the explosion of utopian novels that followed Bellamy's *Looking Backward*, first published in 1888, have been produced, but migration literature has become imbued with utopian figurations nonetheless.[14] One of these dimensions is the imagining of the cosmopolitan metropolis, common to a number of works. These urban 'forges of post-national culture' (Nairn, 2003) are the places where new hybrid cultures and identities are shaped.

A second, but no less crucial, discursive site that has strongly contributed to the utopia of itinerancy discursive formation is that of academic (James, 2005c: 110) and popular discussions of the new cosmopolitanism.[15] The identities

that are said to result from the migrant flows to urban centers are the threads
that weave cosmopolitan utopian figurations. A key indication of this is the
ubiquitous reference to the new territories invested by emergent identities.
Rosenau (2004), for instance, discusses 12 new 'worlds' where new identities
proliferate. These new 'spaces and places' (ibid.: 48), produced by forces that
both fragment and integrate existing social formations, are a product of the
same articulation of movement and space that has always informed utopia.
The emphasis on the new and emergent, fuelled by political imagination
(ibid.: 50), likewise relies on classic utopian tropes. But these worlds, unlike
earlier urban utopias, are oddly diffuse and placeless, more akin to fluid,
informal cultures than emplaced communities.

   Much of the grammar that structures figurations of utopian itinerancy is
clearly indebted to the 'ideologies of progress and economic development, of
instrumental management and economic rationalism' frequently associated
with neo-liberalism and its current hegemony (James, 2005a: 19). However,
as Paul James persuasively argues, one will be at a loss to explain the contem-
porary world if one cannot give an account of other social and cultural pred-
icates such as 'interconnectivity', 'mobility', 'security, justice and democracy
and freedom', and 'autonomy and transcendence' that are both related to and
distinct from neo-liberal imaginings of a global world (ibid.: 20).[16] Cosmo-
politanism, whose discourse draws on many of these predicates, is a powerful
contemporary figuration of itinerancy in the global world (Friedman, 1994);
its core goal has become associated with the extension of democracy beyond
the borders of nation-states (Kennedy, 2006). Global distributive justice is
only possible, some have argued, if liberalism embraces cosmopolitanism and
sheds its unworkable attachment to national communities (Tan, 2002).

   For instance, globalized culture has been described as increasing social
imagination and enabling the emergence of new modes of contestation, in a
world dominated by motion and flow (Appadurai, 1996, 2000). To quote
Appadurai (2000: 6):

> The imagination is no longer a matter of individual genius, escapism
> from ordinary life, or just a dimension of aesthetics. It is a faculty that
> informs the daily lives of ordinary people in myriad ways: It allows
> people to consider migration, resist state violence, seek social redress,
> and design new forms of civic association and collaboration, often across
> national boundaries.[17]

   In other words, the movement-based political imagination creates new social
and political spaces. These new spaces, however, do not result from attach-
ment to place or to traditional national, ethnic or other exclusivist allegiances,
but from the individuals' detachment from these:

> To embrace this style of residence on earth (Pablo Neruda's phrase)
> means repudiating the romantic localism of a certain portion of the

left, which feels it must counter capitalist globalization with a strongly
rooted and exclusivist sort of belonging. . . . The devastation covered by
the complacent talk of globalization is of course very real. But precisely
because it is real, we cannot be content to set against it only the childish
reassurance of belonging to 'a' place. (Bruce Robbins cited in James,
2005c: 112)

More broadly, among the principles underpinning utopian itinerancy in its
cosmopolitan figurations one can find 'radicalized choosing', 'boundary
crossing', 'fragmented subjectification', 'ambivalence', 'difference' and 'de-
construction' (James, 2005c: 117). However, the trope around which these
principles cluster and through which they are given substance is that of global
'deterritorialized mobility'.

In addition to the academic literature on cosmopolitanism, mention also has
to be made of the burgeoning sociological literature dealing with mobility.
In a programmatic essay in defense of a 'mobile sociology', John Urry mobi-
lizes a broad and disparate array of conceptual tools, images and metaphors
(e.g. networks, fluids, scapes, flows, complexity, iteration, mobile hybrids,
game-keeping, de-territorialization, rhizomes, non-linearity) to capture how
diverse mobilities such as 'imaginative travel, movements of images and
information, virtual travel, object travel and corporeal travel' are 'materially
transforming the "social as society" into the "social as mobility"', hence
opening up a 'post-social' agenda for sociology (Urry, 2000a: 186).[18] Among
other things, a post-social agenda necessitates a rejection of the equation of
the social with the nation-state and a sustained critique of 'sedentarist meta-
physics' because it is '"motion" rather than "stasis" or "stability" [that]
characterizes the world in which we live' (Frello, 2008: 26), leading to the
'liquefaction of social structures' (Nowicka, 2006: 412). Interestingly, and
particularly relevant to our argument here, although Urry's vision for a
mobile sociology develops as a conceptual and explanatory effort to grasp
a dimension (i.e. mobility) of social relations that he argues the 'social as
society' approach failed to apprehend, his programmatic vision for a sociol-
ogy of mobilities is not bereft of utopian longing. Indeed, he concludes his
plea for such a sociology by aligning it with the emancipatory interests of a
'global civil society' (Urry, 2000a: 201).[19]

Finally no discussion of the current celebration of mobility would be
complete without a mention, cursory in this case, of what Wegner has called
'the most significant non-literary Utopian [work] of this moment, Michael
Hardt and Antonio Negri's *Empire* (1999)' (Wegner, 2005: 92). For Hardt
and Negri the final extension of capitalist social relations to all available
global space – Empire – does not represent the death knell of anti-capitalist
resistance. As a result of the rise to hegemony of a new form of 'immaterial
labour' (Hardt and Negri, 2000),[20] capitalism, now haunted by the specter
of itinerancy, no longer controls global space and the products of labour.

Mobility and migration, which since the dawn of modernity have contained the potential to disrupt 'the disciplinary conditions to which workers are constrained' (ibid.: 212), fuels the contemporary historical agent of change, the multitude, as it embarks on a voyage towards a future of pure itinerancy: 'the future only as a totality of possibilities that branch out in every direction' (ibid.: 380). Indeed, they redefine the figure of the city, which in spatial utopias had provided a solution to the problem of incessant movement, as the very matrix of emancipatory mobility: 'The cities of the earth will become at once great deposits of cooperating humanity and locomotives for circulation, temporary residences and networks for the mass distributions of living humanity' (ibid.: 397).

As we argued above, classical utopian figurations have been strongly criticized for their rigid spatial schematization of social relations, in the form of homogeneous nation-states, in their attempt to imagine new forms of communal life at the dawn, and throughout the consolidation, of modernity. Consequently, with the advent of global processes that have modified the nation-state's ability to govern mobility and fix identities and social relations, it is hardly surprising that discursive spaces that celebrate movement have emerged. Nor is it surprising that it is these spaces, as we have just seen, that are hosting new figurations of communal global life. The tension between movement and place, symbolized through the hazardous, contingent and uncharted voyage that led to the ideal but remote and insular city, was constitutive of utopian figurations. Thus notwithstanding the fact that it was the imagining of ideal socio-spatial geometries that was primarily valorized in classical figurations, movement remained its constitutive outside. Presently, it is movement, or the utopias of itinerancy, that commands utopian figurations; the relationship has been reversed. Place has, now, become utopia's constitutive outside.

Traditionally, the criticism of, or the ambivalence associated with, utopias has been fed by their perceived attempts to hierarchically spatialize ideal societies, by purging them of contingency and unchoreographed movement. In the words of Bauman, 'Utopias were visions of a closely watched, monitored, administered and daily managed world. Above all, visions of a pre-designed world, a world in which prediction and planning would have staved off the play of chances' (2003: 16). Now that the balance of power between place and movement has shifted, it is equally crucial to critically assess utopias of itinerancy, rather than just celebrating them.

For instance, as James perspicaciously argues, many contemporary exultations of the virtues of radical mobility do so in the absence of a serious discussion of what constitutes a good life; instead, 'past forms of solidarity such as the modern nation tend to be reduced to clichés, and solidaristic attachment and relatively bounded and embodied placement come to be described as part of the problem' (2005b: 61). Moreover, to the extent that

these figurations rely on the withering of power of the nation-state they fail to consider, as Sassen (2006) argues, that denationalizing dynamics are taking place within the normative and institutional framework of nation-states. A number of global forces, from activist networks to multinational corporations to diasporic formations, are leveraging national structures to reach global objectives. Consequently, according to Sassen, nation-states are better understood as the scale at which three central components of sovereignty have been located: territory, authority and rights. This naturalized assemblage is partly becoming taken apart by supranational institutions and processes, including global migration. However, denationalization disproportionately affects economic, primarily urban, elites, whose ties with national institutions have weakened considerably in recent years (Sassen, 2006). The new spatial arrangement does not do away with place; it mostly relocates it in the global, interconnected cities where major transnational economic actors are located (Sassen, 2002). The partly imagined denationalized places are therefore still intimately connected to existing political structures; something that remains obscured in the lofty detachment from place in utopias of itinerary.

The diluted identities emerging in a plural, borderless space tend to be described as a reachable, but still partly imaginary, *topos*. As Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos (2001: 147) argues, 'socially diffused particular' identity has become the 'new utopian destination'. It feeds on movement, just as the discovered, socially fixed identities of older utopias did. Etymologically, Utopia is a negation of place (*u-topos*, the non-place), but current utopian figurations negate it in practice as well as in language. They negate places (often would-be unitary nation-states) and affirm frictionless spaces.

This raises a number of phenomenological questions that we can only briefly sketch out here. First, '[t]his appears to treat displacement and exile as a simple opportunity to detach (at least for the privileged), rather than as a vexed dialectic of abstracted insight and more concrete loss' (James, 2005b: 61). Subjectivity and identity require place to exist. The supreme Cartesian self that needs no place, but simply consciousness of thought, to exist is not a social being. The necessity of movement, and therefore of encounters, cannot be denied. The debate lies between two extremes: movement to a place, where, as in More, most movements become redundant (and dangerous: travel is severely limited in Utopia, and never occurs alone), or movement in a placeless space. The cosmopolitan utopist and cognate figures are but the latest, globalized incarnations of the *flâneur* Walter Benjamin celebrated, following the literary footsteps of Baudelaire in the streets of Paris. The urban porosity of the great European cities has given way to a global openness, but place remains (Philippopoulos-Mihalopoulos, 2001).

Yet the phenomenological similarity between the *flâneur* and the cosmopolitan (the multitudes of encounters, the celebration of abundant material culture, etc.) hides a fundamental difference. The late 19th-century urban

wanderer moves amid the urban structures of universally accessible public places (arcades, boulevards, etc.). Idleness depended on material wealth, to be sure, but within a shared universe. Our current utopias, centered on global cities and the transnational, unbounded traveler, require no such shared *topos*. Thus, it is not surprising that Calhoun (2002) excoriated this new cosmopolitanism as 'the class consciousness of the frequent traveler'. Indeed as Favell notes in his discussion of non-elite migrants: one suspects 'the lived experience of these transnational pioneers to be immensely difficult and unsettling, often, tragic; full of unpredictable social trajectories that clash with the perceptions and expectations of most people around them, the "normal" life within a nation-state community' (2001: 398).

CONCLUSION

In 1958 Ralf Dahrendorf urged fellow sociologists to break free from what he saw as the dominant (functionalist) conception of society based on what he considered to be the main features of utopianism: changelessness, a-historicity and immobility (Dahrendorf, 1958). Utopia, he argued, is the theorized expression of the desire for social and moral permanence, a trap that threatened to condemn much of the social sciences to irrelevance in the face of increasingly kinetic societies. Our objective so far has been to show *pace* Dahrendorf that movement has always been constitutive of utopia. Indeed, today much of what can be identified as utopian thinking celebrates mobility. Does this mean that Dahrendorf's argument has been heeded perhaps a little too well: out with utopian system-construction, in with utopian itinerancy?

Our position is best summarized in three connected points. First, uncovering the integral contribution of the notion of movement to utopian figurations allows us to reconsider both utopia's lamented demise and its recommended demotion. The argument could in fact be made that the current hegemony of one of the constitutive tropes of utopianism – travel – has diffused and multiplied heterotopias. Abolishing borders, promoting a denationalized and cosmopolitan subjectivity, and global justice are far broader social ideals than those articulated in insular utopias. In this sense, utopianism is more pervasive today than it has ever been. The end of utopia (or history or ideology) has been announced in one form or another for some time (Birnbaum, 1975). The more difficult task of relating utopia to new forms of political and social imagination has more rarely been undertaken. The recovery of the centrality of movement and its dialectic relationship with space in utopian figurations is, we believe, a contribution in this direction.

A second point also relates to Dahrendorf's criticism. Utopia works as much, and perhaps even more powerfully, as an inspiration for envisioning alternative forms of sociability than as a concrete blueprint for the structuring of

society.[21] As Wegner persuasively argues, 'utopia presents a narrative picture of history-in-formation rather than the theoretical description of a fully formed historical situation' (2007: 115). While Dahrendorf saw immobility as the key form of sociability secreted through utopianism, we have attempted to demonstrate that immobility, symbolized by the island, or the tightly choreographed city, represents an attempt to restrain and modulate the constitutive notion of movement that powered utopian imaginations. Thus, from its foundational narratives to its recent itinerant incarnation, utopia is built not just on the idea of movement, but on forms of sociability that might harness movement and intimate new communal dynamics. The creative tension between place and space, at the heart of utopia, risks being lost by an over-emphasis on either systemic fixity or unfettered mobility: 'The two sides of the binary opposition require each other in order to exist, generating each other through opposition' (Kaplan, 2006: 406). Unlike Bauman (2003) who argues that it is the loss of space that undermines the possibility of utopia, it is the utopia of movement that is contributing to the elimination of space. Indeed, one could argue, following Jameson, that 'the opposition between global and local is an ideological dualism which generates not only false problems, but false solutions. . . . Multiplicity becomes the central theme of this imaginary closure, whose conceptual dilemma remains that of closure' (2005: 216).

What different forms of utopian closure are possible? Jameson cautiously suggests that were it not 'so outworn and potentially misleading a term, feder-alism would be an excellent name for the political dimensions of this Utopian figure' (2005: 224).[22] In Jameson's usage, federalism leads neither to a roman-ticism of the local nor to an uncritical celebration of the mobile as escape from all spatialized constraints, instead it points to the complex 'coexistence and interrelationship of semi-autonomous and multiple units in such a way that the tension between whole and part is never resolved' (ibid.: 225). Utopia has played an important role in defining the central places of modernity, from the city to the national state, in no small part by imagining the departure from older forms of sociability and the discovery of new ones. The current, movement-celebrating manifestations of utopianism have provided few such alternate definitions of postnational places. Vanishing borders and emerging itinerant identities will inevitably contribute to the rise of new forms of soci-ability that have yet to spark the type of social and political imagination of earlier utopists.

Lastly, understanding utopia as play between movement and place, rather than as dead narratives or dangerous fantasies, contributes to making the range of existing default utopian figurations visible, not only in the utopias of itinerancy, which we have described, but others such as the utopia of the end of utopias (Rancière, 1995). As a result, utopias, and the intimations of new forms of sociability that they generate, could be contested more vigorously

and become the object of hegemonic struggle (Laclau and Mouffe, 1985). The ability to construct and challenge utopian visions is paramount to democratic public debates. Current visions of idealized social futures may never come to be, but their utopian lineage must nevertheless be made clear to comprehend fully their potential implications. The importance of doing so is contained in Mannheim's warning that a world without utopia is a world where the will to shape history has been lost (Mannheim, 1936: 236).

NOTES

1   Itself not a new phenomenon. 'Utopico-religious critiques of modernity' have taken a broad range of forms during the 19th and 20th centuries (Löwy, 1989).
2   As Johnson (2006) has convincingly argued, Foucault left the relationship between heterotopia and utopia underspecified. Although, at one point, Foucault refers to heterotopia as a 'kind of effectively enacted utopia' (Foucault, 1986: 24), he maintains that the latter is fundamentally an unreal space, a 'placeless place' (ibid.), which is not the case with heterotopia. As Johnson notes, a number of scholars have celebrated Foucault's heterotopias as spaces of resistance and have linked them to Bakhtin's utopian rendering of the carnivalesque as well as Lefebvre's foregrounding of the utopian potential found in heterotopic space. On Johnson's reading, however, this interpretation is not only unwarranted; it also goes against the grain of the text where 'heterotopia not only contrasts to but also disrupts utopia' (2006: 84). For our part, we want to emphasize the dependence of both utopias and heterotopias on the unraveling of the medieval conception of space.
3   Buck-Morss (2002) argues that mass utopias were distributed along ideological lines during the cold war, with spatial forms clustered in liberal-democratic nation-states whereas processual ones tended to be found in socialist states.
4   However, in a recent overview of the Utopian genre, Wegner writes that '[u]topia has played a significant part in modern history, and will continue to do so in any foreseeable future' (2005: 92).
5   See Burdett (2003) for an analysis of the utility of the notion of utopia to characterize Italian fascism.
6   We are certainly cognizant of and sympathetic to the way space has been problematized and analytically theorized by geographers. Thus we do not seek to oppose place to a naïve notion of absolute space. Nonetheless we do find Tuan's (1977) phenomenologically inspired distinctions between place and space useful for capturing the space–place tensions that underwrite utopia. According to Taylor, principal among these are the following notions: space is more abstract than place; place is security while space is freedom; space is what allows movement; and finally when space becomes familiar it becomes place (1999: 11). Nonetheless, it is worth keeping in mind that place should not be confused with

the local: place can exist at a number of scales. For instance, as Taylor argues, whereas the nation-state was initially articulated as space, it has come to be experienced as a place (1999). See also Massey (1994).

7   Foucault also used the metaphor of the ship extensively in his *Madness and Civilization* (the more complete, recent translation of the French original is titled *History of Madness* [Foucault, 2006]), but to depict the 'ship of fools', whose function was both to cast away and to secure a place for those deemed mad. Anticipating other utopian vessels, the ship of fools offered escape from the strictures of reason, but also from want and unhappiness.

8   Indeed, the tension between the forced mobility and repressive containment of peasants was registered by Thomas More in *Utopia*, as Marx notes in a footnote in his discussion of primitive accumulation in *Capital* (Marx, 1983: 687). We would like to thank an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this point.

9   Zangwill was himself the British son of Russian Jewish immigrants, while Lazarus was profoundly affected by the fate of Jews seeking refuge in the United States from Russian pogroms in the late 1800s (Parrinder, 2006). Zangwill's other works, documenting London Jewish life in immigrant ghettos, are in many ways the opposite of utopia – stark depictions of social and economic hardship – to which his melting pot metaphor seems to be the antidote.

10   We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this point.

11   It is worth noting, however, that in 1889 an international conference on migration approved the following resolution: 'we affirm the right of the individual to the fundamental liberty' accorded to him 'by every civilized nation to come and go and dispose of his person and his destinies as he pleases' (cited in Thomas, 1939: 254).

12   The 'non-place' signified by the boat in classical utopian writings is today associated with the profusion of serial nodes or 'omnitopias' – such as airport terminals, hotels, restaurants, convention centers, etc. – that are both in and beyond place to the extent that they construct and perform 'geographically distinct spaces as perceptually ubiquitous place': 'wherever you go, there you are' (Wood, 2003: 325). Technology, in the form of ships and navigational aids, also the source of imaginations in classical writings, is no less important today in the form of new modalities of technological connectivity. Marc Augé's anthropology of 'super-modernity', for instance, dissects the non-places that travel and technology impose on us (Augé, 1995).

13   One of the most noted paradoxes of classical spatialized utopias has been the manner in which they attempt to signify freedom from want, injustice, disease, etc., through the creation of tightly choreographed social processes and spatial relations, in this way putting important constraints on the freedom of their denizens. As James notes, this paradox is also operative in contemporary idealization of freedom of movement: '"freedom" entails developing the infrastructure to defend the free movement and operation of some, and to strictly curtail the freedom of others' (2005a: 27).

14   A number of culturally influential writers, notably Michael Ondaatje, Amy Tan and Jhumpa Lahiri, weave some of the central utopian themes we discuss here into their work, including movement, displacement and discovery. In addition,

the post-cold war period has seen the publication of a number of important science fiction utopias cited in Wegner (2005, 2007): Kim Stanley Robinson's *Pacific Edge* (1999) and *Mars* trilogy (1992–6), Joe Haldeman's *Forever Peace* (1997), Toni Morrison's *Paradise* (1997), Ken MacLeod's 'Fall Revolution' quartet (1995–9), Leslie Marmon Silko's *Almanac of the Dead* and China Miéville's *The Iron Council*. We are grateful to an anonymous referee for drawing our attention to this science fiction literature.

15 See, for instance, Appiah (2007) and Breckenridge *et al*. (2002) for two excellent recent examples of the cosmopolitanism debate.

16 It is important to note that neo-liberalism is perhaps the figuration of human, or perhaps more accurately non-human (i.e. capital, knowledge, products), utopian itinerancy par excellence. This, however, is not only in the sense that market fundamentalism is the contemporary form of what Polanyi (2001[1944]) had earlier identified as the 'stark utopia' of economic liberalism: that markets should govern not only economic interactions but the whole of society (Somers and Block, 2005), but also in the way in which neo-liberal figurations are articulated around the 'necessity and inevitability of the free movement of capital and goods' (Kelly, 1999: 384). Indeed, it might be more precise to refer to this type of neo-liberal figuration as a monotopia – 'an organised, ordered and totalized space of zero-friction and seamless logistic flow' (Jensen and Richardson, 2004: 3) – rather than utopia. Thus we exclude a discussion of neo-liberal utopias of frictionless movement not because they are unimportant, but rather because they are so important that they tend to displace everything else.

17 Curiously, the USA remains as the place-holder for the imaginary non-place: 'America may yet construct another narrative of enduring existence, as narrative about the uses of loyalty after the end of the nation-state' (Appadurai cited in James, 2005c: 114).

18 See also Urry (2000b) and more recently (2007). For a critical overview of the field see Nowicka (2006) and Frello (2008).

19 It is worth noting that more recently this utopian longing has been displaced by a stark dystopian projection. The end of the current unsustainable petro-based system of auto-mobility, Urry argues, is likely to lead to a future of energy-based 'regional warlordism' or a 'digital Orwell-ization of self and society' (Urry, 2007: 285–90).

20 For Hardt and Negri immaterial labour produces 'an immaterial good, such as a service, a cultural product, knowledge or communications' (Hardt and Negri, 2000: 290).

21 Jameson asserts that the importance of the utopian form today is precisely its ability to interrupt the ideological conviction that there is no alternative. It does so not by presenting a detailed framework of an alternative future but 'by forcing us to think the break itself, and not by offering a more traditional picture of what things would be like after the break' (2005: 232).

22 We are grateful to the anonymous referee who drew our attention to this formulation.

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