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Anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel: Methodology and results of the ASCI survey[1]

Kurzfassung: Auf Grundlage psychologischer Konflikttheorien einerseits sowie von Item-Response-Modellen andererseits entwickelt dieser Aufsatz eine integrierte Methodologie, die auf die Differenzierung zwischen verschiedenen Formen der Israelkritik abzielt. Eine Anwendung dieser Methodologie auf die Daten des Anti-Semitism and Criticism of Israel (ASCI) Surveys zeigt, dass es zwei Formen der Israelkritik gibt, die aus verschiedenen und entgegengesetzten Prozessen resultieren. (1) Antisemitische Israelkritik ist generell vorurteilsbeladen und teilt nicht nur antisemitische, antizionistische und israelfeindliche, sondern auch palästinenserfeindliche Ressentiments. (2) Nicht-antisemitische Israelkritik speist sich aus Pazifismus und Menschenrechtsengagement und weist jegliche Art von antisemitischen, antizionistischen, israelfeindlichen und palästinenserfeindlichen Vorurteilen zurück. Selbst Israelkritik, die ursprünglich nicht antisemitisch motiviert ist, läuft jedoch Gefahr, in antisemitische Vorurteile abzugleiten.

Abstract: Building upon psychological conflict theory, on the one hand, and item-response models, on the other, the present paper develops an integrated methodology that aims at differentiating the various ways of criticizing Israel. An application of this methodology to the Anti-Semitism and Criticism of Israel (ASCI) survey found two ways of criticizing Israel resulting from two different and antipodal processes. (1) Anti-Semitic criticism of Israel is generally laden with prejudice and shares not only anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli, but also anti-Palestinian resentments as well. (2) Non-anti-Semitic criticism of Israel is motivated by pacifism and human rights commitment and rejects any form of anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist, anti-Israeli or anti-Palestinian resentment. However, even critics of Israel who were not originally motivated by anti-Semitism are also in danger of developing anti-Semitic prejudices.

1. Introduction

One of the merits of German anti-Semitism research is its sensitivity to the various different ways anti-Semitism may manifest itself beyond the traditional prejudices against Jews. This has led to distinctions among various facets of modern anti-Semitism, whose dynamics arise, among other things, from societal and political ways of dealing with the crimes committed against Jews during the Nazi era, and also from societal and political approaches to dealing with the decades-old Middle East conflict.

Manifest or classical anti-Semitism refers to the defamation of Jews, going back to traditional prejudices (cf. Heyder et al., 2005; Frindte et al., 2005a,b; Frindte, 2006; Zick & Küpper, 2007). The spectrum of resentments connected with this ranges from an unspecific rejection of Jews, portrayed as somehow all alike and incompatible with non-Jews, as people whom one should thus not associate, to the classical conspiracy myth, which conjures up the existence of a shadowy international Jewish conspiratorial network, through which the Jews have usurped excessive influence and risen to a position of supremacy in the world, whose preservation is an important goal of Judaism, to the exclusion of Jews from social and political life and the equation of being Jewish with being un-German, which some authors call anti-Semitic separation (e.g. Heyder et al., 2005; Zick & Küpper, 2007).

The concept of *secondary anti-Semitism*, going back to Schönbach (1961), refers to various ways Germans have dealt with the National Socialist past, the Holocaust and the guilt and responsibility questions (Frindte et al., 2005a,b; Frindte, 2006) and ranges from the rejection of special responsibility for the Jews and/or the call for closing the books on the past (Heyder et al., 2005) to mechanisms of fending off guilt and perpetrator-victim reversal (Holz, 2001), which, e.g., insinuate that Jews exploit the Holocaust to their own advantage (Zick & Küpper, 2007) and/or are themselves to blame for their persecution, up to the trivialization or outright denial of the Holocaust.

Latent anti-Semitism (Bergmann & Erb, 1991a,b) can be understood as a reaction to the communication taboo on anti-Semitic resentment. The term refers to the attempt to publicly avoid the topic of anti-Semitism and the Jews (Frindte et al., 2005a,b; Frindte, 2006).

One thereby assumes that the various facets and their manifestations are more or less interchangeable indicators of anti-Semitism and merely differ in the limitations on their expression posed by the communication taboo. Thus, e.g., the flat rejection of Jews is easier to recognize and acknowledge as a prejudice than is the call to close the books, which can be more easily rationalized as a mere expression of the legitimate wish for a positive national (German) identity. Whether the various facets and their manifestations are equivalent indicators of anti-Semitism as such, or whether they are more or less independent attitude dimensions has, however, previously been only inadequately studied.

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Much the same also holds for the question of whether or to what extent *anti-Zionism* can be reduced to anti-Semitism. Anti-Zionism, in the sense of a negative attitude toward Zionism, which makes the "Jews collectively responsible for Israeli policy" (Bergmann, 2002, 118), has at least two aspects: *political anti-Zionism*, which, e.g., finds expression in branding Zionism as a form of racism (which has even found expression in UN resolutions, cf. Bergmann, 2002, 127) and a *generalizing critique of Israel* that attributes responsibility for Israeli policy to "the Jews" in general and thereby in the given case also manifests anti-Semitic resentment, e.g. in the implication that the Holocaust is a welcome means for the Jews to justify Israeli policy.

While the concept of anti-Zionism assumes that reservations against Israeli policy are transferred to "the Jews" as a collective, the concept of an anti-Semitic critique of Israel, going back to Bergmann & Erb (1991b), refers to a reverse process, in which anti-Semitic prejudices are transferred to the Israeli state (Zick & Küpper, 2007), and/or a critique of Israeli Palestine policy serves as a means to circumvent the communication taboo on anti-Semitic attitudes and to transmit anti-Semitic contents – in the sense of ersatz communication – in a socially acceptable (politically correct) manner (Frindte et al., 2005a,b; Frindte, 2006). In view of weakening taboos on expressing anti-Semitic resentment, alongside the increasing public outrage at criticism of Israel, the aspect of ersatz communication should, to be sure, have become less relevant. Yet, the fact that a critique of Israel can be used as a means to transmit anti-Semitic contents remains unaffected by that.

2.   Mental models

Not only anti-Semitism researchers, the European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC, 2005) and the independent expert circle of the German Parliament (Demirel et al., 2011), but also Jewish institutions in Germany and Israeli representatives have repeatedly pointed out that not every sort of critique of Israel can be viewed as expressing anti-Semitism (cf. Klug, 2003; Bergmann & Wetzel, 2003).

A range of empirical findings support this (among others Bergmann, 2002; Heyder et al., 2005; Frindte, 2006; the Gesellschaft für Sozialforschung (Foundation for Social Research) 2007; Zick & Küpper, 2010/11). The explanatory power of these studies is limited insofar, however, as they merely deal with anti-Israeli resentments and do not distinguish between mere resentment and the manner in which people make sense of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – or in other words: the *mental models* with which they attempt to understand it (Kempf, 2011).

If we want to study the relation between anti-Semitism and criticism of Israel, we must keep these things apart and take into account that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is not just between Jews and non-Jews, but rather it is precisely also a *conflict,* affected by the same social-psychological mechanisms as other conflicts. Thus Morton Deutsch (1973, 2000) has shown that competitive conflicts are accompanied by specific misperceptions that become stronger as a conflict escalates, and Daniel Bar-Tal (1998) has shown that in long-lasting intractable conflicts these perceptual distortions harden into societal beliefs that become part of the psychic infrastructure that helps the members of a society to endure such conflicts. These beliefs include, among other things, belief in the justice of one's own cause and one's own victim role, delegitimizing the enemy, and belief in the defense of personal and national security through a policy of strength.

As in every conflict, there are such perceptual distortions on both sides of the conflict, both sides recruit supporters and form coalitions, and both sides take the risk that third parties will side with the opposing party. In a situation like this, virtually everyone who tries to make sense of the conflict will either do so according to a *war frame* that adopts one of the parties' beliefs, or will try to understand the conflict according to a *peace frame* that overcomes these perceptual distortions and admits the justness (of at least some) of the other side's demands, recognizes shared victim roles, abandons the delegitimation of the opponent and strives to achieve personal and national security through a peace solution (or he will try understand the conflict somewhere in between these two poles).

Both of these frames are ambivalent, however. They promise security and simultaneously create insecurity. (1) The war frame offers security, because tried-and-true action patterns can be continued, but it also poses the risk of continuing violence. (2) The peace frame also offers security, because it promises an end to violence, but at the same time it creates insecurity, because new behavioral patterns must be tried whose efficacy is still uncertain.

The mental models by which participants make sense of a conflict, therefore, have both an emotional and a cognitive component. The emotional component is constituted by participants' *emotional closeness* to the conflict and their sensitivity for the *ambivalence* of its prospects. The cognitive component is constituted by the frame according to which the conflict is interpreted and manifests itself in the ways participants *position* themselves to the conflict.

3.   Questionnaire construction

The measurement of anti-Semitic and/or anti-Israeli resentments, the identification of different facets of anti-Semitism, the reconstruction of participants' mental models, and the study of relations among these concepts necessitate a methodological approach that goes beyond a simple mechanical application of the usual standards of Social Psychology.

Today, more than fifty years after Georg Rasch's (1960) ground-breaking research, the most common approach to attitude measurement is still to select certain indicators for a postulated attitude, without examining whether a common attitude dimension actually underlies them, and to compute a sum-score, without examining whether it is a suitable measurement that makes at least a rank order with regard to the attitude dimension one wants to measure.

3.1   Limited use of factor analysis

When researchers try to determine whether different indicators measure the same attitude dimension (cf. Frindte, 2006; Imhoff, 2010), they usually do so by means of *Principal Components Analysis* (PCA), which is, regrettably, unsuitable for this purpose.

The complete PCA solution represents any k items as vectors in a k-dimensional system of orthogonal (= uncorrelated) coordinates or "factors" and the correlation of any two items as the angle between their respective vectors, whereby the so-called factor loadings a_{ij} are identical with the correlation between item i and factor j. If all items measure the same attitude dimension, PCA should result in the identification of one (main) factor on which all the items load high, while the remaining factors describe minor deviations from this general dimension. If each of the items measures another dimension, on the other hand, PCA should produce k factors, each of which can be assigned to one of the items, so that the item loads high on it, but not on the other factors.

However, the loading-matrix $A = (a_{ij})$ which results from PCA is only unique up to multiplication with an orthogonal transformation matrix T, so that any transformed loading Matrix B = AT is an equally good description of the pair-wise item-correlations. In geometrical terms, this means that there are infinitely many ways in which a k-dimensional space can be described by an orthogonal system of coordinates or, in other words: there are infinitely many different ways in which a system of orthogonal coordinates can be rotated and still describe the same k-dimensional space and the same matrix of pair-wise correlations between the items. And there is no (formal) criterion to decide which of these infinitely many orthogonal systems of coordinates should be favored. The only possible criteria are simply pragmatic ones.

The un-rotated loading matrix defines the coordinates in such a way that the first factor explains as much as possible of the variance of the response variables, the second factor explains as much as possible of the remaining variance, and so on. In geometrical terms, this means that all items are represented by vectors which are as near as possible to the *first* coordinate of the system.

The most common rotation-method is VARIMAX, which defines the coordinates in such a way that each of the items loads as high as possible on one of the factors and as low as possible on the others. In geometrical terms, this means that each item is represented by a vector that is as near as possible to *one* of the coordinates.

Whether PCA supports the assumption that all items measure the same attitude dimension or the alternative assumption of k more-or-less independent dimensions will therefore not (or at least not primarily) depend on the data, but on the arbitrarily chosen rotation method we apply. While the un-rotated loading matrix will favor the assumption of one common dimension on which all items load high (cf. tables 1-2), the VARIMAX rotated loading matrix will favor the assumption of various dimensions that are more-or-less independent of each other (cf. tables 3-4).

Factor	Initial eigenvalues	
	Total	Variance %
1	2.061	**68.702**
2	0.633	21.091
3	0.306	10.208

Table 1: Un-rotated PCA: explained variance

Item	Factor		
	1	2	3
1	**0.841**	-0.421	0.340
2	**0.895**	-0.151	-0.420
3	**0.743**	0.658	0.121

Table 2: Un-rotated PCA: factor loadings

The example in tables 1-4 is based on data from a study by Petzold (2004) and analyzes three items that are intended to measure secondary anti-Semitism:

1.   Decades after the end of war, we shouldn't talk so much about the persecution of the Jews and should eventually rule off the past.

2.   One should ultimately put an end to the chitchat about our guilt vis-à-vis the Jews.
3.   The German people [do not] have any particular responsibility vis-à-vis the Jews.

While the un-rotated loading-matrix seems to support the assumption that all three items measure the same dimension, namely secondary anti-Semitism, the VARIMAX-rotated loading-matrix seems to speak for different dimensions.

Factor	Sum of squared loadings	
	Total	Variance %
1	1.023	**34.111**
2	1.019	**33.961**
3	0.958	**31.928**

Table 3: VARIMAX rotated: explained variance

Item	Factor		
	1	2	3
1	0.172	**0.929**	0.328
2	0.266	0.360	**0.894**
3	**0.961**	0.162	0.225

Table 4: VARIMAX rotated PCA: factor loadings

3.2   Item-response theory

Figure 1: Necessary conditions for ordinal homogeneity:
non-intersecting profile-lines

Figure 2: Inhomogeneity:
The item 3 implies a different rank-order between classes 1 and 2

Figure 3: Necessary conditions for strict homogeneity:
monotonous profile-lines

Figure 4: Profile-lines of Petzold's Secondary anti-Semitism scale

No less problematic is the use of sum-scores as a measure for the postulated attitude dimension. Using a set of k items to arrange the participants on a quantitative dimension requires that each of the items defines the same rank order between

the participants. If this is the case, we can speak of the *ordinal homogeneity* of the scale. Since this must hold for any two individual participants, it must also hold for any two groups of participants as well. In order to test whether ordinal homogeneity holds, we may therefore classify the participants into a number of g = 1,…,h distinct sub-samples (classes of participants) and produce profile-lines, as shown in figures 1-4.[1]

If the (test or) questionnaire is homogeneous, the resulting profile-lines must not intersect with each other (cf. figure 1). Otherwise – if there is an intersection of profile lines – the (test or) questionnaire is non-homogeneous, and (at least some of) the items imply different rank orders between the sub-samples (cf. figure 2).

The classification of participants into sub-samples can be based on either some manifest criterion like the participants' sum-scores, or on a latent variable, which can be constructed by means of *Latent Class Analysis* (LCA). As compared with manifest classifications, LCA has the advantage of constructing the classes in a way which provides an optimal description of the response matrix[2] and which is most sensitive to possible lack of homogeneity (heterogeneity). Since it is based on the participants' response patterns, LCA also gives a much more detailed account of the data.

Even if a scale is ordinally homogeneous, this cannot guarantee that the sum-score contains the complete statistical information on a participant's position in this rank order, and classifying participants according to their sum-scores often leads to a loss of statistical information. If we claim that the sum-scores should provide a sufficient statistic for the participants' ranks, then not only the participants, but also the items must be uniquely ordered. As Rasch (1960) showed, the sum-score exhausts the statistical information about the latent variable *if and only if* the item-responses are related to a latent dimension on which both the participants' latent trait (or attitude) and the difficulty of the item-response categories can be measured, via the logistic function of the *Rasch Model* (RM) (cf. Andrich, 1978).

Whether the model fits the data can be tested by means of (conditional) Likelihood-Ratio Tests (Andersen, 1973) and other methods (cf. Rost, 2004). If the model holds, we can speak of *strict homogeneity*, and the above-defined profile-lines are not only non-intersecting, but also monotonously falling (cf. figure 3). If the model does not hold, the loss of statistical information which is associated with the classification of participants according to their sum-scores can be evaluated by use of the so-called Loss of Information Index (LI), which compares the Explanatory Power (EP) of the RM with that of the LCA (cf. Kempf, 2012), and an inspection of the profile lines can inform us about the nature of the information which the sum-score neglects.

An application to Petzold's Secondary anti-Semitism scale reveals that it becomes easier to agree with the items as their anti-Semitic content becomes less obvious: Item 1 ("Decades after the end of war, we shouldn't talk so much about the persecution of the Jews and should eventually rule off the past.") has the highest level of agreement (M = 3.02); item 2 ("One should ultimately put an end to the chitchat about our guilt vis-à-vis the Jews") follows in second place (M = 2.69); and item 3 ("The German people [do not] have a particular responsibility vis-à-vis the Jews") receives the least support (M = 2.51).

LCA identified five latent classes that are clearly ordered with respect to the participants' claim to rule off the past (cf. figure 4). Class 3 (19.5%) contains the participants who reject the statements most strongly (M = 1.52). Class 2 (26.2%) rejects the statements as well, but to a lesser degree (M = 2.08). Class 4 (18.4%) is undecided as to whether to agree or disagree (M = 2.72). Class 1 (27.1%) rather agrees with the statements (M = 3.70), and class 5 (8.7%) displays the strongest support (M = 4.51). The likelihood-ratio test of the 5-class model, as opposed to the saturated model, speaks for a good model fit (L-ratio = 52.99; df = 60; n.s.), and the explanatory power of the model is satisfactory (EP = 91.77%).

The RM, in contrast, must be rejected (L-ratio = 231.95; df = 101, p < 0.001), its explanatory power is unsatisfactory (EP = 63.96%), and the sum-score construction is accompanied by a dramatic loss of diagnostically relevant statistical information (LI = 30.30%).

As the profile lines of the latent classes represented in figure 4 show, the scale is, to be sure, ordinally homogeneous, so that each of the three items defines the same rank order between each of two classes (non-intersecting profile lines). However, the profile lines do not run monotonically, which indicates that the difficulty relation between the items shifts with increasingly strong anti-Semitic attitudes. Participants who basically rejected the statements (classes 3 and 2) disagreed particularly with item 2, which discounts the issue of German responsibility as "chitchat." However, participants who generally supported the statements (class 5) agreed with it even more than with the others. This information, which is highly relevant for the diagnosis of anti-Semitic attitudes, is lost if we merely consider the participants' sum-scores.

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1. In order to do this, we estimate the expected item scores within the overall sample and order the items according to them on the x-axis of the coordinate system, so that the item with the highest overall score is the first, and the item with the lowest overall score is the last (from left to right). Next we estimate the expected item scores within the classes of participants and represent them on the y-axis. Finally, we connect the expected item scores that belong to the same class with each other.
2. I.e. the n × k matrix of the responses of n participants to k items.

4.   Structure of anti-Semitic attitudes

Strict homogeneity is a restrictive concept that is seldom fulfilled in attitude measurement, where even small semantic variations in an item can change its connotations. In our case: from a seemingly innocuous wish to close the books on the past (item 1) to an overtly anti-Semitic utterance (item 2). Since all three items in Petzold's scale define the same rank order of participants (ordinal homogeneity) and thus measure the same attitude-dimension, however, the question arises of whether this attitude is really an expression of anti-Semitism, or merely of the wish for a positive German identity.

4.1   Limited use of correlation studies

In order to understand more about this, we need to study how the various facets of anti-Semitism are related to each other. The usual approach is again to make a Factor Analysis (cf. Heyder, Iser and Schmidt, 2005; Frindte, 2006; Imhoff, 2010), or to develop path models or structural equation models. All these methods are ultimately based on correlation statistics, which unfortunately cannot give a satisfactory answer to this question.

The mere correlation between, e.g., the call for closing the books on the past and manifest anti-Semitic attitudes is not really informative, nor is the correlation between manifest anti-Semitism and attitudes critical of Israel. Participants who unconditionally support Israeli policies will certainly not harbor long-held anti-Semitic attitudes, and dyed-in-the-wool anti-Semites will not sympathize with Israeli policies. Already these two extreme groups produce a modest correlation between criticism of Israel and anti-Semitism, but this correlation says nothing about whether and to what extent anti-Semitism motivates criticism of Israel.

Moreover, correlation studies are also unsuitable because they rely on a range of assumptions that – in the best case – lead to a trivialization of the findings and – in the worst case – to misleading results.

First, they assume that we are dealing with quantitative variables that can be measured on metric scales. Ruled out from the start is that a variable – as, for example, participants' positioning to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – is revealed not simply by the frequency with which subjects agree with statements critical of Israel, but rather by the specific patterns how their evaluations of Israeli and Palestinian policies relate to each other (cf. Kempf 2011).

Second, they assume a multivariate normal distribution of the variables, which is often not the case.

Third, correlation studies examine only the linear relationships between variables. The possibility that, for example, not only the supporters but also the critics of Israeli policies could be guided by human rights considerations is thereby not representable, and the correlation between the participants' human rights engagement and their support vs. criticism of Israeli politics diminishes.

Fourth, they are unsuitable because they only take account of the paired relations between any two variables, and cannot represent complex higher-order relations.

The following example from Rost (2012: 148) shows how methodologically indefensible it is to analyze multivariate relations solely via bivariate relations: The cube in figure 5 represents the relations of three dichotomous variables in the form of a three-dimensional cross tab, as well as the three bivariate cross tabs of the same variables. None of the bivariate cross tabs displays a relation between the two respective variables (= the frequencies in the cells of the cross tabs are all the same). At the same time, the cube displays a very strong (even maximal) trivariate relation of the variables. Four of its eight cells contain the same frequencies (= 20), and the frequency in the other four cells equals zero.

Complex multivariate relations, therefore, cannot be represented by either Factor Analysis or Structural Equation Models. The only thing that these methods can reveal is their bivariate projections.

Finally, these methods are also unsuitable, because they postulate a *universally* valid relation between the different variables and are not able to differentiate among sub-populations within which various different nomothetical regularities may have an effect.

Figure 5: A threevariate crosstab in which each of the bivariate correlations equals zero (from Rost, 2012: 148)

4.2   Anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism

If we do not want to simply confirm our preconceptions about the anti-Semitic content of the supposed facets of anti-Semitism, we need to keep our analysis open for other possibilities as well. We need a method able to differentiate among groups of participants who display different *patterns* in the ways the various facets are combined with each other. Are they indicators for a unique dimension of anti-Semitism, or do the different facets define more or less independent constructs that combine into different patterns (or syndromes) of anti-Semitic and non-anti-Semitic attitudes?

Due to the shortcomings of correlation studies, we need a two-step methodological approach. (1) As a first step, we need to construct homogeneous scales for the various facets, and (2) as a second step, we need to apply LCA in order to test whether or not the various scales define the same rank order.

In the Anti-Semitism and Criticism of Israel (ASCI) survey (Kempf, 2013), we did this by constructing ordinally homogeneous scales (3-4 items each) for the various facets: three sub-scales for manifest anti-Semitism (MA1: Dislike of Jews; MA2: Conspiracy myth; MA3: Exclusion of Jews), three sub-scales for secondary anti-Semitism (SA1: Closing the books on the past; SA2: Relativization of and defense against guilt; SA3: Perpetrator-victim reversal), one sub-scale for latent anti-Semitism (LA: Avoiding to speak about Jews) and two sub-scales for anti-Zionism (IA1: Generalizing criticism of Israel; PA: Political anti-Zionism) (cf. table 5).[1]

The results of the LCA (cf. figure 6) reveal that nearly all the sub-scales for manifest, secondary and latent anti-Semitism define the same rank order with regard to the participants' anti-Semitism (Kendall-tau = 1.00): dislike of Jews (MA1), conspiracy myth (MA2), exclusion of Jews (MA3), the demand to close the books on Germany's past (SA1), perpetrator-victim reversal (SA3), and the avoidance to speak about Jews (LA) are thus equivalent indicators for one and the same attitude dimension: anti-Semitism, plain and simple.

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1.   For the original wording of the items (in German) and the frequency distribution of item responses see Kempf (2013).

Manifest anti-Semitism		
MA1: Dislike of Jews	**M = 1.81**	**SD = 0.898**
mani01p: Jews are somehow all the same.		
mani02ap: There is something simply idiosyncratic about the Jews, and they don't fit in with us very well.		
aslat2p: It is better to have nothing to do with Jews.		
MA2: Conspiracy myth	**M = 2.43**	**SD = 0.837**
aspo8p: There is a Jewish network that has a decisive influence on political and economic processes in the world.		
asman4p: An important goal of the Jews is to safeguard their dominant position in the world.		
asman5p: The Jews have too much influence in the world.		
MA3: Exclusion of Jews	**M = 1.97**	**SD = 0.798**
asman3p: One shouldn't engage in any trade and commerce with Jews.		
mani03p: Important positions in the state and economy should (better) not be held by Jews.		
mani04p: Jews should not get involved where they are not wanted.		
Secondary anti-Semitism		
SA1: Closing the books on the past	**M = 3.14**	**SD = 0.926**
asver4p: Decades after the end of the war, we shouldn't talk so much about the persecution of Jews anymore, but rather finally close the books on the past.		
asver5p: We should ultimately put an end to all the talk about our guilt vis-à-vis the Jews.		
asver6an: The German people have a particular responsibility vis-à-vis the Jews (negative).		
SA2: Defense against guilt	**M = 2.26**	**SD = 0.360**
seku01n: Without the help of the population, Hitler could not have started the persecution of the Jews (negative).		
seku02p: If the Jews had defended themselves more energetically under Hitler, not as many would have perished.		
seku03p: People only talk about the persecution of the Jews. No one ever talks about how much the Germans suffered.		
SA3: Perpetrator-victim reversal	**M = 2.28**	**SD = 0.849**
mani05p: The Jews have only themselves to blame that people don't like them.		
seku05p: Many Jews exploit the Holocaust today.		
seku07p: The way the Jews behaved, it is easy to understand why they were persecuted.		
seku09p: The Jews are unforgiving and harm Germany when they point a finger at the Holocaust again and again		
Latent anti-Semitism		
LA: Avoiding to speak about Jews	**M = 2.17**	**SD = 0.705**
aslat8p: The whole topic of the "Jews" is somehow unpleasant for me.		
lat01p: It would be better not to talk about the Jews.		
lat02p: You cannot say what you really think about the Jews.		
Anti-Zionism		
IA1: Generalizing criticism of Israel	**M = 2.89**	**SD = 0.868**
krit02p: The Holocaust is a welcome means for the Jews to justify Israel's policies.		
krit03p: Without the worldwide power of Jewry Israel could not so easily disregard international law.		
krit04p: We should not let ourselves continue to be pressured by the Jews to let Israel's Palestinian policies go unchallenged.		
PA: Political anti-Zionism	**M = 2.79**	**SD = 0.828**
zion03ap: Zionism has made the victims of yesterday into the perpetrators of today		
zion04p: The goal of Zionism has always been to expel the Palestinians and take over their land.		
zion05p: Zionism is essentially a variety of racism.		

Table 5: Items of the anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism scales

Figure 6: Subscale profiles

On the average[1] the demand to close the books is the statement most likely to be considered a defensible opinion (SA1, M = 3.14), followed by the claimed existence of a Jewish world conspiracy (MA2, M = 2.43), perpetrator-victim reversal (SA3, M = 2.28) and the avoidance of talking about Jews (LA, M = 2.17). Most likely to be acknowledged as expressing prejudices are the exclusion of Jews (MA3, M = 1.97) and still more, dislike of Jews (MA1, M = 1.81).[2]

That the demand to close the books on the past is so generally regarded as a defensible opinion can, of course, be viewed as an indicator that it is also determined by a wish for a positive German identity. Nevertheless, it is an expression of (secondary) anti-Semitism insofar as it increases as participants' scores on the other anti-Semitism scales increase. The more participants oppose anti-Semitic resentments, the more they may find other mindsets (like opposition to closing the books on the past and engagement for preventing history from repeating itself) on which they can build a positive identity.

The scale for defense against guilt and relativizing the Holocaust (SA2, M = 2.26), to the contrary, cannot be subsumed under this dimension of anti-Semitism. It only differentiates to an insignificant extent between the various classes (1.95 ≤ M ≤ 2.51) and defines a clearly different rank order (Kendall-tau = 0.77).[3]

Political anti-Zionism (PA, M = 2.79) and generalizing criticism of Israel which makes the Jews in general responsible for Israeli policies (IA1, M = 2.89) elicit a level of agreement lower than that for the demand to close the books on the past (SA1), but clearly higher than that for the other anti-Semitism scales. They likewise define the same rank order of participants, so that we can assume that they represent equivalent indicators for the same anti-Zionist attitude dimension.

The rank order with regard to this attitude dimension does, however, deviate from that with regard to anti-Semitism (Kendall-tau = 0.83): Class 5 shows the second highest values in issues of anti-Zionism, but does not reveal any anti-Semitic attitudes.

Accordingly, we can conclude: (1) The demand to close the books on the past does not result simply from a wish for a positive German identity, but has a clear anti-Semitic content that cannot be denied. (2) Although anti-Semitic and anti-Zionist attitudes do correlate, they must be distinguished and cannot simply be equated with each other.

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1.   = mean scores in the quota sample. For a sample description see chapter 6.
2.   Participants responded to the items on a five-point Likert scale indicating whether they regarded the respective statements as mere prejudice or as a defensible opinion. Since the middle response category "partly both" implies that the statement is in part viewed as a legitimate political belief, we interpreted only scale values up to 2.7 as a rejection of the statement and values between 2.8 und 3.2 as indicative of an anti-Semitic or anti-Zionist tendency.
3.   Applications of the SA2-scale in a study of German students' reactions to cinematic representations of the Holocaust (Kopf-Beck et al., 2013) indicate that the scale does not measure a consolidated attitude, but rather an ad hoc judgment as to whether the Holocaust could have been prevented if there had been stronger opposition to Hitler.

5.   Positioning to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict

5.1   Methodological considerations

When it comes to the measurement of anti-Semitic criticism of Israel, the possible diversity of meanings is even more problematic: Even the most objectionable statements, like accusing Israeli policies of having proto-fascist aspects, do not necessarily result from an anti-Semitic perpetrator-victim reversal. They may also be attributable to the attempt to dramatize political issues (which has a long tradition, particularly in left-wing criticisms of many different political systems). Even though criticism of Israel *is* a medium in which anti-Semitic contents *can* be articulated, we thus need to take into account that criticism of Israel *may* also be nurtured by a multitude of *alternative sources*.

In any case, we should conclude from this that anti-Semitic criticism of Israel cannot be directly operationalized through certain statements that can be regarded as indicators for anti-Semitic criticism. Whether (in a given case) criticism of Israel is anti-Semitic, or whether it stems from some other motivation can only be determined if we investigate the *patterns* in which it is grouped with anti-Semitic attitudes, on the one side, and with other attitudes and orientations that come in question as possible motivations, on the other.

Particularly in Germany, the way people position themselves toward the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is quite ambivalent. The World War II lesson of "never again fascism, never again war" implies a tendency toward the peace frame (never again war). However, it is ambivalent with regard to human rights. "Never again fascism" can be interpreted in two ways:

- First, as taking the side of the *immediate* victims of National Socialism. This suggests a tendency to unconditional solidarity with Israeli policies and can lead to a *weakening* of the peace frame going as far as reversing into a war frame: Never again fascism, therefore war.
- Second, as acting in the interest of human rights *worldwide*. This suggests a tendency to distance oneself from at least some aspects of Israeli politics and a certain degree of empathy with the Palestinian side. Although initially this means a *strengthening* of the peace frame, the danger is also inherent of *reversing* into a war frame.

In Germany, we can, therefore, also expect to find both positioning patterns *supportive* of Israeli politics and patterns *critical* of it, as well as positioning patterns mirroring a *peace frame* and patterns mirroring a *war frame* (cf. Kempf, 2011).

5.2   Typical positioning patterns

In order to reconstruct these positioning patterns, we applied LCA to the items in table 6.[1]

	Pro-Israeli	Pro-Palestinian
Solution by negotiation	npeace01: A solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict can only be found through negotiation.	
Violence deepens the gap	npeace02: The continued violence of the Israelis and Palestinians deepens the gulf between the two societies and leads to radicalization on both sides	
Account of both sides' needs	npeace03: A solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict must take account of the necessities of life of both populations.	
Accentuation of own side's needs	ipeace01: All the participants should work for the Israelis to be able to look forward to a peaceful future free of fear.	ppeace01: All the participants should work for the Palestinians to be able to lead a peaceful. self-determined life.
Need to force the opponent	iwar01: The Palestinian leadership should be forced to recognize Israel	pwar01: The Israeli government should be forced to recognize the rights of the Palestinians.
Criticism of opponent's politics	iwar02: The Palestinian leadership is not ready to make compromises and tries to impose its maximum aims without regard to losses.	pwar02: Israel is intransigent and tries to maintain existing conditions by the use of force.
Delegitimation of the opponent	iwar03: The goal of the Palestinian leadership is the destruction of Israel.	pwar03: The aim of Israeli politics is the continued oppression and disenfranchisement of the Palestinians.
Legitimation of own side's warfare	iwar04: The Israelis are conducting a legitimate defensive war against Palestinian terrorism.	pwar04: The Palestinians are conducting a legitimate war of liberation against the Israeli occupation.
Condemnation of opponent's violence	iwar05: Nothing can justify the Palestinian terror attacks against the Israeli population.	pwar05: Israel's military operations against the Palestinians are excessive and unjustified.

Table 6: Items for the assessment of the participants' positioning to the conflict

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1.   For the original wording of the items (in German) and the frequency distribution of the item responses see Kempf (2013).

Already the results of the LCA revealed that a majority of the Germans studied are critical of Israeli policies, and that pacifism and human rights orientation play a constitutive role for the way they position themselves to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

While there was a sizable group of participants (15.4% of the quota sample[1]) who took no position at all, the by far largest single group (45.1%) interpreted the conflict in a peace frame with in part a pro-Israeli (12.1%) and in part a pro-Palestinian tendency (33%). Another large group (20.8%) interpreted the conflict in a pro-Palestinian frame that is already very clearly polarized and so-to-speak "on the edge of a war frame." Pro-Israeli and pro-Palestinian hard-liners who interpreted the conflict in a war frame were, with 9.8% or respectively 8.7%, approximately equally large minorities (cf. figure 7).

With the exception of the pro-Israeli hardliners, all these groups (even those who sympathize with Israel) share the view that the goal of Israeli policies is the continued oppression and disenfranchisement of the Palestinians. Nevertheless, they condemn Palestinian terror attacks (almost consistently) more harshly than Israeli military operations. The latter are condemned more harshly only by pro-Palestinian hardliners, but the latter also do not justify terror attacks.

Figure 7: Typical positioning patterns
A = solution by negotiation; B = violence deepens gap; C = account of both sides' needs; D = accentuation of own side's needs; E = need to force the opponent; F = criticism of opponent's policy; G = deligitimation of the opponent; H = legitimation of own side's warfare; I = condemnation of opponent's violence

1.   For a description of the sample see chapter 6.

6.   Two kinds of criticism of Israel

6.1   Scales and sampling

Possible anti-Semitic features included in these frames become identifiable if we relate the positioning patterns to both the various facets of anti-Semitism and other attitudes that may be decisive for the way participants position themselves to the conflict.

In our study, we therefore grouped them together with a variety of other variables in a joint LCA:

1.   Kempf's (2011) scales for assessing the emotional component of participants' mental models (EMO: Emotional closeness to the conflict, and AMBI: Sensitivity to the ambivalence of war and peace);
2.   the above-named anti-Semitism and anti-Zionism scales;
3.   three sub-scales for measuring anti-Israeli resentments (PI01: One-sided attribution of guilt; PI02: Dramatizing and need for action, and IA2: Denying the Jews' right of residence) (cf. table 7);[1]
4.   three sub-scales for measuring anti-Palestinian resentments (AP: Devaluation of Palestinians; TK: Connecting Palestinians and Muslims to terrorism, and IK: Demonizing Islam) (cf. table 8);[2]
5.   an Israel Quiz (IQ) by Kempf & Thiel (2012), by means of which we measured participants' knowledge about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict;
6.   Kempf's (2014) Human Rights Orientation scale (MERE);
7.   the Moral Disengagement scale (MOR) by Jackson & Sparr (2005);
8.   the Pacifism scale (PAZ) by Cohrs et al. (2002), and
9.   a single item (krit01p) that creates a direct connection between criticism of Israel and anti-Semitism, and which has proved to be particularly sensitive to showing the deterioration of criticism of Israel into anti-Semitism. This item reads: "If we want to recognize the true face of the Jews, we need only see how they treat the Palestinians."

PI01: One-sided attribution of guilt	M = 3.13	SD = 0.729
aspo3p: Israel is solely to blame for the emergence and perpetuation of the Middle East Conflict.		
aspo5p: Israel is a state that stops at nothing.		
aspo9p: The Israelis are occupiers and have no right to stay in the Palestinian territories		
PI02: Dramatizing and need for action	**M = 2.97**	**SD = 0.380**
aspo11p: What the Israelis do to the Palestinians resembles what the Nazis did to the Jews.		
aspo12n: The Israelis are interested in a peaceful resolution of the Middle East conflict (negative).		
krit06p: The German government should put pressure on Israel to change its Palestinian policy.		
IA2: Denying the Jews' right of residence	**M = 2.16**	**SD = 0.710**
zion02p: The Jews are an alien presence in the Middle East.		
aspo10p: It would be better if the Jews would leave the Middle East.		
zion01an: If they want to return, Jews who emigrated from Germany should be welcomed here (negative).		
Single item	**M = 2.51**	**SD = 1.277**
krit01p: If we want to recognize the true face of the Jews, we need only see how they treat the Palestinians.		

Table 7: Scales for measuring anti-Israeli resentments

Besides applying LCA instead of the usual correlation statistics, we deviated from the usual standards of Social Psychology in another instance as well. Due to the assumption that there may be various ways of criticizing Israel, a sample representative of Germany as a whole would not really have helped. Certainly, we need such a sample in order to determine how widespread these forms of criticizing Israel are in Germany. But, in order to be able to identify them, it would not have sufficed (just) to ask the man on the street, who is possibly not at all interested in the topic of Israel. We needed to examine how – and why – *critics of Israel* position themselves to the conflict. The sample that we based our study on therefore consisted of two sub-samples: a quota sample representative of Germany, based on age, gender and school education, and an online sample of active critics of Israel, whom we recruited according to the "snowball principle" through various different organizations and activist groups like *Pax Christi*, *Internationaler Versöhnungsbund* and *Schalom 5767*, which work for peace in the Middle East.

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1.   For the original wording of the items (in German) and the frequency distribution of the item responses see Kempf (2013).
2.   For the original wording of the items (in German) and the frequency distribution of the item responses see Kempf (2013).

AP: Devaluation of Palestinians	M = 2.04	SD = 0.675
isla01p: The Palestinians are incapable of managing their own affairs.		
isla02p: You cannot trust the Palestinians.		
isla07p: The Palestinians are backward and primitive.		
TK: Connecting Palestinians and Muslims to terrorism	**M = 2.89**	**SD = 0.495**
isla05p: Islamic terrorism has strong support among Muslims all over the world.		
isla06p: Islamic terrorists are venerated by the Palestinians as heroes.		
isla10p: Hamas is a terrorist organization with which no one should negotiate.		
IK: Demonizing Islam	**M = 2.61**	**SD = 0.858**
isla03p: Islam is not compatible with democracy.		
isla04p: Islam is an intolerant religion.		
isla08p: The highest aim of Islam is to introduce the Sharia (Islamic law) worldwide.		
isla09p: Through the increase in the Islamic population you feel more and more like a stranger in your own country.		

Table 8: Scales for measuring anti-Palestinian resentments

Data were collected during the period between June and November 2010. The quota sample included N = 998 subjects, half of whom were chosen from an "old" German state, or Bundesland (Baden-Württemberg in Western Germany), and the other half from a "new" state, or Bundesland (Thuringia in Eastern Germany, established after the unification of Germany). The ages of the participants ranged from 15 to 92 (M = 47.86; SD = 18.78); 51.3% of them were female, and 48.7% were male. 25.2% had an *Abitur*[1] or comparable school-leaving diploma; 33.1% had a diploma from a *Realschule*[2]; 35.6% had a diploma from a *Volksschule* (elementary school) or *Hauptschule* (secondary modern school); 3.9% were still attending school, and 2.2% had no school-leaving diploma. 94.9% were German citizens, and 5.1% were foreign nationals. 24.8% were Protestants, 24.1% Catholics and 6.0% belonged to a different Christian denomination or congregation; 2.9% were Muslims, 0.8% belonged to various other religions, and 41.3% did not profess to belong to any religion at all; 34.8% of the participants claimed to be religious, and 61.4% stated that they were not religious.

The online sample included N = 464 participants, among whom older subjects (over 55) and participants with a good school education were over-represented. A total of 86.3% of these subjects had an Abitur or a comparable school-leaving certificate, and a further 9.5% had at least a diploma from a Realschule.

6.2   Contrary motivational systems

The joint LCA of the various scales in our study, finally, revealed that there are two kinds of Israel-criticism, resulting from contrary motivational systems (cf. tables 9-14).

	Positionung patterns						
	7, 8 & 9	**6**	**2**	**5**	**4**	**1**	**3**
Class No.	**No position**	**Peace frame with sympathy for Israel**	**Reluctant peace frame**	**Pro-Israeli war frame**	**Peace frame with sympathy for Palestinians**	**Pro-Palestinian frame "on the edge of a war frame"**	**Pro-Palestinian war frame**
6	**0.620**	**0.324**	0.056	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
8	0.165	**0.280**	**0.498**	0.000	0.029	0.027	0.000
3	0.035	**0.194**	0.008	**0.629**	0.009	0.125	0.000
2	0.017	0.028	0.031	0.202	0.121	**0.555**	0.047
1	0.023	0.007	0.059	0.123	0.242	**0.503**	0.042
5	0.005	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.207	**0.788**
7	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.011	0.000	0.083	**0.907**
4	0.057	0.058	0.176	0.265	**0.160**	**0.200**	0.084
9	0.122	0.060	0.224	0.088	**0.061**	**0.016**	**0.429**

Table 9: Frequency of positioning patterns within classes

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1.   Secondary-school leaving certificate (A levels) necessary for university admission in Germany.
2.   Non-classical secondary modern school, usually *not* sufficient in itself for admission to a German university.

Class No.	Ambivalence patterns					
	7	**2**	**3**	**6**	**4 & 1**	**5**
	Focus on Israel's security dilemma	**Undecided whether peace can offer Israel security**	**Ambivalence of peace for both parties**	**Status quo as the lesser evil for Israel**	**Naive pacifism: peace is good, war is evil**	**Undecided whether the continuation of violence is an obstacle to the foundation of a Palestinian state**
6	**0.504**	**0.310**	0.147	0.030	0.009	0.000
8	**0.370**	**0.544**	0.045	0.000	0.027	0.014
3	0.028	**0.344**	**0.395**	0.010	0.224	0.000
2	0.000	0.139	0.077	0.058	**0.688**	0.037
1	0.004	0.094	0.067	0.152	**0.648**	0.036
5	0.000	0.000	0.041	0.008	**0.344**	**0.607**
7	0.000	0.021	0.000	0.054	**0.391**	**0.535**
4	0.000	0.243	**0.265**	0.153	**0.323**	0.015
9	0.145	0.025	0.169	**0.316**	0.228	0.116

Table 10: Frequency of ambivalence patterns within classes

	Class 6	Class 8	Class 3	Class 2	Class 1	Class 5	Class 7	Class 4	Class 9
emo01	2.20	2.28	2.47	2.93	3.11	3.98	3.80	2.71	2.64
emo02	2.93	3.01	3.17	3.55	3.68	4.47	4.32	3.39	3.33
emo03=4	0.71	0.66	0.53	0.31	0.28	0.07	0.10	0.40	0.50
emo03	1.88	1.86	1.89	1.88	1.88	1.69	1.71	1.86	1.82
emo04	0.03	0.02	0.06	0.22	0.39	0.90	0.72	0.08	0.11
emo05	0.02	0.01	0.03	0.14	0.27	0.81	0.63	0.04	0.08
emo06	0.13	0.14	0.24	0.46	0.61	0.83	0.77	0.30	0.24
emo07	0.08	0.09	0.15	0.33	0.46	0.82	0.74	0.22	0.22
emo08	0.05	0.05	0.09	0.20	0.30	0.61	0.53	0.12	0.13
emo09	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.13	0.21	0.63	0.54	0.09	0.12

Table 11: Emotional closeness to the conflict: Mean scores within classes
emo01 = Self-estimated knowledge of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (scores ranging from 1 = very low to 5 = very good); emo02 = Concern for the conflict (scores ranging from 1 = don't care to 5 = very much); emo03=4 = Attachment to none of the parties (0 = no; 1 = yes); emo03 = Attachment to (1 = Palestinians, 2 = both sides equally, 3 = Israelis); emo04 = Has been in Israel (0 = never; 1 = once; 2 = several times); emo05 = Has been in the Palestinian territories (0 = never; 1 = once; 2 = several times); emo06 = Has had personal contact with Israelis (0 = no; 1 = yes); emo07 = Has had personal contact with Palestinians (0 = no; 1 = yes); emo08 = Has Israeli friends, acquaintances or relatives (0 = no; 1 = yes); emo09 = = Has Palestinian friends, acquaintances or relatives (0 = no; 1 = yes)

	Class 6	Class 8	Class 3	Class 2	Class 1	Class 5	Class 7	Class 4	Class 9
SA1	3.28	3.02	3.35	2.86	1.96	1.84	3.06	3.55	4.11
MA2	2.72	1.96	2.51	2.13	1.53	1.78	3.00	3.01	3.79
SA3	2.75	1.64	2.27	1.81	1.38	1.52	2.51	2.81	3.96
LA	2.45	1.79	2.33	1.89	1.46	1.49	2.27	2.62	3.07
MA3	2.29	1.51	2.14	1.52	1.22	1.29	1.89	2.36	3.46
MA1	2.40	1.25	1.75	1.21	1.10	1.10	1.37	2.36	3.52
IA1	2.92	2.42	2.97	2.83	1.94	3.08	4.02	3.32	4.11
PA	2.89	2.38	2.88	2.70	1.98	3.32	3.97	3.04	3.93
PI01	3.25	3.17	3.09	2.80	2.51	3.89	4.26	3.45	3.72
PI02	2.71	2.79	2.83	3.00	2.95	3.56	3.70	3.11	3.31
IA2r	2.36	1.97	2.34	1.73	1.56	1.55	2.19	2.47	2.94
TK	3.08	2.77	3.04	2.87	2.74	2.50	2.64	3.14	3.11
IK	2.83	2.19	2.85	2.45	1.95	1.65	2.07	3.01	3.43
AP	2.60	1.69	2.31	1.71	1.56	1.37	1.48	2.42	2.20
Krit01p	2.95	1.80	2.56	1.93	1.09	1.32	2.75	3.34	4.61

Table 12: Mean scores within classes on the subscales for manifest (MA1. MA2. MA3). secondary (SA1. SA3) and latent (LA) anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist (IA1. PA). anti-Israeli (PI01. PI02. IA2) and anti-Palestinian (TK. IK. AP) attitudes. and single item (krit01p) (ranging from 1 = rejection to 5 = endorsement)

	Class 6	Class 8	Class 3	Class 2	Class 1	Class 5	Class 7	Class 4	Class 9
IQ	1.31	1.48	2.12	2.87	3.02	3.80	3.60	2.50	2.32
PAZ	2.24	3.15	2.45	2.76	2.76	3.48	3.12	2.35	2.10

Table 13: Subscales for knowledge about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (IQ) and pacifism (PAZ): Mean quartiles within classes (ranging from 1 = low to 4 = high).

	Class 6	Class 8	Class 3	Class 2	Class 1	Class 5	Class 7	Class 4	Class 9
MERE-C	0.78	0.60	0.85	0.78	0.86	0.94	0.82	0.54	0.42
MERE-V	2.91	2.40	2.86	2.40	2.14	1.64	1.97	2.96	2.95
MERE-B	3.69	4.12	3.82	4.09	4.28	4.49	4.37	3.83	3.74
MOR	3.21	2.71	3.20	2.93	2.65	1.98	2.25	3.32	3.38

Table 14: Consistency of human rights orientation (MERE-C) (0 = no; 1 = yes) and mean scores on the subscales for justification of human rights restrictions (MERE-V). concern for victims of human rights violations (MERE-B) and moral disengagement (MOR): Mean scores within classes (ranging from 1 = rejection to 5 = endorsement)

LCA identified in all nine different classes (PRE = 36.9%; MEM = 0.94) of supporters and critics of Israeli Palestine politics, who systematically differ not only in their pro-Israeli or pro-Palestinian orientation, but also with regard to the radicalism of their position.

Three of these classes (which together make up 36.4% of the quota sample from the German population) tend to capture a pro-Israeli position.

- The first of these classes (class 6; 10.7%) consists of the participants who are most aware of Israel's security dilemma (50.4%) (cf. table 10) and who seem to sympathize with Israel in a moderate way (32.4%) that does not interpret the conflict according to a pro-Israeli war frame (0.0%) (cf. table 9).
  Far more frequently, however, these subjects avoid taking any position (62.0%) (cf. table 9), and one may suspect, therefore, that behind their apparent sympathy for Israel a good measure of latent anti-Semitism could be hidden. One fact that supports this suspicion is that the members of this class not only display a tendency to anti-Zionism (PA

= 2.89; IA1 = 2.92) and anti-Israeli resentments (PI01 = 3.25, PI02 = 2.71), but also have higher values for the anti-Semitic scales "conspiracy myth" (MA2 = 2.72), "perpetrator-victim-reversal" (SA3 = 2.75) and the "call to close the books" (SA1 = 3.28). They do not even reject as prejudicial the claim that the Israeli treatment of the Palestinians shows the "true face of the Jews" (krit01p = 2.95) (cf. table 12).

What makes them position themselves rather pro-Israel (if they take a position at all) is simply their sensitivity for Israel's security dilemma, combined with demonizing Islam (IK = 2.83) and connecting the Palestinians to terrorism (TK = 3.08) (cf. table 12).

- Class 3 (19.9%) positions itself largely in a pro-Israeli frame (82.3%): 19.4% in a peace frame, and three times as often (62.9%) in a war frame (cf. table 9).

  These radical supporters of Israeli policies are the most sensitive to the ambivalence of peace for <u>both</u> parties (39.5%), but almost as often, however, are uncertain whether peace can offer Israel security (34.4%). A focus on Israel's security dilemma (2.8%) is hardly to be found with them (cf. table 10).

  Similar to class 6, they tend – despite their support for Israel – to anti-Zionism (PA = 2.88; IA1 = 2.97) and anti-Israeli resentments (PI01 = 3.09; PI02 = 2.83) and support the call to close the books on the past (SA1 = 3.35) (cf. table 12).

  What makes them take a position in favor of Israel are their anti-Palestinian resentments: namely demonizing Islam (IK = 2.85) and connecting Palestinians to terrorism (TK = 3.04), combined with a lack of further anti-Semitic attitudes, but with the above-named wish to close the books on the past (cf. table 12).

  That they position themselves chiefly in a war frame could be attributed to their strong emotional closeness to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (cf. table 11), the lack of a pacifistic attitude (PAZ = 2.45) (cf. table 13) and a relatively strongly marked tendency to moral disengagement (MOR = 3.20) (cf. table 14).

- Class 8 (5.8%), stands so-to-speak in the middle between these two classes. Its positioning is clearer than that of class 6, but less radical and more strongly oriented to a peace frame than that of class 3 (cf. table 9).

  These moderate supporters of Israeli policy focus less strongly on Israel's security dilemma than does class 6, and more often than class 3 they have no opinion about whether a peace solution can offer Israel security (cf. table 10). That despite a tendency to anti-Israeli resentments (PI01 = 3.17; PI02 = 2.79) they tend to position themselves in favor of Israel is attributable to their rejection of anti-Zionist attitudes (PA = 2.38; IA1 = 2.42), their tendency to associate the Palestinians with terrorism (TK = 2.77) and a lack of further anti-Semitic attitudes, but a wish to close the books on the past (SA1 = 3.02) (cf. table 12).

  Despite their sensitivity to Israel's security dilemma (37.0%) and their uncertainty as to whether a peace solution can offer Israel protection (54.4%) (cf. table 10), they mainly position themselves in a peace frame (80.7%) (cf. table 9). This is due to pacifistic tendencies (PAZ = 3.15) (cf. table 13) and a concern for the victims of human rights violations (MERE-B = 4.12) (cf. table 14), as well as (with the exception of SA1) strict rejection of all prejudices, be they anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist, or anti-Palestinian in nature (cf. table 12).

The overwhelming majority of the quota sample from the German population (63.6%) positions itself more strongly in favor of the Palestinians than in favor of Israel, and can be subdivided into two groups:

1. First, there are anti-Semitic critics of Israel (classes 4 and 9; together 25.7%) who express strong (class 4) to very strong (class 9) anti-Semitic prejudices (cf. table 12). Their positioning comprehends a spectrum that ranges from being divided between pro-Palestinian (44.4%) and pro-Israeli frames (32.3%) (class 4) to a clear predominance of pro-Palestinian frames (50.6% as opposed to 14.8%) (class 9) (cf. table 9).

2. There are also critics of Israel (classes 2, 1, 5 and 7; together 37.8%) whose position in favor of the Palestinians ranges over a spectrum from relatively strong (classes 2 and 1) to very strong (classes 5 and 7) (cf. table 9), and (almost) completely rejects anti-Semitic prejudices. Only a small sub-group of the most radical of these critics (class 7; 1.9%) tends to believe in the conspiracy myth (MA2 = 3.00) and supports the call to close the books on the past (SA1 = 3.06). The latter view is also not rejected by class 2 (SA1 = 2.86) (cf. table 12).

If we contrast these two groups, it appears that two completely contrary motivational systems underlie them:

- Non-anti-Semitic critics are generally better informed (cf. table 13) and more concerned about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (cf. table 11), their human rights orientation is more consistent (cf. table 14), and they are more pacifistic than the anti-Semitic critics (cf. table 13). With the exception of class 2 (SA1 = 2.86) and class 7 (SA1 = 3.06), who tend to call for closing the books on the past, and the exception of class 2 (TK = 2.87) and class 1 (TK = 2.72), who tend to connect Palestinians to terrorism, they share *no* anti-Semitic and/or anti-Palestinian prejudices (cf. table 12) and criticize Israel more radically, the *better* they are informed (cf. table 13; r = 0.90; Kendall-tau = 0.80), and the *more* they are concerned (cf. table 11; r = 0.94; Kendall-tau = 0.80), the *more* pacifistic they are (cf. table 13; r = 0.35; Kendall-tau = 0.20), the *more* consistent their human rights orientation, and the *less* they justify human rights restrictions (r = -0.80; Kendall-tau = -0.74), the *less* they tend to moral disengagement (r = -0.77; Kendall-tau = -0.60), and the *more* they are concerned for the victims of human rights violations (r = 0.85; Kendall-tau = 0.60) (cf. table 14).

- The anti-Semitic critics of Israel are just the opposite. They prove to be generally burdened by prejudices, and particularly class 9 shares strong anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist, anti-Israeli and anti-Palestinian resentments (cf. table 12). While, in general, they take a *less radical* pro-Palestinian position than the non-anti-Semitic critics (cf. table 9), they criticize Israel more radically, the *less* well-informed they are (cf. table 13) and the *less* they are concerned about the conflict (cf. table 11), the *less* pacifistic they are (cf. table 13), the *less* consistent their human rights orientation, the *more* they tend to moral disengagement, and the *less* they are concerned for the victims of human rights violations (cf. table 14).

However, critics of Israel who were not originally motivated by anti-Semitism are also in danger of gradually developing anti-Semitic prejudices.

- Those who take a position most radically in favor of the Palestinians (cf. table 9) are divided into two groups, of which one (class 5) displays no anti-Semitic prejudices at all, while the other (class 7) tends to the belief that the treatment of the Palestinians in Israel shows the "true face" of the Jews (krit01p = 2.75) and that there is an international Jewish conspiracy (without which Israel could not carry out its policies) (MA2 = 3.00) (cf. table 12).
- In comparison with the no less radical critics of Israel who do not develop such resentments (class 5), they are somewhat less well-informed about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (cf. table 13) and have somewhat less emotional closeness to the conflict (cf. table 11). Their pacifism is somewhat less strongly marked (cf. table 13), and their human rights orientation is somewhat less consistent. They tend to justify limitations on human rights somewhat more strongly, show a somewhat greater tendency to moral disengagement and are somewhat less concerned for the victims of human rights violations (cf. table 14).

The validity of these results also becomes obvious if we (1) look at the distribution of the identified classes within our two samples, and (2) relate the participants' class-membership to their preference for the various political parties in Germany.


Figure 8: Distribution of the identified classes among active critics (online sample) and in the general population (quota sample)
?? = no position; WF = war frame; PF = peace frame

- The active critics of Israel in our online sample show (as expected) no pro-Israeli pattern and position themselves quite antagonistically in favor of the Palestinians, but do <u>not</u> display an anti-Semitic pattern (cf. figure 8).
- In the online sample of active critics of Israel, the non-anti-Semitic/more radical critics of Israel (classes 5 and 7) represent the pattern that appears most commonly. These patterns are, however, quite infrequent in the quota sample from the German population overall (cf. figure 8), and not found in the middle range of society, among voters of the mainstream political parties: CDU/CSU, SPD and FDP (cf. figure 9).
- Anti-Semitic criticism of Israel is typical of neo-Nazis, but is also firmly anchored in the middle segment of society (especially among the conservative CDU/CSU voters). With the Greens and the Left party, it appears somewhat less often (cf. figure 9).
- The results also support our suspicion that latent anti-Semitism is in play with ostensible supporters of Israel who tend to position themselves in a pro-Israeli peace frame but mostly do not take any position at all (class 6). Besides openly anti-Semitic criticism of Israel, this is the only pattern that is found with right-wing extremists (neo-Nazis), among

whom it is in fact more frequently found than in all other segments of society. It is again the Greens and the Left party voters among whom this pattern is somewhat less common (cf. figure 9).


Figure 9: Distribution of the identified classes within the electorate of the German political parties
?? = no position; WF = war frame; PF = peace frame

7.   Conclusions

Criticism of Israeli Palestinian policies continually provokes heated controversies in public discourse. Particularly in Germany, we observe a tendency to tar all criticism of Israel with the same brush and brand it as anti-Semitic. The parliamentary debate on the alleged anti-Semitism of the Left party (die Linke), the recent media controversy over a poem by Günther Grass, (author of the classic postwar novel *The Tin Drum*) and anti-Semitism accusations against noted journalist Jakob Augstein are dramatic examples of this.

As a reaction to increasing criticism of Israel, many Israelis, Holocaust survivors and their descendants around the globe, as well as non-Jewish Germans who have drawn lessons from their country's history, fear that we are witnessing a resurgence of anti-Semitism. As the results of our study show, this fear is justified: 25.7% of the quota sample from the German population (classes 4 and 9) criticize Israel because of anti-Semitic prejudices. Even the 10.7% who seem to sympathize with Israel but (most often) do not take a position on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict (class 6) do so because of latent anti-Semitism.

On the other side, many critics of Israeli policies (both Jewish and non-Jewish) fear that charges of anti-Semitism are intended to silence criticism, and our results indicate that this fear is also justified. The all-inclusive question of whether criticism of Israel is *essentially* anti-Semitic is naïve and can only support existing prejudices or encourage new prejudices.

If we apply an adequate methodology, we find that – at least in Germany – there are in reality two different forms of criticizing Israel that result from two different and antipodal processes.

- *First:* Anti-Semitic criticism of Israel (classes 4 and 9), which is generally burdened by prejudices and shares not only anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist and anti-Israeli but also anti-Palestinian resentments. This form of Israel-criticism is typical of the extreme right and neo-Nazi groups, and is also firmly anchored in the middle segment of society. In the online sample of active critics of Israel it is, however, (nearly) absent.
- *Second:* Non-anti-Semitic criticism of Israel, which is motivated by pacifism and human rights commitment and rejects any form of anti-Semitic, anti-Zionist, anti-Israeli or anti-Palestinian resentments (classes 2, 1, 5 and 7). This form of Israel-criticism is typical for the participants in the online sample of active critics of Israel, and is not found at all among the extreme right or neo-Nazis.

The possible objection that the last-named group could likewise consist of anti-Semites who simply have a greater desire to appear unprejudiced is not very plausible. To be sure, with questionnaire studies one must always consider that the responses could be influenced by social desirability, but in the measurement of anti-Semitic attitudes we did not ask for agreement with or rejection of the respective statements, but only about whether statements represent either a defensible

opinion or a prejudice. Consequently, one can at least assume that this group possesses greater sensitivity for anti-Semitic resentments. Moreover, the distinction between the two groups rests not only on the anti-Semitism scores of their members, but also on the patterns in which they group themselves with the human rights orientation of the participants, their tendency to moral disengagement and their pacifistic vs. militaristic attitudes: While non-anti-Semitic critics of Israel position themselves all the more strongly in favor of the Palestinians the stronger their human rights commitment is, the less they tend to moral disengagement, and the more they are oriented to pacifism, it is exactly the opposite with anti-Semitic critics.

While the majority (60.4%) of participants in the online sample of active Critics of Israel are hardliners who interpret the Israeli-Palestinian conflict according to a pro-Palestinian war frame (classes 5 and 7), these patterns are very seldom found in the quota sample from the German population (3.6%) and in the middle range of society; they are only found among 0.6% of SPD voters. Compared with the pro-Israeli hardliners (19.9% of the quota sample from the German population), they are a very small minority, and it is not surprising if they feel themselves under pressure to oppress their criticism.

For people who feel such pressure, only a little naivety is necessary to again imagine an international Jewish conspiracy behind it, and in fact, the results of our study also demonstrate the danger that critics who were not originally motivated by anti-Semitism might develop prejudices of this sort.

The widespread anti-Semitism in Germany is alarming, but the best approach to opposing it is *not* to fight pacifists and human rights activists who sympathize with the Palestinians, *but* rather to fight the anti-Semites, who can be found in all segments of society.

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