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## On Combinatorial Auction and Lagrangean Relaxation for Distributed Resource Scheduling (1998)

Venue: | IIE Transactions |

Citations: | 27 - 4 self |

### Citations

2333 |
Microeconomic Theory.
- Mas-Colell, Whinston, et al.
- 1995
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...respondence between equilibrium conditions and the convergence properties of auction. Most of these work are done in the context of exchange economy with interdependent and indivisible objects (c.f., =-=[7, 29, 30, 18, 19]-=-). These studies show that a price equilibrium may not exist in general combinatorial auctions where agents demand a bundle of interdependent items. Gul and Stacchetti [19] show that in such an econom... |

1718 |
Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders,”
- Vickrey
- 1961
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...onsible for a manufacturing step issues a request-for-bids to all agents who can supply the input. The best bidder is than selected based on a certain criteria [36, 37, 1]. Upton, Barash and Matheson =-=[50]-=- study a market mechanism for parallel machine scheduling. They propose a particular bid calculation based on the earliest expected completion time. A similar auction-based approach for setup time det... |

1579 |
Optimal Auction Design.
- Myerson
- 1981
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ing can be found in [33]. From the viewpoint of this research, the most relevant branch of the auction theory is the optimal auction design. First two studies on optimal auction design are by Myerson =-=[24]-=- and by Riley and Samuelson [32]. Myerson's study is especially important because it reports that optimal auction design problem is equivalent to a relatively simple constrained maximization problem: ... |

1258 |
The contract net protocol: High-level communication and control in a distributed problem solver.
- Smith
- 1980
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...is and Smith [7] who propose a contract net for dynamic assignment of independent tasks to loosely coupled processors in which the tasks are distributed to the processors in a negotiation environment =-=[39]-=-. In various studies, the contract net model is proposed for dynamic on-line manufacturing scheduling where each agent responsible for a manufacturing step gets its input by issuing request for bids t... |

730 |
Scheduling: Theory, Algorithms, and Systems.
- Pinedo
- 2008
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...facturing scheduling where an agent responsible for a manufacturing step issues a request-for-bids to all agents who can supply the input. The best bidder is than selected based on a certain criteria =-=[36, 37, 1]-=-. Upton, Barash and Matheson [50] study a market mechanism for parallel machine scheduling. They propose a particular bid calculation based on the earliest expected completion time. A similar auction-... |

571 |
Auctions and Bidding,"
- McAfee, McMillan
- 1987
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...of these equilibria operate in an e cient manner. In this respect, price-directed auctions can be viewed as t^atonnements designed to reach market clearing (equilibrium) prices in an exchange economy =-=[31]-=-. Several researchers study the correspondence between equilibrium conditions and the convergence properties of auction. Most of these work are done in the context of exchange economy with interdepend... |

532 |
A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding,"
- Milgrom, Weber
- 1982
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ilibrium. In a recent study, Wellman, et al. [55] develop price equilibrium for single-resource preemptive scheduling problems. 2.2 Auction Mechanism Design and Auction Algorithms McAfee and McMillan =-=[32]-=- de ne auction as a market institution with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from market partici3spants. The literature on auction theory ourish... |

489 |
Negotiation as a metaphor for distributed problem solving.
- Davis, Smith
- 1983
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...distributed problem solving. In this approach the communication among the problem-solving agents is governed by a computational economic process. The contract net approach proposed by Davis and Smith =-=[10]-=- is among the pioneer work in this area. The contract net model has been proposed for dynamic on-line manufacturing scheduling where an agent responsible for a manufacturing step issues a request-for-... |

342 | Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions.
- Rothkopf, Pekec, et al.
- 1998
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...tal economics published between 1962 and 1990. Most studies in this area focus on singleobject simple auctions [33, 13]. A more recent and broader scoped review on competitive bidding can be found in =-=[41]-=-. If we consider scheduling problems as assigning time slots on unit-capacity machines (objects) to a set of competing jobs (bidders), we can see that it is at least as complex as multi-object auction... |

298 | A Market-Oriented Programming Environment and its Application to Distributed Multicommodity Flow Problems.
- Wellman
- 1993
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...e scheduling. They propose a particular bid calculation based on the earliest expected completion time. A similar auction-based approach for setup time determination is proposed by Wang and Veeramani =-=[52]-=-. Neiman, et al. [34] investigate a multi-agent distributed scheduling system where each agent is responsible for a set of resources. To perform its assigned tasks, an agent negotiates with other agen... |

285 |
An implementation of the contract net protocol based on marginal cost calculations
- Sandholm
- 1993
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...e scheduling problem [49,26,27]. The optimization version of the problem has 2srarely been attempted in DAI [49, 28]. Sycara, et al. [49] revise the micro-opportunistic scheduling approach studied in =-=[44]-=- to develop a distributed and multi-agent scheduling system. Liu and Sycara [28] propose a multi-agent approach for specially structured bottleneck job shop scheduling problem with weighted tardiness ... |

210 |
A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Airport Time Slot Allocation.
- Rassenti, SMITH, et al.
- 1982
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... of the job shop scheduling problem with weighted tardiness objective. Although there are several IP formulations for JSP we will use the discrete time formulation due to Pritsker, Watters, and Wolfe =-=[39]-=-. The decision variable is X ijt, where X ijt = 8 < : 1 if operation j of job i has started by time t, 0 otherwise. The JSP under consideration can be formulated as follows: (JSP) min X i Wi 2 4 X t>d... |

200 |
Multi-item auctions
- Demange, Gale, et al.
- 1986
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...tigates the problem of eliciting true preferences for an assignment problem in a similar setting. He presents a generalization of Vickrey's second-price auction mechanism. Demange, Gale and Sotomayor =-=[11]-=- propose a dynamic or progressive auction for the multi-item case to achieve incentive-compatible minimum price equilibrium. Instead of a single-pass sealed bid auction as in Leonard [25], they presen... |

190 |
Optimal auctions.
- Riley, Samuelson
- 1981
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...he viewpoint of this research, the most relevant branch of the auction theory is the optimal auction design. First two studies on optimal auction design are by Myerson [24] and by Riley and Samuelson =-=[32]-=-. Myerson's study is especially important because it reports that optimal auction design problem is equivalent to a relatively simple constrained maximization problem: maximize the seller's expected r... |

136 |
Allocating uncertain and unresponsive resources: An experimental approach
- Banks, Ledyard, et al.
- 1989
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...-dependent valuations. This motivates the investigation of combinatorial auction in which the bidders demand a set or a combination of indivisible objects with a single bid. Banks, Ledyard and Porter =-=[2]-=- consider allocating multiple resources each with divisible capacity when there are uncertainties in supply or demand. They generalize Vickrey's second-price auction for this environment where each bi... |

127 |
An Applications Oriented Guide to Lagrangian Relaxation.
- Fisher
- 1985
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... r i;j;t,p ij ),1 (25) Step size sr should satisfy certain conditions in order to get a good convergence to optimal Lagrangean dual value. A formula that has proven e ective in practice is as follows =-=[14]-=-: sr = r UB, v(LR r) PP 2 k t kt(X r ) where r is a scalar satisfying 0 < r 2 and UB is a target upper bound value for Lagrangean dual which can be updated over the iterations. 13 ! (26)sWe may update... |

120 |
Game Theory with Application to Economics”.
- Friedman
- 1989
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ove auction model based on the relationship between competitive (or Walrasian) economy and game theory. The model uses the notion of noncooperative pseudogame or abstract economy proposed by Friedman =-=[15]-=- and Ichiishi [21]. In this game, a player i is in uenced by other player in two ways: (1)indirect in uence, where i's feasible strategies is restricted to a subset, and (2) direct in uence, where i's... |

118 |
Elicitation of honest preferences for the assignment of individuals to positions
- Leonard
- 1983
(Show Context)
Citation Context .... We investigate each of the three routing types in the following sections. 4.1 Random job shop The data for this problem is shown in Table 2 (This is a modi ed version of the 3x3 job shop example in =-=[24]-=-). First, we implement the adaptive regular t^atonnement in which the payment function has no price discrimination and the auction protocol is adaptive as 19sMachine 1 Machine 2 Machine 3 Time Slots T... |

106 | Auction algorithms for network flow problems: A tutorial introduction
- BERTSEKAS
- 1992
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...r assignment problem, Bertsekas extended application areas of the algorithm for other types of linear network optimization problems such as shortest path, transportation and minimum cost network flow =-=[4, 5, 6]-=-. To develop an auction mechanism for the scheduling of resource-constrained systems is much more complex than multi-item auction. Here, we must deal with auctions in which multiple items have inter-d... |

104 |
Discrete optimization
- Parker, Rardin
- 1988
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...opose a particular bid calculation based on the earliest expected completion time. A similar auction-based approach for setup time determination is proposed by Wang and Veeramani [52]. Neiman, et al. =-=[34]-=- investigate a multi-agent distributed scheduling system where each agent is responsible for a set of resources. To perform its assigned tasks, an agent negotiates with other agents for its required r... |

101 | The auction algorithm: a distributed relaxation method for the assignment problem,
- Bertsekas
- 1988
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...vement on the exact auction mechanism based on a labeling algorithm. The equivalence of multi-object auctions and the classical assignment problem led Bertsekas to develop so called auction algorithm =-=[3]-=-. Auction algorithm is similar to the approximate auction mechanism proposed by Demange, Gale and Sotomayor [11]. Bertsekas show that the price vector obtained at the end of the auction is the approxi... |

101 | Market-oriented programming: Some early lessons
- Wellman
- 1996
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...cheduling approach for the vehicle routing problem. Another line of research inDAI uses the notion of economic equilibrium [54] to model and analyze the interactions among distributed agents. Wellman =-=[53]-=- proposes such a approach which nds equilibrium prices for multicommodity ow problems. More recently, Ygge and Akkermans [56] propose a resource-oriented equilibrium-seeking approach for power load ma... |

96 |
Competitive equilibrium in an exchange economy with indivisibilities
- Bikhchandani, Mamer
- 1997
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...respondence between equilibrium conditions and the convergence properties of auction. Most of these work are done in the context of exchange economy with interdependent and indivisible objects (c.f., =-=[7, 29, 30, 18, 19]-=-). These studies show that a price equilibrium may not exist in general combinatorial auctions where agents demand a bundle of interdependent items. Gul and Stacchetti [19] show that in such an econom... |

96 |
The efficient allocation of individuals to positions.
- Hylland, Zeckhauser
- 1979
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...respondence between equilibrium conditions and the convergence properties of auction. Most of these work are done in the context of exchange economy with interdependent and indivisible objects (c.f., =-=[7, 29, 30, 18, 19]-=-). These studies show that a price equilibrium may not exist in general combinatorial auctions where agents demand a bundle of interdependent items. Gul and Stacchetti [19] show that in such an econom... |

89 |
Multi-project scheduling with limited resources: A zero-one programming approach.
- Pritsker, Walters, et al.
- 1969
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...peration on one particular machine, or a dominant resource forms the bottleneck, then JSP is reduced to a single machine problem. For a complete taxonomy of production scheduling problems, see Pinedo =-=[38]-=-. 3.2 A Combinatorial Auction Mechanism for Scheduling We propose a general auction mechanism for JSP using the notion of multi-item combinatorial auction. The proposed mechanism is progressive or dyn... |

84 | Manufacturing experience with the contract net. Distributed Artificial Intelligence,
- Parunak
- 1987
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...he following Lagrangean dual problem: (LRD) max 0 v(LR ) There are alternative ways to improve the Lagrangean lower bound and solve the Lagrangean dual, among them is the subgradient search procedure =-=[35]-=-. Subgradient optimization starts with an initial value for the multipliers , e.g. 0 =0. Then the method generates a sequence r over the iterations r by the rule r+1 kt = maxf0; r kt + sr kt(X r )g (2... |

74 |
Optimal multi-unit auctions
- Riley
- 1989
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...time slots that each job can bid. As in standard auctions each bidder may submit a demand function, make an offer for payment along with a demand function, or use any other means to signal his demand =-=[21]-=-. We consider two possible selling procedures: (1) Price directed auction tatonnement starts with an initially announced reservation price vector. Then, each job bids for a combination of time slots f... |

69 |
1994], “Modeling Competitive Bidding: A Critical Essay
- Rothkopf, Harstad
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ationally tractable auction types. Applications of auction mechanisms to optimization has also been proposed by Graves, Schrage, and Sankaran [16] for class scheduling, and Rassenti, Smith, and Bul n =-=[40]-=- for the allocation of airport time slots to airlines. In a majority of these problems, competitive (Walrasian) price equilibria are known to exist and auction procedures aim to reach one of these equ... |

69 | Mackie-Mason, “Some economics of market-based distributed scheduling
- Walsh, Wellman, et al.
- 1998
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...agents for its required resources. Sandholm [45] proposes a similar dynamic scheduling approach for the vehicle routing problem. Another line of research inDAI uses the notion of economic equilibrium =-=[54]-=- to model and analyze the interactions among distributed agents. Wellman [53] proposes such a approach which nds equilibrium prices for multicommodity ow problems. More recently, Ygge and Akkermans [5... |

67 |
Papers in Experimental Economics.
- Smith
- 1991
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...tive-compatible minimum price equilibrium. Instead of a single-pass sealed bid auction as in Leonard [25], they present two progressive auction mechanisms, one exact and another approximate. Sankaran =-=[46]-=- proposes an improvement on the exact auction mechanism based on a labeling algorithm. The equivalence of multi-object auctions and the classical assignment problem led Bertsekas to develop so called ... |

61 |
The Auction Algorithm for Assignment and Other Network Flow Problems: A Tutorial.
- Bertsekas
- 1990
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...valent to nding the dual optimal solution for the assignment problem. Bertsekas later extends auction algorithm for other network ow problems such as shortest path, transportation and minimum cost ow =-=[4, 5, 6]-=-. In general scheduling problems a job agent may demand a combination of time slots to process its operations. Consequently we must deal with auctions in which agents bid for 4smultiple items that hav... |

47 | Exploiting problem structure for distributed constraint optimization”,
- Liu, Sycara
- 1995
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...igence (DAI). The idea is to decouple the scheduling task into subproblems each solved by a local agent. These approaches are rooted from the constraint satisfaction version of the scheduling problem =-=[49,26,27]-=-. The optimization version of the problem has 2srarely been attempted in DAI [49, 28]. Sycara, et al. [49] revise the micro-opportunistic scheduling approach studied in [44] to develop a distributed a... |

38 |
Nonlinear Optimization
- Bertsekas
- 1999
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...valent to nding the dual optimal solution for the assignment problem. Bertsekas later extends auction algorithm for other network ow problems such as shortest path, transportation and minimum cost ow =-=[4, 5, 6]-=-. In general scheduling problems a job agent may demand a combination of time slots to process its operations. Consequently we must deal with auctions in which agents bid for 4smultiple items that hav... |

36 | Applications of distributed artificial intelligence in industry
- Parunak
- 1996
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...acturing scheduling where each agent responsible for a manufacturing step gets its input by issuing request for bids to other agents who can supply that input and selecting the best bidder among them =-=[27, 28, 1]-=-. While Parunak [27, 28] discusses requirements for appropriate implementation of contract net to the manufacturing setting, Baker [1] presents an implementation of contract net in which actual accoun... |

33 |
Metaphor or reality: A case study where agents bid with actual costs to schedule a factory
- Baker
- 1996
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...facturing scheduling where an agent responsible for a manufacturing step issues a request-for-bids to all agents who can supply the input. The best bidder is than selected based on a certain criteria =-=[36, 37, 1]-=-. Upton, Barash and Matheson [50] study a market mechanism for parallel machine scheduling. They propose a particular bid calculation based on the earliest expected completion time. A similar auction-... |

33 | Exploiting meta-level information in a distributed scheduling system
- Neiman, Hildum, et al.
- 1994
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...search e orts on auctions and bidding. Smith [47] discusses auction research in experimental economics published between 1962 and 1990. Most studies in this area focus on singleobject simple auctions =-=[33, 13]-=-. A more recent and broader scoped review on competitive bidding can be found in [41]. If we consider scheduling problems as assigning time slots on unit-capacity machines (objects) to a set of compet... |

32 |
Auctions and bidding models: a survey
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans
- 1980
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...roduces the concept of second-price auctions. A bibliography by Stark and Rothkopf [48] lists nearly 500 papers over the next two decades after Vickrey's study. In another survey, Engelbrecht-Wiggans =-=[12]-=- reviews main theoretical results and research e orts on auctions and bidding. Smith [47] discusses auction research in experimental economics published between 1962 and 1990. Most studies in this are... |

28 |
Game Theory for Economic Analysis
- ICHIISHI
- 1983
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ines (objects) to a set of competing jobs (bidders), we can see that it is at least as complex as multi-object auctions which deal with independent-valued, indivisible objects. Hylland and Zeckhauser =-=[20]-=- consider the problem of allocating individuals to positions with limited capacities. They propose an auction-assignment mechanism where the individuals respond to the system with true valuations. Leo... |

20 |
Competitive bidding: a comprehensive bibliography."
- Stark, Rothkopf
- 1979
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ists nearly 500 papers over the next two decades after Vickrey's study. In another survey, Engelbrecht-Wiggans [12] reviews main theoretical results and research e orts on auctions and bidding. Smith =-=[47]-=- discusses auction research in experimental economics published between 1962 and 1990. Most studies in this area focus on singleobject simple auctions [33, 13]. A more recent and broader scoped review... |

20 |
Using Lagrangean techniques to solve hierarchical production planning problems”, Management Science 28
- Graves
- 1982
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...s. Since the model must include all details needed for scheduling, the model quickly becomes intractable. One common way of treating the complexity is to decompose the monolithic model hierarchically =-=[12]-=-. In this case, problem is decomposed into solvable small pieces in which each piece takes input from an output of higher, less-detailed level. In such hierarchical structure, there is a high possibil... |

15 |
An Auction Method for Course Registration
- Graves, Schrage, et al.
- 1993
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...NP-Hard. They examine di erent bid structures to nd computationally tractable auction types. Applications of auction mechanisms to optimization has also been proposed by Graves, Schrage, and Sankaran =-=[16]-=- for class scheduling, and Rassenti, Smith, and Bul n [40] for the allocation of airport time slots to airlines. In a majority of these problems, competitive (Walrasian) price equilibria are known to ... |

15 | Distributed Problem Solving through Coordination in a Society of Agents. Paper presented at
- Liu, Sycara
- 1994
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...igence (DAI). The idea is to decouple the scheduling task into subproblems each solved by a local agent. These approaches are rooted from the constraint satisfaction version of the scheduling problem =-=[49,26,27]-=-. The optimization version of the problem has 2srarely been attempted in DAI [49, 28]. Sycara, et al. [49] revise the micro-opportunistic scheduling approach studied in [44] to develop a distributed a... |

15 |
Job-shop scheduling by implicit enumeration
- Lageweg, Lenstra, et al.
- 1977
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ach of the three routing types in the following sections. 4.1. Random job shop The data for this problem is shown in Table 1 (This is a modified version of the 3 3 job shop example in Lageweg et al. =-=[53]-=-). First, we implement the adaptive regular tâtonnement in which the payment function has no price discrimination and the auction protocol is adaptive as in subgradient search. We set the planning ho... |

10 |
A pricedirected approach to real-time scheduling of production operations
- ROUNDY, MAXWELL, et al.
- 1991
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...or demand. They generalize Vickrey's second-price auction for this environment where each bidder demands a combination of some portions of each resource with a single bid. Rothkopf, Pekec and Harstad =-=[42]-=- investigate simultaneous combinatorial auctions in which bidders submit bids for a combination of indivisible objects. They show that nding the revenuemaximizing set of noncon icting bids is NP-Hard.... |

9 |
Walrasian equilibrium without complementarities.
- Gul, Stachetti
- 1997
(Show Context)
Citation Context |

9 |
Distributed constraint heuristic search
- Sycara, Roth, et al.
- 1991
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ket partici3spants. The literature on auction theory ourished after the seminal paper by Vickrey [51], in which heintroduces the concept of second-price auctions. A bibliography by Stark and Rothkopf =-=[48]-=- lists nearly 500 papers over the next two decades after Vickrey's study. In another survey, Engelbrecht-Wiggans [12] reviews main theoretical results and research e orts on auctions and bidding. Smit... |

8 | On resource-oriented multi-commodity market computations
- Ygge, Akkermans
- 1998
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...resource-oriented equilibrium-seeking approach for power load management problems. This is a quantity tatonnement approach for Walrasian or competitive equilibrium. In a recent study, Wellman, et al. =-=[55]-=- develop price equilibrium for single-resource preemptive scheduling problems. 2.2 Auction Mechanism Design and Auction Algorithms McAfee and McMillan [32] de ne auction as a market institution with a... |

8 | Distributed Constraint Satisfaction through Constraint Partition and Coordinated Reaction. Paper presented at - Liu, Sycara - 1993 |

7 |
A price schedules decomposition algorithm for linear programming problems
- Jennergren
- 1973
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...based on the relationship between competitive (or Walrasian) economy and game theory. The model uses the notion of noncooperative pseudogame or abstract economy proposed by Friedman [15] and Ichiishi =-=[21]-=-. In this game, a player i is in uenced by other player in two ways: (1)indirect in uence, where i's feasible strategies is restricted to a subset, and (2) direct in uence, where i's utility level is ... |

7 |
Distributed constraint satisfaction through constraint partition and coordinated reaction
- Lui, Sycara
- 1993
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ider the problem of allocating individuals to positions with limited capacities. They propose an auction-assignment mechanism where the individuals respond to the system with true valuations. Leonard =-=[25]-=- investigates the problem of eliciting true preferences for an assignment problem in a similar setting. He presents a generalization of Vickrey's second-price auction mechanism. Demange, Gale and Soto... |

7 |
Architectures and auctions in manufacturing
- Upton, Barash, et al.
- 1991
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... where an agent responsible for a manufacturing step issues a request-for-bids to all agents who can supply the input. The best bidder is then selected based on a certain criteria [7–9]. Upton et al. =-=[10]-=- study a market mechanism for parallel machine scheduling. They propose a particular bid calculation based on the earliest expected completion time. A similar auction-based approach for setup time det... |

6 |
Competitive equilibrium with indivisibilities
- Ma
- 1998
(Show Context)
Citation Context |

6 |
MICRO-BOSS: A Micro-opportunistic Factory Scheduler. Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
- Sadeh
- 1991
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... < T (21) Xi;j;t Xi;j,1;t,p i;j,18j > 1;t (22) Xi;j;t2f0; 1g8j; t (23) Each subproblem satis es the integrality property, in fact each is the dual of a specially structured maximum ow network problem =-=[43]-=-. Hence, each job-level subproblem can be solved using e cient network ow algorithms. For a vector of Lagrangean multipliers , v(LR ) which is a function of solutions to (LR ;i), provides a lower boun... |

5 |
Auction and Optimization: Methods for closing the gap caused by discontinuities in demands
- Jose, Harker, et al.
- 1997
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...e following section, under regular t^atonnement there is no \optimal pricing" that supports optimal resource allocation. As demonstrated in the context of large-scale linear programming decomposi=-=tion [22, 23]-=-, linear subproblem objective leads to degeneracy. To relieve the problems of degeneracy, Jose, Harker and Ungar [23] propose augmented t^atonnement which imposes price discrimination among job agents... |

5 |
shop scheduling by implicit enumeration
- Job
- 1977
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...e following section, under regular t^atonnement there is no \optimal pricing" that supports optimal resource allocation. As demonstrated in the context of large-scale linear programming decomposi=-=tion [22, 23]-=-, linear subproblem objective leads to degeneracy. To relieve the problems of degeneracy, Jose, Harker and Ungar [23] propose augmented t^atonnement which imposes price discrimination among job agents... |

5 |
On a dynamic auction mechanism for a bilateral assignment problem
- Sankaran
- 1994
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...i-agent distributed scheduling system where each agent is responsible for a set of resources. To perform its assigned tasks, an agent negotiates with other agents for its required resources. Sandholm =-=[45]-=- proposes a similar dynamic scheduling approach for the vehicle routing problem. Another line of research inDAI uses the notion of economic equilibrium [54] to model and analyze the interactions among... |

5 |
The basic theory of optimal auctions
- Myerson
- 1983
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...om participation), and (2) incentive compatibility constraints that define equilibrium behavior where bidders reveal their true valuations. For a review of optimal auction design studies, see Myerson =-=[25]-=-. While useful for auctioning simple goods, the use of auction procedures to schedule resource-constrained systems is more complex. The problem is at least as complex as multi-object auctions which in... |

3 |
1992� Auction algorithms for network �ow problems: A tutorial introduction
- Bertsekas
- 1992
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...valent to nding the dual optimal solution for the assignment problem. Bertsekas later extends auction algorithm for other network ow problems such as shortest path, transportation and minimum cost ow =-=[4, 5, 6]-=-. In general scheduling problems a job agent may demand a combination of time slots to process its operations. Consequently we must deal with auctions in which agents bid for 4smultiple items that hav... |

3 |
An introduction to the theory of bidding for a single object
- Engelbrecht-Wiggans
- 1983
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...search e orts on auctions and bidding. Smith [47] discusses auction research in experimental economics published between 1962 and 1990. Most studies in this area focus on singleobject simple auctions =-=[33, 13]-=-. A more recent and broader scoped review on competitive bidding can be found in [41]. If we consider scheduling problems as assigning time slots on unit-capacity machines (objects) to a set of compet... |

3 | English and double auctions with di erentiated commodities - Gul, Stacchetti - 1997 |

3 |
Applications of Distributed Arti cial Intelligence in Industry
- Parunak
- 1996
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...facturing scheduling where an agent responsible for a manufacturing step issues a request-for-bids to all agents who can supply the input. The best bidder is than selected based on a certain criteria =-=[36, 37, 1]-=-. Upton, Barash and Matheson [50] study a market mechanism for parallel machine scheduling. They propose a particular bid calculation based on the earliest expected completion time. A similar auction-... |

2 |
An adaptive machine bidding strategy for distributed shop-floor control under stochastic part demands
- Wang, Veeramani
- 1995
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... with an explicit set of rules determining resource allocation and prices on the basis of bids from market partici3spants. The literature on auction theory ourished after the seminal paper by Vickrey =-=[51]-=-, in which heintroduces the concept of second-price auctions. A bibliography by Stark and Rothkopf [48] lists nearly 500 papers over the next two decades after Vickrey's study. In another survey, Enge... |

1 |
Incentives, iterative communication, and organizational control
- Cohen
- 1980
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...l report their true optimal solutions. Earlier studies show that some price-directed mechanisms that guarantee the convergence to a globally optimal solution are incentive compatible in certain cases =-=[8, 9]-=-. There is no research to-date for the more complex discrete optimization problems. We believe that in order to achieve true distributed scheduling in realistic settings, the above issues and many oth... |

1 |
Truth-telling, dominant strategies, and iterative Groves mechanisms
- Cohen
- 1986
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...l report their true optimal solutions. Earlier studies show that some price-directed mechanisms that guarantee the convergence to a globally optimal solution are incentive compatible in certain cases =-=[8, 9]-=-. There is no research to-date for the more complex discrete optimization problems. We believe that in order to achieve true distributed scheduling in realistic settings, the above issues and many oth... |

1 |
English auctions and walrasian equilibria with multiple objects: A dynamic approach
- Ma
- 1997
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...by a local agent. These approaches are rooted from the constraint satisfaction version of the scheduling problem [49,26,27]. The optimization version of the problem has 2srarely been attempted in DAI =-=[49, 28]-=-. Sycara, et al. [49] revise the micro-opportunistic scheduling approach studied in [44] to develop a distributed and multi-agent scheduling system. Liu and Sycara [28] propose a multi-agent approach ... |

1 |
MICRO-BOSS: A mmicro-opportunistic factory scheduler
- Sadeh
- 1991
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...duling problem [42, 18, 19]. The optimization version of the problem has rarely been attempted in this area [42, 20]. Sycara, et al. [42] revise the micro-opportunistic scheduling approach studied in =-=[36]-=- to develop a distributed and multi-agent scheduling system. Liu and Sycara [20] propose multi-agent approach for specially structured bottleneck job shop scheduling problem with weighted tardiness ob... |

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On resource-oriented multicommodiy market computations
- Ygge, Akkermans
- 1998
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... model and analyze the interactions among distributed agents. Wellman [15] proposes such an approach which finds equilibrium prices for multicommodity flow problems. More recently, Ygge and Akkermans =-=[16]-=- propose a resource-oriented equilibriumseeking approach for power load management problems. This is a quantity tâtonnement approach for Walrasian or competitive equilibrium. In a recent study, Wellm... |

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Computationally manageable combinationial auctions
- Rothkopf, Pekec, et al.
- 1998
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...es in supply or demand. They generalize Vickrey’s secondprice auction for this environment where each bidder demands a combination of some portions of each resource with a single bid. Rothkopf et al. =-=[35]-=- investigate simultaneous combinatorial auctions in which bidders submit bids for a combination of indivisible objects. They show that finding the revenue-maximizing set of nonconflicting bids is NP-H... |