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## Reputation acquisition in debt markets (1989)

Citations: | 332 - 1 self |

### Citations

2132 | Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect - Stiglitz, Weiss - 1981 |

1800 | Theory of the Firm - Jensen, Meckling - 1976 |

1374 | Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring
- Diamond
- 1984
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... to utilize costly technologies for dealing with such problems, such as restrictive covenants in bond indentures (see Smith and Warner 1979) and additional monitoring by a financial intermediary (see =-=Diamond 1984-=-, 1988). The model focuses on the study of debt markets but has implications about the dynamics of reputation formation in general.1 The general characteristics of markets in which reputation takes ti... |

850 | Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification - Townsend - 1979 |

695 | The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance - KLEIN, LEFFLER - 1981 |

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392 | On Financial Contracting: An Analysis of Bond Covenants
- Warner
- 1979
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ecords) will face more severe incentive problems and would be the ones most likely to utilize costly technologies for dealing with such problems, such as restrictive covenants in bond indentures (see =-=Smith and Warner 1979-=-) and additional monitoring by a financial intermediary (see Diamond 1984, 1988). The model focuses on the study of debt markets but has implications about the dynamics of reputation formation in gene... |

106 |
An Expository Note on individual Risk without Aggregate Uncertainty
- Feldman, Gilles
- 1985
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...iod until T that begins when a type 13 I use a version of the law of large numbers here by equating the fraction of type B's who actually repay with its expected value. This can be made rigorous (see =-=Feldman and Gilles 1985-=-).846 JOURNAL OF POLITICAL ECONOMY r r 0................... ............ ....... -... .. ......................... .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . date t 1 T FIG. 3.-Face values, rt, g... |

4 | Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria." Q.J.E - Cho, Kreps - 1987 |

4 |
Does it Pay to Maintain a Reputation
- DYBVIG, SPATT
- 1980
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...d expected consumption over T periods, where T is finite but very large (we take the limit as T -> o). Assume finite T because infinite T introduces many equilibria that are not limits as T -> o (see =-=Dybvig and Spatt 1980-=-). Borrowers make decisions to maximize discounted expected consumption, given by ET= 1E(ct) * dt, where ct is the realization of the consumption random variable et in period t, and d is the discount ... |

3 | Agency Problems and the Theory of the Firm."J.P.E - Fama - 1980 |

3 | Reputation and Imperfect Information."J. Econ. Theory 27 - Kreps, Wilson - 1982 |

2 | Perfect Sequential Equilibrium."J. Econ. Theory 39 - Grossman, Perry - 1986 |

2 | Credit Reputation Equilibrium and the Theory of Credit Markets - Spatt - 1983 |

1 | Reputation Acquisition in Debt Markets - Chicago, Bus - 1986 |

1 | Theory 27 (August 1982): 253-79. (a) "Sequential Equilibria." Econometrica 50 (July 1982): 863-94. (b) Merton, Robert C. "On the Cost of Deposit Insurance When There Are Surveillance Costs."J - Econ - 1978 |

1 | This content downloaded on Mon, 14 Jan 2013 20:35:23 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions 862 - Paul, Roberts - 1982 |