

How Did Britain Develop? Adaptive Social Systems and the Development of Nations

Transformation

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Abstract

The economic development of the West is under examined in terms of lessons there may be for development strategies employed in the global South today. This article examines the emergence of sustained change in economic growth in Britain in the 19th century, in light of the normative poverty eradication strategies of today. The article focuses not so much on what happened in Britain and why, as on what did not happen during this period of rapid economic development. The purpose of this anachronistic examination is to search for helpful correctives to current poverty eradication thinking and practice. There are two major lessons. First, Britain's experience of rapid economic growth suggests that social change is unpredictable and thus immune to today's linear planning models. Second, Britain's development is a story of changes in the individual and social identity of the British people themselves – the British people changed. A set of proposals in response to these findings is then described.

Keywords

Adaptive social systems, development, economic development, economic history, poverty, poverty eradication, social change, transformational development

Life is understood backwards,
but must be lived forwards.

Søren Kierkegaard

Introduction

The purpose of this article is to examine the emergence of sustained economic change in Britain in the 19th century. Industrialization, urbanization, technological innovation, modern science, along with the discovery of the concepts of capital and a market systems, combined to create a set of forces that redirected the history of Britain and, in time, the rest of the world. My interest is not so much what happened and why, but rather, what did not happen during this period of rapid economic development? The purpose of this anachronistic examination is to see if there are lessons for

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


Figure 1. The radical redirection of history.
(Data from Maddison, 2003).

development professionals and others who aspire to do the work of poverty eradication in poor countries in the global South today.

What Happened in Britain in the 19th Century?

Something new happened in the world at the beginning of the 19th century. Since the time of Christ, the world's population and gross domestic product had remained relatively unchanged. In 1800, over 90% of the world's families lived in contexts of scarcity and insecurity; immediate survival was their central concern.

In the early 1800s, this enduring trajectory suddenly changed. Over the last 200 years, the world's gross domestic product increased over 50 times (see Figure 1) resulting in a seven-fold increase in global per capita income (Maddison, 2003). Over the same time period, the world's population grew six times as child mortality dropped rapidly and life expectancy increased correspondingly (Griffin, 2008). The trajectory of economic and population growth of the nation had changed dramatically.

This increase in material well-being started in Britain, and then spread to Europe, the United States, and Japan, and in the last 20 years, to middle income countries such as Brazil, India, and China (Hobsbawm, 1975; Maddison, 2001). This has meant some good news for the poor. The number of people living on less than \$1.25 per day declined from over 90% in the early 1800s to 17% in 2011 (World Bank, 2014).

Historians have offered a variety of explanations for what contributed to this dramatic new trajectory in history. Modernization theory argues that industrialization, urbanization and education resulted in people turning away from their traditional (and conservative) cultural values in favor of new 'modern' values which fit nicely within the emerging market system of modern capitalism (Inglehart, 2000; Rostow, 1960). Another alternative argues that it was the discovery of the difference between the traditional value of physical assets like land, gold and timber in contrast to their potential as capital which can be leveraged for larger returns (De Soto, 2000). Others point to the

emergence of new economic institutions that enabled global trading, banking and the emergence of a global market system and free trade (North and Thomas, 1973).

In contrast, another group argues that the economic growth in Europe had little to do with Europe itself, but more to do with colonialism and the early stages of globalization. Some argue that the West got wealthy at the expense of the rest of the world (Frank, 1967; Rodney, 2011). Others point to the impact of migration – in the form of slavery and outward migration from Europe – on Britain's economic growth (Manning, 2013). A variation of this theme connects the institution of slavery to the development of capitalism and the British Empire (Williams, 1994).

Others attribute the rapid change to an increase in human ingenuity reflecting a wave of technological inventions made possible by the emergence of modern science which led to an understanding of how things work or fail to work (Mokyr, 2009). In yet another view, some argue that Britain's change in direction was shaped by the emergence of what are called the 'social virtues' as a result of the work of British moral philosophers such as Adam Smith, Francis Hutcheson, and Edmund Burke, as well as the preachers of the Wesleyan Revival, some Church of England bishops and missionaries (Himmelfarb, 2004: 5–19, 116ff).

Since I am not a historian, I am happy to leave the search for the answer to those better qualified than I. And I assume that most of what I have just summarized provides some of the pieces of a comprehensive explanation for how Britain's economic history changed. But, as someone interested in poverty eradication in the global South, I began to wonder if there was another way of interrogating this radical change in material development in Britain that might inform the development conversations of today?

What follows is an anachronistic thought experiment of sorts as most of what I looked for in Britain's history was not available or even possible then. The idea that poor nations could be developed did not emerge until after the Second World War. The thinking and practice of economic development today is a recent product of over 60 years of trial and error. Carrying out this thought exercise might suggest some insights that may be helpful in correcting our thinking about development today.

So what *did not happen* in Britain in the run up to the 19th century? In the story of how Britain and then Europe and the United States developed, what things were not parts of the explanation?

What Did Not Happen?

The answer is obvious and instructive. No nations came to help backward, under-developed Britain break out of its many poverty traps. No international organization proposed Millennium Development Goals for 1815 for Britain. There were no development economists with strategies to eradicate poverty such as today's Amartya Sen, Jeffrey Sachs, William Easterly, and Paul Collier. There was no United Nations, no UNDP, nor a Global Health Alliance. There were no development strategies, no development agencies, no development funding nor anyone bringing new technology into Britain from somewhere else. In the early 1800s, Britain was just a poor country with a stagnant population, a mercantile economy and a preponderance of uneducated rural poor.

Since all of the above is currently considered essential to helping the global South overcome its poverty today, and since the West decided it had a moral obligation (and a Cold War motivation) to 'develop' others after World War II, one wonders what kind of corrective Britain's rather extraordinary development story might offer?

The significant insight seems to be that the energy for Britain's development emerged from within Britain itself, without a plan or a champion or even national leadership. The emergence of Britain's development seems more like a bits and pieces affair. Scientists, working largely on their own, with very simple equipment they made themselves, with no research grants or supporting government institutions, began to study God's other book – nature – and slowly began to piece

together an evolving understanding of how God's creation worked. New agricultural methods were developed by trial and error in the fields. Investigations into the human body led to the study of disease, new health interventions slowly emerged and people became healthier. Farmers and family businesses, applying the new scientific knowledge and making simple mechanical innovations, became more productive.

For the purpose of this article, the most intriguing of these small, emergent, disconnected changes was the change in the way people began to view themselves and each other. Deirdre McCloskey, professor of economics and English literature at the University of Illinois, describes the way English literature during the 19th century reveals a profound change in how the people of England – upstairs and down – understood themselves as well as the nature of their interaction with each other (McCloskey, 2006). Poor serfs, who knew and accepted their place in life, slowly morphed into a new middle class that was treated with increasing respect and given freedom to innovate, to become merchants and enjoy the fruits of their efforts (Mokyr, 2009: 2). What McCloskey called the 'Bourgeois Revaluation' saw a new 'faithful dignity' being accorded to the middle class and 'new, hopeful liberty' that encouraged innovation, risk taking and wealth creation on an increasingly wide social scale (McCloskey, 2010: 11).¹

Ordinary people began to act as if they could change their conditions and make choices about their lives, ideas that had been unimaginable not that much earlier in Britain. A change in self-understanding and social identity somehow took place that resulted in a widespread increase in human agency (Rosenau, 1990: 13). The bottom line: Britain developed in part because the British people changed in the way they viewed themselves as individuals and as a society, and what they could do.

This 'bits and pieces' process of change from below resulted in an emergent development momentum that then drove the more systemic changes from the ground up. In time, the social institutions of government, the private sector and a newly emerging civil society, especially the churches, began to react to and more deeply understand the impact of all this change and understand what might help and hinder it. Primary education became universal and free because this economic sea change in Britain demanded that more people be literate and able to do their maths. Health systems emerged to keep workers healthy. New economic and social institutions slowly evolved as it became clear that this development from below required new laws, better police and honest courts. Because this emergent process had a downside for the poor, legal protections were created for working poor as well as for vulnerable woman and children. Institutions, whose sole function was compassionate caring such as the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children, emerged for the first time in human history (Sznaider, 1998). These government and church-based efforts of organized compassion led to 19th-century Britain being referred to as 'the humanitarian century' (Pinker, 2011: 168) or the 'age of benevolence' (Himmelfarb, 2004: 131).²

Thus did Britain 'develop itself' in the 19th century. Slowly, haltingly, unevenly, unfairly, and without a plan, the British people participated in the emergence of wealth creation and job creation, of increasingly nutritious food, improved health and education for all, as well as the social institutions to support and encourage Britain's trajectory of change and care for the poor who were struggling with the transition. These outcomes are the same as what the development community seeks to enable in countries of the global South today. But, if Britain's development was not brought about by external intervention, money and technology, what might Britain's story have to say to the development community and its poverty eradication strategy and approaches today?

Emergence of Structure Within Complex Adaptive Social Systems

One possible answer lies in the recent understandings of what are called complex or dynamical systems. These are systems of such complexity, with so many moving parts, with so many

feedback loops, that they are unpredictable. They cannot be modeled. Simplifying assumptions do not work. Complex systems develop counter-intuitively; they cannot be managed or controlled.

Complex systems made up of human beings take this uncertainty and ambiguity to an even higher level (Gunderson and Holling, 2002). Civilizations, societies and cultures are made up of self-aware people who do not have to follow the rules of physics or chemistry. Instead, the people who make up societies make choices, sometimes for rational reasons and sometimes not.³ Furthermore, people adjust, usefully or not, to what is going on around them. Thus, social systems are more than dynamical or complex, they are also adaptive – change emerges from within. Examples of adaptive social systems include economies, stock markets, political parties, geopolitical organizations, and terrorist networks.⁴ The only consistent feature of adaptive social systems is their unpredictability and the resulting failure of efforts to ‘manage’ these kinds of systems toward predetermined goals.

High levels of complexity and continuous adaptation do not mean that these systems are eternally chaotic. Imagine pouring sand on a sand pile. For a time, the sand pile *organizes itself* into a cone that grows higher and higher. The sand pile appears to be a stable structure. Then, unpredictably and without warning, the next piece of sand hits the cone and the cone collapses. Yet, as you continue to pour more sand on the newly collapsed pile, it begins to self-organize into a new cone once again (Adapted from Bak, 1996: 32). Thus structure in complex social systems does emerge and it also goes away unexpectedly.

Niall Ferguson, a historian at Harvard, has applied the idea of adaptive social systems to understanding the unfolding of history. Setting aside explanations of history’s unfolding as arbitrarily named epochs, the work of great men or the result of great ideas, he wonders ‘. . . if history is not cyclical and slow-moving, but arrhythmic – sometimes almost stationary, but also capable of violent acceleration’ (Ferguson, 2011: 299). New historical direction (structure) does emerge, unexpectedly triggered by constellations of relatively small events. These seemingly stable new structures break down unpredictably as well. As we have seen, Britain’s development emerged from very little, coalesced and grew into a global empire and then collapsed rather quickly with the end of World War II. Global economic growth seemed inevitable in the mid-2000s only to collapse with the Great Recession of 2009. The Arab Spring emerged unexpectedly in 2010 and is now in the midst of a chaotic aftermath. The shape or timing of a future emergent order in the Muslim world is unknown, yet the ‘international community’ aspires to ‘manage’ the situation.

As an aside, this understanding of the emergence of new things and the disappearance of the old within history allows us to comment on the question of whether or not the development of Britain was because the British had a superior culture. There is no evidence that Britain developed as a result of a grand British vision of a better future, a brilliant economic growth strategy systematically pursued as a nation or as a result of a discovery of the will and resources necessary to break out of centuries of scarcity, insecurity, and tradition. The development of Britain was an example of Ferguson’s dynamical understanding of history – a major new thing emerging unbidden and unplanned in bits and pieces, with fits and starts, with good news and not so good news. Uneven, erratic, and often unfair, the understanding of how to create wealth and share that wealth among the many simply emerged. This historically new trajectory in history had to emerge for the first time somewhere and, without merit or favor, Britain just happened to be that place.

Development as Emergence of Structure

So what does all this suggest to us about poverty eradication in the twenty-first century? My account of Britain’s economic development seems compatible with the idea of structure emerging unbidden within a complex adaptive social system. This suggests that development strategies seeking social change are by definition trying to change adaptive social systems – not fixing broken

‘machines.’ Thus they must suffer from the unpredictability and unmanageability of such systems. For programs seeking social change, unintended consequences are the norm, not the exception.

This perspective has been a minor thread in development thinking for some time (Fowler, 2007; Korten, 1980; Myers, 2011; Uphoff, 1992) and is only now beginning to disturb the mainstream of development studies as evidenced by the recent work of Owen Barder (2010) and Ben Ramalingam (2013). The unalterable fact is that development is ‘less and less about creating deliverable products . . . and more concerned with introducing behavioral changes which have to be sustained in the longer term’ (Mosse, 2001: 7). Social change is the ultimate goal of development, not a series of technical fixes.

Before extending this line of thought, I must make two important and critical clarifications. First, it is important to note that my reflections on the story of Britain and complex adaptive social systems are not intended to be used as an argument that the West should get out of the development business today, nor as an argument that we should just leave poor countries alone to figure out their own development path. Neither position would be ethical.

Second, while changing complex social systems is hard, unpredictable work that does not respond well to planning and execution strategies for the reasons we’ve just seen, on the so-called hardware side of development – health technology and building things – these seem a little different. Immunizations do protect children from disease and a functioning health system is essential to human well-being. Technical knowledge and good equipment are essential in creating water and sanitation systems. When building a school, a building plan is necessary. But even these kinds of interventions run into the vagaries and unpredictability of complex social systems behavior when parents refuse to allow their children to be immunized or resist sending their girl children to school. This is one of the major discoveries the Gates Foundation made recently as it looked back at its first 10 years and looked forward its second decade of work (*The Economist*, 2014: 87).

Implications for Development Theory and Practice

The central lessons from the story of Britain’s development are twofold. First, development strategies promoting social change in complex adaptive social systems are unpredictable and idiosyncratic by nature. This finding has three implications: We will need 1) to change our mental model and metaphors for development, 2) to expect and seek out the unexpected, and 3) to focus more on what is actually happening rather than on dogmatically carrying out original development plans. Let’s explore these three implications before moving to the second central lesson and its consequences.

The first implication is that we need to *change our mental model* of development. We need to let go of the mechanical model of modernity which assumes that development takes place by following models from elsewhere or by injecting some missing ingredient such as money, education, technology, good governance, etc. (Barder, 2010). In contrast, David Mosse’s social anthropology research suggests that (sustainable) ‘development “solutions” often evolve from experimentation and practice rather than from design’ (2001: 6).

This in turn suggests that we need to learn from our growing knowledge of complex adaptive social systems such as ecology, economics, and history. Our assumptions and metaphors about how social systems work and develop need to change. We are going to have to surrender our faith in Log Frames and Design, Monitoring and Evaluation (DME) program plans.⁵ Good process needs to become as important as figuring out how to complete measurable activities. Results-Based Management needs to be redefined so that ‘results’ include evidence of increased individual and social agency as well as continuous discovery and adaptation as evidence of sustainable social change.

As complex social systems, nations and communities will experience change that is unexpected or counter-intuitive. This means we must learn to *expect and look for the unexpected*. Change will come in fits and starts, often in unexpected ways. Our development frameworks and planning tools must reflect more of a discovery model of development committed to on-going process, open-endedness and continuing adjustment. Setting aside the mechanical mental model includes accepting that we cannot plan our way into a better future. Working with adaptive social systems means you have to learn your way into the future (Myers, 2011: 244). Apparently faith – believing in a future not yet here nor guaranteed – has a role in development work, too.

Furthermore, we have to pay as much attention to noticing the unexpected as we do to monitoring the expectations of the original development plan itself. The resulting social learning takes place in the context of national, regional and community-based discussions about what is working and what is not, as well as about changes that have surprised the stakeholders. The outcome of this learning process is a requirement for continuous re-planning. To support this process of on-going discovery and adjustment, frequent monitoring is more likely to improve development outcomes than impact evaluations (Myers, 2011: 247, 288).

This does not mean that one tosses out the old development strategy and sets a new one in its place every few months or years. It is more likely that the longer-term vision for a better future will remain largely intact – purpose and goals tend to remain same. But the inputs, outputs, and outcomes, and especially the process of change, may require continuing adjustment in response to what is actually happening on the ground as well as what the nation or community is learning about itself and its context. Agency headquarters folk and development donors, who assume that tracking inputs and outputs is the key to making a difference, may find this shift disquieting. Even NGO leaders and politicians at the national level may resist creating the organizational space for this kind of adaptive learning process. All of these more distant stakeholders will need to undergo a kind of conversion and adjust their expectations to the way things actually work in adaptive social systems, not the way they wish them to be.

The second major lesson from our reflections on Britain's development is that for nations to develop, the people within them need to change. Conditions need to be created that allow poor nations and their people to figure out what in their culture enhances life and well-being – and thus must be preserved – as well figuring out what kind of change holds the potential of overcoming things that diminish life. They need the freedom to decide what may help them overcome a sense of limited capacity or diminished social identity in favor of change that may increase human agency, dignity, and liberty (Christian, 2011; Myers, 2011). People need to discover that they can diagnose their situation and learn their way toward a better future for themselves. At the end of the day, these are decisions that only people from within the nation or community can and should make (Taiwo, 2010: 13). There are four implications of this finding. Development agencies and practitioners need 1) more humility, 2) more patience, 3) an appreciative process in contrast to a problem-solving one, and 4) a willingness to share what we have when we are asked and not before.

The first implication is that we, who desire to assist in the development of others, need a lot *more humility*. If development is something that emerges from within a social system, then outsiders don't know as much as they think they do. We may need to listen more and talk less. If part of the development of Britain consisted of ordinary people learning to define their own problems, to recognize opportunities, and being free to respond, then we need to accord the same opportunity to poor nations today.

This means that we, as Christians, need to look for the evidence of the image of God in those we serve and honor that image. We need to follow God as God works in poor nations, not yield to

the temptation to act like god. When we show up with packaged answers to problems we have defined, the nation and its communities are denied an opportunity to develop the skills critical to empowerment and sustainability.

The second implication follows from the first. There is a need for a lot *more patience*. Learning to figure things out for the first time takes time. This is especially true when your prior experience with your government or international NGOs is that you are supposed to sit back and wait for them to provide you the service they think you need or tell you what you need to do.

Patience means creating space for discovery and learning. This in turn means that we need to work on much longer timeframes. We need to be willing to honor the process of trial and error. Development programming needs to be more about learning, and less about completing projects on time. Poor nations need to be given the freedom to move at their own pace, not that preferred by an impatient West. If God chooses to walk no faster than a human being can walk (Koyama, 1980), then surely we must be willing to do the same.

Taking time to enable people to discover their own future is hard for externally funded development promoters to do. Funding agencies do not like to pay for process; process seems too ‘squishy.’ How do you measure it? They prefer tangible outcomes, usually within their 2–4-year funding commitments. We need to remember that it took Britain a little over 200 years to get where it is today. Development work in the global South is just 60 years old and many of the places in the South remain severely constrained by their colonial experiences. At the end of the day, we need to accept that this kind of social change takes as much time as it takes.

The third consequence is a requirement to *pursue appreciative processes*, not just the problem-solving approaches preferred by outsiders keen on diagnosis and corresponding interventions. Affirming an appreciative process is both a practical issue and a theological affirmation. Practically speaking, learning how to determine the next steps in the pilgrimage of one’s country or community, and being free to choose one’s process for change is as important to development as solving a particular development problem. If social change is going to emerge from within the nation or community at its own pace and time, we need to be willing to engage them from a stance of helping them understand what they already know and how they perceive change to be emerging. This kind of stance is critical to people discovering a sense of agency and to become actors. We need to remember that Britain developed in part because its people did. Are we open, sensitive and discerning enough to listen to how the nation or community sees God already at work in their midst and allow them to hear the better future toward which God is calling them? From a theological perspective, an appreciative approach honors the gifts and creativity that God has bestowed on every human being as well as the central fact that God is already at work redeeming and recreating even the poorest parts of today’s world.

For all the deconstruction of and debate about the value and effectiveness of participatory development processes (Cooke and Kothari, 2001; Guijt and Kaul Shah, 1998; Kumaari, 2004; Ngunjiri, 2003) over the past 15 years, the simple fact is that no other development process offers the potential to treat the poor with respect and convey confidence in their worth, brains and potential. No other methods are on hand by which the poor can discover how much they know about their context, or imagine solutions to their concerns, or come to believe they have the liberty and potential to drive their own development and futures.

The final consequence is that while we must take a supporting and enabling role, we must also be *willing to share* what we have *when we are asked*. While countries in the global South must find their own development path, this does not mean they must also reinvent existing technology. This is where poor nations today have an advantage over 19th-century Britain, which had to create the technology to support its social change. The poor are smart and know that outsiders often have

ideas, processes, and technology that can help them. If our journey with the poor is relational and respectful, times will come when they will ask us to share ideas or methods or technology. Making leap-frogging technology available allows local folks to figure out creative ways to make use of it as we have seen with the use of cell phones for health and banking (Doron and Jeffrey, 2013). Technological change can happen now while social change will take time. Discerning what the mix of social change versus technological intervention is an important challenge and allowing the poor to decide when they need it may be a better way to get the mix right.

In addition to the foregoing, something else is required of the practice of a Christian development strategist. We need a development spirituality that shows that our faith in God and God's redemptive work in the world – and in particularly in development – is more than a simple spiritual affirmation. We need to pray and act as if co-discovering a development program strategy, and working within a social learning process that releases human agency, is an act of discernment – seeking out what God is already doing and becoming part of it. We need to be as spiritually discerning as we are technically discerning. We need to act as dependent people, not self-sufficient experts with the money, technology and answers. The ambiguity and uncertainty of development work should drive us and those we seek to serve to continuing prayer and quiet reflection – listening to God and waiting to hear what God has to say to us. After all, the social transformation we seek is to follow after and become part of God's work in the world.

Connecting Things Up

The bottom line is that the process side of development – what some call the software side – is not a cost to be avoided in the name of efficiency, but a critical success factor to be embraced in the name of effectiveness. Development sustainability may be more substantively linked to the emergence of individual and social agency and human liberty than to providing money, technology or one-size fits all programming.

How then does this contribute to the contemporary development strategy conversation? It seems clear that it does not fit well with the formulaic, top down approach for ending chronic poverty of Jeffrey Sachs and his proposal for Millennium Villages (Sachs, 2005, 2015). What I am proposing does connect to some degree with William Easterly's argument for searching for development solutions via local initiatives and a trial and error approach that calls more a greater dependence on learning than planning (Easterly, 2006). It also connects in part with the work of Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Duflo and their promotion of randomized control experimentation as a way of identifying the most effective practices (Banerjee and Duflo, 2011). There is an even closer connection with Amartya Sen's proposal that enhancing human freedom is both a means and an end of development (Sen, 1999).

All of these strategies, however, still tend to work within an outside-in model of change. While the approaches of Easterly, and also Banerjee and Duflo, are more local than the traditional top-down models like Sachs, they nonetheless assume some form of external intervention is necessary to increase capabilities or to prepare multiple development options or to carry out evaluations. The deeper, more time-consuming step of creating conditions by which nations and communities learn to analyse their own situation, propose their own solutions, and then evaluate and discover for themselves what is working or not is largely missing. By so doing, the internal or psychological impact of chronic poverty – what some have marred identity (Christian, 2011; Myers, 2011) – is unaddressed. The poor need to discover for themselves that they have worth, God given dignity and are capable of hope and visions of change. This is what happened to the British people over the course of the 19th century. Their understanding of their personal and social identities was

transformed. The helpless and hopeless evolved into actors and agents with growing self confidence in their ability to change their world.

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Notes

1. Sadly, McCloskey and the others cited earlier in this summary of explanations never ask the question about the origin of these new ideas and values. Rodney Stark (2005) makes a compelling argument that these are by-products of the Judeo-Christian theological tradition in Britain and Europe. Michael Gillespie (2008) also makes a case for the theological origins of what has normatively been called the emergence of secular modernity. Sadly, exploring the issues of origins further goes beyond the bounds of this article.
2. Pinker argues that this emergence of cooperation and humanitarianism is a product of psychological and social evolution. Himmelfarb, on the other hand, points to Britain's deist moral philosophers, including Adam Smith, and the Wesleyan Revival and its gospel of good works, as the sources of this emergence of the value and practice of compassion (2001).
3. For an interesting exploration of what this means to understanding history see Gaddis (2002).
4. For an interesting application of complex social systems to foreign policy see Ramo (2009).
5. The Logical Framework Approach (Log Frame) was developed in the 1969 for the United States Agency of Development (USAID) as a management tool mainly used for designing, monitoring, and evaluating international development projects. Based on a linear, logical, problem solving frame, it remains the normative planning framework today for most government agencies, the UN and aid agencies.

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