#### DMCA

## Tornado Attack on RC4 with Applications to WEP & WPA ⋆

### Citations

3225 | Numerical Optimization
- Nocedal, Wright
- 1999
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ives a benchmark on what we should expect. – Another approach is to use Lagrange multipliers to find the optimal solution. We used the fmincon function in Maltab with Sequential Quadratic Programming =-=[50]-=- (SQP) algorithm as the default algorithm to compute the local minimum. This algorithm was very fast and stable compared to the Genetic algorithm which is explained next. Since this algorithm needs a ... |

962 | Aspects of Multivariate Statistical Theory. - MUIRHEAD - 1982 |

575 |
Standard for Local and metropolitan area networks, Part 16: Air Interface for Broadband Wireless Access Systems-Amendment for Physical and Medium Access Control Layers for Combined Fixed and Mobile Operation
- IEEE
- 2005
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...[S′i[i]+S′i[ j′i]] In WEP and WPA attacks, the basis of the complexity measurement is the time it takes to compute the key value which is determined by the biased equation. 2.2 Description of WEP WEP =-=[22]-=- uses a 3-byte IV concatenated to a secret key of 40 or 104 bits (5 or 13 bytes) as an RC4 key. Thus, the RC4 key size is either 64 or 128 bits. In this paper, we do not consider the 40-bit key varian... |

257 | Weaknesses in the Key Scheduling Algorithm of RC4”.
- Fluhrer, Mantin, et al.
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... ν n c r Nx k λ Nν Nµ cond. biases 1u ( ¯K[2], ¯K[3], ¯K[13], ¯K[14]) 242.10 242.10 12 2 7 1 2.66 232 N6 without 1c ( ¯K[2], ¯K[3], ¯K[13], ¯K[14]) 241.38 253.10 12 2 7 211.72 2.66 232 N8 with 2u ( ¯K=-=[15]-=-, ¯K[2], ¯K[3], ¯K[14]) 240.38 245.38 14 2 2 5 0.67 232 N15 without 2c ( ¯K[15], ¯K[2], ¯K[3], ¯K[14]) 239.12 255.85 14 2 2 16.73 0.67 232 N17 with 3u merge 1u+2u 241.83 246.87 12 2 8 without 3c merge... |

229 |
Sequential analysis: tests and confidence intervals
- Siegmund
- 1985
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...]. It is referred to as the “interactive mode”. This approach turns out to be more efficient in terms of the average number of packets compared to the other types of distinguishers. In fact, Siegmund =-=[67]-=- has proved the following theorem (see [29] for details). 30 Theorem 11. For a simple hypothesis testing against a simple alternative with independent, identically distributed observations, a sequenti... |

99 | Making a faster cryptanalytic time-memory trade-off.
- Oechslin
- 2003
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... client begins the connection. The attacker can wait or launch a deauthenticate-attack against the client. When he gets the hash, he can try to find the key with a dictionary attack, a rainbow attack =-=[51]-=- or one of the multiple attacks that exist on hashed keys. – A flaw in WiFi Protected Setup (WPS) is known from the end of 2011 by Tactical Network Solutions (TNS) [80]. From this exploit, the WPA pas... |

77 | A practical attack on broadcast RC4
- Mantin, Shamir
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...2] or initial state reconstruction from the keystream bytes [19,32,43,76] with complexity 2241 for the best state recovery attack. Relevant studies of the PRGA reveal biases in the keystream bytes in =-=[41,57]-=-. Mironov recommends in [44] that the first 512 initial keystream bytes must be discarded to avoid these weaknesses. Recently, Ohigashi et al. [52] showed that even if these initial bytes are discarde... |

72 | Statistical analysis of t.he alleged rc4 keystream generator. Fast Sofiuiare Encryption - Fluhrer, McGrew - 2000 |

64 |
Note on the inversion theorem,”
- Gil-Pelaez
- 1951
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...,x2 is given by Davies [9]: ϕ∆Y x1 ,x2 (u) = E(eiu∆Yx1 ,x2 ) = e iu 2 ∑ m=1 ∑ j=b,g am jt2m j 1−2iuam j 2 ∏ m=1 ∏ j=b,g (1−2iuam j) 12 If E(|∆Yx1,x2 |) is finite, it follows from Gil-Pelaez =-=[17]-=- that F∆Y x1 ,x2 (w) = Pr(∆Yx1,x2 < w) = 1 2 − ∫ ∞ −∞ Im ( ϕ∆Y x1 ,x2 (u)e−iuw 2piu ) du 21 Substituting what we have, one derives F∆Y x1 ,x2 (0) = Pr(∆Yx1,x2 < 0) = 1 2 − ∫ ∞ −∞ Im e iu ... |

60 |
Fitting the negative binomial distribution to biological data.
- ISS, FISIIEII
- 1953
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...(IV16) RC4KEY[1] = (high8(IV16) or 0x20) and 0x7f RC4KEY[2] = low8(IV16) RC4KEY[3] = low8((PPK[5]⊕ (TK[1]‖TK[0]))≫ 1) RC4KEY[4] = low8(PPK[0]) RC4KEY[5] = high8(PPK[0]) RC4KEY[6] = low8(PPK[1]) RC4KEY=-=[7]-=- = high8(PPK[1]) RC4KEY[8] = low8(PPK[2]) RC4KEY[9] = high8(PPK[2]) RC4KEY[10] = low8(PPK[3]) RC4KEY[11] = high8(PPK[3]) RC4KEY[12] = low8(PPK[4]) RC4KEY[13] = high8(PPK[4]) RC4KEY[14] = low8(PPK[5]) ... |

55 | Not so) random shuffles of RC4
- Mironov
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ion from the keystream bytes [19,32,43,76] with complexity 2241 for the best state recovery attack. Relevant studies of the PRGA reveal biases in the keystream bytes in [41,57]. Mironov recommends in =-=[44]-=- that the first 512 initial keystream bytes must be discarded to avoid these weaknesses. Recently, Ohigashi et al. [52] showed that even if these initial bytes are discarded, RC4 can still be broken i... |

53 |
A Standard for the Transmission
- Postel, Reynolds
- 1988
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... the ciphertext is again XORed with the shared key and the plaintext is recovered. The receiver checks the linear error correcting code and it either accepts the data or declines it. It is well known =-=[58,72,79]-=- that a some portion of the plaintext is practically constant and that some other bytes can be predicted. They correspond to the LLC header and the SNAP header and some bytes of the TCP/IP encapsulate... |

47 |
Linear statistical weakness of alleged RC4 keystream generator
- Golic
- 1997
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...version problem of the KSA: given the final state of the KSA, the problem is to recover the secret key [5,55]. Analysis of weaknesses in the PRGA have largely been motivated by distinguishing attacks =-=[16,18,40,42]-=- or initial state reconstruction from the keystream bytes [19,32,43,76] with complexity 2241 for the best state recovery attack. Relevant studies of the PRGA reveal biases in the keystream bytes in [4... |

44 |
On a new class of “contagious” distributions applicable in entomology and bacteriology.
- Neyman
- 1939
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...n was that the variance of the distribution was much higher than the expected value. A number of distributions have been devised for series in which the variance is significantly larger than the mean =-=[2,13,49]-=-, frequently on the basis of complex biological models [7]. The first of these was the negative binomial, which arose in deriving the Poisson series from the point binomial [70,82]. We use a generaliz... |

44 | Plaintext recovery attacks against SSH
- Albrecht, Paterson, et al.
- 2009
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ackets two RC4 keys are successfully recovered, the Moen, Raddum and Hole attack can be applied. This leads to a TK key recovery attack on WPA with complexity 2104 using 2 packets. – Paterson, et al. =-=[54]-=- observed very large, IV dependant biases in the RC4 keystream when the algorithm is keyed according to the WPA specification. They leveraged these biases together with similar techniques presented in... |

39 | A New Version of the Stream cipher SNOW
- Ekdahl, Johansson
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...low8(PPK[0]) RC4KEY[5] = high8(PPK[0]) RC4KEY[6] = low8(PPK[1]) RC4KEY[7] = high8(PPK[1]) RC4KEY[8] = low8(PPK[2]) RC4KEY[9] = high8(PPK[2]) RC4KEY[10] = low8(PPK[3]) RC4KEY[11] = high8(PPK[3]) RC4KEY=-=[12]-=- = low8(PPK[4]) RC4KEY[13] = high8(PPK[4]) RC4KEY[14] = low8(PPK[5]) RC4KEY[15] = high8(PPK[5]) Note that a filter avoids the use of some weak IV classes. Actually, only the weak IV class discovered b... |

39 |
On a general class of contagious distributions
- Feller
- 1943
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...igh8(PPK[0]) RC4KEY[6] = low8(PPK[1]) RC4KEY[7] = high8(PPK[1]) RC4KEY[8] = low8(PPK[2]) RC4KEY[9] = high8(PPK[2]) RC4KEY[10] = low8(PPK[3]) RC4KEY[11] = high8(PPK[3]) RC4KEY[12] = low8(PPK[4]) RC4KEY=-=[13]-=- = high8(PPK[4]) RC4KEY[14] = low8(PPK[5]) RC4KEY[15] = high8(PPK[5]) Note that a filter avoids the use of some weak IV classes. Actually, only the weak IV class discovered by Fluhrer, Mantin, and Sha... |

36 | A key recovery Attack on the 802.11b Wired Equivalent Privacy Protocol (WEP
- Stubblefield, Rubin, et al.
- 2004
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ies of these attacks have often been miscalculated and conditions to recover the secret key are not the same. For example, [72,79,4,65] check the most 106 probable keys instead of the first one as in =-=[15,35,34,31,68,69]-=-. Additionally, the IEEE 802.11 standard does not specify how the IVs should be chosen. Thus, some attacks consider randomly picked IVs and some consider incremental IVs (both little-endian and big-en... |

35 |
Numerical inversion of a characteristic function.
- Davies
- 1973
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...C4KEY[2] = low8(IV16) RC4KEY[3] = low8((PPK[5]⊕ (TK[1]‖TK[0]))≫ 1) RC4KEY[4] = low8(PPK[0]) RC4KEY[5] = high8(PPK[0]) RC4KEY[6] = low8(PPK[1]) RC4KEY[7] = high8(PPK[1]) RC4KEY[8] = low8(PPK[2]) RC4KEY=-=[9]-=- = high8(PPK[2]) RC4KEY[10] = low8(PPK[3]) RC4KEY[11] = high8(PPK[3]) RC4KEY[12] = low8(PPK[4]) RC4KEY[13] = high8(PPK[4]) RC4KEY[14] = low8(PPK[5]) RC4KEY[15] = high8(PPK[5]) Note that a filter avoid... |

35 |
A new weakness in the rc4 keystream generator and an approach to improve the security of the cipher
- Paul, Preneel
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...2] or initial state reconstruction from the keystream bytes [19,32,43,76] with complexity 2241 for the best state recovery attack. Relevant studies of the PRGA reveal biases in the keystream bytes in =-=[41,57]-=-. Mironov recommends in [44] that the first 512 initial keystream bytes must be discarded to avoid these weaknesses. Recently, Ohigashi et al. [52] showed that even if these initial bytes are discarde... |

33 |
Sampling Theory of the Negative Binomial and Logarithmic Series Distributions
- Anscombe
- 1950
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...acks. Below we give an example of one of these biases (the Korek A u13 2 bias): ¯K[3] = 1−σ3(2) if S2[3] = 2, S2[1] = 0 and z1 = 3 This event happens with probability P3u (3,2), where σ3(2) = S0[1]+S1=-=[2]-=- P3u (3,2) = (N−1 N )3 (N−2 N )N−4 + 1N ( 1− (N−2N )N−4)≈ 35.9/N Since K[0],K[1] are known, σ3(2) can be computed by an attacker. We denote f := 2−σ3(2) as the biased equation or the biased relation, ... |

32 |
Analysis of the stream cipher rc4
- Mantin
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... scheme. In 1996, Jenkins published two biases in the PRGA of RC4 on his website [28], which were used in an attack by Klein later [31]. These biases were generalized by Mantin in his Master’s Thesis =-=[39]-=-. In 2008, Paul, Rathi and Maitra [56] discovered a bias in the index which generates the first keystream word of RC4. Another bias in the PRGA was discovered by Maitra and Paul in [36]. Finally, Sepe... |

32 |
Using the Fluhrer
- Stubblefield, Ioannidis, et al.
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ies of these attacks have often been miscalculated and conditions to recover the secret key are not the same. For example, [72,79,4,65] check the most 106 probable keys instead of the first one as in =-=[15,35,34,31,68,69]-=-. Additionally, the IEEE 802.11 standard does not specify how the IVs should be chosen. Thus, some attacks consider randomly picked IVs and some consider incremental IVs (both little-endian and big-en... |

31 | Predicting and Distinguishing Attacks on RC4 Keystream Generator
- Mantin
- 2005
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...version problem of the KSA: given the final state of the KSA, the problem is to recover the secret key [5,55]. Analysis of weaknesses in the PRGA have largely been motivated by distinguishing attacks =-=[16,18,40,42]-=- or initial state reconstruction from the keystream bytes [19,32,43,76] with complexity 2241 for the best state recovery attack. Relevant studies of the PRGA reveal biases in the keystream bytes in [4... |

22 | Analysis Methods for (Alleged) RC4 - Knudsen, Meier, et al. - 1998 |

19 | Passive-only key recovery attacks on RC4
- Vaudenay, Vuagnoux
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...isher for RC4. Roos [59] and Wagner [81] identified classes of weak keys which reveal the secret key if the first bytes of the key are known. This property has been widely exploited to break WEP (see =-=[6,15,21,35,34,65,4,72,79]-=-). Another class of results concerns the inversion problem of the KSA: given the final state of the KSA, the problem is to recover the secret key [5,55]. Analysis of weaknesses in the PRGA have largel... |

18 | Optimal key ranking procedures in a statistical cryptanalysis
- Junod, Vaudenay
- 2003
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...s to find the best ordering of these pairs to minimize the expected complexity for finding the good pair in an exhaustive search going through this list. One can follow the approach by Junod-Vaudenay =-=[30]-=-. They proved that the best mixing paradigm consists of sorting the (x1,x2) following their likelihood ratio, which is obtained by multiplying the likelihood ratio of x1 and of x2. They showed that th... |

16 |
The distribution of a linear combination of chi-squared random variables
- DAVIES
- 1980
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...EY[3] = low8((PPK[5]⊕ (TK[1]‖TK[0]))≫ 1) RC4KEY[4] = low8(PPK[0]) RC4KEY[5] = high8(PPK[0]) RC4KEY[6] = low8(PPK[1]) RC4KEY[7] = high8(PPK[1]) RC4KEY[8] = low8(PPK[2]) RC4KEY[9] = high8(PPK[2]) RC4KEY=-=[10]-=- = low8(PPK[3]) RC4KEY[11] = high8(PPK[3]) RC4KEY[12] = low8(PPK[4]) RC4KEY[13] = high8(PPK[4]) RC4KEY[14] = low8(PPK[5]) RC4KEY[15] = high8(PPK[5]) Note that a filter avoids the use of some weak IV c... |

16 | Two Linear Distinguishing Attacks on VMPC and RC4A and Weakness
- Maximov
- 2005
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...version problem of the KSA: given the final state of the KSA, the problem is to recover the secret key [5,55]. Analysis of weaknesses in the PRGA have largely been motivated by distinguishing attacks =-=[16,18,40,42]-=- or initial state reconstruction from the keystream bytes [19,32,43,76] with complexity 2241 for the best state recovery attack. Relevant studies of the PRGA reveal biases in the keystream bytes in [4... |

15 |
Breaking 104—bit WEP
- Tews, Weinmann, et al.
- 2007
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...isher for RC4. Roos [59] and Wagner [81] identified classes of weak keys which reveal the secret key if the first bytes of the key are known. This property has been widely exploited to break WEP (see =-=[6,15,21,35,34,65,4,72,79]-=-). Another class of results concerns the inversion problem of the KSA: given the final state of the KSA, the problem is to recover the secret key [5,55]. Analysis of weaknesses in the PRGA have largel... |

14 | On the Optimality of Linear, Differential, and Sequential Distinguishers
- Junod
- 2003
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...d Murphy [47] to decrease the complexity of their attack against DES. With this type of model in mind, the notion of nmax-limited generic sequential non-adaptive distinguisher was defined by Junod in =-=[29]-=-, where nmax is an upper bound for the allowed number of packets in that context. We can also use the notion of sequential distinguishers for RC4 key recovery. Mapping the definition of an nmaxlimited... |

14 |
A Class of Weak Keys
- Roos
- 1995
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...Generator Algorithm (PRGA), and the blackbox analysis [65], which looks at RC4 as a blackbox and discovers weaknesses. For the KSA, one of the first weaknesses published on RC4 was discovered by Roos =-=[59]-=- in 1995. This correlation relates the secret key bytes to the initial state of the PRGA. Maitra et al. [37] generalized Roos-type biases and introduced a related key distinguisher for RC4. Roos [59] ... |

14 |
Tornado Probabilities
- Thom
- 1963
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... the point binomial [70,82]. We use a generalized version of the negative binomial distribution called the Pólya distribution. The main application of the Pólya distribution is in Tornado Outbreaks =-=[74]-=- and Hail Frequency analysis [73]. In most climates, the probability of hail is small. If the mean hail frequency ranges on an interval f1 < f < f2 for all climates, it was observed that for values of... |

13 | New Form of Permutation Bias and Secret Key Leakage
- Maitra, Paul
- 2008
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...aster’s Thesis [39]. In 2008, Paul, Rathi and Maitra [56] discovered a bias in the index which generates the first keystream word of RC4. Another bias in the PRGA was discovered by Maitra and Paul in =-=[36]-=-. Finally, Sepehrdad, Vaudenay and Vuagnoux [65] discovered 48 new correlations in the PRGA between state bytes, key bytes and the keystream and 9 new correlations between the key bytes and the keystr... |

13 |
New State Recovery Attack on RC4
- Maximov, Khovratovich
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...em is to recover the secret key [5,55]. Analysis of weaknesses in the PRGA have largely been motivated by distinguishing attacks [16,18,40,42] or initial state reconstruction from the keystream bytes =-=[19,32,43,76]-=- with complexity 2241 for the best state recovery attack. Relevant studies of the PRGA reveal biases in the keystream bytes in [41,57]. Mironov recommends in [44] that the first 512 initial keystream ... |

12 | Non-)Random Sequences from (Non-)Random Permutations - Analysis of RC4 stream cipher
- Gupta, Maitra, et al.
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...n also be used in broadcast schemes, when the same plaintext is encrypted with different keys. In this mode, the attacker often tries to find unconditional or conditional biases on the keystream (see =-=[41,38,63,26,1,52]-=- for the most relevant attacks.). WEP Related Work. The WEP key recovery process is harder in practice than in theory. Indeed, some bytes of the keystream may be unknown (see the Appendix of [79] for ... |

11 |
Iterative Probabilistic Cryptanalysis of RC4 Keystream Generator
- Golic
- 2000
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...em is to recover the secret key [5,55]. Analysis of weaknesses in the PRGA have largely been motivated by distinguishing attacks [16,18,40,42] or initial state reconstruction from the keystream bytes =-=[19,32,43,76]-=- with complexity 2241 for the best state recovery attack. Relevant studies of the PRGA reveal biases in the keystream bytes in [41,57]. Mironov recommends in [44] that the first 512 initial keystream ... |

11 |
Permutation After RC4 Key Scheduling Reveals the Secret
- Paul, Maitra
- 2007
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...exploited to break WEP (see [6,15,21,35,34,65,4,72,79]). Another class of results concerns the inversion problem of the KSA: given the final state of the KSA, the problem is to recover the secret key =-=[5,55]-=-. Analysis of weaknesses in the PRGA have largely been motivated by distinguishing attacks [16,18,40,42] or initial state reconstruction from the keystream bytes [19,32,43,76] with complexity 2241 for... |

9 | Efficient Reconstruction of RC4 Keys from Internal States
- Biham, Carmeli
- 2008
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...exploited to break WEP (see [6,15,21,35,34,65,4,72,79]). Another class of results concerns the inversion problem of the KSA: given the final state of the KSA, the problem is to recover the secret key =-=[5,55]-=-. Analysis of weaknesses in the PRGA have largely been motivated by distinguishing attacks [16,18,40,42] or initial state reconstruction from the keystream bytes [19,32,43,76] with complexity 2241 for... |

9 | Statistical Attack on RC4: Distinguishing WPA
- Sepehrdad, Vaudenay, et al.
- 2011
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ets. The most 106 probable keys are brute-forced as well. However, the IVs were not randomly chosen and some attacks such as the FMS were over represented. – In 2011, Sepehrdad, Vaudenay and Vuagnoux =-=[66]-=- introduced an optimized key recovery attack on WEP, obtaining the same success probability as the previous attacks with only 4000 packets, but they did not provide experimental verification of their ... |

8 | Next Generation of WEP Attacks - Korek - 2004 |

7 |
Pairs and triples of DES S-boxes
- Murphy, Davies
- 1995
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ive, one can look at the problem as fixing the success probability and searching for the minimum average number of packets to reach that probability. This idea was initially used by Davies and Murphy =-=[47]-=- to decrease the complexity of their attack against DES. With this type of model in mind, the notion of nmax-limited generic sequential non-adaptive distinguisher was defined by Junod in [29], where n... |

6 |
an improved MIC for 802.11 WEP
- Ferguson, “Michael
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...d randomly. We assume incorrect ones are suggested with the same probability 1−pℓNν−1 . If x is not the correct value, it is not suggested for sure when ν is correct. Since low7(( ¯K[3]− ¯K[2])⊕ (( ¯K=-=[14]-=-− ¯K[13])≫ 1)) is balanced, this incorrect x has NνNx values ν belonging to the set of Nν − 1 incorrect ones. So, x is suggested with probability NνNx × 1−pℓ Nν−1 . Consequently, the Xx,m,ℓ for incorr... |

6 | Discovery and Exploitation of New Biases in RC4
- Sepehrdad, Vaudenay, et al.
- 2010
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... cryptanalysis of RC4: attacks based on the weaknesses of the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA), attacks based on the weaknesses of the Pseudorandom Generator Algorithm (PRGA), and the blackbox analysis =-=[65]-=-, which looks at RC4 as a blackbox and discovers weaknesses. For the KSA, one of the first weaknesses published on RC4 was discovered by Roos [59] in 1995. This correlation relates the secret key byte... |

5 |
Practical Exploitation of RC4
- Hulton
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...isher for RC4. Roos [59] and Wagner [81] identified classes of weak keys which reveal the secret key if the first bytes of the key are known. This property has been widely exploited to break WEP (see =-=[6,15,21,35,34,65,4,72,79]-=-). Another class of results concerns the inversion problem of the KSA: given the final state of the KSA, the problem is to recover the secret key [5,55]. Analysis of weaknesses in the PRGA have largel... |

5 | A practical message falsification attack on WPA
- Ohigashi, Morii
- 2009
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... Service) attack or an ARP poisoning. In order to be practical, the attack requires some additional quality of services features (described by IEEE 802.11e) to be enabled. – The Ohigashi-Morii Attack =-=[53]-=- is an improvement of the Beck-Tews attack on WPA-TKIP. Indeed, this attack is efficient for all modes of WPA and not just those with QoS features. The time to inject a fake packet is reduced to appro... |

5 |
On the Error of Counting with a Haemocytometer
- Student
- 1907
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ger than the mean [2,13,49], frequently on the basis of complex biological models [7]. The first of these was the negative binomial, which arose in deriving the Poisson series from the point binomial =-=[70,82]-=-. We use a generalized version of the negative binomial distribution called the Pólya distribution. The main application of the Pólya distribution is in Tornado Outbreaks [74] and Hail Frequency ana... |

5 | Brute forcing Wi-Fi Protected Setup. When poor design meets poor implementation.” http://sviehb.files.wordpress.com/2011/12/viehboeck wps.pdf - Viehbock - 2011 |

4 |
Need Security Pointers
- Korek
- 2004
(Show Context)
Citation Context |

4 |
New Results on Generalization of Roos-Type Biases and Related Keystreams of RC4
- Maitra, Paul, et al.
- 2013
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...eaknesses. For the KSA, one of the first weaknesses published on RC4 was discovered by Roos [59] in 1995. This correlation relates the secret key bytes to the initial state of the PRGA. Maitra et al. =-=[37]-=- generalized Roos-type biases and introduced a related key distinguisher for RC4. Roos [59] and Wagner [81] identified classes of weak keys which reveal the secret key if the first bytes of the key ar... |

4 | Smashing WEP in a passive attack
- Sepehrdad, Susil, et al.
- 2013
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...addition to the key derivation, WPA provides a packet integrity protection scheme MIC [14]. Thus, only passive key recovery attacks can be considered. ⋆ This paper is the full version of our FSE 2013 =-=[64]-=- paper and the corrected version of our paper published at Eurocrypt 2011 [66]. 1.1 Related Work We recall three approaches for the cryptanalysis of RC4: attacks based on the weaknesses of the Key Sch... |

4 |
The Frequency of Hail Occurrence
- Thom
- 1957
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...se a generalized version of the negative binomial distribution called the Pólya distribution. The main application of the Pólya distribution is in Tornado Outbreaks [74] and Hail Frequency analysis =-=[73]-=-. In most climates, the probability of hail is small. If the mean hail frequency ranges on an interval f1 < f < f2 for all climates, it was observed that for values of f near f1 the hail storms are qu... |

3 |
Additional Weak IV Classes for the FMS Attack
- Bittau
- 2003
(Show Context)
Citation Context |

3 | Full Plaintext Recovery Attack on Broadcast RC4
- Isobe, Ohigashi, et al.
- 2013
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...n also be used in broadcast schemes, when the same plaintext is encrypted with different keys. In this mode, the attacker often tries to find unconditional or conditional biases on the keystream (see =-=[41,38,63,26,1,52]-=- for the most relevant attacks.). WEP Related Work. The WEP key recovery process is harder in practice than in theory. Indeed, some bytes of the keystream may be unknown (see the Appendix of [79] for ... |

3 |
chopchop (experimental WEP attacks). http: //www.netstumbler.org/showthread.php?t=12489
- Korek
(Show Context)
Citation Context .... By default, between 1000 to 1000000 keys are brute-forced. In this paper, we improve the conditions of the Korek attacks and prove their success probability. – The ChopChop attack was introduced in =-=[33,71]-=-. It allows an attacker to interactively decrypt the last m bytes of an encrypted packet by sending 128×m packets in average to the network. The attack does not reveal the key and is not based on any ... |

3 |
Falsification Attacks against WPA-TKIP in a Realistic Environment
- Todo, Ozawa, et al.
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...acket is reduced to approximately 15 minutes to 1 minute at the best. For this attack, a man-in-the-middle attack is superposed to the Beck-Tews attack, to reduce the execution time of the attack. In =-=[75]-=-, the time complexity of Ohigashi-Morii attack was improved. This new attack focuses on a new vulnerability of QoS packet processing. This attack still works even if the Access Point (AP) does not sup... |

3 |
On the Poisson law of small numbers
- Whitaker
- 1914
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ger than the mean [2,13,49], frequently on the basis of complex biological models [7]. The first of these was the negative binomial, which arose in deriving the Poisson series from the point binomial =-=[70,82]-=-. We use a generalized version of the negative binomial distribution called the Pólya distribution. The main application of the Pólya distribution is in Tornado Outbreaks [74] and Hail Frequency ana... |

2 |
Aircrack-ng, accessed October 22
- Devine, Otreppe
- 2011
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...t in 2001, almost all wireless cards were using incremental IVs in big-endian mode. – There is no proper theoretical analysis of the Korek [34,35] key recovery attacks. Only tools such as Aircrack-ng =-=[11]-=- use them, with no analysis. Aircrack-ng classifies the most probable secret keys and brute-forces them, to 2 reach success probability of 50% with about 100000 packets (random IVs). Note that the amo... |

2 |
802.11i-2004: Amendment 6: Medium Access Control (MAC) Security Enhancements
- IEEE
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...a short period of time. Below, we list the most well-known attacks on WPA in the literature: – Dictionary Attack: Through eavesdropping the network, the goal of the attacker is to get a WPA handshake =-=[25,11]-=-; the hash of the key is communicated between the client and the Access Point (AP) when the client begins the connection. The attacker can wait or launch a deauthenticate-attack against the client. Wh... |

2 |
Attacks on the RC4
- Klein
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...l bytes are discarded, RC4 can still be broken if used in a broadcast scheme. In 1996, Jenkins published two biases in the PRGA of RC4 on his website [28], which were used in an attack by Klein later =-=[31]-=-. These biases were generalized by Mantin in his Master’s Thesis [39]. In 2008, Paul, Rathi and Maitra [56] discovered a bias in the index which generates the first keystream word of RC4. Another bias... |

2 | Attacks on the WEP Protocol
- Tews
- 2007
(Show Context)
Citation Context .... By default, between 1000 to 1000000 keys are brute-forced. In this paper, we improve the conditions of the Korek attacks and prove their success probability. – The ChopChop attack was introduced in =-=[33,71]-=-. It allows an attacker to interactively decrypt the last m bytes of an encrypted packet by sending 128×m packets in average to the network. The attack does not reveal the key and is not based on any ... |

2 |
Practical Verification of WPA-TKIP Vulnerabilities
- Vanhoef, Piessens
- 2013
(Show Context)
Citation Context ..., they use a large number of correlations in RC4 keystream to decrypt some packets and derive the TKIP MIC value. Given the plaintext data and its MIC value, they could efficiently derive the MIC key =-=[77]-=-. It is then explained how the MIC key can be used to inject and decrypt packets. In practice, the attack can be executed within an hour. This attack does not recover the WPA temporary key (TK). We ex... |

2 |
All Your Biases Belong to Us: Breaking RC4
- Vanhoef, Piessens
- 2015
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...4 and WPA. Particularly, those linear correlations are effective for the state recovery attack since they include the first known three-byte keys (IV-related) information. – Recently, Vanhoef, et al. =-=[78]-=- introduced another attack on WPA. Their attack works on RC4 in broadcast scheme model, i.e., for the attack to work, the same packet needs to be encrypted with different keys. To satisfy this require... |

1 |
Enhanced TKIP Michael Attacks, 2010. http://download.aircrack-ng.org/wiki-files/doc/enhanced tkip michael.pdf
- Beck
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...( ¯K[14]− ¯K[13])≫ 1)) We denote Nν = 232 the total number of possible ν’s and Nx = 27 the total number of possible x’s. Also let k be the total number of agglomerated biases we can use to vote for ¯K=-=[3]-=-, ¯K[13] and ¯K[14]. We can recover the 7 weak bits as follows: for each candidate value x (normally distributed), each packet m and each ℓ = 1, . . . ,k if the agglomerated bias condition holds, the ... |

1 |
Offline bruteforce attack on
- Bongard
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...A are enabled (for instance QoS), or if the same plaintext in encrypted under many different keys (may not be easily achievable). Currently, dictionary attacks [11] and recovering the PIN code of WPS =-=[80,8]-=- by brute-force (see below) are the main techniques that break WPA in practice. If the user chooses a safe 3 password and WPS is disabled, we are not aware of any method that can perform a key recover... |

1 |
New Linear Correlations related to State Information of
- Ito, Miyaji
- 2015
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...am bytes in WPA to the first three bytes of the RC4 key, which are known from the IV. Using these correlations, they improved the data complexity of the attack in [54] for few keystream bytes. 4 – In =-=[27]-=-, Ito, et al. focused on the state information and investigated various linear correlations among the unknown state information, the first three bytes of the RC4 key, and the keystream bytes in both g... |

1 |
How to Recover Any Byte of Plaintext on RC4
- Ohigashi, Isobe, et al.
- 2013
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... the PRGA reveal biases in the keystream bytes in [41,57]. Mironov recommends in [44] that the first 512 initial keystream bytes must be discarded to avoid these weaknesses. Recently, Ohigashi et al. =-=[52]-=- showed that even if these initial bytes are discarded, RC4 can still be broken if used in a broadcast scheme. In 1996, Jenkins published two biases in the PRGA of RC4 on his website [28], which were ... |

1 |
On Non-Negligible Bias of the First Output Byte
- Paul, Rathi, et al.
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...o biases in the PRGA of RC4 on his website [28], which were used in an attack by Klein later [31]. These biases were generalized by Mantin in his Master’s Thesis [39]. In 2008, Paul, Rathi and Maitra =-=[56]-=- discovered a bias in the index which generates the first keystream word of RC4. Another bias in the PRGA was discovered by Maitra and Paul in [36]. Finally, Sepehrdad, Vaudenay and Vuagnoux [65] disc... |

1 | Distinguishing WPA
- Gupta, Maitra, et al.
- 2013
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... key recovery attack against WPA with complexity 296 and using 242 packets. Later, we transform our partial key recovery attack into a distinguisher for WPA. Our distinguisher was further improved by =-=[60]-=- using another technique. We apply our analysis to WEP and show experimentally that the best attacks so far can still be improved. We review some errors in our previous publications [65,66] and verify... |

1 |
Finding an Internal State of RC4
- Tomasevic, Bojanic, et al.
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...em is to recover the secret key [5,55]. Analysis of weaknesses in the PRGA have largely been motivated by distinguishing attacks [16,18,40,42] or initial state reconstruction from the keystream bytes =-=[19,32,43,76]-=- with complexity 2241 for the best state recovery attack. Relevant studies of the PRGA reveal biases in the keystream bytes in [41,57]. Mironov recommends in [44] that the first 512 initial keystream ... |